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Abstract
As in many low- and middle-income countries, out-of-pocket payments by households
account for a large share of health care spending in Lao PDR. These payments can deter
use of services and increase the risk of financial catastrophe and impoverishment.
Consequently, the Government of Laos is attempting to expand health insurance and
. risk-protection coverage through four different schemes. This thesis examined two of
those schemes: community-based health insurance (CBHI) and social health insurance
(SHI). Using a conceptual framework that was developed based on the theoretical and
empirical literature, three sub-studies were designed and implemented to explore: the
determinants of household enrolment in CBHI; the determinants of enrolment of firms in
SHI; and the impacts of CBHI enrolment on utilisation and financial protection.
Data for the CBHI studies were collected using household and village surveys with 3000
households (14,804 individuals) in 87 villages, and six focus group discussions with
members and non-members. In the SHI study, a survey was administered to 130 private
firms. The CBHI and SHI studies employed a cross-sectional, case-comparison design
and used a variety of econometric and qualitative methods in the analysis, including
propensity score matching.
The findings from the two enrolment studies identified various factors that drive and
hinder enrolment in health insurance. The impact evaluation showed that CBHI had a
positive effect on utilisation and financial protection, but given the low coverage of the
scheme and low utilisation, the impacts on a population level are negligible. Moreover,
the poor are the least likely to enrol and the poor who are enrolled incur higher out-of-
pocket expenditures than the uninsured. The policy implications for Laos are discussed
in the context of the international debate regarding the potential contributions of CBHI
and SHI in national health financing strategies as countries progress towards universal
coverage.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Many low- and middle-income countries rely heavily on out-of-pocket payments from
households to finance health care. There is now widespread recognition that out-of-
pocket payments can deter households from seeking health care when needed, and that
those who do seek care may face financial catastrophe and impoverishment (WorId Bank
2004; WHO 201Ob). Given that illness is often unpredictable, households are often
poorly prepared to meet the costs associated with health care. This is especially true for
the poor (Preker et al. 2004; van Doorslaer et al. 2006).
A key question facing all countries is how their health financing systems can promote
access. to services and increase financial protection. This question is particularly
pertinent in the current climate, where countries are striving to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and other development and poverty reduction targets.
Recognising the importance of developing the health financing system, the member
states of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2005, endorsed a resolution
encouraging countries to introduce health financing reforms in order to progress towards
(or maintain) universal coverage of health services. Universal coverage is defined as
"access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for
all at an affordable cost" (WHO 2005). To achieve this goal. many countries are
adopting, or have already adopted, a model of health care that focuses on extending
health insurance and risk-pooling mechanisms to cover the entire population.'
Although there is no blueprint for moving towards universal coverage, many countries
that have successfully expanded coverage have, to some extent, used general taxation,
social health insurance or a mix of both (Carrin et al. 2005a). Given that the move to
universal coverage is a long process, a pluralistic health financing system usually evolves
during the transition period, whereby a mix of health insurance and risk-protection
schemes are targeted at distinct socio-economic groups. Community-based health
1 In this document, the term health insurance includes schemes in which contributions are explicitly linked
to a health insurance fund, as well as schemes whereby fmancing is more implicit, such as in systems
financed by general government revenues.
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insurance (CBHI) and/or other types of voluntary insurance are often introduced to serve
segments of the population that are left uncovered (usually the informal sector).
However, the literature has shown that, with a few exceptions, the vast majority of CBHI
and other voluntary schemes fail to reach a large proportion of their target population,
and in the absence of subsidies most schemes exclude the poor (Bennett et al. 1998;
Ekman 2004; De Allegri et al. 2006b; Schneider and Hanson 2006; Jowett and Hsiao
2007; Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009). In some countries, separate risk-protection
schemes specifically target the poor, with varying success; in others, the poor are left
without coverage.
In Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), out-of-pocket payments by households
accounted for an estimated 62 percent of total health care expenditures in 2007 (WHO
2007). These payments include user fees for services and drugs in public health facilities,
as well as expenditures in the private sector (i.e., pharmacies, clinics, drug vendors,
private providers, and traditional providers), and facilities outside the country (e.g.,
Thailand and Vietnam). As in other countries, the Government of Laos is trying to
expand coverage of health insurance and risk protection schemes in order to increase
access to health services, increase financial protection, and generate resources for the
health sector. The ultimate goal is achievement of universal coverage (MOH Lao PDR
2010). Currently, four main schemes operate in Lao PDR: a mandatory Civil Servants'
Scheme (eSS) for government employees; a mandatory Social Health Insurance (SHI)
scheme for private and state-owned enterprises'; voluntary community-based health
insurance for the informal sector and self-employed workers; and health equity funds
(HEFs)3 for households living in extreme poverty. However, outside the CSS, which
covers approximately 6.3 percent of the population and reaches approximately 90
percent of its target group, the schemes reach a small segment of the population, with
approximately 1.7 percent of the population enrolled in CBHI, 1.S percent enrolled in
SHI and 2.1 percent enrolled in HEFs in 2009. Thus, just over one tenth of the
2 The SHI scheme is part of a larger social security programme that includes a comprehensive package of
health care and other benefits, including medical care, paid sick leave, paid maternity leave, death benefits,
employment injury or occupational disease benefits, retirement pensions, life insurance, and disability
insurance.
3 Health equity funds are social protection schemes in which a third part pays for services on behalf of the
poor. In Laos, HEFs are usually funded by a donor and implemented by NGOs or local health authorities,
which work with the communities to pre-identify the poorest people in the district and provide health cards
to them to obtain free services (Thome and Pholsena 2009).
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population is currently covered by risk-pooling schemes. Although part of the reason for
low coverage of health insurance in the population is that the schemes are not yet
operating nationally, coverage remains low even in areas that have been targeted. The
government is considering various options for scaling up to achieve universal coverage
by 2025.4
Although some of the reasons for low coverage can be inferred from the international
literature and a few small studies in Laos, there has been no systematic attempt to
understand the factors affecting enrolment in health insurance in Laos. Moreover, very
little is known about whether the schemes are meeting the government's objectives of
promoting increased utilisation and financial protection. As the Government of Laos
considers various options for expanding health insurance and progressing towards
universal coverage, a number of key questions require answers. For example, why is
enrolment in CBHI so low after nearly a decade of piloting? What are the factors most
likely to influence whether or not households enrol in CBHI? What has been the impact
ofCBHI on members' utilisation of services and out-of-pocket expenditures? Why do so
few private sector firms enrol in SHI despite the fact that the scheme is mandatory? What
are the opportunities and challenges related to expanding enrolment in health insurance?
What steps can be taken to progress towards universal coverage? These questions
inspired the research design for this thesis and will be addressed in this document.
1.Z Knowledge gaps in the health financing literature
Given the focus on expanding enrolment of health insurance globally, many researchers
have examined the determinants of enrolment in health insurance at the household level
in different country contexts. There has been particular interest in exploring the
determinants of enrolment in CBHI, likely because most CBHI schemes fail to achieve
high coverage rates and therefore understanding the factors affecting enrolment can help
to inform strategies for increasing coverage. For the most part, these studies reach
agreement on the factors affecting enrolment, although findings differ across contexts
4 The relative sizes of the target groups are as follows: civil servants and their dependents account for
approximately 7% of the population; the target group for sm (private sector firms and their dependents)
comprises approximately 8% of the population; CBm targets the informal sector and the unemployed
(approximately S2% of the population), and HEFs serve the poor (approximately 33% of the population).
More details on coverage are given in Chapter 3.
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and the studies show inconsistencies regarding whether or not health status is a
significant determinant.' Moreover, only a few small qualitative studies have examined
the determinants of enrolment in Lao PDR. Country-specific evidence from Laos will
help the government to understand better why enrolment remains so low, and what
factors are likely to facilitate CBHI expansion.
Several studies and systematic reviews examine the impacts of CBHI on utilisation and
out-of-pocket expenditures and there is moderately strong evidence to suggest that CBHI
can increase utilisation of health care among beneficiaries and can reduce out-of-pocket
health care expenditures for its members, although this protection effect may be marginal
(Preker et al. 2002; Ranson 2002; Jowett et al. 2003; Ekman 2004; JUtting 2004b;
Devadasan et al. 2007). However, as noted by systematic reviews, most studies
examining the impact of CBHI suffer from methodological weaknesses (Ekman 2004;
Palmer et al. 2004). One of the main concerns with the studies is the failure to account
adequately for differences in risklhealth status between members and non-members that
leads to selection bias (ILO 2002; Palmer et al. 2004). The broader body of literature on
voluntary health insurance (i.e., schemes not defined as "CBHI") and more recent CBHI
studies use several econometric techniques, including propensity score matching, to
overcome this "selection problem" but good quality impact evaluations of CBHI are still
relatively rare. Moreover, some of the better studies still fail to control for a number of
factors expected to affect selection into insurance.
While a considerably large body of literature examines the household-level determinants
. of enrolment, very little is known about the determinants of firms • enrolment in SHI or
social security. The dearth of research on this topic is mainly due to the mandatory
nature of SHI, which theoretically eliminates the enrolment decision-making process.
However, in reality, most developing countries face difficulty getting the formal sector to
enrol in SHI: compliance is low, enforcement is weak; and several evasion tactics are
commonly used (Bailey and Turner 2001; McGillivray 2001). Therefore, despite the
S Studies from Senegal, Thailands, India and China (Jakab et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2006;
Chankova et al. 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008) found evidence of adverse selection in the schemes, while a
second study from Senegal (JUtting 2004b), and studies from Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and the school health
insurance programme in Vietnam (Nguyen and Knowles 2010) found no relationship between illness and
enrolment.
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mandatory nature of SHI for the formal sector, firms do make a choice to enrol or not to
enrol in insurance, but the literature provides little insight into the determinants of
enrolment at the firm level. Understanding the factors driving enrolment in SHI will
therefore be beneficial to the Government of Lao PDR and governments of other
countries attempting to expand SHI as part of an overall strategy to achieve universal
coverage.
Although specific studies on enrolment and impact evaluations of CBHI and SHI are
important and would help to fill gaps in the health financing literature, there is also a
need for evidence to inform the broader debate regarding the most effective and efficient
approaches to extending coverage, raising revenues, and pooling resources in low-
income, low-capacity environments.
1.3 Purpose and outline of thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to generate new knowledge about the factors affecting
enrolment in health insurance and the impacts of insurance on utilisation and financial
protection. The specific objectives, which will be revisited in Chapter 4, are as follows:
1. To explore the household and village-level determinants and barriers related
to enrolment in CBHI in Lao PDR;
2. To measure the extent to which enrolment in CBHI facilitates access to health
care services and offers financial protection to insured individuals by using a
robust methodological approach;
3. To explore the firm-level determinants and barriers related to enrolment in
social health insurance;
4. To identify the opportunities for, and challenges of, expanding health
insurance to the informal and formal sectors in Lao PDR and internationally.
This thesis is expected to fill gaps in the international health financing literature by
providing country-specific information about the determinants of CBHI enrolment;
adding methodologically robust evidence regarding the impacts of CBHI on access to
health services and financial protection; and generating new evidence about the firm-
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level determinants of enrolment in SHI.6 The evidence generated through this study is
also expected to contribute to the ongoing dialogue regarding options for expanding
health insurance and progressing towards universal coverage in Laos and in other
country settings. Specifically, the thesis informs the debate regarding the effectiveness
and efficiency of using contributory schemes to extend coverage, raise revenues, and
pool resources in low-income, low-capacity environments.
The thesis begins with a literature review on five major topics that are relevant to the
study (Chapter 2). The first section of the literature review summarises the trends in
health financing and the movement towards universal coverage. The second section
covers the theoretical underpinnings of the demand for health and health insurance -
information that is required for conceptualising the decision-making processes' of
enrolling in and using health insurance. A synopsis of the empirical literature on the
determinants and impacts of enrolment in CBHI is given in the third section, along with
a discussion of the methodological limitations of many of the existing CBHI impact
evaluations. The broader body of literature on the impacts of voluntary health insurance
is also brought into this discussion. In the fourth section, literature that offers insight into
the decision of firms to enrol in SHI is presented. The final section focuses on the
programme evaluation literature, and describes various econometric approaches that
have been used to evaluate the impact of social programmes. This understanding was
necessary for guiding the methodology used for one of the sub-studies in the thesis and
for locating the sub-study within the body of empirical research on impact evaluations.
Following the literature review, Chapter 3 presents background information about Laos,
describes the structure and financing of the health care system, and gives an overview of
the schemes studied in this thesis (i.e., CBHI and SHI).
Building upon the literature review and knowledge of the health system and financing
arrangements in Laos, Chapter 4 presents a conceptual framework that highlights how
economic theory and evidence from the empirical literature have shaped the research
questions and methodology of the thesis. Next, the overall methodology is presented,
followed by a description of the specific quantitative and qualitative methods employed
6 SHI is the largest benefit in the social security scheme and is the focus of this study. However, because
SHI is part of a larger social security scheme, the study will actually look at the determinants of enrolment
in social security. The terms "social security" and "srn" will be used interchangeably throughout this
thesis.
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across three sub-studies. For each of the sub-studies, the study design, sampling,
description of the data, and field procedures are presented. The limitations of the study
designs are also discussed.
Three results chapters follow, each of which presents findings from one of the three sub-
studies (Chapters 5 through 7). The first results chapter presents the fmdings from the
first sub-study on the determinants of household-level enrolment in CBHI and also
examines the factors affecting village level enrolment rates. The next results chapter
presents findings about the impact of CBHI on utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures,
source of care, and other outcomes of interest. Next, the findings from the third sub-
study examine the determinants of firm-level enrolment in SHI. Each results chapter
describes the methods used in the analysis, presents the descriptive findings and results,
and discusses the findings in relation to the health financing literature. Although the
policy implications of the study are also highlighted, a more detailed discussion of the
policy implications is reserved for the final chapter. In each results chapter, the
limitations of the analytical approach are discussed, followed by concluding remarks.
The final chapter (Chapter 8) first synthesises the findings from the three results
chapters, summarises the limitations and strengths of the methodology, and discusses the
overall contribution to the literature. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the policy
implications for expanding CBHI and SHI and presents recommendations for expanding
coverage, raising revenues, and pooling resources as Lao PDR progresses towards
universal coverage. Although these recommendations are specific to Laos, the discussion
has relevance for other low- and middle-income countries striving to achieve universal
coverage. The chapter then closes with some recommendations for further research and
concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
There is now widespread recognition that out-of-pocket payments for health care can
have serious consequences on access to services and financial protection for the
uninsured. Consequently, many countries are moving towards a model of health
financing that reduces out-of-pocket expenditures by pooling risks through health
insurance, general revenues, or a combination of approaches. Social health insurance for
the formal sector, community-based health insurance for the informal sector and other
schemes are therefore playing a more prominent role in health financing systems. As
countries attempt to expand health insurance in both the informal and formal sectors,
evidence regarding the determinants of enrolment and the impacts of the scheme on
access to care and financial protection will help to identify strategies to strengthen and
expand the schemes, and will help governments understand the extent to which health
insurance is offering protection to their citizens.
Before undertaking a study on enrolment in and impact of health insurance, it was
necessary to understand the overall health financing context in which health insurance
schemes operate, as well as the theoretical frameworks that explain the demand for
health care and health insurance. A review of the empirical literature on both CBHI and
SHI was also important in identifying the gaps in the literature and informing the study
design. Finally, knowledge of econometric techniques that can help to reduce selection
bias in programme evaluations was required for one sub-study in this thesis, and
therefore the programme evaluation literature was reviewed. After describing the
methodology used for the literature review (Section 2.2), the findings are presented:
section 2.3 examines the trends in health financing and approaches taken to progress
towards universal coverage; section 2.4 considers the theories that explain the demand
for health care and health insurance; Section 2.5 and 2.6 explore the empirical literature
on CBHI and SHI, respectively; and Section 2.7 reviews the programme evaluation
literature. Finally, section 2.8 discusses the relevance of the literature, highlights the
knowledge gaps and limitations identified by the review, and explains how these gaps
and limitations have shaped the research questions addressed in this thesis.
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2.2 Methodology
Various approaches were used for identifying the relevant literature. Several keywords,
titles, and subject headings were used to search the following databases: PubMed,
Embase, Econlit, and lSI Web of Science. Published and unpublished literature from
Google Scholar was also searched. The searches were limited to articles published in
English but no specific time limits were imposed.
Search terms:
• "Community based health insurance" or "community health insurance". All
retrieved records were reviewed to identify articles that were related to
enrolment, willingness to join, willingness to pay, and impacts on several
different outcomes, including utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures, and equity.
• "Social health insurance" and "social security" and "employer-based
insurance" and "private insurance", combined with ("developing countries" or
"low income countries" or "middle income countries ").
• "Social security" combined with ("compliance" or "evasion ").
• "Health insurance" and "universal coverage" and ("developing countries" or
"low income countries" or "middle income countries '').
• "Evaluation" combined with "selection bias" or "econometric" or "propensity
score matching".
Following the electronic searches, reference lists of all selected papers (including several
systematic reviews on CBHI and reviews on econometric methods for programme
evaluation) were checked manually to identify additional relevant papers. Health
economics text-books and materials from health economics and health policy courses at
LSHTM and London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) were also
reviewed to better understand demand theory, while materials from a policy evaluation
course at University College London provided useful summaries of various econometric
techniques that can be used to reduce selection bias in programme evaluations. The
World Bank, WHO, ILO and USAID-funded Partnerships for Health Care Reform Plus
(PHRPlus) websites, the University Senate House library, and the World Bank online
library, were also important sources for various aspects of the review.
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2.3 Trends in Health Financing
2.3.1 Trends in health financing and the goal ofuniverso! coverage
Many developing countries have relied heavily on households' out-of-pocket payments
to finance their health care systems. These payments are to some extent a consequence of
health sector reforms in the late 1980s, which focused on promoting user fees for public
health services and increasing the role of the private sector in health care provision
(McIntyre et al. 2006). Although many countries are considering a shift away from user
fees, or have already done so, the burden of health care payments continues to fall on
individuals. However, there is now widespread recognition that out-of-pocket payments
contribute to low utilisation of health care and substantial financial barriers (Xu 2002;
James et al. 2006; McIntyre et al. 2006; Meessen et al. 2006; van Doorslaer et al. 2007),
and that health insurance and other risk-pooling schemes can contribute to achievement
of broader development and poverty red~ction goals.' As a result, many countries have
focused efforts on extending health insurance coverage to the entire population.
In 2005, the Member States of WHO adopted a resolution encouraging countries to
develop their health financing systems in order to progress towards (or maintain)
universal coverage of health services. Universal coverage in the health sector is defined
as "access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions
for all at an affordable cost" (WHO 2005). The movement towards universal coverage is
not only being undertaken in developing countries: many middle-income countries are
grappling with the best way to extend coverage to their population and policymakers in
the US are in an active debate over how to (or whether or not to) provide coverage to
approximately 50 million uninsured people. This movement towards universal coverage
has been driven by the awareness that improved access to health care and protection
against losses due to illness and unforeseen medical expenditures can make a positive
contribution to a country's social and economic development (Mills 1998). Moreover,
many countries recognise affordable access to health care as a fundamental human right
that should not be denied (Garrett et al. 2009). To achieve universal coverage,
international agencies and donors are currently supporting governments in low- and
7 Developing prepayment and risk-pooling schemes facilitates achievement of the MOOs by preventing
medical-related impoverishment and increasing access for all (including women, children, people living
with mV/AIDS, etc.).
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middle-income countries in the development of prepayment and risk-pooling schemes,
the path taken by most countries that have come close to achieving universal coverage
(WHO 2005; Carrin et al. 2008; WHO 2010b). As noted in the 2010 World Health
Report, it is only through risk-pooling and prepayment that the goal of universal
coverage can be achieved (WHO 201Ob).
2.3.2 Approaches to extending coverage: SHI vs. taxation
Most countries that have achieved universal coverage have done so over a period of
several decades, using either taxation or SHI as the principle mode of financing (Carrin
and James 2004), although several countries have used a mix of approaches, especially
more recently. The tax-based system (the Beveridge model) uses general government
revenue to pay for health services. In contrast, SHI (the Bismarck model) uses mandatory
payroll contributions from formal sector workers, with contributions shared by
employees and employers and contributions earmarked for health care services
(Nitayarumphong 1998). Although traditionally SHI has covered formal sector workers,
it has also been extended to cover the informal sector in several countries using various
models (discussed below). In a system that is entirely tax-financed, all members of the
population receive a common level of coverage, usually under a single delivery system.
Service delivery for SHI can be offered in the same system as thos~ who are not covered,
or in separate systems (as in many Latin American countries)(Wagstaff 20IOb).
However, both taxation and SHI models share the following common features: 1)
payments are compulsory and are usually set according to income; 2) people contribute
whether or not they are ill (although people on very low incomes or other vulnerable
groups may be exempted from SHI); and 3) low-risk individuals are not permitted to opt-
out of the scheme, thereby increasing risk-pooling from the healthy to the sick (Carrin et
al.2008).
Both SHI and taxation have merits and demerits and a country's decision about which to
implement will depend on economic, social and political factors. Wagstaff suggests that
the choice between the models influences the extent to which a health system can carry
out its three functions: collecting revenues; pooling revenues across different groups; and
purchasing health care services (Wagstaff 2010b). The evidence suggests that taxation
performs relatively better in achieving high coverage rates (and larger risk pools) and
that universal coverage can be achieved relatively faster through a system financed
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through general tax revenues (Wagstaff 2009). However, in many low- and middle-
income countries, especially in South-East Asia, a model based on SHI is more
commonly implemented. The drawbacks of a mandated SHI are that even when it covers
its target population, it leaves the informal sector - which is often a substantial
proportion of the workforce in developing countries - uninsured (Bennett et al. 1998;
Carrin et al. 2005b). Evidence also suggests that SHI, relative to systems funded out of
general revenues, result in higher per capita total health expenditures (Wagstaff 2009).
Although taxation also has its disadvantages, implementation of SHI creates challenges
in low- and middle- income countries due to a small formal sector, a predominantly rural
population, low technical capacity to administer schemes, and weak regulatory capacity
(Carrin and James 2004), which leads to high rates of evasion and therefore loss of
revenues (Wagstaff 20 1Ob).
2.3.3 Extending coverage to the informal sector and the poor: country
experiences
The transition to universal coverage is gradual and a large share of the population usually
remains uncovered during the transition period. For example, in systems where SHI
dominates, the formal sector is usually covered first (with or without dependents) and
coverage is then gradually expanded to other groups (Carrin et al. 2008). One of the most
pressing challenges in extending coverage of health insurance is reaching the informal
sector. Informal sector workers are difficult to identify, do not have formal employer-
employee relationships that are conducive to collecting contributions (either through
social security or taxation), and many have irregular incomes that lead to defaults on
contributions. Although countries are still grappling with how to expand coverage to this
"hard-to-reach" population, various mechanisms have become somewhat
institutionalised and offer some important lessons.
One approach to targeting the informal sector has been through the extension of SHI.
Vietnam and the Philippines have extended SHI to this group on a voluntary basis, while
the poor are covered through general taxation," In Vietnam, the voluntary SHI scheme
targets not only the non-poor informal sector, but also students and family members of
formal sector workers. As with many voluntary schemes, coverage rates have been low
8 Colombia has a similar programme except that enrolment for the non-poor is mandatory. However,
evasion of contributions remains a problem (Pinto and Hsiao 2007).
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under this model, with the exception of school children in Vietnam, whose enrolment is
practically mandatory" (Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009). Moreover, adverse selection in
both countries is generally a problem among this population (Banzon 2009; Wagstaff
20 IOb). Both countries have made more progress covering the poor through general
revenues, with 66 percent of the target group covered in 2004 in the Philippines (Jowett
and Hsiao 2007) and 75 percent of the poor covered in Vietnam in 2009 (Lieberman and
Wagstaff 2009). However, there are inclusion and exclusion problems with this targeting
approach: many households fail to apply for the scheme while government revenues are
often leaked to the non-poor (Wagstaff 20 IOb).
Another approach to covering the informal sector is through a separate subsidised, health
insurance scheme that exists alongside the formal sector. For example, in the
government's Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) in China, the non-poor
informal sector pay subsidised flat-rate contributions while the poor are covered by
general revenues. China has achieved high levels of coverage (approximately 80 percent)
through the RCMS. However, adverse selection and shallow coverage remain
problematic (Wagstaff et al. 2009). InMexico's Seguro Popular scheme, the premiums
for the non-poor are subsidised on a sliding scale (according to ability to pay) and the
poorest 20 percent of the population are fully subsidised by a mix of federal and state
taxes (Frenk et al. 2006).
In an effort to circumvent political, organisational, and economic barriers, CBHI has
been introduced to provide coverage for the informal sector. CBHI is increasingly
recognised as an important component of a national health financing strategy, although
there is disagreement over whether or not it can facilitate the transition to universal
coverage (WHO 2001; Carrin et al. 2005b). The vast majority of schemes fail to reach
the poor and fail to achieve high coverage, leading to meagre levels of risk-pooling and
low sustainability of schemes (Bennett et al. 1998; WHO 2001; Bennett 2004; Ekman
2004; Carrin et al. 2005b). However, it is likely that during the transition to universal
coverage, CBHI, implemented alongside other schemes, holds some promise by serving
the informal sector that is not easily reached by formal insurance schemes. Rwanda is
perhaps the most-widely cited example of a country that has achieved relatively high
9 Insurance agents market various schemes at schools and colleges and enrol students in groups:
approximately three quarters of the target group are now insured.
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coverage through a voluntary CBHI scheme. (The scheme became mandatory in 2007
but even prior to the mandatory law, much progress had been made in increasing
coverage). The success in Rwanda can be largely attributed to strong financial backing
(e.g., linkages with donors, microfinance institutions and formal health insurance
schemes), which has provided sufficient subsidies to stimulate uptake of insurance by the
poor and allow gradual expansion of the benefit package (Diop et al. 2007). With this
support,mutuelle/o have been able to focus on their goals of achieving equity and high
coverage levels without the pressure of being self-sustainable. Government stewardship
of expansion has also been strong. In 2004 a national policy for mutuelles was adopted
and expansion of mutuelles has been a key element in poverty reduction strategies. This
focused policy framework has allowed donor funding to be channelled to the mutuelle
programme and has strengthened the entire health system (Logie et al. 2008; De Allegri
et al. 2009). Other factors affecting successful scale-up include a focus on primary health
care and cost-containment.
Ghana has also had considerable success implementing CBHI: according to one estimate,
coverage reached 55 percent by 2009 (Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011). However, until the
launch of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which introduced CBHI
schemes in every district and made the scheme mandatory by law, CBHI schemes
operated on a very small scale and were highly fragmented in that there was no risk-
pooling or coordination across schemes. The NHIS represents a concerted effort to
achieve universal coverage and this effort is backed by political stewardship and
government (and donor) financial backing. Between 2004 and 2006 the health sector
share of the budget increased from 8.2 percent to 15 percent (McIntyre et al. 2008). The
Ghanaian CBHI schemes function at the district level and are managed by the National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) at the central level. The NHIF provides a re-insurance
mechanism for district schemes, which consists of both cross-subsidies from the civil
servants' social security fund and government subsidies to cover the premiums of the
poor and vulnerable groups. However, introducing risk-equalisation measures between
districts would help to increase risk-pooling (McIntyre et al. 2008). Despite the progress
10 In Francophone Africa the term "Mutuelle de Sante II or simply "mutuelles" is the equivalent of Mutual
Health Organisation - a synonym for CBHI.
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in Ghana, there have been challenges in getting the poor to enrol (Jehu-Appiah et al.
2011) and cost-escalation is a concern (Soors et al. 2010).11
Even though in most countries CBHI fails to achieve high coverage rates, when
implemented alongside other schemes CBHI can serve as a stepping stone to achieving
universal coverage. This is no more apparent than in Thailand where CBHI served the
informal sector for decades and over time was able to bring about relatively high
coverage rates (but only after government subsidies were introduced). However,
problems due to adverse selection and low financial viability persisted (Supakankunti
2000). As part of a larger agenda to achieve universal coverage, the scheme was
eventually rolled into a tax-financed scheme that covers the informal sector, the poor,
and those not covered by formal sector schemes (See Section 2.3.4).
In summary, there are a number of approaches for covering the population outside the
formal sector during the transition to universal coverage. Figure 2.1 shows how the
health financing typically evolves during this transition.
Figure 2.1 Health financing options during the transition to universal coverage
Universal
coverage
Tax-based financing
Social health insurance
~ Mix of tax-based and
~ social health insurance
'I,-me-rm--ed-'-"'--atag-ea-=-of-c-o-ve-,.-g---'. t
. ~ Mixes of community-,
~ cooperative- and enterprise-
r----=~..., based health insurance
Absence and other private insurance,
of financial I social health insurance-type
protection coverage for specific groups
and limited tax-based financing
Health expenditure
dominated by
out-ot-pocket spending Source: (Carrin et al. 2005a)
II The experience of Ghana discussed in this review is based on evidence from the published literature
prior to March 2011. However, a recent report by Oxfam suggests that coverage of the National Health
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) has been exaggerated and could be as low as 18% (Oxfam International201I).
This report has caused much controversy over the reported success in Ghana, although the quality and
reliability of the evidence used in the Oxfam report is yet to be determined.
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2.3.4 Achieving universal coverage through a pluralistic financing system: the
experience o/Thailand
Targeting distinct populations through different schemes has become more commonplace
as countries strive to increase coverage across groups that generally differ by
socioeconomic status. Thailand is one of the only lower middle income countries to have
achieved universal coverage of health care and did so using a pluralistic financing
approach. The first two schemes to exist in Thailand were the government schemes: the
tax-financed Medical Welfare Scheme (the Low-Income Scheme) for low-income
people, and the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) for government
workers and their families (Hanvoravongchai and Hsiao 2007). The voluntary scheme
was introduced in 1983, and went through several reforms over a period of two decades.
In the early 1990s, a separate social security scheme was successfully introduced to
cover employees in the formal private sector, using a mix of employee, employer and
government contributions (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2004). However, even with these
four schemes in place in 2001, a substantial share of the population remained uninsured
and targeting problems were evident in the Low-Income Scheme (due to both inclusion
and exclusion problems). The informal sector, which is largely engaged in agricultural
production, did not have regular cash income for premium payments. Moreover,
enforcing compliance among the informal sector was projected to be difficult and
expensive (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). Thus, the government created the
"Universal Coverage" (UC) scheme, also known as the "30 Baht Scheme,,12, which
brought beneficiaries of the Voluntary Health Card, the Low-Income Scheme and the 30
percent of the population that was uninsured, under one mandatory scheme that is
financed through taxation. The UC scheme has been shown to be equitable,
administratively more efficient than the old system, and sustainable for the long term.
Together with the SHI and the CSMBS schemes, almost all Thai citizens are now
covered by health insurance and the scheme has been shown to provide financial
protection, reduce the incidence of catastrophic expenditures, and improve equity
between the poor and the rich (Prakongsai et al. 2009).
12 The scheme was known as the 30 Baht scheme because beneficiaries who are non-poor and non-elderly
pay a fixed user fee of 30 Thai baht (USUSO.86) for each visit or admission (Towse et al. 2004). However,
the initial co-payment of 30 baht per visit or admission was discontinued in 2006 and there is no longer a
deductible, nor a ceiling on coverage (Prakongsai et al. 2009).
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The experience of gradually bringing together different insurance schemes under one
universal coverage policy is not unique to the countries covered in this review. In a
review of other countries in Asia that achieved universal coverage earlier on, Mills notes
that Japan, Korea and Taiwan all used multiple schemes but that over time, different
schemes were standardised and eventually brought under one umbrella (Mills 1998). In
contrast to a single health insurance fund, this "piecemeal" approach can be effective in
reaching distinct population groups, when the strategy for increasing coverage is well
articulated through a cohesive strategy and guided by political stewardship at the central
government level, as was done in Thailand. However, McIntyre et al (2008) warn that in
trying to achieve universal coverage, the schemes not become fragmented: the size of the
risk pools should be maximised, and strong income and risk-equalisation mechanisms
should be introduced within the overall system. Moreover, many low-income countries
will be unable to finance expansions in coverage unless investments to the health sector
are increased dramatically. In most countries, there is scope for increasing government
funding to the health sector - a sector that is usually underfunded. This can be achieved
by increasing the percentage of funds allocated to the Ministry of Health, and by raising
revenues through innovative financing mechanisms, such as value-added taxes or excise
taxes and insurance premiums (WHO 201Ob). However, in the poorest countries
increases in external donor funding (both in the amount and the predictability of
funding), will be needed to supplement resources raised domestically (Carrin et al. 2008;
WHO 2010b).
To achieve universal coverage, a myriad of conditions are required. While there is no
blueprint for moving towards greater health insurance coverage, it is clear that ensuring
political stewardship, increasing investments in the health sector (to subsidise premiums
and improve the quality and supply of health care), harmonising schemes, implementing
risk-equalisation mechanisms and cross-subsidies, increasing efficiencies, and mandating
coverage (or subsidising coverage through taxation), all have important roles to play.
The path chosen will depend on the country context and the existing systems, but
regardless of the approach, countries need to recognise the trade-offs of increasing
coverage across the following three areas: the breadth of coverage (the proportion of the
population covered by insurance schemes); the depth of coverage (the overall benefit
package that is covered); and the height of coverage (the level of financial protection)
(WHO 20IOb).
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2.4 Theoretical underpinnings of the demand for health care and health
insurance
2.4.1 The demand for health care
Health care helps individuals achieve or maintain a desired health status. Thus, the
demand for health care is derived from the demand for health (Grossman, 1972).
Grossman used the Human Capital Theory to explain the demand for health and health
care, proposing that health is both an investment good (individuals invest in themselves
through health care, healthy behaviour, and education, as a way of producing good
health), and a consumption good (good health increases productivity, lifetime earnings,
and time spent in activities that maximise utility) (Grossman 1972). Consumers invest in
health by utilising medical care, but also through diet, exercise, and time: these
investments help to maintain or improve the consumers' health stock, which provides
individuals with "good health" (Folland et al. 2007).
Like other commodities, health care is considered a "normal good" with a positive
income elasticity of demand, explaining why the poor are less likely to use health
services. However, this theory assumes that consumers have perfect information when in
reality, individuals cannot predict the timing of illness, future health care, or the financial
implications of illness. Insurance reduces this uncertainty by protecting against
unforeseen losses and expenditures (Folland et al. 2007).
2.4.2 The demand for health insurance
The demand for health insurance is often explained using theories of decision-making
under uncertainty, with expected utility (EU) theory being the most common (Marquis
and Holmer 1996). According to this theory, individuals maximise utility by reducing
financial uncertainty and risk caused by possible illness and/or medical expenditures.
Thus, in deciding whether or not to enrol, households weigh the expected utility of
having health insurance with the expected utility of not having insurance. If the expected
utility to be derived from enrolling is higher than that derived from not enrolling, the
household will opt to enrol (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). Given the uncertainty of
health care needs in the future, risk-averse individuals (or households) will be more
likely to enrol in health insurance due to the desire to protect themselves from
unforeseen health-related financial loss in the future (Arrow 1963). Insurance also lowers
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the price of health care at the point of use, resulting in a higher demand for health care
for the insured relative to the uninsured, all other factors being equal.
Despite its wide application, authors have criticised EU theory for failing to account for
the association between income and insurance choice (Schneider 2004), societal context
(Schoemaker 1982), expected pay-offs of insurance (Manning and Marquis 1996), the
status quo bias (Salkeld et al. 2000), prospects of gains or losses (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979; Marquis and Holmer 1996), and the long-term implications of risk
management (Dercon 2004). Most of these theories are summarised by Schneider
(2004b), who explains that theories other than EU may explain better the demand for
health insurance in low-income contexts and among the poor. For example, the theory of
expected pay-offs (Manning and Marquis 1996) suggests that households will insure only
if they perceive the benefits of enrolment to be higher than the costs, relative to being
uninsured. However, the expected benefits are assessed not in terms of risk but in terms
of the advantages of being enrolled, i.e., access to better quality care, reduced waiting
times, lower costs of care, etc. (Schneider 2004). If individuals are uncertain about
whether or not insurance will bring about these better outcomes, they will fail to insure.
In addition, the status quo bias suggests that consumers prefer the status quo to
something new and unknown, especially when alternatives become more complicated
(Salkeld et al. 2000). This theory suggests that the decision for poor and illiterate groups
to enrol may be influenced by the extent to which these groups have clear information
about a health insurance scheme, especially if the concept of insurance is new (Schneider
2004).
The poverty literature explains that households are expected to become more risk averse
as they move closer to poverty. In this situation, individuals may become risk-averse to
"risky investments" that could push them into - or further into - poverty. The decision
to enrol will also depend on differences in the ability to finance insurance, the relative
values of current or future protection, and the ability to smooth consumption in the face
of unexpected illness (e.g., by selling assets, borrowing, accessing savings, diversifying
income etc.) (Wagstaff 2000; Schneider 2004). Moreover, Dercon (2007) notes that
insurance is a difficult concept to grasp and that purchasing insurance may actually
increase uncertainty in low-income contexts. The upfront costs of insurance may also
explain the reluctance of the poor to insure (Dercon 2007).
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2.4.3 Distortions in the health care market: asymmetries of information
One of the biggest concerns about voluntary health insurance is adverse selection.
Adverse selection results from asymmetric information with regard to individuals' need
for health services because individuals often have better information about their health
status and expected need for services than do insurers. This asymmetry of information
leads individuals with high-risk characteristics (e.g., chronic illness) to enrol in health
insurance at a given premium when they have a known future need for health care
services (Folland et al. 2007). If premiums are not risk-rated, but are rather priced to
cover the cost of the average household, a disproportionate number of ill members in a
scheme will drive up the cost of premiums over time and can result in healthier
individuals leaving the scheme (because their expected utility with insurance becomes
less than the expected utility without insurance). Given that the objective of insurance is
to pool risks - allowing transfers from healthy to sick members and from wealthier to
poorer members - adverse selection can lead to inadequate risk pooling and can
threaten the financial viability of an insurance scheme (Morris et al. 2007). Approaches
that minimise adverse selection include risk-rated premiums (mainly in high income
countries), household or group enrolment, minimum coverage requirements, waiting
periods, exclusions for pre-existing conditions, and mandatory enrolment.
The second problem stemming from asymmetric information is moral hazard. This
arises because health insurance weakens the price effect of health care, thereby changing
the demand for health care. Although the insurance effect has positive consequences in
that it increases access and provides financial protection, insurance can also lead to
changes in incentives on the demand and supply side that result in excess use of services
(Morris et al. 2007). This occurs because with the protection of insurance, individuals
increase consumption levels beyond that which would prevail if they faced the full cost
of their consumption (McGuire et al. 1989). Given that increased consumption of health
services is a desirable policy objective in many developing countries, some authors argue
that an optimal amount of moral hazard can have positive efficiency gains when it
increases the quantity of care consumed (Nyman 1999; Zweifel and Manning 2000;
Jowett et al. 2004).
A third distortion caused by asymmetric information is due to the principal-agent
relationship (Arrow 1963). Physicians, who have informational advantages about a
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patient's need for health services, act as agents on behalf of insured patients and in this
respect can influence the amount and type of health care used by the patient. Depending
on the mode of reimbursement to the physician, the physician may have an incentive to
induce demand for a higher volume of services and more expensive care. This
phenomenon is referred to as supplier-induced demand (Folland et al. 2007).
2.5 Review of empirical literature on CBUI
Before reviewing the CBHI literature, the definition of CBHI should be clarified.
Community-based health insurance is also referred to as community health insurance
(CHI), and to a lesser extent as Mutual Health Organisations (MHOs) or mutuelles de
sante in French. The term CBHI is used throughout this thesis. Although the term CBHI
encompasses a variety of models, Soors et al (2010) in a WHO report explain that CBHI
schemes usually share the following five features: 1) risk-pooling at the level where the
schemes are organised by and for individuals who share common characteristics; 2)
solidarity: premiums are independent of individual or household health risks (and are
usually flat-rate); 3) participatory decision-making and management; 4) non-profit
character; and 5) voluntary affiliation. The non-profit nature differentiates CBHI from
private voluntary health insurance, whereas the other five characteristics differentiate
CBHI from SHI, which is also non-profit in nature. However, the authors of the WHO
report note that in practice, not all CBHI schemes are consistent with these five
principles. For example, schemes organised by the government within an overarching
strategy towards universal coverage may maintain voluntary affiliation, as in Laos, or
may opt for mandatory enrolment, as in Ghana and Rwanda (Soors et al. 2010). Given
that CBHI and voluntary insurance fall along a continuum and share several common
features, this CBHI literature review incorporates, where appropriate, voluntary
insurance schemes that are not specifically identified as "CBHI".
2.5.1 Enrolment in CBHl
The problem of low enrolment in community based health insurance has been a topic of
policy debates for decades. In an effort to understand these low enrolment levels, several
studies have examined the factors affecting enrolment, either to understand enrolment on
its own or as part of a larger impact evaluation within which factors affecting enrolment
need to be measured to reduce bias in impact findings. Although the majority of studies
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have been conducted on mainly small-scale CBHI schemes in sub-Saharan Africa, there
are numerous studies on enrolment from larger schemes in Asia. Many of these studies
use econometric analysis and identify the following as determinants of enrolment: higher
education of the household head; better access to social networks; religious affiliation;
ethnicity; favourable perceptions related to scheme factors (e.g., benefits and
convenience of scheme administration, location and timeliness of collection); a higher
proportion of children in the household; living in a female-headed household; and
distance to the health facility (JUtting 2003; Schneider and Diop 2004; De AUegri et al.
2006a; Chankova et al. 2008; Gnawali et al. 2009; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011). However,
the association between socioeconomic status and enrolment - which indicates equality
of the schemes - is inconsistent across studies: some studies show no significant
difference in enrolment between the poor and the wealthiest group (Schneider and Diop
2001; Polonsky et al. 2009), while others find that the poor are significantly less likely to
enrol (Bennett et al. 1998; Ekman 2004; Gnawali et al. 2009; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011).
The demand for CBHI is also positively associated with higher perceptions of quality of
care (Dong et al. 2009; Gnawali et al. 2009; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011).
Although illness is expected to influence enrolment in insurance, the evidence regarding
this relationship is mixed. Studies from Senegal, Thailandr', India and China found
evidence of adverse selection in the schemes (Jakab et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2005; Wang
et al. 2006; Chankova et al. 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008), while a second study from
Senegal (JUtting 2004b), and studies from Burkina Faso (De AUegri et al. 2006a),
Rwanda (Schneider and Diop 2001), Ghana" (Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011), and the school
health insurance programme in Vietnam (Nguyen and Knowles 20 I0) found no
relationship between illness and enrolment. Some of the inconsistent findings on the
relationship between enrolment and health status are likely to stem, at least in part, from
differences in measurement. For example, there is wide variation in the indicators used to
measure health status. Moreover, some indicators may not adequately capture variation
in health status or may not serve as valid measures. Of course, details of the schemes can
also determine whether adverse selection is a determinant of enrolment. For example, in
13 The evaluation of the Thailand scheme was conducted when Thailand had a community-based scheme.
14 The Ghana study found a positive association between ill health and current enrolment in the third
income quintile only but not overall; the study also found a positive association between ill health and
previous enrolment in the first and second income quintiles.
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some countries the requirement to enrol all household members or impose a waiting
time may prevent or minimise adverse selection (Atim 1998).
In addition to using econometric methods to understand enrolment, other studies have
used contingent valuation to estimate the demand for health insurance as a function of
premiums, subsidies, copayments, economic status, geographic location, and other
factors (Dong et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2006; Ying et al. 2007; Onwujekwe et al. 201Oa).
Qualitative studies have also allowed researchers to move beyond identification of the
characteristics associated with enrolment to reach an in-depth understanding of the
features of the scheme design and management and the ways in which these influence
enrolment. Focus group discussions in Burkina Faso, Uganda and Nigeria revealed that
affordability of premiums, technical arrangements of the scheme (e.g., unit of
membership, attractiveness of benefit package), timing and frequency of premium
collection, community involvement, and understanding of the concepts of CBHI are
important factors affecting enrolment (De Allegri et al. 2006b; De Allegri et al. 2006c;
Basaza et al. 2007; Basaza et al. 2008; Onwujekwe et al. 201Ob). Another qualitative
study from Guinea-Conakry found that failure to understand the concepts and principles
underlying insurance was not a factor affecting enrolment (Criel and Waelkens 2003).
Poor quality of care (Criel and Waelkens 2003; Basaza et al. 2008; Mathauer et al. 2008)
and limited trust in the management of the scheme (Schneider 2005; Basaza et al. 2007;
Mathauer et al. 2008; Ozawa and Walker 2009) were also noted as reasons for low
enrolment in Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and Cambodia, underscoring the importance of
supply-side factors - both within the health system and within the scheme - in
determining whether or not a household will purchase insurance.
Given that enrolment decisions tend to vary by scheme and across contexts,
understanding the factors affecting enrolment in a particular CBHI .scheme requires
country-specific evidence. In Lao PDR, only a few small qualitative studies have
investigated the factors affecting enrolment (IHPP and NIOPH 2007; Burnet Institute
2008). One study found that people are willing to pay for a mandatory health tax, but
would be unlikely to join a voluntary CBHI scheme if they were healthy
(Patcharanarumol 2008). Another study found that community factors are the strongest
drivers of enrolment: where village leaders are supportive of schemes others are willing
to enrol (Jacobs 2007). A third qualitative study in Vientiane province cites a number of
reasons for non-enrolment: poor understanding of the concept of health insurance, poor
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information about CBHI scheme details (i.e., where to make payments, benefit package,
etc.), lack of confidence in the scheme, poor geographical access to health services, and
poor quality of care in government services (Burnet Institute 2008). However, many
questions about the reasons that households enrol, or do not enrol, in CBHI remain
unanswered.
2.5.2 The impacts of CBHIand voluntary insurance on utilisation and financial
protection
This section of the review first presents a summary of findings and then describes the
evaluation approaches.
Summary of the findings
Several systematic reviews examine the impact of CBHI on utilisation and financial
protection (Atim 1998; Bennett et al. 1998; Jakab and Krishnan 2001; ILO 2002; Preker
et al. 2002; Ekman 2004; Palmer et al. 2004; Carrin et al. 2005b). The evidence suggests
that CBHI increases utilisation of health care among beneficiaries IS (Ekman 2004;
Gnawali et al. 2009; Aggarwal 2010). This is particularly important in developing
countries because CBHI can increase access to modem care and therefore help to change
health-seeking behaviour (Schneider and Diop 2001). There is also evidence that CBHI
can reduce out-of-pocket health care expenditures for its members, although this
protection effect may be marginal (Preker et al. 2002; Ranson 2002; Jowett et al. 2003;
Ekman 2004; JUtting 2004b; Devadasan et al. 2007). Another study from India found
that although out-of-pocket expenditures overall are not lower for the insured relative to
the uninsured, the extent of borrowing and selling assets is significantly lower among the
insured, indicating financial protection (Aggarwal 2010). In contrast, out-of-pocket
payments were found to be higher among the insured in urban areas of China (but no
significant difference was found between the insured and uninsured in rural areas). This
lack of financial protection in China is likely due to restrictive benefit packages, high
co-payments, supplier-induced demand (as a result of fee-for-service plans) and a
IS A study from Burkina Faso found that the number of outpatient visits in insured households was 40%
higher than among the uninsured but this difference was only significant among the highest quintile. There
was no significant difference in utilisation of inpatient visits between the insured and uninsured (Gnawali
et al. 2009).
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demand for expensive care among the insured (Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; Wagstaff
et al. 2009).
Despite the protection effect for its members in most settings, the vast majority of CBHI
schemes fail to reach a large proportion of their target population, and in the absence of
subsidies most schemes exclude the poor (Bennett et al. 1998; Ekman 2004; De Allegri
et al. 2006b; Schneider and Hanson 2006). There is also evidence that the increased
access brought about by health insurance in developing countries may not be uniform
due to other "costs" of using care: barriers due to distance to facilities (Bennett et al.
1998; Criel et al. 1999; Ranson et al. 2006; Sinha et al. 2006); features of the scheme
design (Ranson et al. 2006; Sinha et al. 2006); transportation costs (Ranson et al. 2006);
poor quality of care (Ekman 2004); and restrictions on benefit packages limit both
utilisation and financial protection (Ranson 2002; Devadasan et al. 2007).
Summary of approaches
As noted by systematic reviews, most studies examining the impact of CBHI suffer from
methodological weaknesses (ILO 2002; Ekman 2004; Palmer et al. 2004). Some
common criticisms of reviews are the small sample sizes, lack of baseline data or time-
series data, weak data sources, limited use of control groups, and the failure to control
for confounding variables and selection bias. Moreover, many evaluations are based on
pilot projects and/or schemes with very few members, thereby limiting the external
validity of findings (ILO 2002; Palmer et al. 2004). However, since these reviews were
conducted, the quality of the literature has improved, due to a few methodologically
robust studies. Moreover, when the larger body of literature on voluntary health
insurance is considered, the quality of the evidence increases substantially.
One of the main concerns of CBHI studies with respect to selection bias is the failure to
adequately account for differences in risklhealth status between members and non-
members (ILO 2002; Palmer et al. 2004). People with a greater need for health services
are more likely to self-select into an insurance scheme, creating a positive correlation
between insurance status and out-of-pocket health expenditures. This need is not usually
observed and is a latent variable; the latent variable produces selection into insurance as
well as affecting the outcome of interest, while the entry into insurance is affected by
anticipated benefits from insurance. Thus, measuring the impact of insurance on a
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specific outcome of interest (e.g., utilisation) must take into account that the outcome
and the variable capturing enrolment status into insurance may be endogenous.
The broader literature on voluntary health insurance is of much higher quality than the
CBHI literature. Recognition of the selection problem has shaped much of this literature.
Authors address the selection problem using two-part models (Waters 1999; Yip and
Berman 2001; Wang et al. 2005); instrumental variable (IV) methods (Galarraga et al.
2010), IV models combined with fixed effects (Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008); and the
Heckman selection model (Jowett et al. 2003). Propensity score matching (PSM) has
also been used in the voluntary health insurance literature as well as in some more recent
CBHI studies and these studies are discussed below. While these econometric studies
represent an improvement over the (older) CBHI literature there are still methodological
limitations. First, most of these studies are conducted using secondary data and therefore
a number of variables expected to influence enrolment in insurance are not observed.
Thus, most studies control for health status but with a limited set of variables (usually
self-assessed health status)." Moreover, few studies control for preferences for different
types of care, resulting in selection bias. Third, most studies conducted using IVs assume
that the instruments are valid (many without offering theoretical justifications or proper
statistical tests), and that unobserved heterogeneity has been accounted for in the analysis
(Deaton 2010; Wagstaff 20 lOa).
More recently, authors examining the impacts of voluntary health insurance (and more
recently CBHI) on utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures (and health status") have used
propensity score matching (PSM). This method was pioneered by Rubin and Rosenbaum
(1983) and has been used to evaluate the impact of a range of social programmes
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Guo et al. 2006), including job training programmes
(Heckman et al. 1997 ; Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Purdon 2002; Smith and Todd 2005),
medical trials (Reeve et al. 2008), education programmes (Blundell 2005), health
interventions (Jalan and Ravallion 2003) and health insurance schemes (Trujillo et al.
16 Self-assessed health status is usually the variable of choice for these studies, and although there is
evidence of a strong correlation between self-perceived health status and other more objective measures
(Wang et al. 2009), this variable may fail to capture variation in health status within the sample. O'Donnell
et al. (2008) recommend using measures from three categories (i.e., medical, functional, and subjective) to
obtain a better picture of the distribution of health in a sample population.
17 Health status was not an observed outcome in this thesis but the methodology of these studies is relevant
to this review.
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2005; Wagstaff 2007; Wagstaff and Yu 2007; Gnawali et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009;
Wang et al. 2009; Aggarwal201O; Mensah et al. 2010; Wagstaff201Oa).
PSM has advantages over IV methods and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in that it
imposes fewer restrictions on the data (Section 2.72 discusses the advantages of PSM
over other methods in more detail). Despite the advantages of using matching, many of
the health insurance studies employing PSM are based on secondary data and relevant
factors such as preferences for care, and multiple measures of health status are not
usually available. Furthermore, none of the studies focus on Laos specifically.
2.6 Review of empirical literature on the determinants of enrolment in SHI
The discussion above in Section 2.5.1 illustrates that there is a substantial body of
literature on household-level enrolment in CBHI. Several studies also examine the
determinants of household-level enrolment in employer-based insurance (Abraham et al.
2002; Monheit and PrimoffVistnes 2006), SHI (Balabanova et al. 2003; Mathauer et al.
2008; Nguyen and Knowles 2010), and social security (Auerbach et al. 2007; Thornton
et al. 2010). However, very little is known about the determinants oifirms' enrolment in
SHI or social security. The dearth of research on this topic is mainly due to the
mandatory nature of SHI, which theoretically eliminates the enrolment decision-making
process. However, in reality, most developing countries face difficulty getting the formal
sector to enrol in SHI: compliance is low, enforcement is weak, and several evasion
tactics are commonly used (Bailey and Turner 2001; McGillivray 2001). For example, in
the Philippines' Employed Program (a mandatory SHI scheme for all government and
private sector employees), evasion is a problem: only about 30 percent of those who
should be contributing are doing so (Jowett and Hsiao 2007). In one region of Russia,
only 2 percent of private enterprises enrolled in the country's obligatory SHI scheme
(Twigg 1999). Therefore, despite the mandatory nature of the programme, firms do make
a choice to enrol or not enrol in social security. However, the literature provides little
insight into the determinants of enrolment at the firm level.
Although no studies found in the literature explicitly examine the determinants of
enrolment in SHI, there are a few bodies of literature that are relevant to the study of
firm enrolment in insurance, the first being the social security and SHI compliance
literature. However, it is important to note the differences between the determinants of
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enrolment and the determinants of compliance. As explained by McGillivray (2001)
"enrolment (coverage) measures the extent to which persons who by law or regulation
are participants in a social security scheme and are generally obliged to contribute to
(the scheme) "....while "compliance....refers to the extent to which covered persons meet
their contribution obligations. " Therefore, the extent to which the compliance literature
can offer insight into the determinants of enrolment is limited, but nonetheless relevant.
Most often, the problems of non-compliance are typically explored from a regulatory or
administrative standpoint, but a smaller body of literature focuses on reasons for evasion.
Insights into how and why firms evade contributions are therefore discussed. Some of the
most common evasion strategies include underreporting the number of permanent
employees; reclassifying job descriptions - in order to hire temporary workers instead
of permanent ones; underreporting earnings; and failing to remit (or delaying remitting)
employee contributions which they have withheld from their employees (Bailey and
Turner 2001; McGillivray 2001; Wagstaff 2009). A few discussion papers shed light on
why evasion occurs. One main reason is the desire to maximise profits (McGillivray
2001). For example, firms feel that they can offer a more competitive compensation
package (Bailey and Turner 2001), or can maintain lower labour costs in the absence of
social security (Nyland et al. 2006; World Bank 201Ob). Other reasons for evasion are
that administration of social security is too complex for firms to take on (McGillivray
2001), and the value attached to social security among employees is low (Bailey and
Turner 2001). Other studies show that the extent to which firms evade their social
security contributions is related to government tolerance (i.e., weak government
enforcement, perceived likelihood of getting caught, and extent of penalties (Bailey and
Turner 2001; McGillivray 2001; Nyland et al. 2006». Another study shows that evasion
of social security is related to external and political forces such as economic growth, trust
in social institutions and regulations, differing social values of regime types, and
institutional inertia (Ramia et al. 2008). Corruption also plays a role in the motivation to
evade payments: some firms collect contributions but keep them or delay payment to the
social security scheme (Nyland et al. 2006; Ramia et al. 2008). Finally, one study from
Shanghai uses a dataset of 2,200 firms to explore the relationship between firm
characteristics and compliance with social security. The findings show that larger firms
and firms in real estate or construction are less likely to comply with social security
obligations, but that a firm's risk profile, i.e., how dangerous the business is, is not
associated with compliance. The Shanghai study adds value by identifying the types of
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firms that are least likely to comply with their social security obligations: these findings
can be used to assist the policing process (Nyland et al. 2006).
A second body of literature on private employer-based health care in the United States
(US) offers insight into firms' preferences for employer-based health insurance, although
the mechanism for insuring these firms is voluntary. A review by Glied and Graff Zivin
(2004) summarises much of the literature in this area (Glied and Graff Zivin 2004). The
evidence suggests that unionised firms and firms in the manufacturing sector are more
likely to offer health insurance (Buchmueller et al. April 2001). Larger firms, firms with
higher wage workers, and firms in which employees demand health insurance are also
more likely to provide insurance (Gruber and Lettau 2004). In addition, lower staff
turnover rates and age heterogeneity are associated with a firm's enrolment in insurance
(Ellis 2005). Other studies look at the price elasticity of enrolment and find varying
results (Thorpe et al. 1992; Feldman et al. 1997; Marquis and Long 2001; Gruber and
Lettau 2004) but there is some evidence that smaller firms are much more responsive to
changes in price than are larger firms (Gruber and Lettau 2004).
Finally, a third body of literature looks at the factors that cause informal sector firms to
transition to more formal arrangements. In most developing countries many businesses
operate in the informal sector and therefore do not usually participate in formal societal
institutions, e.g., national and local treasuries, banking systems, trade organisations, and
governmental programmes such as social security (Jackie and Li 2006). However, if
firms want to grow and survive, becoming more formal is usually a prerequisite: firms
need to ensure property rights, enforce contracts, and have access to capital (Jaekle and
Li 2006). Levenson and Maloney (1988) offer a framework for explaining when and how
informal firms will participate in societal institutions (i.e., become more formal). Using
data from urban firms in Mexico they show that larger (measured by revenues) and older
firms are more likely to register with the federal treasury, the social security
administration (IMSS), and to be enumerated in the Census of firms. A study by JackIe
and Li from Peru supports these findings, although does not specifically examine
participation in social security (Levenson and Maloney 1998; Jackle and Li 2006).
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2.7 Programme evaluation literature
As described in the literature review methodology (Section 2.1), the programme
evaluation literature includes some useful reviews on various econometric methods and
these were used extensively in this review (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000; Bryson et al.
2002; Ravallion et al. 2007; Imbens and Wooldridge 2008; Caliendo and Kopeinig May
2005). Materials from an econometrics course in policy evaluation also informed this
section of the review. IS Unless otherwise stated, the concepts discussed below were
taken from the IFS course materials.
2.7.1 The evaluation problem
Much of the impact evaluation literature is based on the Rubin Causal Model, also
referred to as the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model or the Neyman-Rubin-Holland model of
causal inference (lm~ens and Wooldridge 2008). The notation from Imbens and
Wooldridge (2008) will be used throughout this section.
N (indexed by ;=1, ......N) represents the number of individuals observed. Treatment
status is given by w, such that w=1 if the individual receives treatment and w=O
otherwise. Y;(I) and Y,(O) denote the potential outcomes for individual; with and without
treatment", respectively. The effect of the treatment on individual; is 'l', and is calculated
I
as the difference between the potential outcomes, such that:
'l';=Y;(1)-Y,(0)
According to the Rubin Causal Model, the inherent problem of evaluation is one of
missing data. In the equation above, an individual (or observation) cannot be in the
"treated" and "untreated" group at the same time. Thus, if individual; receives treatment,
the observed outcome for individual; had she not received treatment (the counterfactual
outcome) can never be observed. Similarly, if individualj is observed without treatment,
it will not be possible to observe the outcome for individual j had he received treatment.
The inability to observe two individuals in two states simultaneously is referred to as the
18 The course was led by Barbara Sianesi at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), University of College
London, and was held in July 2010.
19 The term treatment is conventionally used in the evaluation literature to indicate participation in a
programme.
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"evaluation problem", or the "fundamental problem of causal inference" Because the
counterfactual outcome can never be observed, programme evaluations attempt to
estimate the counterfactual in order to measure treatment effects (Imbens and
Wooldridge 2008).
Given the missing data problem, an alternative for estimating the counterfactual outcome
is to identify a comparison group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group and
then compare outcomes between the treated and untreated. However, the problem with
this approach is that programmes are not usually randomly assigned, and are instead
placed according to the needs of the population, who in tum self-select into programmes
(Khandker et al. 2010). Therefore, programme participants are likely to be very different
from non-participants in ways that affect treatment outcomes, especially when the
programme is voluntary. Individuals may enrol in the programme due to an underlying
need for the programme or due to the expected gains that will be generated from
participation (e.g., chronically ill individuals enrol in health insurance due to a known
need for health services while healthy individuals do not participate; highly motivated
individuals enrol in a labour market training programme because they expect to gain
from it, whereas those who are less motivated and do not expect to gain do not
participate). This phenomenon is known as selection bias and results when a factor
affecting participation is associated with the outcome variable (Imbens and Wooldridge
2008). Thus, measuring the impact of insurance on a specific outcome of interest must
take into account that outcomes and enrolment may be endogenous. A number of
econometrics approaches have been used to address the problem of selection bias and
these are described in the next section.
2.7.2 Approaches to overcoming selection bias
The second element of the Rubin Causal Model is the assignment mechanism.
Individuals are assigned to, or self-select, a programme in one of four ways: 1)
randomisation; 2) selection on observable covariates (observables); 3) selection on
unobservable covariates (unobservables); 4) selection on both observables and
unobservables (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008; Khandker et al. 2010). A selection of
methods used to estimate the treatment effects of a programme, and the assumptions,
strengths, and weaknesses of the approaches, are described under the four main headings
below. Table 2.1 at the end of this section also summarises this information.
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Randomisation
One approach to estimating the counterfactual outcome is through randomisation. When
individuals are randomised to a treatment, and if randomisation is conducted correctly
and sample size is sufficient, differences in the outcomes can be attributed to the
programme and not to other confounding variables, thereby eliminating the problem of
selection bias (Khandker et al. 2010). For these reasons, randomised control trials are
considered the gold standard for estimating the counterfactual outcome. However, in
reality, experiments are rarely observed in economics (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008).
Even when experiments are feasible, problems can arise due to randomisation bias (e.g.,
selection due to eligibility), compliance issues, and contamination of the control group.
Experiments are also costly and are not always practical, or ethical, to implement. More
commonly, observational studies (or "quasi-experimental" studies) are conducted.
However, assignment to the control group in observational studies is usually based on
purposive programme placement or, in the case of voluntary programmes such as health
insurance, self-selection into the programme. If not adequately accounted for, non-
randomised programme placement and attrition leads to bias in the estimate of treatment
effects (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000).
Selection on observables
Econometric methods can be used to reduce bias in treatment effects caused by selection
but the method of choice should depend on the assumptions about selection into
treatment and the available data. Two methods discussed in this review account for
selection into treatment based on observables. These two methods share many of the
same assumptions, which must be satisfied to estimate unbiased treatment effects. These
methods and their assumptions are described below:
1. Propensity score matching (PSM): PSM, and other matching methods, mimic an
experiment ex post by constructing a comparison group from among the untreated
observations that is as similar as possible to the treated group in terms of observable
characteristics. The use of this method makes two assumptions. First, the assumption
of unconfoundedness (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), also referred to as "exogeneity",
or the "conditional independence assumption" (CIA), assumes that selection into the
programme can be explained by observable variables. This assumption allows for
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selection on unobservables, as long as they do not affect outcomes (Imbens and
Wooldridge 2008).
The overlap assumption, or "assumption of common support" assumes that any
combination of characteristics observed in the treatment group can also be observed
in the comparison group. Thus, the distribution of the propensity scores must lie
within the same region in both groups to ensure that matched observations are
comparable. This assumption also assumes that no covariates perfectly predict
enrolment. Together, these two assumptions are commonly referred to as "strong
ignorability" (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
The main problem with the unconfoundedness assumption is that it is not testable. It
therefore assumes that all factors affecting participation in the programme can be
measured. Upholding this assumption therefore requires a rich dataset and good
knowledge about the factors affecting participation (Blundell 2005). Other
advantages and disadvantages of this method are summarised at the end of this
section in Table 2.1
2. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): OLS, or "multiple linear regression" is commonly
used to estimate treatment effects by regressing the outcome on the covariates (one of
which is a dummy variable for treatment status). Like PSM, the method assumes
unconfoundedness and common support. However, unlike PSM, the regression
model imposes restrictions on the relationship between the covariates and the
outcomes by assuming that independent variables have a linear and homogeneous
effect on outcomes.
Selection on unobservables
The next 2 methods assume that selection into the programme is based on unobservables.
These methods and their assumptions are described below.
1. Instrumental variables: This approach assumes that a variable that is related to
participation but not to the outcome of interest can be identified. This variable is
known as an instrumental variable (IV) or "instrument" and it introduces an element
of randomness into treatment assignment, and therefore can approximate the effect of
an experiment (Bryson et al. 2002). The main drawback of the approach is that it is
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difficult to identify a suitable instrument and justify its credibility (Heckman 1995;
Blundell and Costa Dias 2000).
2. Heckman selection estimator: This approach is similar to the IV approach but is more
robust and more demanding about the assumptions of the model structure. For
example, it assumes that the unobservable variables that jointly influence
participation and outcome are normally distributed (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000).
As with the IV method, the drawback is that it is difficult to identify a credible
instrument. Moreover, estimates are sensitive to the assumptions about the
distribution of the unobserved variables not being met (Bryson et al. 2002).
Selection on observables and unobservables
The next 2 methods, described below, assume that selection into the programme is based
on either observables, unobservables or both.
1. Before-after estimators: The main approach with this method is to compare
outcomes of the treated before and after treatment. The main assumption is that
the unobservables are specific to an individual (and not to external changes):
those unobservables can either be fixed over time or transitory (not fixed over
time) but programme-participation is dependent on factors that are fixed over
time (Bryson et al. 2002). The main drawback to this method is that it does not
control for individual time-variant effects or external changes (e.g., a
macroeconomic effect; a policy change). Another concern is that if a temporary
reduction in outcomes occurs just before the programme is introduced (e.g.,
unemployment occurs before training programme), the treatment effects will be
overestimated. This is known as Ashenfelter's Dip (Heckman et al. 1999).
2. Differences-in-differences estimator (natural experiment): This approach controls
for both observables and unobservables by comparing changes in outcomes of the
treated and untreated before and after treatment. In addition to the individual
fixed and transitory effects allowed with the before-after estimators, this method
also allows for trend effects (effects not specific to individuals) when they affect
both the treated and untreated group equally (e.g., a macroeconomic effect; a
policy change). The method assumes that the composition of the treatment group
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remains unchanged between the pre-treatment and post-treatment; otherwise, treatment
effects will be biased (Bryson et al. 2002). Ashenfelter's dip is also a concern with this
method.
2.7.3 Measuring treatment effects: parameters of interest
Much of the programme evaluation literature estimates the average treatment effect
(ATE) and the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). Deciding which
parameter to use will depend on the policy question of interest. Each of these parameters
are defined below. As an extension of the formula given earlier for the treatment effect
of individual t. the average treatment effect (ATE) in the population can be calculated by
averaging the treatment effects for all observed individuals, such that:
This parameter assumes that all those who have been assigned to (or offered) a program
are fully compliant with the program. However, in reality not everyone participates,
while some participate but drop out of the program before completion. Moreover, in a
voluntary program, people randomized to be offered a program cannot be forced to
participate. For this reason, the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator is often of policy
relevance. The ITT compares outcomes for those to whom treatment was offered with
those to whom treatment was not offered, irrespective of actual enrolment. This
parameter is important when trying to determine the average impact of a program on the
population targeted by the program (Gertler et al. 2011).
Because programmes often reach only a segment of their target population (either
because of purposive programme placement or selection into the programme), it is
generally of interest to policymakers to measure the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT). This estimate of the program's effect takes into account those who have
been offered the program and actually enrolled and is given by the following equation:
ATT=E(Y;(I)-Y;(O»lw;=I,
which is the equivalent to:
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ATT=E(Yj(1)IWj=l) - E(Yj(O)lwj=l)
If the method used for programme evaluation assumes homogeneous returns, i.e., all
participants respond the same way to a given treatment, the ATE and the ATT will be the
same. However, most of the recent econometrics literature assumes a more realistic
,
scenario - that the impact across individuals is heterogeneous (Bryson et al. 2002). This
heterogeneity stems from two sources: 1) some people respond better to treatment than
others, based on underlying characteristics, and therefore the impact of a programme
varies across individuals; 2) people participate in programmes based on this
heterogeneity (i.e., an individual anticipates gains from the programme and therefore
participates). Allowing for heterogeneity, the ATT will be different than the ATE
(Imbens and Wooldridge 2008).
In summary, there are several methods that can be used to estimate the counterfactual
outcome in a programme evaluation. The extent to which treatment effects can be
estimated with minimal bias will depend on.whether or not the assumptions mentioned
above are upheld. In identifying the optimal method, the literature recommends that the
choice be guided by three factors: knowledge of the selection process; the parameters of
interest; and the richness and nature of the available data (Heckman et al. 1999; Blundell
and Costa Dias 2000; Blundell 2005).
2.8 Relevance of literature, research gaps, and priorities in Lao PDR
The review of the literature identifies a number of research gaps and provides a broader
context for the health financing policy priorities in Lao PDR. The universal coverage
literature shows that, at a time when the Government of Laos is making an effort to
expand enrolment in health insurance, many countries are developing their health
financing systems to achieve universal coverage. Some of the approaches that other
countries have taken to reach out to different population groups provide insight into
options for expanding health insurance in Laos.
The review of economic theory provides a partial explanation of the decision to enrol in
insurance. However, most theories model behaviour of individuals in industrialised
countries and do not translate well to low-income countries, where poverty and trust
have been found to influence decision-making. Nevertheless, some theories and
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discussion of risk offer alternative explanations of why people choose to enrol: unlike
expected utility theory, which explains that more risk-averse individuals are more likely
to purchase insurance, the literature suggests that enrolling in insurance may be seen as a
more "risky investment" due to the uncertainty of the expected pay-offs, the comfort in
maintaining the status quo, and the extent to which individuals have confidence and trust
in the insurance scheme and the overall health care system. Thus, greater risk-aversion
(especially among the poor) may make it less likely for individuals to purchase
insurance. However, the relationship between risk and enrolment in health insurance
needs to be further explored in different contexts.
Although many studies examine the determinants of enrolment in CBHI, little is known
about the factors driving or hindering enrolment in CBHI in Laos. Understanding
decision-making in the context of Laos is an important policy question in light of the low
enrolment levels in CBHI and the government's plans to expand coverage among the
informal sector. Moreover, measuring the extent to which adverse selection plays a role
in the Lao scheme will be important for the MOH in its effort to make CBHI more
financially viable.
While there is a voluminous body of literature exploring the impact of CBHI on
utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures, weak study designs and the failure to account
for selection into voluntary insurance limit the conclusions that can be drawn from these
studies. Experimental designs are not always appropriate for evaluating the impacts of
social programmes, but there are a number of econometric approaches that can
approximate the treatment effects of a programme and reduce the risk of selection bias.
Although more recent CBHI studies have attempted to tackle the "selection problem"
using methods that control for selection bias, high quality studies on the impacts of
CBHI are still rare. Many CBHI studies still fail to adequately control for the factors that
are likely to contribute to selection bias, such as health status and other risks, risk-
preferences, and preferences for different types of care. Furthermore, there has been no
attempt to measure the impacts of CBHI in Laos. A research study examining the
impacts of CBHI using a robust evaluation approach has relevance for health policy in
Laos and will make a positive contribution to the health financing literature.
The challenges of expanding social security and/or SHI in developing countries have
been widely debated. While this literature touches on factors associated with social
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security compliance, no study explicitly addresses firms' decision to enrol or not enrol in
SHI (or a broader social security scheme), although the larger body of literature on social
security compliance and preferences for private employer-based insurance in the US
offers insight into factors that shape a firms' decision to enrol in SHI. Given the growing
interest in expanding health insurance towards universal coverage (in Laos and
internationally), and the scarcity of data on the determinants of enrolment in SHI or
social security, identifying the factors that are likely to drive or hinder enrolment of firms
in SHI is likely to be an important contribution to policymakers in Laos and other
countries looking to stimulate SHI enrolment.
The next chapter gives an overview of the study setting and describes the insurance
schemes that will be examined in the thesis (i.e., CBHI and SHI). The chapter also
highlights the health financing priorities in Lao PDR that have helped to shape the
questions addressed in the thesis, thereby setting the context for the overall study.
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Chapter 3. Study setting
This chapter gives an overview of the socio-demographic characteristics, the economic
environment, and the health situation in Lao PDR and describes the organisation and
financing of health services. Also presented is a detailed description of the two health
insurance schemes studied in this thesis: CBHI and SHI. Much of the information
presented here was generated from reviews of government, donor and NOO documents,
key informant interviews with employees of the CBHI and SHI schemes, and
compilation of data from government documents and databases from international
organisations.
3.1 Country profile
3.1.1 Geographic and demographic characteristics
Lao PDR is a landlocked country in Southeast Asia, bordered by Cambodia, Myanmar,
Thailand, Vietnam and China. Its geographic position in the heart of South-East Asia
makes it a crossroads for trade, and historically, it has served as a buffer zone between
neighbouring countries (Messerli et al. 2008). Three quarters of the country is
mountainous, with high elevations and steep terrain, and the Mekong River forms most
of the western border with Thailand. Although the level areas in the southern provinces
are suitable for rice cultivation and farming, overall arable land accounts for only 4 to 5
percent of the country's surface. The country is divided into 16 provinces and one
municipality (Vientiane Capital), and further subdivided into 140 districts. Although the
Mekong is a popular route for trade within the region, the Khong Falls in the south of the
country prevents sea access (Messerli et al. 2008) .
. Lao PDR's population of 6.3 million is low by regional standards and population density
is much lower than .in neighbouring countries. Only 32 percent of the po~ulation resides
in urban areas, but the migration to urban areas has resulted in a high urban population
growth rate. Thirty-eight percent of the population is below 15 years of age, and together
with the Philippines, the population is growing at a faster rate than any other country in
the region (World Bank 201Ob). The population is also the most ethnically and
linguistically diverse in mainland South-East Asia: the official ethno-linguistic groupings
include 49 distinctive ethnic groups and four main ethno-linguistic families, including
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Lao-Tai (Tai-Kadai); Mon-Khmer (Austro-Asiatic); Sino-Tibetan; and Hmong-Mien
(Messerli et al. 2008). Table 3.1 shows how Lao PDR compares to other countries in the
region with respect to demographic and socioeconomic indicators.
3.1.2 Economic and health profile
Lao PDR remains one of the poorest countries in South-East Asia, and is ranked 122nd
out of 162 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2010). Like many of its
neighbours, the country is transitioning from an agricultural socialist economy to a
market-oriented economy. Laos is still largely dependent on official development
asslstance/" but economic growth is relatively strong by regional standards (see Table
3.1) due to increased integration with neighbouring countries and development of
mining, hydropower, and other sectors (MOH Lao PDR et al. 2008). In the next few
years, nearly 40 percent of GDP growth is expected to come from the power sector,
mainly due to the recent construction of the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) project - a large
hydropower facility jointly implemented by the government and a private power
company, and financed by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and others (World
Bank 2010a).21The manufacturing industry has also grown in recent years, and with the
exception of garment factories, small enterprises still dominate this sector. The services
industry is also growing, largely due to tourism (ADB and World Bank 2007). The
growth in these industries is expected to increase fiscal space22 (Tangcharoensathien et
al. 2011), which is currently low by regional standards (See Table 3.1). However, the
extent to which increased government resources will be spent on the health sector is
unpredictable.
Although the country has achieved much progress in reducing poverty and child
mortality over the last decade, poverty rates remain high and significant challenges
remain in improving health outcomes, which, as shown in Table 3.1, are among the
poorest in the region. It is important to note, however, that while average health and
20 Official development assistance accounts for 72 percent of total public expenditure in the health and
education sectors (ILO 2007).
21 The Nam Theun 2 project is a SUS 1.45 billion hydropower project expected to contribute substantially
to the country's economic growth. Electricity from NT2 will be exported to Thailand (under pre-arranged
long-term contracts) and used for domestic consumption. There is much optimism in Laos that this new
source of funding will generate large government revenues. There is also potential for increasing revenues
to the health sector through NT2 as funds are already earmarked for economic development and poverty
reduction. However, no specific earmarks for the health sector have been defined.
22 Fiscal space refers to the government's ability to collect tax and spend funds for desired purposes.
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poverty outcomes in Laos are low by regional standards, these indicators do not reveal
disparities by region, income, or ethnicity. For example, maternal mortality rates range
from 200 to 800 per 100,000 live births throughout the country (Messerli et al. 2008) and
literacy rates are nearly 100 percent in urban areas, but below 75 percent in rural areas
without road access (Department of Statistics 2010). These disparities are part of the
Table 3.1 Demographic, socioeconomic and health indicators, South-East Asia
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Demographic Indicators
Population (millions), 2009 6.3 14.8 230.0 92.0 67.8 87.3
Population growth rate (annual %), 2009 1.8% 1.7% 1.2% 1.8% 0.6% 1.2%
% of population < 15 years, 2009 38% 33% 27% 34% 22% 26%
Population density (people/sq. km), 2008 27 82 125 303 132 278
Urban population (% of total), 2009 32% 22% 53% 66% 34% 28%
Urban population growth (annual %), 2009 5.5% 4.5% 3.3% 2.9% 1.6% 2.9%
Socioeconomic indicators
GOP per capita (constant 2000 US$) $496 $505 $1124 $1215 $2567 $674
GOP per capita (PPP US$), 2008 $2124 $1951 $3994 $3513 $8086 $2787
GOP growth (annual %), 2009 6.4% -1.9% 4.5% 1.1% -2.2% 5.3%
GNI per capita ($US, Atlas method), 2009 $880 $610 $2050 $2050 $3760 $930
Government tax (% of GOP)(fiscal space), 2007 10.1% 8.2%" 12.3%C 14.0% 16.1% 13.0W
% households living below $1.25 a day, PPP, 2007 37 %' 26% 29% 23% 2%C 21%d
Income Gini coefficient, 2006/7 33% b 44% 38% 44% 42% C 38% cl
Primary school completion (% of relevant age 74% 85% 108% 92% 87% 101%
group), 2007
Health Indicators
Life expectancy at birth (years), 2008 65 61 71 72 69 74
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), 2008 48 69 31 26 13 12
Under five mortality rate (per 1000 live births), 59 88 39 33 14 24
2009
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births), 405 472 228· 162
d 12 75f
2005
Total fertility rate (births per woman), 2008 3.5 2.9 2.2 3.1 1.8 2.1
% of children <5 yrs receiving ORT for diarrhoea 49% 50% 54% 60% 46% 65%
(2005-8)
% of 1 year aids immunised with OPT, 2009 57% 94% 82% 87% 99% 96%
% of 1 year olds immunised with measles, 2009 59% 92% 82% 88% 98% 97%
HIV prevalence (% of pop' n 15-491, 2007 0.2% 0.8% 0.2% 1.4% 0.5%
Notes: Unless otherwise stated, the source of the indicators is the World Bank (WE), World Development
indicators database, 2010. Unless otherwise indicated, the date for the estimate is given in the left column.
a 200718 figure from Department of Statistics, 2010; b WB 2002; c WB 2004; dWB 2006: eWB 2007; fWB
200B; g 2007 figure from Tangcharoensathien et al, 2011.
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reason that the country will likely fail to achieve most of its Millennium Development
Goals for the health sector by 2015 (Thome and Pholsena 2009).
3.2 Health care provision and financing
3.2.1 Organisation of health services
The main network for the provision of services is the public sector, which includes 4
central government hospitals, 3 specialised hospitals, 5 regional hospitals, 13 provincial
hospitals, 127 district hospitals and 717 health centres. Given the country's low
population density and low utilisation rates there are more facilities and hospital beds
than can operate efficiently (Knowles 2006). Table 3.2 compares service delivery
characteristics between Laos and neighbouring countries.
The shift to a market-economy in recent years has facilitated growth of the private health
sector, which is still relatively small and is largely unregulated. It consists of
approximately 500 small private clinics; 600 traditional medicine practitioners; 2,000
pharmacies and drug vendors (many of which are unlicensed), and a large number of
unlicensed "village health workers" with varying levels of formal training. Today,
government facilities account for a low percentage of outpatient visits (20 to 25 percent)
(Knowles 2006), while private pharmacies and clinics are often the first choice of care
for people in urban areas (Paphassarang et al. 2002; Patcharanarumol 2008). In addition,
many people use private health services in neighbouring Thailand, where the majority of
health workers speak Lao as their native tongue'" (Knowles 2006; Thome and Pholsena
2009).
Access to health services in Laos varies by urban and rural location. Approximately 93
percent of the population lives within a 90 minute walk to a health facility, although this
ranges from 108 minutes on average in rural areas to 19 minutes in urban areas.
Moreover, in the mountainous regions individuals must travel three hours to reach a
health facility (Thome and Pholsena 2009).
23 Isan Thai is spoken in North-Eastern Thailand and is a dialect of the Lao language.
Page I S6
Table 3.2 Service delivery and health financing indicators, South-East Asia
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Service delivery indicators
Hospital beds (per 10,000 people) (2002-2006) 12.0 1.0 6.0 10.6 22.0 26.6
Physicians (per 10,000 people) (2002-2004) 3.5 1.6' J.3 11.5 3.1 5.6
Nurses and midwives (per 10,000 people) (2002-2004) 9.7 8.5' 8.2 61.2 13.6 6.6
Pregnant women receiving ~ 1 ANC visit (%),2006 35.1 69.3 93.3 91 97.8 90.8
Births attended by skilled health staff (%) (2005-2008) 20.3 43.8 79.4 62.2 97.3 87.7
Health expenditure indicators
Total health expenditure (THE) as % of GOP, 2007 4.0% 5.9% 2.2% 3.9% 3.7% 7.1%
Health expenditure per capita (US$)(2007) $27 $36 $42 $63 $136 $58
Source ifexpenditure
General government expo on health as % of THE ,2007 19% 29% 55% 35% 73% 39%
Private expenditure on health as % of THE, 2007 81% 71% 46% 65% 27% 61%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 10006 100%
OOPs as % of private expenditure on health, 2007 76% 85% 66% 84% 72% 90%
OOPs as % of THE, 2007 62% 60% 30% 55% 19% 55%
Notes: ANC=antenatal care; OOP=out-of-pocket expenditure. External resources for health are included
in government and private shares. The source of the service delivery indicators is WHO, National Health
Accounts, various years. The source of the health expenditures indicators is the World Bank (WB), World
Development Indicators database, 2010; a WB 2000.
The health sector in Laos faces a number of challenges with respect to human resources.
Although the numbers of physicians and nurses are higher than in Cambodia and
Indonesia, levels are still low (See Table 3.2). Most health workers receive inadequate
training, low salaries, and inadequate non-monetary incentives. Thus, productivity is low
and most workers are disproportionately concentrated in Vientiane Capital and
economically better-off regions where they have an. opportunity to earn supplemental
income through the private sector (Dodd et al. 2009).
3.2.2 Health care financing
Prior to the early 1990s, health care in Laos was funded solely through the government
budget, with support from China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. Government budget
deficits, waning international support, and a shift to a market-economy led to an
increased reliance on household and community financing. Revolving drug funds and
user fees were adopted in the 1990s, with the objective of securing access to essential
medicines and increasing revenues to the health sector (MOH 1995; Murakami et al.
2001). Although user fee exemptions were endorsed by a user fee exemption policy in
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1995, in practice, many of the poor pay for health services due to difficulties in
implementation of the policy (e.g., lack of clear criteria for identifying the poor; lack of
financial support to providers for exempted patients, etc.)(Patcharanarumol et al. 2009).
Thus, the burden of financing falls largely on households, with out-of-pocket payments
accounting for 62 percent of overall health spending - among the highest in the
region." Government spending on health as a percentage of total health expenditures is
much lower than other countries in the region (19 percent compared with 73 percent in
Thailand (World Bank 2010b). This is equivalent to less than one percent of GOP and
estimates show that the level has not risen in real terms over the past decade (Powell-
Jackson and Lindelow 2010). Much of the public expenditure on health (75 percent)
covers salaries for health care workers, and therefore facilities are dependent on revenues
from the revolving drug funds to cover recurrent costs (WHO 201Oa). Some of the
revenues from revolving drugs funds are also used to fund top-ups to staff to augment
their low salaries. Given this dependency, there is an incentive for providers to
overprescribe non-essential and non-generic drugs and diagnostic tests. Drug
procurement is not adequately regulated and although the price for drugs is officially set
at cost plus 25 percent, in practice drugs are often charged at a higher profit margin and
charges are not always displayed in pharmacies (Thome and Pholsena 2009; Ron et al.
2010).
The actual cost of health services in Laos is substantial, especially given the country's
high poverty rate. The World Health Survey (2003) estimated the total cost of an
inpatient episode between US $15 to US $90 depending on the level of care (WHO
2003). At the time of these estimates, per capita income was US $340 (World Bank
2003), and therefore an inpatient visit accounted for between 4 and 25 percent of annual
per capita income. These high costs contribute to impoverishment and reluctance to use
services. Moreover, an estimated 40 percent of households reportedly sell items or
borrow money to pay for health services (WHO 2003).
Four main health insurance and risk-protection schemes operate in Lao PDR. These
include: a mandatory Civil Servants' Scheme (CSS) for government employees and their
dependents; a mandatory Social Health Insurance (SHI) scheme for private and state-
24 Recent studies in Lao POR suggest that out-of-pocket spending in official National Health Accounts
Estimates may be under-estimated (Powell-Jackson and Lindelow 2010).
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owned enterprises and their dependents; voluntary community-based health insurance
(CBHI) for the informal sector and self-employed households; and health equity funds
(HEFs) for households living in extreme poverty. However, outside the CSS, which
covers approximately 6.3 percent of the population, these schemes reach a small segment
of the total population, with approximately 1.7 percent of the population enrolled in
CBHI, 1.5 percent enrolled in SHI and 2.1 percent enrolled in HEFs in 200925 (See
Figure 3.1). Thus, just over one tenth of the population is currently covered by health
insurance and risk-protection schemes.
Although the abovementioned numbers give an indication of overall coverage of health
insurance in the population, it is also important to understand the relative sizes of the
population groups (sub-populations) and their respective coverage rates. Thus, Figure 3.2
shows the approximate size of each sub-population'? and the coverage rates that have
been achieved: civil servants and their dependents account for less than 500,000
individuals in the country (7 percent of the population); private sector employees and
Figure 3.2 Coverage of health insurance and
health equity funds in Lao PDR, 2009
Figure 3.2 Proportion of individuals
enrolled in health insurance and health
equity funds by sub-population, 2009
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Source: Compilation of data by the author, from: CBHI database, MOH, 2009; SSO database, SSO Jan 2009;
CSS/SASS databases, 2009; HEF 2009 annual report, MOH 2010.
25 The latest coverage figures show that HEFs currently reach closer to 3% of the population (MOH Lao
PDR Dep't of Planning and Finance March 2011).
26 The estimates of the size of each sub-population are used for illustrative purposes. The size of the
informal sector was made by subtracting the formal sector and their dependents, the military, and the poor
from the total population. However, the true size of each sub-population is difficult to estimate given the
lack of distinction between the "formal" and "informal" sectors, and the difficulty of identifying the poor.
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their dependents (the SHI target group)' make up approximately 8 percent of the
population; the informal sector and the self-employed account for more than 3 million
people (about 52 percent of the population) and the poor account for a little more than 2
million (33 percent of the population). Apart from the CSS scheme, which reaches
approximately 90 percent of its sub-population, coverage rates within each sub-
population are low. However, it is important to recognise that SHI, CBHI and HEFs are
not yet operating country-wide and have therefore only targeted a small fraction of their
respective sub-populations.f For example, the SHI scheme contracts only with
provincial and central hospitals located in the four provinces where a substantial
proportion of the population is engaged in private sector employment. By the end of
2009, roughly 30 percent of firms that had been targeted by the SSO had enrolled.28 The
rationale for introducing CBHI in only select districts was to ensure that the scheme was
functioning well before expanding to other more remote areas. CBHI therefore was first
introduced in the most affluent urban and semi-urban areas where health services are ofa
reasonable quality. However, given the challenges of getting the target population to
enrol, roll-out of the schemes to other geographic areas has been slow. For example, by
the end of 2009, only about one quarter of the informal sector had been targeted by
CBHI and only 13 percent of those targeted had enrolled." Thus, the reasons for low
coverage are in part due to limited geographic implementation of the schemes, but even
in the targeted areas, coverage levels remain low.
Despite low coverage of health insurance and risk-protection schemes, the government is
considering various options for scaling up to achieve universal coverage by 2025. A
merger of all social health protection schemes is also planned for 2015 and the MOH is
currently working with other agencies on a decree to govern this process. Expansion of
health insurance schemes and health equity funds are stated priorities in the Sixth
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP 2006-10) and the more recent
National Health Sector Development Plan (NHSDP 2011-15). To operationalise these
plans, the Health Financing Strategic Plan 2011-15 was drafted in 2009-2010 but has not
yet been approved by the national assembly. The mission of the plan is: "To achieve
27 The coverage levels within each sub-population are shown in Figure 3.2. However, these are only
approximations - it is difficult to estimate the true coverage within each sub-population because the size of
each sub-population is only an approximation (the definitions of each are overlapping). Moreover, only a
small proportion of each sub- population has actually been targeted.
28Calculationby the author, based on Social Security Database, 2009
29 Calculation by the author using data from CBrn database, MOH 2009.
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universal coverage by reducing out-of-pocket spending for health, thereby increasing
access to essential quality health services for all Lao people without catastrophic
expenses and to attain thefive health MOOs "(MOH Lao PDR 2010).
This thesis was designed in part to inform the strategic planning process by providing
empirical evidence about the determinants of enrolment in CBHI and SHI and the
impacts of CBHI on utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures. The following section
gives more details about the CBHI and SHI schemes.
3.3 Overview of CBHI and SHI schemes
3.3.1 Overview of CBHI
CBHI was introduced in 2001 as a pilot project by the Ministry of Health (MOH), and
has received technical assistance from two donors (previously the United Nations Trust
Fund for Human Security, implemented through WHO, and now Agence Francaise de
Developpement (AFD), implemented jointly through Swiss Red Cross (SRC) and GRET
(Professionals for Fair Development». The office responsible for managing the scheme
is the Health Insurance Program, within the Department of Planning and Finance, MOH.
The MOH contracts hospitals to provide services for CBHI members" and a gatekeeping
system requires members to first seek services at the contracting facility in their district.
The CBHI benefit is similar to that of the two formal sector schemes: it covers outpatient
and inpatient services including primary health care, specialist"services, diagnostic tests,
and drugs prescribed at hospitals. The features of both CBHI and SHI are summarised in
Table 3.3.
The main target group for CBHI is households who are self-employed or working in the
informal economy and are not covered by other social protection schemes. Enrolment
takes place at the household level for all members and the cost of premiums varies
according to urban or rural residence, and number of household members. The cost of
the premiums were originally set at between 2.5 to 3 percent of average household
income (Ron July 2010). However, the contribution levels have not been updated since
30 In most districts, the MOH contracts with the district hospital to provide services. However, in two
districts (Viengkham district in Vientiane Province and Luang Prabang municipality) there is no district
hospital and the MOH instead contracts with a provincial hospital.
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Table 3.3 Overview of CBRI and SRI scheme characteristics
CBHI SHI
Membership Voluntary Compulsory (although not enforced)
Unit of membership Household Firm
Coverage (2009) Approximately 105,000 (1.7% of the Approximately 95,000 (1.5% of the
population) population)
Beneficiaries All household members as defined by Employees in private and state-owned
the "family book" (official registration enterprises, their dependents (including
book within the villages) children <18) or <25 ifin full time
education, and retirees
Eligible providers Contracts with government district Contracts mainly with government
(type of facility) hospitals for first-line care, and provincial and central hospitals
provincial and central hospitals for
referral care
Health care benefit Includes mainly curative outpatient Includes mainly curative outpatient (OP)
package (OP) and inpatient (JP) care and and inpatient (IP) care and prescription
(inclusions/ exclusions) prescription drugs. Excludes long IP drugs. Excludes long IP stays, road
stays, road accidents, non-prescribed accidents, non-prescribed drugs, some
drugs, some specialist services and care specialist services and care outside the
outside the country. country.
Preventive services Includes preventive care, but most Includes preventive care, but most
preventive care is provided free at preventive care is provided free at
government facilities in vertical government facilities in vertical
programmes. programmes.
Exclusions None None
Waiting period 1 month for OP; 3 months for IP; 6 3 months for all services, except work-
months for deliveries, obstetric and related injuries
elective surgery; 3 months for
emergency
Responsible Agency Health Insurance Unit, Department of Social Security Office (under MOLSW)
Finance & Planning, MOH
Supporting agencies WHO, AFD ILO/WHO
Payment arrangements Capitation payment Capitation payment (80,000
(approx. 60,000 Kip/person/year), Kip/person/year + additional funds to
prepaid monthly. In practice, only cover chronic diseases based on cases
40,000 because of late payments. No treated (paid quarterly). High-cost
additional payments to providers. treatments paid on a case-by-case basis.
Capitation distribution 70% retained at district level; 30% of Either 1) 100% to provincial hospital, or
across levels of care payment to referral hospital 2) 60% district and 40% provincial.
Contribution Flat rate monthly payments according to 4.5% of earnings from employees; 5%
collection procedures household size and location (See Table from employers up to a ceiling of LAK
3.4). Contributions collected by village 1,500,000 ($175.00). 4.4 percentage
collectors and distributed to account points of the 9.5% contribution is
managers in hospitals. allocated to health benefits. (No
additional charge for dependents)
Referral Referral required for care at provincial No gatekeeping, except in areas where
or central hospitals (except in areas with SSO contracts directly with district level.
no district hospital) However, members must use one
hospital of their choice.
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2005, despite average inflation rates of 5.5 percent per year since that time (International
Monetary Fund April2010). Table 3.4 below gives the contribution levels by family size
and location. For a family of five in 2009, the contribution comprised approximately one
percent of average household consumption in the sample." (For the same family size in
the poorest quintile, the premiums comprise 2.4 percent of household consumption in the
sample).
Table 3.4 Monthly contributions for eBBI (Lao Kip/SUS)
UrbanCBHI RuralCBHI
Single person
Family 2-+ persons
Family 5-7 persons
Family >8 persons
Monks, nuns, dormitory students
1+,000 ($1.65)
2+,000($2.82)
30,000($3.53)
33,000($3.88)
5,000($0.59)
12,000($1.+1)
20,000($2.35)
25,000($2.9+)
28,000($3.29)
5,000($0.59)
Source: (Ron 2009)
Household contributions to the scheme are collected on a monthly basis by a village
collector - an individual appointed by the village chief who receives LAK 2,000
(US$0.25) for each newly enrolled household and LAK 1,000 (US$0.12) for each
monthly contribution. However, a recent study reported several problems with the fee
collection system: insured households complained that collectors stopped collecting fees
or did not come on a consistent basis, and village collectors reported that collection fees
were too low to cover the costs of travel (Burnet Institute 2008). As a result, some
villages have moved to a system whereby villagers pay the CBHI account manager at the
district hospital directly.
To date, CBHI has been implemented mainly in the most affluent urban and semi-urban
areas but the MOH intends to expand to more remote areas in the future. As discussed
earlier, the rationale for starting in urban and semi-urban areas was so that the scheme
could be strengthened before expanding to more remote areas that were considered more
difficult to reach. Thus, in the targeted areas health care services are of a reasonable
quality and the socioeconomic status of the target population was deemed high enough
31 This calculation was made by taking the unweighted average annual contribution for families of five in
urban and rural areas (Ron 2009) and dividing it by the average consumption level for a family of five in
the sample.
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that households could afford the premiums.f However, after 9 years of piloting, CBHI in
Laos continues to face the same challenges that most other countries implementing
CBHI have experienced. The first challenge is coverage: Figure 3.3 shows that rolling
out the scheme to new districts has not resulted in substantial increases in enrolment. By
July 2009, the schemes were operating in 19 districts but reached only 7 percent of the
population in the targeted districts (and 13 percent of the population in the targeted
villages in those districts). This is the equivalent to 1.7 percent of the total population. It
is expected that scale-up of the scheme to more remote areas will pose further challenges
due to low population density, poor geographical access to contracting facilities, limited
acquaintance with and knowledge of modem health care among ethnic minorities, and
low quality of care available in the districts that have not yet been targeted.
Figure 3.3 Expansion of CBHI, 2002-2009
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Another challenge facing expansion of CBHI is financial sustainability: the scheme is
currently not generating enough revenues to cover the cost of services and drugs offered
to CBHI members. Only the salaries of health care workers are subsidised by the
government; all other costs incurred by CBHI members are expected to be covered by
the household premiums. Ninety percent of the amount collected through premiums is
paid to the contracting hospitals regardless of actual use by beneficiaries, and the
32 Risk-pooling is at the district level but CBHI is not always rolled out across all villages in a district
because some villages are too remote or do not have good access to the hospital.
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remaining 10 percent covers administrative costs. In Vientiane Capital, this capitation
payment amounted to between LAK 40,000 to 45,000 (US$4.70 - $5.30) per insured
person per year in 2009 (Ron July 2010). The capitation is arbitrarily split between the
district and the referral hospitals, according to need. However, in the absence of
additional subsidies or higher premiums, the capitation payments are insufficient to
cover the cost of services. As a result, several central hospitals in Vientiane Capital have
refused to contract with the CBHI scheme (Ron July 2010). In contrast, providers depend
on revenues paid through user fees and revolving drug funds to cover recurrent costs of
facilities (Ron et al. 2010).
In addition to the problems of low coverage and insufficient funding, high drop-out rates
from CBHI (estimated at 6 percent (WHO 2009)) and late payments have been reported.
For example, in 2009 an average of 54 percent of members made their payments during
the three month warning period that is imposed after payment is due (WHO 2009). A
recent study describes various management challenges of the scheme, including
insufficient staffing, insufficient technical capacities and scarce financial resources at all
levels (Goursat 2010). Anecdotal evidence also claims that the scheme sutTers from
adverse selection - a phenomenon that is explored in this thesis.
3.3.2 Overview of SHl scheme
In Lao PDR, social health insurance is part of a larger social security programme and
covers employees in the private formal sector (including previously state-owned
enterprises) and their dependents. The social security scheme consists of a
comprehensive package of health care and other benefits, including medical care, paid
sick leave, paid maternity leave, death benefits, employment injury or occupational
disease benefits, retirement pensions, life insurance, and disability insurance. Upon
enrolment in social security, a firm is automatically enrolled in all social security
benefits and therefore, enrolment in social health insurance (the focus of this study) is
linked to enrolment in the other benefit packages by design. Introduced in 1999, the
scheme is managed by the Social Security Organization (SSO), a semi-autonomous
organisation within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Funding for the scheme
is generated from a combination of employee and employer contributions, which are
dependent on employees' earnings and are paid through payroll taxes. Employees
contribute 4.5 percent of their earnings, while employers contribute 5 percent of each
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employee's earnings, up to a ceiling of US $175 per month. Enrolment in the scheme is
mandatory for all enterprises with at least 10 employees. However, the scheme is
currently only operating in four provinces (Vientiane Capital, Vientiane Province,
Savannakhet and Khammoune). Within the group of firms that were targeted by 2009,
only 30 percent were enrolled.P With rapid expansion of the labour force, and various
amendments to the labour law requiring smaller companies to enrol in social security,
plans are underway to expand the scheme in order to reach people outside major urban
centres but implementation has so far been slow. More details of the scheme are
provided in Table 3.4 above.
The health care fund (referred to as SHI) receives the largest share of employee and
employer funds and is also subsidised by the government to finance outpatient and
inpatient care, and prescription drugs available at public hospitals. There are no co-
payments or limits on the number of contacts or services provided. Public providers are
paid by capitation, which is fixed at LAK 80,000 (US$ 9.40) per insured person per year
(Thome and Pholsena 2009).
The SSO depends on its public relations department to stimulate enrolment among its
target population. The public relations team makes announcements through the radio and
daily newspapers, and also convenes meetings on an ad hoc basis with large companies
(100 employees+) to raise awareness about the scheme and encourage enrolment.
However, the public relations department was staffed by only five people in 2009 and
lacks the financial resources and capacity to effectively stimulate enrolment among the
target population (Personal communication with Social Security Office December 17,
2008).
Social security legislation and enforcement
According to the SSO Decree 207, enrolment in social security is mandatory for all
enterprises with at least 10 employees (Social Security Organization 1999). However, the
decree is difficult to enforce for two main reasons. First, Decree 207 is a ministerial
decree, and therefore by nature, weaker than a law promulgated by the President.
Second, no regulatory procedures are in place to enact penalties for non-compliant firms.
3lCalcuiation by the author, based on Social Security Database, 2009
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Although an inspection unit at SSO was introduced in 2008 with a mandate of
identifying non-compliant enterprises, at the present time only verbal warnings can be
issued. Furthermore, the SSO office is understaffed and has very little capacity to carry
out inspections: like the public relations department, the inspection unit was staffed by
only five people in 2009.
In an effort to strengthen the regulatory framework around social security, the SSO is
planning to 1) draft guidelines for inspections and sanctions for non-compliant
companies; and 2) work with other line ministries to promulgate a law specific to social
security. The new law will mandate enrolment of all enterprises with at least one
employee (Personal communication with Social Security Office December 17, 2008).
Although the Labour Law (2006) mandates that "all labour units must participate
In...social security", the language is vague in that it does not specifically define the term
"labour unit" or the minimum number of employees that constitute a "unit"(2006). The
implications of this vague description of the target group are discussed in Chapter 7 on
SHI enrolment.
In summary, low enrolment in social security can be attributed, at least in part, to the
small size of the formal sector, limited geographic reach of the scheme (4 provinces
only), lack of enforcement and weak regulatory structure, and limited capacity of the
SSO to attract new members through scheme promotion. Thus, social security effectively
functions as a voluntary scheme. Therefore, understanding the factors that influence
enrolment, as well as employers' perspectives on social security, will help to inform
strategies to expand and improve the scheme.
This chapter has given an overview of the study setting and has described the insurance
schemes that will be studied in the thesis. The following chapter will present the
methodology; subsequent chapters will present the results from three sub-studies; and a
final chapter will discuss the policy implications of the findings.
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Chapter 4. Methods
4.1lntroduction
Building upon the literature review in Chapter 2 and the health financing context
described in Chapter 3, this chapter describes and justifies the choice of the research
methods. The chapter first presents the aim of the study and revisits the objectives that
were defined in Chapter 1. Next, the conceptual framework that was developed to guide
the methodology is presented. The methodology for the overall study is then described,
followed by individual descriptions of the CBHI and SHI sub-study methods. With the
description of each sub-study, potential limitations of the overall design and sources of
bias are discussed. The methods presented in this chapter cover all aspects of the study
approach, with the exception of the analytical approach, which is included in each of the
three results chapters. Discussion of the policy implications of the findings is reserved
for the concluding chapter of the thesis.
4.2 Research aim and objectives
Aim
The aim of the thesis is to generate new knowledge about the factors affecting enrolment
in health insurance and the impacts of insurance on utilisation and financial protection,
thereby contributing to the ongoing dialogue regarding options for expanding health
insurance in Laos and other countries.
Objectives
The specific objectives of the thesis are as follows:
1. To explore the household and village-level determinants and barriers related to
enrolment in CBHI in Lao POR;
2. To measure the extent to which enrolment in CBHI facilitates access to health
care services and offers financial protection to insured individuals by using a
robust methodological approach;
3. To explore the firm-level determinants and barriers related to enrolment in social
health insurance;
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4. To identify the opportunities and challenges of expanding health insurance to the
informal and formal sectors in Laos and internationally.
4.3 Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework shown in Figure 4.1 integrates economic theory and evidence
from the empirical literature into a model of health-seeking behaviour. Economic theory
suggests that the demand for health care is derived from the demand for health. As
illustrated in the bottom left of the framework, individuals invest in health through use of
health services as well as through diet, exercise and other investments that are expected
to improve health. Similarly, firms invest in their employees (by offering benefits such as
health care that improve their well-being) as a way of increasing productivity among
employees and maximizing profit.
The top left of the framework illustrates how the demand for CBHI is shaped by factors
at the individual, household and village levels. These factors might include education,
exposure to CBHI, and certain elements of scheme design such as terms for premium
payment. Similarly, the demand for SHI is shaped by determinants at the firm level, such
as firm size, education of the company head, and wage levels. Given that health care is
considered to be a normal good (with a positive income elasticity of demand),
households or firms with higher revenues are expected to be more likely to enrol in
insurance. The expectations about the relationship between size of firm and enrolment in
social security are less clear, however. On one hand, larger firms are more likely to have
a lower variance of medical expenditure and are therefore less likely to need insurance to
smooth expenditure. On the other hand, larger firms have higher revenues and therefore
should be more likely to be able to afford, and enrol in, social security. This trend of
larger firms enrolling was expected by key informants who were interviewed prior to the
study. However, after controlling for revenues it seems more likely that smaller firms
would be more likely to enrol in SHI, as these firms have more to lose from a few serious
illnesses in a given year.
The demand for health insurance (whether at the individual, household or firm level) is
also influenced by the need for health care services. Individuals (or households or firms)
often have a better understanding of their need for health care than do insurers and this
need influences their likelihood of enrolling. This information asymmetry contributes to
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a distortion in the market for health insurance (due to adverse selection). Thus,
households with ill family members are expected to be more likely to purchase health
insurance, as doing so allows them to reduce uncertainty due to illness. In contrast,
households that are relatively healthy will be less likely to purchase health insurance. At
the firm level, adverse selection can come about if firms with greater exposure to
occupational risks are 'more likely to enrol in health insurance. Moreover, when
mandatory enrolment is not enforced within firms and healthy individuals are permitted
to opt-out of social security, adverse selection can result and can lead to poor risk-
pooling.
Expected utility theory assumes that the demand for health insurance is also influenced
by the desire to reduce uncertainty and that the demand for health insurance should be
particularly high for risk averse households. Enrolment in CBHI decreases uncertainty of
health expenditures, which leads to increased utility. Thus, risk-averse households should
be more likely to enrol in health insurance relative to more risk-tolerant households.
While individuals and households seek to maximise utility, firms seek to maximise
profits. Incentives for maximizing profits will therefore differ depending on the health
care financing arrangements of a firm. In Laos, firms are required by the Labour Law to
pay for health care for their employees directly. For such firms, insurance can help to
either minimise costs that they would otherwise incur in the face of unexpected illness.
This allows them to maximize profits. Given the profit-maximizing behaviour of firms,
firms in which employees have a greater occupational risk (e.g."·higher number of
injuries, higher rates of illness, etc.) will be more likely to purchase health insurance than
firms that perceive themselves to be "low risk".
Despite the wide acceptance of expected utility theory, it is important to note that
"reduced risk" is not necessarily attained by purchasing insurance: in some contexts,
enrolment in insurance may actually increase risk, especially when insurance is a
relatively new concept and when it is not clear that the expected pay-offs will outweigh
the costs of enrolling. For example, in an environment where quality of care is poor (e.g.,
the public health care system in Laos), individuals, households, and firms may perceive
the option to purchase insurance as more costly or risky than using care at the time it is
needed at alternative sites (e.g., private sector).
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of the determinants and impacts of enrolment in health
insurance
Determinants of DemBod for HC Bnd Insu'nnce
Supply of Health Care:
Quality, provider
payments, treatment by
staff, availability of drugs,I+----------i etc,
National & International Goals
CBHI
enrolment
SHI
enrolment
Universal coverage
Demand for health
ca re services
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I-----~ of health care
lncreased risk-
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Once enrolled, insurance is expected to increase the demand for health care by lowering
the price of care at the point of service delivery. The lower price for the insured
represents a downwards movement along the demand curve, which results in insured
individuals demanding more services. Thus, insurance can lead to an increase in use of
services. Given that CBHI and SHI in Laos both provide full coverage for outpatient and
inpatient services, with no copayments, it is expected that among those who use services,
the insured will incur lower out-of-pocket expenditures than the uninsured. Insurance
also increases risk-pooling across individuals and across time. Consequently, health
insurance is expected to serve as a vehicle for achieving national and international goals,
i.e., universal coverage; increased revenues to the health sector; improved access to
health care services; increased financial protection; improved health; and ultimately,
poverty reduction and economic development. (Improved health leads to increased
productivity, which leads to economic development and reduced poverty). Furthermore,
increased revenues generated from health insurance can translate into increased
investments in the health sector (assuming the political will to invest in health care is
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present), thereby improving the supply of health care (top right of framework). Supply-
side factors in both the health care system (e.g., quality) and within the scheme (e.g.,
management of insurance schemes) influence the demand for health care among
households and firms: at a given price, improved quality, trust and promotion of schemes
can increase the demand for health care (and health insurance).
This framework is useful for understanding the role that health insurance can play in
helping a country to achieve both health and non-health objectives. Using this framework
to guide the methodology helps to move beyond analysis of individual schemes and
explore interactions with broader health system objectives - a recommendation made
by critics of earlier CBHI evaluations (Bennett 2004; Carrin et al. 2005b). It also
suggests a series of hypotheses to be investigated in the empirical sections of the thesis.
4.4 Methodology for overall research study
This research study comprises three sub-studies and employs a mix of quantitative and
qualitative methods. Table 4.1, below, summarises the objective and methods for each
sub-study. A timeline, which includes all components of the study, is also shown in
Figure 4.2.
Table 4.1 Summary of oblectives and methods for sub-studies
Sub- Objectives Primary Methods Results
study (Secondary methods used for background Chapter
research)
# t. Enrolment in CBHI (Key informant interviews with CBHI and hospital 5
staff; exploratory focus group discussions); household
and village surveys; focus group discussions
2 #2. Impact of CBHI Household survey, with data collected for all 6
individuals; vill~e survey; focusgro~ discussions
3 # 3. Enrolment in SHI Firm survey; (review of legislation and documents; 7
key informant interviews; secondary data analysis of
Lao Economic Census; Excel projections of coverage
expansion scenarios)
1,2 & #4.Opportuni ties/ challenges Analysis of results from sub-studies 1, 2 & 3 8
3 of expanding health insurance (Document reviews; discussions)
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4.4.1 Development of the research objectives
The CBHT study" was part of an ongoing effort by the World Bank to strengthen the
evidence base for health financing decision-making in Lao PDR and to help the
government develop a long term vision for health financing reform. I became involved in
the World Bank project in May 2008, with the specific objective of designing and
carrying out a study on health financing that would serve as my PhD research, and would
al 0 be part of the World Bank's health financing programme in Laos. As principal
investigator, I took primary responsibility for all aspects of the study. Prior to my
involvement in this study, discussions were held between the World Bank, WHO and the
MOH regarding the need for a study on CBHI, and funding from the World Bank had
been provisionally approved. My task was to hold discussions with the staff in the CBHf
office (health insurance division), World Bank, WHO and other partners, and to identify
re earch questions that were both relevant to the Government of Laos and would make
an important contribution to the health financing literature. r therefore reviewed all
34 Although there are two CBID sub-studies (one examines enrolment and the other examines impacts), the
same design was used for both sub-studies and therefore the "CBHl study" refers to the overall study.
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documents related to the CBHI programme (including draft decrees, reports, and
studies), attended health financing meetings, and visited with other researchers in Laos to
solicit feedback on logistical and cultural challenges of conducting fieldwork in the
country. This "information gathering phase" allowed me to become familiar with the
health financing context and to identify the research and policy priorities of the
government and its partners. This process also prevented duplication of efforts and
ensured that policyrnakers, donors, researchers, and other users of the information were
consulted during the research design phase.
During the information gathering process, discussions revealed that there was a gap in
knowledge about the social security scheme and that it would be helpful to learn more
about the challenges of expanding coverage of social health insurance to the formal
private sector. Therefore, a separate proposal for funding from the World Bank was
developed and was subsequently approved. Thus, in addition to designing a study that
fills gaps in the international literature, this research was intended to inform health policy
in Laos. The study answers a direct call from the Lao Minister of Health for high quality
research studies to guide health policy decision-making on risk-protection schemes."
4.4.2 Roles and responsibilities
It is important to recognise that there was substantial overlap between my PhD study and
the work that I conducted for the World Bank. I also carried out additional work for the
World Bank that is not presented here. Throughout the study period, I received guidance
from my supervisor at the World Bank, Magnus Lindelow. This support was
instrumental in helping me think through the study designs, designing the questionnaires,
and directing me to key stakeholders who I consulted during the process (e.g.,
government stakeholders, international experts, etc.). Magnus also provided guidance
with the analytical approach and provided feedback on policy notes that were developed
based on the study findings. However, throughout the process I was given the freedom to
work independently to ensure that I would meet the requirements for the PhD.
35 In a health financing meeting in Vientiane in June 2008, several government ministries, international
organisations and implementing agencies discussed the need to overcome barriers to expansion of risk-
protection schemes. The Minister of Health, in his keynote address, emphasised the need for high quality
research studies to guide health policy decision- making on this topic.
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Under my supervision and with funding from the World Bank, Indochina Research Laos
(IRL), a local research finn, was hired through a competitive process to carry out the
data collection, data entry, and preliminary cleaning for all components of the study. IRL
has extensive experience with the methods applied in this study (household surveys,
focus group discussions (FGDs), and enterprise surveys), and is skilled at all aspects of
survey implementation.
IRL assigned three teams to carry out the various components of the studies. The first
research team was tasked with implementing a CBHI survey" and included 32 staff
members: 24 data collectors; 6 data collection supervisors; one senior field supervisor
and an operations manager. The second team carried out FGDs and included one local
moderator with extensive experience conducting FGDs in the context of health and
development projects in Laos, one note taker, and one field supervisor. The third team
was assigned to a finn survey (for the SHI study) and included six data collectors, one
field supervisor, and an operations manager. In collaboration with the field supervisors
for the CBHI and SHI studies I co-led the training and pilot testing for all three study
components. I supervised all the training and pilot-testing (7 weeks in total), as well as
the first two weeks of the CBHI survey and the first week of the SHI finn survey. I was
present for the exploratory FGDs and FGD pilot tests but did not attend the final round
of FGDs, due to the risk of introducing bias. During the rest of the data collection period,
I communicated with the project director and field supervisors on a weekly basis at a
minimum, although often correspondence occurred daily over email and Skype.
With my training and supervision, IRL was responsible for data entry for all surveys,
translation of all open-ended responses in the finn survey, and transcription and
translation of the CBHI FGDs. Further details of these procedures are discussed in
forthcoming sections of this chapter.
4.4.3 Ethical approval
The study meets international ethical standards and posed little risk to participants.
Formal approval of the study was granted by the ethics committees at the National
Institute of Public Health in Laos and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
36 The CBHI survey includes both a household and village survey.
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Medicine (LSHTM) (See approval notices in Appendix AI). Formal procedures were
required before data collection could begin and these are described, along with a
description of the consent process, under each component of the study.
4.5 Methodology for CBHIstudies
The CBHI study includes two sub-studies: the first on enrolment in CBHI and the second
on the impacts of CBHI on access to services and financial protection. However, one
design was used for both sub-studies and is therefore described as the "CBHI study
design".
4.5.1 CBHI research questions
To achieve the study objectives, the research questions in Table 4.2 were defined.
Specific hypotheses that were tested are included in the respective results chapters.
Research Questions
Table 4.2 Research questions and study objectives for CBHI sub-studies
Study Objectives
• What is the typical profile of households that enroll do not enrol in
CBHI?
• What is the relative importance of factors driving households'
enrolment in CBHI (e.g., health status, risk preferences,
socioeconomic status, education levels, exposure to CBHI, etc.)?
• How do enrolment levels differ across villages and what are the
reasons for these differences?
• Are CBHI members more likely to use health care services than an
equivalent comparison group of uninsured individuals?
• Does CBHI membership influence the source of health care
delivery among those using services?
• Do insured users of health care incur lower out-of-pocket payments
for health care than uninsured users?
• Are CBHI members with an inpatient visit less likely than
uninsured users of inpatient services to employ coping strategies
(e.g., borrowing, selling assets) to pay for health care?
• How do outcomes (e.g., utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures)
differ across socioeconomic groups?
• What are the prospects for increasing coverage of CBHI? }
How can Lao PDR progress towards universal coverage given the
current health financing arrangements?
•
Objective 1. To explore the
household and village-
level determinants and
barriers related to
enrolment in CBHI.
Objective 2. To measure
the extent to which
enrolment in CBHI
facilitates access to health
care services and offers
financial protection to
households.
Objective 4. To identify
the opportunities and
challenges of expanding
health insurance in Laos
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4.5.2 Overview of the study design
The CBHI study used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. The main method
was a cross-sectional case-comparison survey, combined with a qualitative component
(both prior to and following the household survey). The ex-ante qualitative work
consisted of key informant interviews and exploratory focus group discussions and was
used to understand better how CBHI had been implemented and which factors were
expected to affect selection into the scheme, thereby informing the study design. Surveys
were administered to households and villages: the household survey also collected
information about all individuals living in the household (using a proxy respondent).
Survey data were analysed in Stata 10.1 using propensity score matching, which controls
for bias due to observable differences. The ex-post qualitative component consisted of
six focus group discussions and was used to help interpret quantitative findings.
4.5.3 Justification of study design
Although randomised control trials (RCTs) have traditionally been viewed as the gold-
standard for evaluations, there is growing evidence that non-randomised designs may be
more appropriate for evaluating complex public health interventions (Black 1996;
Victora et al. 2004) and that more attention need be paid to understanding why
interventions work, rather than whether or not they work' (Craig et al. 2008; Deaton
2010). The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods used in this study
facilitates this understanding. In designing this study, a RCT was not considered feasible
in Laos for several reasons. First of all, it is very rare that health insurance is assigned
randomly - one exception is the RAND Health Insurance study in the US (Newhouse
and Insurance Experiment Group 1993). Given that CBHI is a voluntary insurance
programme, random allocation into the insurance scheme itself would not have been
possible. Theoretically, it could have been possible to offer the programme to villages
using clustered randomisation, but there were two issues that made this option
suboptimal. First, given the low uptake levels of CBHI in Laos, the number of enrolees
would have been uncertain. Moreover, members can drop-out of the scheme on a
monthly basis, posing a risk of high attrition rates. A second argument against a RCT is
that a considerable amount of time would be required between the point at which CBHI
was launched and the measurement of outcomes. One year between recruitment and
measurement of outcomes was considered the minimum amount of time that would be
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needed to reliably examine differences on relatively rare outcomes such as inpatient
visits. During this period of at least one year, contamination caused by overlapping and
poorly coordinated donor activities was highly likely. Between 2005 and 2008, 21
different donors were operating in Laos, with 71 separate projects implemented in the
health sector alone (MOH and WHO 2010). Thus, the risk of contamination of either
control or intervention areas during the study period would be unforeseeable and much
more difficult to prevent than in a cross-sectional study and would likely impact on the
.outcomes of interest. Moreover, waiting one year between the launch of additional CBHI
pilots and measurement of outcomes would not allow the findings to be fed into the
government's health financing strategic planning process.
Although the next best approach to a RCT was a longitudinal prospective study that
compared a group of CBHI households with uninsured households, this approach was
not considered feasible for the same reasons that a RCT was not considered feasible: the
likelihood of high attrition rates; risk of contamination; and the need to generate timely
research findings. Another factor that significantly weakened the case for a RCT or a
longitudinal prospective design was the uncertain donor support for CBHI in the future.
At the time the study was designed it was known that WHO would be terminating its
support to the CBHI office and that AFD would be taking over in only some of the WHO
districts. Termination of support during the study period could affect study outcomes and
bias results.
After ruling out both a RCT and a longitudinal prospective design, the next best
approach was a case-comparison design (with a sample selected from districts where
insurance had been operating for at least two years), combined with a qualitative
component. This design was expected to overcome the problems mentioned above. For
example, to prevent contamination it was possible to confirm with the MOH and other
donors whether particular programmes were operating in the study areas (e.g., health
equity funds supporting CBHI, NOO support for health care or CBHI premiums, etc.)
and exclude these areas from the sample. A cross-sectional study also eliminated the
potential for attrition or potential loss of donor support during the study period.
Moreover, the desired sample size of eligible households (i.e., those who had been
enrolled for one year) could be ensured prior to data collection. A final advantage of a
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cross-sectional design is that it allowed results to be generated relatively quickly, thereby
feeding into the health financing strategic planning process that began in Laos in 2009.
Despite the advantages of using a cross-sectional study, there were some concerns that
needed to be addressed - the main one being that a cross-sectional design does not
allow for control of time-invariant unobservables (as well as other types of
unobservables) and could lead to bias in the estimation of treatment effects. Given the
voluntary nature of CBHI, it is likely that households who choose to enrol in CBHI are
inherently different from households who choose not to enrol. Households may enrol due
to a greater need for health services, and because they anticipate benefits from the
scheme. This need for health services produces selection into insurance and if not
observed, can lead to bias when measuring outcomes of interest. Therefore. an attempt
was made in this study to minimise selection bias by: 1) making an effort in the design
phase to understand both the implementation of the programme and the most important
factors affecting household selection into the scheme. thereby allowing these factors to
be measured in the survey and controlled for in the analysis; 2) relying on a rich-dataset
of variables collected using primary data, which allowed for careful measurement of
factors that often result in selection bias due to unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., multiple
measures of health status, preferences for different types of care. risk preferences, etc.);
and 3) using propensity score matching (PSM) in the analysis, which minimises bias due
to observable characteristics and allows for heterogeneity in treatment effects. Although
other approaches for the analysis were carefully considered, the decision to use PSM was
based on the assumption that selection into the programme was based on observable
variables. This assumption could be made only after a thorough understanding of the
programme and of the factors most likely to influence enrolment. The justification for
using PSM is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
In summary, there was a strong rationale for choosing a cross-sectional survey with a
qualitative component. Several techniques were used to overcome problems that have
traditionally been associated with cross-sectional studies, such as the failure to
adequately control for risk and health variables, which can lead to selection bias. The ex
ante and ex post qualitative work also added value to the overall design in that it
informed the questionnaire and facilitated interpretation of the quantitative findings.
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Further details of the design, and the rationale for the design, are discussed in Section
4.5.5.1 (Design ofCBHI survey).
4.5.4 Pre-survey work
As mentioned above, before designing the methodology for the household survey it was
important to fully understand the CBHI scheme, its implementation, and the most
important factors affecting selection into CBHI. Therefore, over the course of a few
weeks, I conducted several key informant interviews with staff from the CBHI office and
hospitals where the scheme is operating to learn more about the programme and its
implementation. The interviews with staff at the CBHI office were conducted in English,
and interviews with the hospitals were conducted in the Lao language, with the
assistance ofa translator. The deputy director of the CBHI office accompanied me during
visits to the hospital, during which time we met with the account managers" for the
CBHI scheme and learned about the process that a CBHI member goes through when
seeking care at the hospital. We also examined the account manager's records to see how
the hospital identifies whether a household is enrolled in CBHI and whether they are up
to date on their contribution payments. A considerable amount of time was also spent
mapping the locations of the districts and villages where CBHI had been implemented
and the corresponding dates when CBHI was launched, and identifying the criteria for
implementation in those areas. These discussions revealed that the CBHI scheme had not
been implemented randomly, as discussed in Chapter 3. These details of implementation
informed the study design and will be' discussed in the next section (Section 4.5.5.1,
Design ofCBHI Survey).
Following the key informant interviews, two exploratory focus group discussions
(FODs) were held. The purpose of these discussions was to 1) identify the most
important household-level factors affecting selection into the scheme; 2) identify or
validate the meanings of various concepts that would be used in the questionnaires (e.g.,
risk, trust); and 3) explore the extent to which participants would be willing to share
experiences and speak openly and honestly about their feelings towards CBHI. Both
37 The account manager at the district hospital is hired by the CBHI office (MOH) and is responsible for
collecting contributions from the village collectors and keeping up-to-date records regarding which
households are enrolled and have made monthly payments. The account manager also keeps all CBHI
member books, in which all visits made by the CBHI members are recorded. All records, with the
exception of one hospital, were paper-based at the time of the study.
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FODs took place in Ban Xokkham, Saysettha District" in Vientiane Capital and were
moderated by the director of Indochina Research. All discussions took place in the Lao
language. I observed and listened to all discussions with the assistance of a translator.
The discussions revealed that participants were willing to share experiences and even
criticise the scheme and the government health care system. This was unexpected given
that previous research had reported cultural constraints to obtaining accurate information
through FGDs and interviews (due to "politeness bias") (Jacobs 2008; Patcharanarumol
2008). It seems that in urban and semi-urban areas, where this study was conducted,
people are very willing to speak openly while in rural areas (the location of the previous
studies). people may be more reserved.
4.5.5 Design and implementation of CBHl survey
The details of the CBHI survey are described under three main sub-headings: design;
implementation; and preparation for analysis.
4.5.5.1 Design o/CBHI Survey
Study design
CBHI and comparison households were both selected from villages where CBHI had
been running for at least two years. (This design is herein referred to as the "within
village comparison" design). A great deal of time was spent considering the trade-offs
between the within-village comparison design and an alternative design in which the.
comparison group would be selected from non-CBHI villages (herein referred to as the
"across-village comparison" design). The Within-village comparison design was optimal
for the enrolment sub-study because it allows exploration of the reasons that some people
in a given village join health insurance while others do not join. However, it was not
immediately clear which option was optimal for measuring impacts. The across-village
comparison design would result in a comparison group that has not been given the option
to enrol, which would reduce the risk of household selection bias. In contrast, the within-
village comparison group would be selected from a group that has explicitly declined
enrolment in CBHI, increasing the risk of household-level selection bias. Although the
38 The reason for choosing Xaysettha district for pre-piloting and piloting are described under "pilot
testing". .
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across-village comparison design initially seemed the most attractive option, closer
examination of programme implementation revealed that this design could lead to
significant village-level selection bias, which was expected to pose a bigger problem
than household level selection bias in this context. This is because CBHI has not been
rolled out randomly, as revealed by the exploratory work. In most districts CBHI has
only been offered to villages within close proximity to the contracting hospital. In fact, in
some districts, the villages that are not targeted are not accessible by road. In other
districts, CBHI has been offered to all villages, making it difficult to find an
"unexposed" comparison group within the district. Through discussions with the CBHI
team, it was confirmed that many of the non-targeted villages were expected to be very
different from the targeted villages not just in terms of distance to facilities and access,
but also with respect to socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and other village-level factors
that may not easily be observed. Given that CBHI had been implemented using a very
selective approach, the across-village comparison design would introduce strong village
level effects that are likely to contribute to selection bias due to unobservables. The
exploratory work revealed that these village effects are likely to be stronger than
household-level effects in determining enrolment. The across-village comparison design
was also expected to lead to poor balancing on observable characteristics (because the
CBHI and comparison villages are very different on measurable characteristics). As
discussed in the literature review and in the forthcoming impact evaluation (Chapter 6)
poor balancing on observables is a problem when using PSM because it reduces the
number of observations on the common support and, if groups are very different, could
lead to a small sample with which to measure impacts."
39 Considering trade-offs between selecting a comparison group from exposed villages vs. unexposed
villages is not a decision that is unique to this study. A previous study (Wagstaff et al. 2009) considered
these issues when designing an evaluation of the NCMS in China and that study was useful in informing
this design. The China study benefitted from using a survey that had already been conducted in counties
with and without insurance and the authors were therefore able to select the comparison group from both
targeted and untargeted villages and compare the results. The authors later decided that unobservables
affecting selection into insurance at the household level were potentially more problematic than at the
village level and therefore selected the comparison group from untargeted villages. Since this study was
designed, at least two other studies have considered the issue of whether to select the comparison group
from unexposed areas or from non-participants in targeted areas and both have had the luxury of sampling
from both groups, and then made a decision to use the unexposed comparison group to estimate treatment
effects (Wang et al. 2009; Aggarwal 2010). However, implementation of the scheme in Laos was very
different from implementation of CBHI in the other countries, the major factor being that districts and
villages where CBHI had been implemented were very different from non-exposed areas.
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While the within-village comparison design increases the likelihood of household level
selection bias, the pre-survey work provided a good understanding of the factors
affecting enrolment. It was therefore possible to include in the questionnaire, all known
potential factors affecting enrolment including several measures of health status and risk,
which were used to control for adverse selection. Availability of different health care
options and proxies for preferences for modem health care were also measured through
the survey (See Data collection below for more details). Thus, given the strong
knowledge of the programme and rich dataset that would be generated through the
questionnaires, the within-village comparison design was considered optimal as it was
expected to result in less bias and better balancing on observables. Furthermore, this
design could be used to study both enrolment and impacts (on utilisation, out-of-pocket
expenditures, source of care and coping mechanisms).
Sampling
A sample of 3000 households (14,804 individuals) was selected from 87 villages where
CBHI had been operating for at least two years. The enrolment rate in these villages was
15.7 percent, with a median enrolment rate of 12.2 percent. The sample covered a total of
six districts in three provinces, and was drawn from urban and semi-urban areas,
reflecting the areas where CBHI has been implemented to date. For every CBHI
household recruited to the sample, two comparison households were selected (from the
same village): the reason for this ratio was to ensure that an adequate pool of comparison
households would be available for matching in the impact evaluation. Thus, the sample
included 1000 CBHI households and 2000 comparison households. This size was
informed by sample size calculations, which are outlined later in this section. The CBHI
households in the sample comprise 30 percent of the CBHI households across the six
districts. The sample was selected using a 3-step sampling approach, described below."
1. Purposive selection of districts: Six districts were purposively selected: Sissattanak;
Hatxaifong; Champasak; Keoudom; Viengkham; and Phonehong. The selection
criterion was that CBHI was launched in the district at least two years prior to the
survey. Seven out of the 10 districts where the scheme was operating met this
40 I selected the districts and villages in the sample and trained the data collection team to randomly select
the households in the village.
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criterion; the seventh district was excluded due to the likelihood of contamination of
the comparison group, due to multiple donor projects taking place in that area, and
the cost constraints of conducting field work in a district that was relatively far away.
Figure 4.3 shows a map of the districts, with corresponding CBHI coverage rates.
2. Selection of clusters (villages) using probability proportional to size (PPS): A two-
stage cluster sample was selected using probability proportional to the number of
CBHI households in each village. This ensured that all CBHI households across all
eligible villages had an equal chance of being selected. Some large villages were
selected multiple times (i.e., because of their larger size they had a higher probability
of being selected more than once)."
3. Random selection of households: Within each cluster, 8 CBHI and 16 comparison
households were randomly selected. Where villages were selected more than once,
multiples of 8 CBHI and 16 comparison households were randomly selected. A
CBHI household was eligible for the study if it had been enrolled for at least one
year.42 Comparison households were eligible as long as they were not members of
another scheme or had not been enrolled in another scheme for at least one year."
The sampling frame used to select CBHI households was the most recent CBHI
member list that is maintained and updated monthly by the village collector. The
comparison households were selected from the village registry, which includes all
households in the village and is updated annually.
Each step of the sampling is outlined in further detail in Appendix Bland forms
designed to assist the research team in the sampling process are included in Appendix
B2. These forms were also used to collect up-to-date details about the size of CBHI and
4. To determine the size of the CBHI population in each village prior to the sampling, the CBHI office in
the MOH sent personnel to update information at the village level and to compile a list of all CBHI
villages and their respective numbers of CBHI members enrolled. This information is not routinely
collected by the CBHI office. but was collected specifically for this study.
42 It is important to distinguish the two year requirement for villages from the one year requirement for
households. The two year requirement for villages ensured that the sample was selected from villages
where the scheme was well established and where there would be a high likelihood of recruiting
households that had been enrolled for at least one year.
43 In the final sample, 199 comparison households (10 percent of the comparison group) were former
members of the scheme but had dropped out more than one year before the survey.
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comparison populations to be used for sample weighting." The median eligibility rate
for CBHI households (i.e., # of households that had been enrolled for one year/ # of all
CBHI households) was 94 percent. This high eligibility rate indicates that the eligible
households are representative of the total sample of CBHI households in the villages
where the sample was drawn.
Figure 4.3 Location and coverage rates of CBHl study districts
Viengkham district (urban)
• 614 households enrolled
• 9% enrolment rate in villages
• 19/19 villages with CBHI
Phonehong dist. (semi-urban)
467 households enrolled
15% enrolment rate in villages
24/59 villages with CBHI
Keoudom district (semi-u
• 722 households enrolled
• 21% enrolment rate in villages
• 31/31 villages with CBHI
txaifong district (urban)
252 households enrolled
4% enrolment rate in Villages
24/60 villages with CBHI
Sissattanak district (
• 603 households enrolled
• 8% enrolment rate in villages
• 40/40 villages with CBHI
•
• 31% enrolment rate in villages
• 24/92 villages with CBHI
Prior to selecting the sample, sample size requirements were calculated separately for
each outcome based on the expected differences between CBHI and comparison
households on utilisation and OOPs (i.e., the effect size). Various scenarios were
calculated using the 'sampsi' command in Stata, and adjustments were then made in
Excel to take into account the intracluster coefficient, illness and utilisation rates, and
44 I created sampling forms for the survey team so that they would have a systematic approach for selecting
the sample. At the same time that the sampling took place, the team was asked to record the following
information on the sampling sheet: the number of eligible CBHl households (i.e., those enrolled for at least
one year); the total number of CBHI households; and the total number of non-CBHI households. The data
from these sampling sheets were entered with the survey data and were used to construct the appropriate
sampling weights.
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potential loss of observations due to the use of PSM. Several assumptions needed to be
made to calculate the sample size." The assumptions for the calculation for out-of-
pocket expenditures yielded the largest sample size requirement and are given below:
• Effect size: The effect size of 25 percent was used in the calculations, which means
that the study attempted to detect a 25 percent difference in means between CBHI
and comparison individuals with respect to their out-of-pocket expenditures. This
difference is smaller than what other impact evaluations of health insurance in the
region have detected (Wagstaff2007; Wagstaff et al. 2009). Because the data on out-
of-pocket expenditures are not normally distributed" the relative means between the
two population groups were estimated using the natural log. For example, a 25
percent difference in means in a skewed distribution is equal to In(1.25)=0.22
regardless of the value of the means. Therefore, the means of the two populations are:
ml=l; m2=1.78.
• lntracluster correlation: A value of 0.02 was used to estimate the intracluster
correlation. The World Bank LSMS survey manual states that this value for most
LSMS variables ranges from 0.01 to 0.10. Discussions with a statistician confirmed
that 0.05 is considered to be quite large and that 0.02 is an appropriate estimate for
health expenditures.
• Standard deviation of the outcome (OOPs): The standard deviation of OOPs was
taken from a study in Vietnam (Wagstaff2007), where health care costs are expected
to be similar to Laos (m=$196.76; sd= 667.32). The log of the standard deviation was
then used in the Stata calculation, given the skewed distribution of OOPs.
• Power = 90%; confidence level = 95%
• Potential loss of sample due to PSM: The use of PSM can substantially reduce the
sample size if a large number of observations are off the common support and
therefore, the sample size estimates were increased by another 10 percent to account
for this potential loss.
4' These assumptions were made after personal communication with Ben Armstrong. a statistician at
LSHTM. Other documents were also consulted to assist with sample size calculations: Data for Impact
Evaluation (World Bank 2007); LSMS survey manual (Grosh and Munoz 1996); and Stata help files.
46 The distribution of OOPs is not typically normal because of a high frequency of people not using health
care. The tails of the distribution can also be long due to a small frequency of very high spenders.
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The results showed that to detect a difference of 25 percent a total sample size of 1004
observations was required. However, utilisation of health care is quite rare (estimated at
1 in 5 individuals in a given year) in the general Lao population. Because OOPs are
measured only on the sample of individuals who use health care, the required sample size
of 1004 observations needed to be multiplied by five, giving a required sample size of
5020 observations. Thus, the actual sample size of 14,804 individuals'" (from 3000
households) was considered sufficient to detect a difference of 25 percent. In fact, the
actual sample is large enough to detect differences of 15 percent within a 99 percent
confidence interval. Such a large sample, relative to sample size calculations was
justified because it was not clear how many observations would be lost due to PSM.
There was also interest in analysing data by subgroups (e.g., inpatient visits only;
quintile analysis, etc.), which required a relatively large sample size. Given the large
sample of individuals, a 99 percent confidence interval was used for the impact
evaluation (which took place at the individual level), while a 95 percent confidence
interval was used to study enrolment (which took place at the household level).
Description of Questionnaires
Questionnaires were designed to be administered to the head of household where
possible and to collect information about household level characteristics, as well as
information about all individuals living in the household. Although the interviewee
answered questions on behalf of all household members, where possible, responses were
validated by other household members who were present during the interview and in
some cases modules were answered by different individuals (although some modules
required that the household head responded)." A particular emphasis of the
questionnaire was to capture self-selection into the scheme _. most importantly adverse
selection. As shown in the conceptual framework in Chapter 4, characteristics such as
presence of chronic illness, disabilities, pregnancies, or even different attitudes and
preferences for health care, have a direct effect on an individual's use of health services.
Controlling for the differences in these risk and health factors gives a more reliable
estimate of the effects of insurance on utilisation, expenditures, and other outcomes and
47 Out-of-pocket expenditures were measured at the individual level.
48 The consumption module was answered by the individual who purchases food in the local market; the
risk-perception module was answered by the head of the household to the extent that this was possible;
questions about health care use and expenditures were often validated by other household members.
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decreases the likelihood of selection bias. Because perceptions of "illness" and "poor
health" differ across households, this study used multiple measures of health status to
adequately capture factors affecting enrolment. Health status of all individuals in the
household was measured using four indicators: self-reported health on a scale of 1 to 549;
the presence of a chronic disease or disability; whether or not the individual had
difficulty performing activities in the past 3 months; and whether or not the individual's
health had deteriorated in the past year. These variables reflect three different categories
of health indicators that are typically used to measure health status: medical, functional,
and subjective (Wagstaff et al. 1991). O'Donnell et al. (2008) recommend using multiple
measures from these three categories because they can provide a better picture of the
distribution of health in a sample population relative to using just one measure
(O'Donnell et al. 2008).
Other types of risks were also measured in the questionnaire, including: age, presence of
elderly family members and children five years or below; number of women in the
household; number of births in the past year; and a pregnancy in the household. Given
the various theories described in Chapter 2 about the uncertain role of risk-aversion as a
determinant of enrolment in health insurance, a measure of risk-aversion was included in
the questionnaire to understand better the relationship between risk-aversion and
enrolment. The head of household's attitude towards risk was measured using an
experimental gambling approach with hypothetical payoff levels which, at the
maximum, represented slightly more than the average daily expenditure of an individual.
This question was adapted from a study in India by (Binswanger 1980) and used by
(Krishnan and Krutikova 2010). so In the analysis, the variable was dichotomised to
differentiate those who were completely risk-averse from those who will take at least
some risk.
49 Although this variable is referred to as "self-reported" health, the proxy respondent actually answered
the question for all household members.
so To measure risk preferences the head of household was presented with a gamble in which he/she was
asked to guess which hand contained money. The first option gave the same pay-out (S,OOO Kip) regardless
of the hand selected and was hence "risk-free" but in the next five bets, the stakes were gradually
increased, with the last choice being an "all-ot-nothing" risk. It was expected that only individuals who
were risk-loving would take this "all-ot-nothing" gamble, while only those who were completely risk-
averse would accept the "risk-free" gamble.
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Other variables in the household questionnaire measure preferences for modem health
care, for example, ethnicity and attitudes towards government health facilities.51 Laos is
comprised of several ethnic groups, and it is expected that some of these ethnic groups
have a preference for traditional care over modem care. Perceptions of quality of care at
the household and village level were also measured, as quality perceptions are expected
to influence enrolment. However, the household-level measure of quality perception is
likely to be endogenous in that CBHI members may have more contact with the health
system, which may influence their quality perceptions.52 Therefore, in the impact
evaluation only the village-level measure, which is expected to be less endogenous than
the household-level measure, was used to control for selection into the scheme. The
questionnaire also included sociodemographic characteristics, including an aggregate
consumption measure, which compiled data on the types of food and non-food items that
households purchased, produced themselves, or obtained through nonfinancial
transactions. Forty-one food items and 28 non-food items were included in the survey.
The recall period varied depending on the item but was either one, three, or twelve
months.
For each individual in the household, data were collected about illness, whether or not an
individual had an outpatient or inpatient visit, how many visits they had, how much they
spent, the length of hospital stay, and the source of care. A separate module also
collected data on coping mechanisms that the household may have used to pay for health
care.
The village questionnaire included questions about sociodemographic characteristics of
the village and village chief, political support for the schemes, exposure to CBHI and
SI To measure attitudes towards modem care, interviewees were presented with a small vignette describing
mild, moderate and severe health problems and asked where they would recommend that an uninsured
friend seek services. The results were expected to serve as a proxy for measuring whether a household uses
modern services.
52 To measure household level quality the head of the household was asked to rate the quality of services at
the district (or contracting) hospital, relative to other options in the area and was also asked whether or not
he/she would recommend a friend to seek care at the contracting hospital. The response was dichotomised
to differentiate those who rate the quality of services as high and would recommend services to a friend,
from those who rate the quality of services as mediocre or poor and would not recommend services to a
friend.
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CBHI campaigns, perceived quality of facilities'", access to different health care options
in the village, and other variables of interest. The English versions of the household and
village questionnaires are included in Appendices Cl and C2, respectively.
4,$.5.2 Implementation of CBBI survey
Formal procedures
In addition to receiving ethical approval for the study, two letters were required before
data collection could begin: I) a letter of approval from the MOH, which was presented
to villages prior to data collection; and 2) a letter from the CBHI office (MOH) to inform
provincial MOH offices of the fieldwork and ask for their cooperation (See Appendix A2
for both forms). The provincial MOH offices then notified the district health offices and
requested that one official be assigned to each district to work with the data collection
teams during the study. The role of the officials varied but tasks included scheduling
appointments with the village chief in advance of the survey, guiding the team to the
villages, and making formal introductions to the village chief.
As outlined in the ethics application, some Lao colleagues advised against obtaining
written consent from household survey respondents, explaining that participants would
feel uncomfortable with such a formal procedure. Thus, for the CBHI study, the ethics
committees in Laos and the UK granted approval for the researchers to obtain written
informed consent from the village chiefs on behalf of the interviewees in the village, and
verbal informed consent from households. In place of a signature by the interviewee, the
interviewer was asked to sign the consent form to confirm that he/she had received
verbal consent to proceed with the study.
Despite the apprehension around written consent, the research team discovered during
the pilot tests that most CBHI interviewees were eager to provide their signature on the
consent form and in most cases, written consent was given. One possible explanation for
the differences in preferences for consent procedures is that people in urban and semi-
urban areas, where the study was conducted, are accustomed to following official
procedures, whereas people in rural areas, where previous studies had problems with the
53 To measure village-level quality, the village chief was asked to rate the quality of the contracting
hospital relative to a variety of health care options. Results were compiled into three levels of quality
perceptions: high, medium and low.
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consent process, may be intimidated by such formal procedures. The information sheets
and consent forms for all the surveys are included in Appendix A4.
Training and pilot testing
In preparation for the survey, training and pilot-testing took place over 3.5 weeks in
January and February 2009, at which time survey instruments were translated into Laos,
back-translated into English and validated by the research team. The training included a
mix of classroom sessions and field training/piloting. During the classroom sessions, the
field supervisor and I (with the assistance of a translator) reviewed the questionnaires
aloud with the trainees to ensure each question was clear and that the translation was
accurate. The sessions also included role-play exercises, inwhich interviewers took turns
administering and answering the questionnaires. This process not only helped the
interviewers to gain hands-on experience in administering questionnaires but was also
useful in uncovering problems with the translation, skip patterns, and general flow of the
questionnaire. The training also covered interviewer techniques and ethical procedures.
The translated questionnaires and sampling procedures were pre-tested on a purposively
selected sample of households in the following six villages in Xaysettha district,
Vientiane Capital: Ban Xiengda, Ban Somsagna, Ban Nonekor Tai, Ban Nonekor Nuea
and Ban Nonesavang. All data collectors were required to conduct five pilot interviews,
at least one of which was observed by a supervisor, prior to commencing data collection.
After each pilot test, interviewers returned to the classroom to discuss any problems
encountered. The field supervisor and I then checked the questionnaires for accuracy and
added new codes for frequent "other" responses.
Data collection and field procedures
Interviewers were divided into six teams of five people, each consisting of four data
collectors and one data collection supervisor. The data collection supervisors directed the
activities of their teams and checked all questionnaires within 24 hours of completion,
while the field supervisor oversaw the work of all six teams and also performed random
checks on data collectors (See Quality Assurance below). The operations manager
sometimes assisted the field supervisor and data collection supervisors and was also
responsible for overseeing data entry.
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Data collection took place over six weeks from February 19 to April 3, 2009. Prior to
conducting the survey, interviewers verbally briefed participants on the study and
requested informed consent. from participants Households were also given an
information sheet, which contained information on which they had already been briefed.
Households were then screened to ensure eligibility. The screening ensured that CBHI
households had been enrolled in the scheme for at least one year, and that comparison
households were not members of another health insurance scheme (e.g., CSS, SSO,
private insurance, or health equity fund).s4Household questionnaires were administered
to the head of household, where possible, and information about all household members
(e.g., demographic characteristics, health status, use of health care, expenditures, etc.)
was collected. ss All interviews were conducted in the Lao language. The response rates
for the CBHI and non-CBHI strata were 99.7% and 96.9%, respectively.
Several rules were followed to prevent availability bias in the selection of households.
Given that many individuals were not at home during the day, many interviews took
place at night and on weekends. In some villages, interviews travelled to farmers' fields
to either conduct the interviews or to arrange an appointment for a later date.
Interviewers made three attempts to contact a household for an interview, after which
time a replacement household was randomly selected by the data collection supervisors.
Although sometimes the spouse of the household head was interviewed, the module on
risk preferences was specifically designed for the household head and therefore if the
head of household was not present for the interview, interviewers made an appointment
to return to the household.
The screening process sometimes revealed that there were not enough eligible
households in a village, either because CBHI households had dropped out or because
they had not been enrolled for one year. When this occurred, replacement villages and
households were selected using the same methodology used to select the original villages
and households. A total of six replacement villages and 108 replacement households
were selected.
54 Screening of eligible CBHI households had already been conducted prior to arrival at the household
(during the random selection process). Therefore, screening at the household level was only necessary to
confirm eligibility.
ss A household and its members included all individuals registered in the "family book" - an officiaI
documentation of families maintained by villages.
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After questionnaires were completed they were checked by supervisors and stored in a
locked box until the team returned to the IRL office in Vientiane, at which time
questionnaires were processed for data entry. Data were double-entered into a Microsoft
Access Database and random checks were performed by the operations manager.
Quality assurance procedures
The most important factor affecting quality of the data was the skill of the interviewer,
and therefore the training programme was quite rigorous. After three and a half weeks of
training for the CBHI survey and five pilot tests each, all interviewers were well
prepared to successfully administer the interviews. To ensure quality of data, 30 percent
of the interviews were "back-checked", meaning that households were visited a second
time by the data collection supervisor or field supervisor and asked to repeat randomly
selected questions. During this process, interviewees were also asked to assess the skills
and manner of the interviewer. In addition to the back-checks, 10 percent of the
interviews were directly observed by a supervisor. Written reports summarising the
results of interviews in each district, total progress made, and any problems encountered,
were submitted to me through email on a biweekly basis, (in addition to regular weekly,
and sometimes daily, contact by email and Skype when I was out of the country).
4.5.5.3 Data preparation
Cleaning and recoding
During the questionnaire design stage, a data analysis plan was developed for all relevant
outcomes. This plan was instrumental in guiding the data preparation and analysis. The
data were first cleaned and recoded where necessary. For the enrolment analysis,
household and village level datasets were merged. For the impact evaluation, datasets at
all three levels were merged (e.g., individual, household and village level) given that the
analysis was at the individual level. Although many variables were already described
above, some key variables were recoded or constructed:
Health status: Self-perceived health status was dichotomised to differentiate those who
rate their health as "less than good" from the remaining group. Dichotomising the
variable avoids the imposition of a scale that may not be comparable between individuals
(O'Donnell et al. 2008).
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Consumption: Data from the consumption module were aggregated to give annual per
capita consumption. Price data were obtained from a local market in each district and
given that the districts covered urban and semi-urban areas, prices were quite similar
between districts and the average price of goods was used for the entire sample. Health
care expenditures were excluded from the final consumption measure to prevent
endogeneity between consumption and enrolment. Per capita consumption rates were
calculated using the adult equivalent scaling factors that were used in the 3rd Lao
Economic and Consumption Survey (NSC 2004). The consumption unit is 1 adult
equivalent for the first adult in the family, 0.9 for other adults, 0.7 for children 7-15 years
and 0.4 for children below 7 years. This approach accounts for the fact that members of a
household share some expenses and that small children consume less food than an adult.
However, it is important to note that there was no empirical basis from Laos for the
choice of the adult equivalent parameter, but results from this approach were similar to
those using equal weights for all household members. Households were divided into per
capita consumption quintiles, with sampling weights applied to the quintiles.
Asset index: An asset index was constructed using principal components analysis (PCA)
of household assets and characteristics, following the methodology used by (Filmer and
Pritchett 2001).56 Sixteen variables were used to construct the index: the first principal
component captured 35 percent of the variation in wealth status. More details of the asset
index and its use are discussed in Chapter 5, while the steps taken to construct the index
and the results of PCA are given in Appendix B3.
Risk preferences: The risk preference variable was dichotomised to differentiate those
who were completely risk averse from those who will take at least some risk.
4.5.6 Design and Implementation of focus group discussions
Overview of focus group discussions
Focus group discussions were held in six villages where CBHI is running: three of the
groups included members and three included non-members. Thus, each group was
$6 This methodology is a tool for summarising variability among a set of variables and can be used to
reduce a large number of variables into fewer common linear combinations. The first principal component
is usually assumed to be the asset index as it explains the most variation in the sample (O'Donnell et al.
2008).
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relatively homogeneous in terms of their decision to enrol in health insurance. This
homogeneity of groups is expected to encourage more free-flowing conversations among
group participants (Morgan 1997). The non-member groups also included individuals
who had previously been members (drop-outs). The decision to combine non-members
and drop-outs was made after preliminary focus group discussions revealed that reasons
for never enrolling are similar to reasons for dropping out. The pilot test also confirmed
that it was feasible to interview both non-members and drop-outs together.
Sampling
Villages were purposively selected from the list of villages where the survey had already
been conducted. One FGD with members and one with non-members were carried out in
each of the three study provinces. An effort was made to choose villages with a range of
coverage levels (low, medium, and high), varying distance to the district hospital
(close/far away), and of varying size (small, medium and large). One village was also
selected because it had a high drop-out rate. Table 4.3 gives a profile of the six villages
in the sample.
A total of 55 individuals participated in the FGDs, with 7 to 10 in each group.
Participants were purposively selected from the household lists used in the survey but
were not necessarily interviewees from the survey. However, most were aware of the
survey because it had been conducted in their village. An effort was made to include
participants with a range of characteristics in an effort to obtain broad representation of
the community. However, village collectors were not invited to participate in the FGDs
given that their presence could bias the responses from participants. For example, in the
exploratory FGD the presence of the village collector seemed to influence participants to
say what they thought the village collector wanted to hear. This effect of hierarchy on
group dynamics has been cited in the literature (Kitzinger 1995). The criteria for
selecting participants are summarised in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3 Profile of focus group discussion sites
Village Ban Ban Ban Ban Ban Ban Phaphinh
Thamouong Chompettai Kaenghai PhonHang Donetalath
District Hatxaifong Sissattanak Keoudom Viengkham Champasak Champasak
(Province) (Vientiane (Vientiane (Vientiane (Vientiane (Champasack) (Cham pasack)
Cap.) Cap.) Prov.) Prov.)
Membership Members non- members non- members non-members
members members
Coverage 7% (low) 4% (low) -14% 38% (high) 16% 11% (low -
(medium) (medium) recently
decreased
from 24%)
# CBHI HHs 25 17 21 38 113 13
Distance to 4-5 km <1 km 10+ km to 10+ km to In village 18 km (was
contracting district provincial (district once close to
facility hospital hospital hospital was district
recently hospital)
moved here)
Village size 379 HHs 435 HHs 146 HHs 99 HHs 711 HHs 118 HHs
(medium) (medium) (small) (small) (large) (small)
Urban/semi- Urban Urban Semi-urban Urban Urban Urban
urban
Support Good Good Good Good Good Good
from village
chief
Main Factory Small trade; Farming Rice Farming; civil Farming;
occupation(s) workers; civil service; farming service; small small trade;
flower factory; and trade fishing;
plantation construction vegetable construction;
gardening civil service
Other Money Members CBHI Road access
collector complain of contracts poor during
very negative high with rainy season
about CBHI transport provincial
and may costs to hospital
drop out hospital -high drop-
outs
Table 4.4 Criteria for selecting focus group discussion participants
Members Non-members/
dro -outs
At least 1 has been in the scheme for < 1 year
At least 2 have been in the scheme for 2 years+
At I at 4 members are drop-outs (preferably 2 have dropped out in
last year)
At least 4 members have never enrolled in CBHI (and do not have
other insurance)
At least 1 has small children (or a woman is pregnant)
At least 1 HH has elderly family member(s)/ i elderly
At least 1 HH of an ethnic minority
Good mix of men and women
./
./
./
./
./
./
./
./
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Description of focus group discussion guide
The FOD guide was finalised following preliminary data analysis of the quantitative
work. Five main topics were explored, including: knowledge of CBHI (and details of
implementation); motivation for enrolment/non-enrolment/dropping-out; experiences and
perceptions of the scheme and of the health care system; impact of enrolment/non-
enrolment on use of services, expenditures, and source of care; and recommendations for
improving the scheme. The FOD guide was translated into Lao and discussions were
conducted using the translated topic guide. The English versions of the guides for
members and non-members are included in Appendix C4 and CS, respectively.
Training and pilot testing
A local female moderator with experience conducting FODs in Laos was. hired to
facilitate the discussions. Training and pilot testing were conducted over a four day
period in Vientiane Capital from May 11 to 14, 2009. On the first two days, the
moderator was briefed on the CBHI scheme and the study. On the last two days, two
pilot-tests were held: two with members and two with non-members and drop-outs. The
pilot tests were conducted in two villages: Ban Thaduea and Ban Somsanouk in
Hatxaifong district. I observed these discussions with the assistance of a translator. A
note taker and the field supervisor from IRL were also present.
Some potential concerns regarding group dynamics were addressed during the pilot test
and an effort was made to ensure each member felt comfortable and participated in the
discussions. One concern. was that some participants were more willing to participate
than others and could dominate the conversation. The moderator and I noticed in the
pilot FODs that people had different comfort levels, and some women were reluctant to
speak openly unless they were asked questions directly. Thus, it was important for the
moderator to draw people out as much as possible and give each participant an
opportunity to share their views and experiences.
Data collection and field procedures
Data collection took place over 6 days, from May 17 to May 22,2009. Prior to the day of
the FODs, the IRL field manager travelled to the selected villages to brief the village
chief on the study and to ask for informed consent. All village chiefs agreed to allow
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their villages to participate. The chief was then asked to participate in a short village
questionnaire that gives a profile of the community.
Focus group discussion participants were recruited on the day of the FODs. However,
given that some participants were working during the day, the discussions were
sometimes conducted in the evenings to prevent availability bias. The village chief and
village collector assisted the moderator with the recruitment of participants but the
moderator was instructed to prevent either of these individuals from influencing the
decision about which households to interview, as this could bias the responses. The role
of the village authorities was merely to help identify households with certain
characteristics. Several FODs have faced the problem of the participants not showing up
for the discussion (Miles and Huberman 1994) and therefore, the engagement of the
village authorities in the recruitment process was expected to increase the likelihood that
villagers would participate.
At the beginning of the interview, the moderator briefed the participants on the study and
asked for their verbal informed consent. An information sheet was also given to each
participant (See Appendix A4 for all consent forms and information sheets). The
moderator then briefed participants on the rules of the FOD and discussed the need to
keep all aspects of the discussion confidential. All discussions were audio recorded and
transcribed and lasted between 1.S to 2 hours.
4.5.7 limitations of study design
The main limitation of the methodology for the CBHI study is the cross-sectional nature
of the survey, which leads to the possibility of selection bias due to unobservables.
However, as discussed earlier, it is expected that the effect of any unobservables is
minimal because of the efforts that went into understanding the programme and
controlling for a wide range of variables expected to influence enrolment. Nevertheless,
the potential for bias should be considered and will be discussed further in relation to the
impact evaluation (Chapter 6).
Other concerns relate to bias in the focus group discussions. The first concern is the
effect that the moderator may have had on the participants. The interviewer, through
body language or tone of voice, could have influenced participants' responses (the
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"interviewer effect ''). Second, individuals could have exaggerated responses merely
because they were participants in an experiment (the "Hawthorne effect") (Berg 2001).
A similar concern is response bias, which occurs when participants craft their responses
according to what they think the interviewer wants to hear (Miles and Huberman 1994).
It is also possible that participants exaggerated negative opinions about CBHI in hopes of
improving the scheme in the future. On the other hand, it is possible that participants
were reluctant to speak too negatively about the CBHI scheme or the public health care
system in Laos for fear of information getting back to the government. Other concerns
may have arisen due to group dynamics of the FGDs. For example, the composition of
the group can prevent participants from speaking openly for a number of reasons. First, it
is possible that the participants with the "strongest voice" influenced the discussion in
one way or another. Second, the fact that male and female participants may interact
differently in mixed groups has been documented (Thome and Henley 1975). The
preliminary FGDs showed evidence of these effects on group dynamics. However, these
effects may have been minimized given that the moderator had extensive experience and
had no incentive to influence results, and because I was not present during the final
FGDs.
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4.6 Methodology for SHI study
This section describes the methodology used to study enrolment in social health
insurance.
4.6.1 SHI research questions
To achieve the study objectives, the research questions in Table 4.5 were defined:
Table 4.5 Research questions and study objectives for SHI sub-study
Research Questions Study Objectives
•
Objective 2. To explore the
firm-level determinants and
barriers related to enrolment in
social health insurance
•
Which employer characteristics are associated with enrolment
in social security (e.g., size of firm, type of ownership, risk
profile, etc.)?
What motivates employers to enrol/not enrol in social
security?
What have been firms' experiences with social security (e.g.,
impact on business, strengths and weaknesses of the scheme)?
Is the benefit package offered by non-enrolled firms
comparable to social security benefits?
Is there any evidence that firms are employing strategies to
evade social security contributions?
•
•
•
• What are the prospects for increasing coverage of SHI? } Objective 4. To identify the
How can Lao PDR progress towards universal coverage given opport~nities and .challenge~ of
the current health financing arrangements? expanding health insurance m
Laos
•
4.6.2 Study design and implementation
This sub-study used a cross-sectional case-comparison design of 130 firms, including 6S
enrolled and 6S non-enrolled firms. The study was conducted in Vientiane Capital, the
province with the highest concentration of formal sector enterprises. A structured
questionnaire with both closed- and open-ended questions was administered to
employers. Although the survey was the main method used in the sub-study, other
methods were employed to help set the context for the study and to shed light on the
potential for expanding coverage. These methods include: reviews of legislation and
documents; key informant interviews; secondary data analysis of the Lao Economic
Census; and Excel projections of various coverage expansion scenarios. The
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methodology used for the pre-survey work (i.e., key informant interviews) and
household survey are discussed below. Details of the analysis of the household survey, as
well as the secondary data analysis and methodology used to project coverage scenarios
in Excel, are included in Chapter 7.
Justification for design
The sub-study on enrolment was designed to address key policy questions in Laos, and to
shed light on the reasons that enrolment in social security is so low. Given that
information was needed relatively quickly to inform the development of the country's
health financing strategy, a cross-sectional case-comparison design was considered an
optimal approach. In addition, the main purpose of the study was to generate descriptive
information about the scheme, and therefore a cross-sectional design was deemed
appropriate.
The decision to use a sample size of 130 was mainly based on budget constraints. The
cost of an enterprise survey is relatively expensive: one enterprise interview was more
than six times that of a CBHI household survey. Moreover, the SHI study was
considered secondary to the CBHI study, as part of the World Bank work, and therefore
a relatively smaller amount of funding was allocated for this study. In addition to
considering budget constraints, the literature was consulted regarding the minimum
sample size required for logistic regression: according to Long and Freese, models using
maximum likelihood should use no fewer than 100 observations (Long and Freese 2006).
Thus, a sample size of 130 was appropriate given both the budget constraints and the rule
of thumb for the minimum sample size.
Pre-survey work
Prior to designing the study I held key informant interviews with five private sector
employers (three SSO-member firms and two non-member firms); three leaders of
business associations; the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry; two senior
staff members in the State Authority of Social Security; and two senior staff members in
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the Social Security Organization. 57 Additional meetings with mid-level staff at SSO
occurred on an ongoing basis. Approximately one third of these key informant interviews
were conducted in Lao, and therefore a translator accompanied me. The purpose of the
discussions with private sector employers was to better understand the factors
influencing enrolment in social security, in order to inform the questionnaire. The
purpose of the interviews with SSO staff members was to learn more about the scheme,
its implementation, and the Social Security Organization; to identify the optimal
sampling frame for the study; and to better understand how the target group for the
scheme was defined. An overview of the target group as it is officially defined in the Lao
legislation, and the discrepancies between the official group and the actual target group,
are presented in Chapter 7.
Sampling
Lists of firms maintained by the SSO were used as the sampling frame for this study,
which is herein referred to as the SSO database. The SSO database actually consists of
two separate lists (one for enrolled firms and one for non-enrolled firms), maintained by
two separate departments within the Social Security Organization and therefore to
construct the sampling frame, these lists were merged. Merging the lists required
reclassifying and recoding the names of industries into one common list, as the two
departments that maintain the lists use different industry categories.
After linking the two lists, the master list included 1320 firms (388 member and 932
non-member firms) but this list was subsequently restricted to firms in Vientiane Capital,
as this province has the highest concentration of private-sector firms. The sampling
frame was also restricted to the four biggest industries in the SSO target group:
manufacturing; construction; trade; and services, leaving a total of 891 firms (252 SSO-
member and 639 non-member firms). Selecting a subsample of industries is consistent
with the methodology used in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (World Bank sampling
57 The five private sector employers included staff from two hotels (small and medium-sized); a small to
medium-sized internet technology and computer sales company; a small furniture design and interior
decoration company; and a large soft drink company. The business associations included the Lao ICT
Commerce Association; the Association of the Lao Garment Industry; and the Lao Hotel and Restaurants
Association.
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methodology, 2007). Within Vientiane Capital Province, firms were selected from seven
districts but the district was not a criterion for recruitment to the sample.s8
A sample of 130 employers (including 65 member firms and 65 non-member firms) was
selected using stratified random sampling, from the four industries in the sampling frame
and from four size categories (10 to 19 employees; 20 to 49 employees; 50 to 99
employees; and 100 or more employees), amounting to a total of 16 strata in the SSO-
member group and 16 strata in the non-member group. To perform the sampling, I
created lists of all firms in each strata (e.g., SSO-member firms in the manufacturing
industry with 10 to 19 employees; non-member firms in the services industry with 50 to
99 employees, etc.) and used a random number generator in Excel to select firms until
the total quota in each stratum had been reached (the quota in each stratum was
approximately four firms).
Once the firms were selected, employers were contacted by telephone to request
participation in the survey. Following acceptance, an appointment was made for a face-
to-face interview. If the prospective interviewee was not available, the interviewers
called back up to three times to reschedule the appointment. If firms refused or an
appointment could not be arranged after three attempts, a replacement firm was selected
from the same stratum of the sampling frame.
As is often the case with firm surveys, the refusal rate was quite high.59 Among the firms
that were contacted, 20 percent declined to participate in the survey. In an additional 13
percent of firms, the interview could not be successfully arranged (after attempting to
follow-up or re-schedule three times). Therefore a total of 33 percent of the sample (43
out of the 130 firms) that was originally selected needed to be replaced, and this was
done using the original sampling approach. However, due to the high refusal rate, in
some strata the quota (i.e., -4 firms in each) could not be selected and therefore firms
needed to be selected from another stratum." Thus, the strata in the final sample size are
,. The districts where the firms are located in Vientiane Capital include: Hatxaifong; Sissattanak;
Chanthabuly; Xaysettha; Sikhottabong; Naxaithong; and Xaythany.
'9 In addition to the low response rate, the quality of the SSO database was poor and one third of the firms
could not be located, had moved or were no longer in business. However, these firms were not factored
into the response rate.
60 If less than 4 firms were available in a given stratum, a firm was selected from the next stratum in the
list. I performed selection of all replacement firms and gave the lists to the interviewers.
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not equal but sampling weights were used to restore representativeness of population
proportions as they appear in the sampling frame. The procedures for weighting are
further discussed in Chapter 7.
The low response rate was expected given previous reported difficulty of interviewing
private sector employers in Laos and because the initial point of contact was through
telephone." The profile of the firms that refused to participate differed between the
enrolled and non-enrolled populations: in the SSO group, mostly larger firms (>50
employees) refused to participate while in the non-enrolled group mainly smaller firms
(<50 employees) refused to participate. These differences between groups may lead to
some concern of sampling bias.
Description of questionnaire
A structured questionnaire with both closed- and open-ended questions was designed to
capture variables that are expected to influence enrolment in social security, such as
characteristics of businesses (ownership, company size, revenues, etc.),
sociodemographic characteristics of heads of company (education, age, nationality,
gender), risk perceptions of firms, details of employment contracts and employee
benefits, and awareness of, and experiences with, social security. For some questions,
employers were asked to obtain information from company records if available, such as
the number of employees by employment contract, and the amount paid to social security
and other benefits. The detailed questionnaire is included in Appendix C3.
Ethical procedures
For the SHI study, no official notices from the government were delivered to employers
in advance but once telephone contact had been made with an employer, a letter from the
country manager of the World Bank was sent to employers to brief them on the study
and to request their cooperation (See Appendix A3).
61 Indochina Research Laos had previously conducted several enterprise surveys in Laos, all of which had
relatively low response rates.
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All interviewees were asked to provide written informed consent prior to participation in
the survey. The information sheets and consent forms for the SHI study are included in
Appendix A4.
Training and pilot testing
In preparation for the survey, training and pilot-testing took place over a two week
period, from February 19 to March 6, 2009, at which time the questionnaire was
translated into Lao, back-translated into English, and validated by the research team. The
training included a mix of classroom sessions and field training/piloting, much the same
as that followed for the CBHI survey training. The classroom sessions covered
interviewer techniques, ethical procedures and role-play exercises. The translated
questionnaires and survey procedures were pre-tested on a purposively selected sample
of 24 enterprises. Each data collector was required to conduct four surveys prior to data
collection. After each pilot test. interviewers returned to the classroom to discuss any
problems encountered. After the pilot tests, the operations manager and I checked the
questionnaires for accuracy and added new codes for frequent "other" responses.
Data collection, field procedures, and quality assurance measures
The research team assigned to the SHI study consisted of six data collectors, one field
supervisor, and an operations manager. Data collection took place over a 2 month period.
from March 10, 2009 to May 10, 2009. Where possible, the questionnaire was
administered to heads of companies (i.e., chief executive officer, director, general
manager, etc.)." However, the study focused on benefits and contracts and therefore, it
was reasonable for the head accountant or human resources director to participate when
the head of the company was not available. All interviews were conducted in the Lao
language and most were conducted during the work day given that that was the best time
to schedule appointments with employers. At the end of each day, questionnaires were
brought to the IRL office and submitted to the data entry staff. Data were double-entered
into a Microsoft Access Database and random checks were performed by the operations
manager. Like the CBHI surveys, the data collection supervisor, with the help of the
62 Thirty-nine percent of interviews were conducted with the head of the company (e.g., director, general
manager, chief executive officer, etc.); 30% were conducted with the head accountant; and 33% were
conducted with the human resources manager. (Two percent were conducted with more than one
respondent).
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operations manager, directly observed the surveys 10 percent of the time and back-
checked 30 percent of the interviews. However, most of the back-checking took place
over the phone, given that it was difficult to make an appointment with the employers.
The team updated me on their progress in much the same way as they did with the CBHI
study: written reports summarising the results of interviews in each district, total
progress made, and any problems encountered, were submitted to me through email on a
biweekly basis, in addition to regular correspondence through email and Skype when I
was out of the country.
Data preparation
After data were entered by IRL I received a copy of the dataset and spent several weeks
cleaning, recoding and generating new variables where necessary. A data analysis plan
that was developed during the questionnaire design stage guided the data preparation and
analysis. Details of data analysis are described in Chapter 7.
4.6.3 Limitations of study design
The main limitation of the design is that the sampling frame, although it is representative
of the current target group, represents only a small proportion of firms in the country.
Moreover, this study examined trends in only four industries. This narrow sampling
frame has implications for external validity in that the study results can only be
generalised to the small percentage of firms in the sampling frame (i.e., those that have a
tax identification number, are registered with the central or provincial Tax Registration
Office (Ministry of Finance), have 10 or more employees, are operating in the four
provinces where the scheme is running, operate in one of the four industries in the
sample, and are included in the SSO database).
There are a few design issues that may contribute to bias. First, the cross-sectional nature
of the data makes it difficult to imply causal relationships and therefore findings from the
logit model should not be interpreted as such. Second, the small sample size leads to
large standard errors and can increase the likelihood of sampling errors, relative to a
larger sample size. There is also a risk that using different respondents (e.g., head of
company, human resources director) may bias the responses in one direction or another,
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but this bias is likely to be less than if the head of the company had been required to
respond, which would have resulted in a higher refusal rate due to unavailability.
4.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has given an overview of the research aim and objectives, the conceptual
framework, the methodology for each sub-study, and the limitations of the study designs.
In the next three chapters the analytical approach for each sub-study will be described,
followed by the results and a discussion of the findings as they pertain to the literature.
The first results chapter (Chapter 5) focuses on the determinants of enrolment in CBHI;
the second results chapter (Chapter 6) examines the impacts of CBHI on utilisation, out-
of-pocket expenditures and other outcomes of interest; and the third results chapter
(Chapter 7) explores the determinants of enrolment in social health insurance.
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Chapter 5. Enrolment in community-based health Insurance
5.1 Introduction
Community-based health insurance is often implemented to provide coverage to
households outside the formal sector. However, in most countries where CBHI has been
implemented, coverage rates are low. As countries strive to achieve greater coverage of
health insurance, there is interest in learning more about what is encouraging households
to enrol and how the schemes can be strengthened to increase enrolment levels.
However, the findings are context dependent and vary across countries. In Laos, after
nearly a decade of piloting CBHI, less than 2 percent of the population is covered and
coverage in the targeted areas stands at approximately 13 percent. Chapter 3 revealed a
number of problems with the scheme but there are still many unanswered questions
regarding what is driving, and hindering, enrolment.
The conceptual framework in Chapter 4 gives an idea of the factors that are most likely
to affect enrolment: the empirical literature identifies a range of determinants at the
individual, household and village level, while economic theory holds that individuals
enrol in insurance due to a demand for health care and the desire to decrease risk
(although some theories suggest that purchasing insurance is not necessarily a risk-
reduction strategy). As shown in the conceptual framework, the demand for health
insurance is also influenced by the need for health care services. Individuals often have a
better understanding of their need for health care than do insurers. This information
asymmetry contributes to a distortion in the market for health insurance in that
individuals with higher rates of illness (and therefore more certainty of the need for
health care) will be more likely to enrol. This phenomenon is known as adverse
selection. When the cost of the premiums are flat-rate, as they are in Laos, adverse
selection can threaten the financial sustainability of the scheme because the cost of
services used exceeds the revenues collected through premiums.
This sub-study was designed to provide country-specific evidence about the determinants
of enrolment in CBHI in Laos and to explore specifically whether individuals with ,
poorer health status and higher rates of risk aversion are more likely to enrol in the
voluntary CBHI scheme. The sub-study responds to objective 1 of the overall study,
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which is to explore the household and village-level determinants and barriers related to
enrolment in eBH! in Lao PDR. Specifically, the sub-study aims to answer the following
research questions:
1. What is the typical profile of households that enroll do not enrol in CBHI?
2. What is the relative importance of factors driving households' enrolment in
CBHI (e.g., health status, risk preferences, socioeconomic status, education
levels, exposure to CBHI, etc.)?
3. How do enrolment levels differ across villages and what are the reasons for
these differences?
Within the second research question above, four hypotheses derived from the conceptual
framework are tested:
Hypothesis 1: Households with poorer health status are more likely to enrol in
CBHI than households with better health status.
Hypothesis 2: Households with greater aversion to risk are more likely to enrol in
CBHI than households that are more risk-tolerant.
Hypothesis 3: Households that are better-off financially are more likely to enrol
in CBHI than households of lower socioeconomic status.
Hypothesis 4: Households with higher perceptions of quality at the district
hospital will be more likely to enrol in CBHI than households with lower quality
perceptions.
The next section presents the methodology of the study, and this is followed by the
descriptive findings and results. The discussion then summarises how the results relate to
the literature, and highlights policy implications in Laos (these policy implications will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). Some limitations of the analytical approach are
then reviewed.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Overview 0/methodology
This sub-study uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to understand better
the decisions regarding enrolment in CBHI. The study employs a cross-sectional, case-
comparison design of CBHI households and uninsured (comparison) households, both
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from villages where CBHI has been implemented. The methods include: exploratory
focus group discussions; household and village surveys; and focus group discussions. As
described in Chapter 4, the exploratory work informed the study design and the
questionnaires. The household and village survey covered 3000 households across 87
villages and 6 districts, and the sample was selected using a multi-stage cluster sampling
approach. Six focus group discussions with members and non-members were conducted
in the same study areas and were intended to complement the surveys by providing more
in-depth explanations about the decision to enrol or not to enrol. Chapter 4 presented the
study design, sampling, data collection and more detailed description of the methods for
this sub-study. The following discussion on methodology covers only the methods used
in the analysis.
5.2.2 Quantitative analysis of household and village surveys
The analysis for this sub-study took place at the household level, given that the level of
enrolment in CBHI is the household. Descriptive data analysis was performed to better
understand which types of households typically enrol in CBHI. CBHI and non-CBHI
households were compared on a range of characteristics and T-tests were used to
compare means for continuous variables; Chi-squares and Fisher's exact63 tests were
used for proportions or categorical variables. All estimates account for sampling weights
and village-level clustering by using the "svy" commands in Stata. This weighting is
necessary because in this sample, the proportions in each stratum differ from the
respective population proportions (i.e., the CBHI population is effectively oversampled)
and in the absence of weights differences in means and proportions of the sample will
yield biased population estimates (Deaton 1997). Use of the sampling weights restores
the sample to one that is representative of the population and applying the cluster effect
ensures robust standard errors. The weights are simply the inverse of the probability that
the observation was selected and the cluster effect is accounted for at the village level.
To perform the multivariate analysis on the determinants of enrolment, a probit model
was used. The probit model is a qualitative discrete choice model that has been
63 Fisher's exact tests were used for 2x2 columns.
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developed to model relationships in which the outcome is binary." In this study, the
probit is used to estimate the probability that a household will enrol in CBHI. The
probability of enrolment is a function of individual/household and village characteristics,
such that:
Pny=Ilx) = f(X I. X]. B)
where y takes on a value of I for an enrolled household and 0 for an uninsured
household. X, represents individual and household characteristics; X] is a vector of
village level characteristics; and e represents the error term. The probit model uses
sampling weights and accounts for the cluster effects at the village level.
In studying enrolment using a cross-sectional survey, it was important to acknowledge
that the relationship between independent variables and enrolment could be endogenous
and endogeneity of consumption was a primary concern. For example, CBHI households
may incur lower out-of-pocket expenditures on health care, leading them to have higher
consumption levels than if they had not enrolled in CBHI and had to pay for care
directly. Thus, enrolment affects consumption, making it difficult to test whether
consumption is a determinant of enrolment. To partially address this endogeneity
problem, health care expenditures were excluded from the aggregate consumption
measure, but it is still possible that the relationship between consumption and enrolment
is endogenous (i.e., the level of non-medical consumption in a household could still be
affected by whether or not the household took up CBHI). However, given that no
suitable instrumental variable for consumption could be identified it was not possible to
control for this endogeneity. The use of quintiles of the consumption measure is expected
to be less endogenous than the use of an absolute consumption measure, although is
unlikely to remove endogeneity in the model.
In addition to using consumption quintiles to look at the relationship between wealth and
enrolment, a household asset index was also used. The methodology for constructing this
index was described earlier in Section 4.5.5.3. Relative to consumption, an asset index is
64 The probit model differs from the logit model in that the error in the probit is assumed to be distributed
normally, whereas the error term in the logit model is assumed to be distributed logistically. The
mathematical model for the probit is given as: Pny=Ilx) =fPo+B1Xl+BzXz+. ~ (_tZ) dt (Long and Freese
-co v2n 2
2006).
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more likely to reflect longer-run household wealth or living standards, and is less likely
to account for short-run interruptions or shocks to the household (Filmer and Pritchett
2001). For example, in the face of medical expenditures, individuals are more likely to
smooth consumption and less likely to sell household assets. Although there is some
correlation between consumption and the asset index, the asset index also has an
independent effect on enrolment, which justifies its inclusion in the model. More details
of the probit model are given in Section 5.3.2.
For ease of interpretation of the probit model findings, the marginal effects of each
independent variable on the outcome are presented. The marginal effect indicates the
magnitude of the effect of a particular variable on enrolment in insurance. To report
marginal effects, the command "dprobit" is used in Stata. This command also generates a
maximum-likelihood probit model but rather than reporting coefficients, as in the probit,
it reports the average percentage point difference in the probability of enrolment of a
CBHI household relative to a comparison household (for continuous variables) and the
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
In addition to looking at the marginal effects, another approach was used to interpret the
effect of key variables on enrolment. Because the probit model assumes a nonlinear
relationship between the independent variables and the outcome variable, the marginal
effects are not constant and it is difficult to interpret the relationships from the probit
model alone. Instead, the relationship between an x-variable and the outcome depends on
the level of x as well as the level of other independent variables. Therefore, to understand
the relationship between health status and enrolment across wealth quintiles, predicted
probabilities were estimated. These predicted probabilities represent the probability that
a household will enrol in CBHI when all other factors are held constant at their mean
,
value and were estimated using the SPost programme in Stata, which is a post-estimation
programme (Long and Freese 2006). Comparing predicted probabilities for
"representative individuals" allows the change in probability of enrolment as the variable
of interest changes to be seen. This technique also allows the values of different variables
,
. to be imputed, and the impact of health status on enrolment across quintiles to be
modelled.
In addition to measuring household-level enrolment, the study also examined the factors
affecting village-level enrolment levels across the 87 villages in the study. Enrolment
Page 1112
levels were collected from village records" during sampling and an ordinary' least
squares regression model was then used to regress village enrolment levels (which
ranged from one percent to 72 percent) on various village-level factors. Given that
villages in the multi-stage cluster sample were selected with probability proportional to
population size, the sample was self-weighted and sampling weights in the analysis were
not necessary. All quantitative analysis was performed in Stata 10.1.
5.2.3 Qualitative analysis a/focus group discussions
The objective of the qualitative analysis was to confirm and check consistency with the
'quantitative results and to present findings in richer detail, thereby leading to a deeper
understanding of the relationships that emerged through the quantitative analysis. Given
the cross-sectional nature of the survey, the qualitative results also helped to shed light
on the direction of relationships between independent variables and CBHI enrolment.
The analysis followed a two-part process. First, the moderator, who conducted the FGDs,
transcribed the FGDs and prepared summary notes in English. The summary notes
served as a first step in data reduction, while ensuring that the most important
information was retained for the analysis, which I then performed. These summary notes
contained all the essential information that was generated by the discussions but omitted
instructions and clarifications. Responses were quantified where possible and quotes
from participants were included. I then analysed the data using thematic analysis (Miles
and Huberman 1994). I used Microsoft Word 2007 to manually code results from the six
FGDs, organising the results by themes that corresponded to each of the respective
research topics. I used a table to record the codes and frequencies of the responses in
order to interpret the relative importance of emerging themes. Quotes that were most
useful in explaining the findings were selected and organised under each theme. I had
trained the moderator to pay particular attention to differences between individual
opinions and actual group consensus. Therefore, in the analysis, I also paid particular
attention to identifying these 'outliers' and presenting them where relevant. This type of
analysis is known as "deviant case analysis" or "negative case analysis" and is a useful
process for preventing self-selecting biases in the analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994;
Kitzinger 1995).
6.S Village collectors maintain records of all enrolled households. Information about payments made to the
scheme is collected monthly and maintained by the village collectors.
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Descriptive findings
Household-level descriptive findings
Table 5.1 presents the results of the descriptive statistics at the household level. The
results showed that CBHI households are larger, more likely to be married, and more
educated than uninsured households. On average, the household head in CBHI
households is also older. There is no difference in ethnicity between CBHI and
comparison households: most households belong to the Tai-Kadai ethnic group.66 CBHI
households have significantly higher consumption levels than uninsured households but
similar per capita consumption levels. Per capita income levels are also similar between
groups and are just below the national average of $880 per capita.67 There is no
significant difference in the number of CBHI and comparison households living below
the national poverty line: across the sample, 21.4% of households live in poverty. This
percentage is less than the estimated poverty headcount in the population (37%). Thus,
the sample has a lower average income level than the population but also has fewer
households living in poverty, which makes sense given that CBHI targets the near-poor
in the informal sector but does not specifically target the poorest or the richest
households. Among CBHI household heads who are employed'", the insured are more
likely than the uninsured to hold a long-term contract. There is no difference between
groups in the location of the households: one third in both groups lives in urban ereas."
In terms of health status, CBHI households are less healthy than uninsured households,
as shown by the CBHI group's poorer self-rated health, higher prevalence of disability or
chronic illness, higher proportion of households who reported difficulty performing
activities, and a higher proportion of households with a family member with
deteriorating health. CBHI households also have more elderly household members, more
women of reproductive age, more pregnant women, and are relatively less risk-averse
66 The official ethno-linguistic groupings include 49 distinctive ethnic groups and four main groupings.
However, 98 percent of the study sample belongs to the Tai-Kadai group as this group dominates the cities
and other semi-urban areas where the study was conducted.
61 The comparison with national income and poverty levels is for illustrative purposes only and should be
interpreted with the caveat that the methodologies for calculating these figures are different.
68 "Employment" excludes unpaid household duties but includes subsistence farming.
69 Although "urban/rural location" is really a village measure, it was measured at the household level
because a few large villages included both urban and semi -urban areas.
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than uninsured households. (See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.5.1 for a description of the risk-
aversion measure.) 70
Attitudes towards different sources of care serve as proxies for preferences for modem
health care over traditional. The descriptive findings show that attitudes are similar
among CBHI and non-CBHI households. However, CBHI households report a higher
perception of quality of health care at the district hospital. CBHI members are also more
likely than the uninsured to have attended a CBHI campaign, to have more close
relatives and friends in the scheme, and to place higher trust in the scheme."
70 The percentage of risk-averse household heads also differs by socioeconomic status: in the first
consumption quintiJe, 41% of household heads are risk averse, compared with 42% in the second quintile,
43% in the third quintile, 37% in the fourth quintile, and 38% in the fifth quintile.
71 Due to the cross-sectional nature of the study, the number of close relatives and friends enrolled in the
. scheme (a proxy for ''peer pressure"), and trust in the scheme are likely to be highly endogenous and were
therefore left out of the final model.
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Table S.l Background characteristics of CBHI and comparison populations
CBHI Comparison p-value
(n=I000) (n=2000)
Sociodemographic characteristics
Mean household size (persons)
Marital status of household head (% married)
E.ducation
Highest level=any primary
Highest level=any secondary
Highest level=university/institute
Highest level=vocational
Age of HH head (mean years)
HH is member of ethnic majority (1=Tai-Kadai; O=other)
Total annual household consumption ($US)
Total annual per capita consumption, mean ($US)t
Total annual per capita income, mean ($US)
HHs living below $1.25 per day
E.mployment status
Not working for money
Family farm-based agriculture
Small-scale trading or family business
Work for someone else
HH heads with long-term employment contract (12 months +)
Household is located in urban area (vs. semi-urban or rural)
Health status and risk aversion
HHs inwhich avg self-rated health is <3 on scale of 1 to 5
HHs in which someone has disability or chronic condition
HHs in which someone had difficulty with activities in 3 months
HHs inwhich s/o experienced deterioration of health in past year
Risk preferences: head of household is risk-averse
Other risk variables
5.3
84.2%
43.1%
31.6%
5.1%
11.8%
52.4
98.6%
$3,162
$754
$863
21.6%
21.1%
24.0%
26.4%
28.5%
17.2%
30.1%
19.4%
23.4%
16.3%
11.9%
37.1%
4.7 <0.001**
80.4% 0.027*
42.7% 0.866
37.2% 0.028*
2.3% 0.002**
8.4% 0.020*
48.4 <0.001**
98.2% 0.404
$2,729 <0.001**
$741 0.531
$845.9 0.822
20.3% 0.435
17.2% 0.009**
22.8% 0.644
31.2% 0.039*
28.8% 0.878
11.6% 0.002**
33.9% 0.413
14.9% 0.023*
14.5% <0.001**
11.0% 0.008**
8.5% .034*
41.6% 0.041*
21.9% .001**
37.6% 0.754
1.4 <0.001**
13.9010 0.261
2.3% .004**
99.5% 0.669
92.6% 0.138
96.8% 0.42
64.8% <0.001**
66.2% <0.001**
30.7%
48.9% <0.001*·
HHs with any member age 65+
HHs with any member age 0-5
Mean # of females 15-49
HHs in which a woman has given birth in past 2 years
HHs with a pregnant woman
Attitudes towards sources of care and quality perceptions
28.0%
37.0%
1.6
15.7%
4.4%
HH respondents recommending a government hospital for an uninsured friend )
a severe condition/emergency? 99.4%
a moderate condition? 94.6%
a minor condition?
HH respondents stating that services at district hospital are good
97.5%
75.4%
Exposure to CBHI and trust in scheme
HH attended CBHI campaign
How many of your close relatives/friends had joined CBHI prior to
enrolment? (or how many are enrolled now?)
None
Some
Many
HHs reporting trust that contributions will be used properly
HHs reporting that members will get the benefits they pay for when
they need them
92.5%
4.5%
49.2%
46.3%
92.5%
95.8%
20.4%
69.7%
69.4% <0.001*·
*Sian!ficant at 5%; sign!ficant at 1%. Reported results are based on t-tests of meansfor continuous variables and chi-squaresJor
proportions I categorical variables. All estimates accountJor sampling welshts and villose-level dusterins. tPer capita e.~penditure
was calculated using adult equivalents.
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Descriptive findings on use of health services and out-of-pocke: expenditures
(Individual-level)
To shed light on utilisation of health care and out-of-pocket expenditures, descriptive
results from analysis on individuals in CBHI and comparison households are presented
in Table 5.2. The findings show that a significantly higher percentage of CBHI
individuals in the sample had a somewhat serious or serious illness in the past 3 months,
relative to uninsured individuals. However, there was no significant difference between
groups in the percentage of sick individuals who went without care during this time. On
average, individuals in CBHI households were significantly more likely to use health
services and incurred significantly lower out-of-pocket expenditures than individuals in
households without insurance.
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of health care utilisation and expenditures by individuals
eBHI
n=5336
Non-
eBHI
n=9468 p-value
% of people who had a somewhat serious or serious illness in past 3 months
% with somewhat serious/ serious illness who went w / 0 care in 3 months
% of individuals with an IP visit in past month
% of individuals with an OP visit in past 1year
OOPs for OP visits in past month, per person ($US)
. OOPs for IP visits in past 1 yr, per person ($US)
OOPs on all care per person in 1 yr (incl. premiums)(for those with IP or
OP visit) $62.78 $99.09 <.001**
*Significant at 5%; significant at J%. Reported results are based on t-tests of means for continuous
variables and Fisher's exact testsfor proportions/ categorical variables. J USD=8,500 Lao Kip (2009)
13.3% 11.+% 0.001......
0.+006.5% 7.5%
3.9%
13.5%
$5.66
$186.37
<.001*·
0.009*·
0.011·
8.1%
15.1%
$3.20
$76.22 <.001··
Village-level descriptive findings
Table 5.3 summarises the characteristics of the 87 villages from which CBH! and
comparison households were selected. The average age of the village chief is 49 years
and most have less than a secondary education. Roughly two thirds of the chiefs are
members ofCBH!. In terms of the options for health care in the villages, half the villages
have pharmacies, one third have both drug sellers and healers, one tenth have a health
centre and less than one fifth have a private clinic.
In three quarters of the villages a village collector collects monthly contributions at
members' homes, while in the other one quarter of villages, members make their
payments directly to the contracting hospital. The majority of villages have mass
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organisations that promote the scheme and CBHI is a regular discussion topic at
meetings.
Table 5.3 Descriptive characteristics of villages
%ormean/sd
Age of chief, years (meantsd)
Chief has secondary or higher education
Chief is a member of CBHI
Pharmacy in village
Drug seller in village
Healer in village
Health centre in village
Private clinic in village
Village has had 3+ CBHI promotional campaigns
# visits from provincial CBHI team (mean/sd)
Door to door promotion of CBHI conducted
Village collector comes to home to collect payments
Mass organisations promote CBHI
CBHI is discussed at formal village meetings at least IX month
Village collector has stolen money
% of villagers working for government (meanfsdj)
% of villagers working in migrant labour (mean(sd»
Perceived quality of contracting facility is poor
Perceived quality of contracting facility is average
Perceived quality of contracting facility is high
Contracting facility: Sissattanak district hospital
Contracting facility: Hatxaifong district hospital
Contracting facility: Phonehong district hospital
Contracting facility: Keoudom district hospital
Contracting facility: Vientiane provincial hospital
Contracting facility: Champasak district hospital
48.9(8.3)
43.7%
67.8%
49.4%
33.3%
33.3%
11.5%
16.1%
29.9%
1.1(0.7)
13.8%
75.9%
63.2%
64.4%
10.3%
16.8%(19.1)
7.04%(8.8)
11.5%
60.9%
27.6%
19.5%
9.2%
10.3%
21.8%
19.5%
19.5%
Note: All estimates at the village level are self-weighted.
N=87
The majority of chiefs rate the quality of the facility that contracts with CBHI for first-
line care as average or higher, relative to other options. In four fifths of the villages,
CBHI members are required to use the district hospital for their first line care, whereas in
one-fifth of the villages, CBHI members go directly to the provincial hospital for their
first line care as there is no district hospital within close proximity.
5.3.2 Determinants of CBRIenrolment: quantitative and qualitative results
Household-level determinants of CBRI enrolment
The marginal effects of explanatory variables were estimated from the probit model and
are shown in Table 5.4. The results showed that age and education of the household head
were associated with enrolment in CBHI, such that households in which the household
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head is older or has either vocational or post-secondary education, were more likely to
enrol. Surprisingly, household size was not significantly associated with enrolment, even
though the scheme's premium structure provides an incentive for larger households to
enrol: as family size increases, the cost of the premium per person decreases.
The results confirmed that health status is a significant determinant of enrolment in
CBHI. The marginal effect indicates that having a chronic illness in the household
increased the probability of enrolment by almost 5 percentage points, while having a
member who had difficulty performing activities increased the probability of enrolment
by 3 percentage points. Both these relationships were significant. However, households
with poorer than average (self-rated) health were not significantly more likely to enrol."
Other types of risks at the household level were significantly associated with enrolment:
having a pregnancy in the household and having more women of reproductive age.
However, having an elderly family member or a child under the age of five73 was not
significantly associated with enrolment.
The relationship between illness and enrolment was supported by the focus group
discussions. In all focus group discussions, the most frequently cited reason for enrolling
was that family members suffer from chronic conditions, while in non-member
households the second most frequently reported reason for never enrolling in the scheme
was that people were healthy.
"Joining CBBI is really convenient as I often see doctors about my diabetes and
high blood pressure. Sometimes it is not only me who sees the doctors, but also
my family members: one person has a fever or another person has a problem
with his stomach. "
-CBHI member from Ban Donetalarth, Champasak district
72 Four health status variables were used in the analysis: self-rated health; chronic illness; difficulty; and
deteriorating health. Tests for multicollinearity showed that the variables are only weakly collinear
(VIF<l.S; tolerance is between .72 and .83 for all variables). However, it was also necessary to test for
synergistic effects (i.e., whether the presence of multiple symptoms had an additional effect on enrolment).
When entered separately, each variable with the exception of "deterioration of health" was significantly
associated with a higher probability of enrolment. "Deterioration of health" was removed from the final
model to improve model fit. A second iteration of the model was constructed using all three remaining
health variables and interactions of the variables: none of the interactions were significant but "chronic
illness" and "difficulty with activities" were both significant at the .01 level. The interactions were
therefore dropped from the model as they did not further explain relationships between variables.
73 The relationship between having children aged o-s and enrolment was not significant and was removed
from the final model.
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"In my case, I always get sick. The hospital is like my second home! I had an
operation five months after enrolling in the scheme and I did not pay anything. "
-CBHI member from Ban Kaenghai, Keoudom district
"No one in my family gets sick; I am not really interested in this scheme. When
someone in myfamily gets sick, wejust go to the hospital like normal patients. "
-Non-member from Ban Chompettai, Sissattanak district
The positive association between pregnancy and enrolment in CBHI would make sense if
most women in the target group had a preference for facility deliveries. For women who
are expecting to become pregnant", CBHlcan be an attractive option in that deliveries
are covered by the scheme, whereas deliveries in public hospitals are considerably
expensive." Even if women don't anticipate becoming pregnant prior to enrolment, it is
possible that once enrolled, women remain in the scheme when they become pregnant, in
order to take advantage of free facility deliveries. However, in all three FGDs with
members, participants agreed that most women prefer to deliver babies in their homes,
rather than in a facility. Thus, the quantitative and qualitative findings showed some
inconsistencies. However, only a few pregnant women participated in the FGDs and very
little time was allotted during the FGDs to discuss preferences for maternal health care.
Therefore, insufficient data exists to investigate this issue thoroughly. Thus, it is difficult
to ascertain whether or not the relationship between enrolment and pregnancy is related
to the demand for maternal care or tied to other unobservable factors that are related to
pregnancy.
74 Pregnant women in the sample were pregnant at the time of data collection and therefore became
~regnant at least one year after enrolment in cmn. .
5 In 20 II, the Government of Laos introduced a pilot project to provide free deliveries in public facilities
for all women. However, at the time of data collection, deliveries were only free for the insured.
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Table 5.4 Marginal effects of determinants of enrolment
lHpendent variable: CBHI enrolment (1,0) M.E. S.E. p>lzl
Household-level variables
Age of household head
(Age of household head)!
Education of HH head: completed any primary (vs. "nonej
Education of HH head: completed any secondary
Education of HH head: completed any vocational
Education of HH head: completed any post-secondary
HH head is married (vs. "not married")
Household size: 4-5 members
Household size: 6+ members
0.0064 0.0021 0.003*·
<0.0001 <0.0001 0.0+3*
0.0062 0.0117 0.595
0.0117 0.0161 0.459
0.0425 0.0231 0.031·
0.0686 0.0381 0.025·
0.0152 0.0093 0.123
-0.0007 0.0112 0.952
0.0111 0.0133 0.391
0.0095 0.0118 0.401
0.0+61 0.01+3 <0.001**
0.0302 0.0168 0.0+7*
0.0+11 0.0241 0.0+8*
0.0127 0.0035 <0.001**
-0.0016 0.0088 0.860
-0.0141 0.0064 0.030*
0.0118 0.0130 <0.3+8
0.0262 0.0130 <0.029*
0.0503 0.0165 <0.001*·
0.0+52 0.0168 <0.003·
0.192 .0030 <0.001··
-0.0148 0.0100 0.162
-0.0184 0.0097 0.075
0.0117 0.0119 0.310
0.0199 0.01+1 0.205
0.0395 0.0066 <0.001··
0.08+6 0.0077 <0.001**
-0.0334 0.0088 <0.001·*
Someone in household has worse than average health
Someone in household has a chronic health condition
Someone in HH had difficulty performing activities in past 3 months
At least one pregnancy in household (currently)
Number of women of reproductive age (15-49)
At least one HH member >=65 years
Household head is risk averse
HH consumption per capita: quintile 2 (vs. quintile 1)
HH consumption per capita: quintile 3
HH consumption per capita: qulntile 4
HH consumption per capita: quintile 5
HH wealth (asset index)
Job HH head: family farm (vs. not working for money)
Job HH head: small-scale trading/ self-employed
Job HH head: work for someone else
Recommends a government hospital for moderate illness
Household head's perception of quality of district hospital is good
Attended campaign
Urban (vs. semi-urban or rural)··Viiiag;:le;er;arlabies·····-·----····-·······-·······--._ _ _ .
Pharmacy in village -0.00+8
Drug seller in Village -0.0178
Health centre in village -0.0238
Private clinic in village -0.0150
Young village chief «=+0 years) 0.0+28
Village chief has secondary education (vs. primary only) 0.016+
Chief is a member of CBHI -O.OOH
CBHI collection system in place (vs. "other") 0.0108
3 or more campaigns conducted in village 0.0283
Door-to-door promotion of CBHI in village -0.00+3
Relative quality in village is medium (vs. "low") 0.0003
Relative quality in village' is high 0.0187
Village size (log of# households in village) -0.0390
Contracting hospital 1: Sissattanak district (vs. Hatxaifong district) 0.0206
Contracting hospital 3: Phonehong district -0.00+5
Contracting hospital 4: Keoudom district 0.0843
Contracting hospital 5: Viengkham provincial 0.0154
Contracting hospital6: Champasak district 0.1674
0.0097
0.0091
0.0094
0.0127
0.0150
0.0082
0.0099
0.0108
0.0085
0.0134
0.0150
0.0207
0.0085
0.0180
0.0206
0.0260
0.0177
0.0342
0.620
0.053
0.024·
0.259
0.001**
0.0+5·
0.889
0.327
0.001*·
0.754
0.983
0.343
<0.001··
0.228
0.822
<0.001··
0.359
<0.001*·
Number of observations 3000
Pseudo R2=0. 1803; Wald chi2(46)=872.+o; Prob>chi2<0.001; Log pseudolikelihood=-886.078
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)=4.95, Prob chi2=0.763
.sign!flcant at 5%; **sion!flcant at 1%; Note: Samplino welshts were applied to the model and the t-statlstics were adjusted
Jor clusttrlns at the Village level and therifore, standard errors are robust. Non-sioniflcance '?! the Hosmer-Lemeshow test
Indicates that the data fit the model well. There are no obvious mlsspedficatJons.
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In contrast to prior expectations, the quantitative findings showed that households in
which the household head is risk averse were significantly less likely to enrol in CBHI.
Qualitative interviews shed light on why this may be the case. Although the majority of
the respondents in the FGDs reported that enrolling in CBHI allows people to minimise
their risk, some felt that enrolling in CBHI is a risky venture and that enrolment actually
increases risk, because one can't be sure that benefits will be delivered when they are
needed.
"I am taking a risk by putting money into the scheme because after two years if
the scheme col/apses I will not get anythingfrom it. "
-Member from Ban Thamouong, Hatxaifong district
Thus, risk-averse individuals who worry about losing money from an unexpected illness
do not have enough confidence in the CBHI scheme to see investing in it as a risk-
reduction strategy.
Although there was no association between enrolment and the job category of the
household head, households with higher income (measured by consumption quintiles)
were significantly more likely to enrol in CBHI. The probit analysis showed that the
probability of enrolment increases with wealth for households in the top three quintiles.
However, once a certain level of wealth has been achieved, the additional effect of
wealth has diminishing returns, as shown by the peak in the marginal effect among the
fourth quintile. This makes sense given that CBHI does not target the rich. According to
a FGD participant, "rich people are not interested in joining this scheme because they
have money and when they get sick they can choose wherever they like to go for
treatment; mostly they will go to private clinics, then to the central hospital or to
Thailand". The most frequent reason for never enrolling in CBHI was the inability to
afford the premiums. A FGD participant explained why his family's financial situation
prevents him from enrolling:
"For me, it's already difficult to pay for our monthly expenduure. I don't have
enough money. My four children also go to school; sometimes I cannot earn
money for their school on time. Then I have other expenses such as water bill,
electricity bill, rice farming (because I have to pay for water pumped into my
rice field). It costs more than 1 million kip per year. So the money I earn is spent
on many things. There are eight people in my family,' they sometimes get sick but
not very serious illness. I sometimes borrow money from others when my
children get sick"
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-Non-member from Ban Phonehang, Viengkham district
In addition to the effect of household consumption on enrolment in CBHI, wealth status,
measured by a household asset index, exerts an independent effect on enrolment such
that households with higher living standards (as measured by household assets) are more
likely to enrol in insurance.
In designing this study, it was acknowledged that the decision to enrol in CBHI could be
linked to factors such as ethnicity, preferences for modern health care (e.g., whether a
household uses traditional or modern care), and perceptions of quality of care. The study
found that almost all households in the sample belong to the Tai-Kadai ethnic group, and
therefore" this variable was excluded from the multivariate analysis. Almost all
households recommended a government hospital for moderate illness (a proxy for a
preference for modern services) and any differences in preferences for care did not
explain differences in enrolment in this sample.
The probit analysis showed a significant and positive association between perception of
health care quality at the contracting facility and enrolment in CBHI. Given the cross-
sectional nature of the data, the relationship between quality and enrolment could be
endogenous: it is plausible that higher quality reported by CBHI members is a result of
being in the scheme, rather than a factor affecting enrolment. For example, CBHI
members may have more contact with the district hospitals or a better experience overall
because they don't have to pay for health care, leading them to report better quality.
However, the qualitative findings, described below, are incongruent with the quantitative
findings.
The qualitative findings allow exploration into various dimensions of quality and shed
light on differential treatment between ~embers and non-members. Across all six FGDs,
CBHI members, non-members and drop-outs agreed that non-members, who pay for
services at the point of service delivery, receive services faster than CBHI members
regardless of the urgency of health care needs.
"When CBHI members go to the hospital and show their membership card, the
hospital workers ignore them and make them wait for a very long time. But if
people with money come to the hospital, the staff gives them Jaster services -
they need not wait long! In some cases, when CBHI members have an
emergency or very serious illness, they do not receive priority treatment.
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Instead, they are kept for a very' long time and have to wait their turn. So some
people would die before they get their turn! This is why some people drop out"
-Drop-out from Ban Thamouong, Hatxaifong district
Across all six villages where FGDs were held, participants complained that. CBHI
members usually receive low quality drugs, while non-members are prescribed a variety
of more expensive drugs. CBHI members are also reportedly treated with less respect
than cash-paying patients. Among drop-outs, poor quality of services was the most
frequently mentioned reason for leaving the scheme.
"I took my wife to the district hospital to have tests. Thefirst day we were there,
we did not get examined because it was quite late. The next day we went back,
the hospital staff told us to wait. We were just waiting for doctors and did not
get anything. Wewaited with other eBBI members until lunch time. They told us
to come back again in the afternoon. We then came back in the afternoon and
the doctor gave us each three pills of Paracetamol and other medicines. I
noticed that other eBBI members also got the same kind of medicines. Later, I
took my wife again to the hospital. This time! didn't use the eBB! membership
card I used cash. The nurses and doctors took good care of my wife and! paid
each of them 700,000 kip per day (US $82.00/day). They provided very good
services but it was about 11 days and I spent 16million kip (US $1882.00)! I
actually had no problem to pay the money because I wanted to save my wife'S
life. Since then, I stopped being a eBB! member since we have money to pay ."
-Drop-out from Chomphettai, Sissattanak district
Aside from the differential treatment given to members and non-members, health care
workers reportedly provide faster treatment to patients who have money or who have
relatives working in the hospital. Several participants also mentioned that children are
given preferential treatment over adults. However, quality of service delivery is
reportedly poor in general. Both members and non-members reported that health care
staff members do not have the skills to diagnose health problems and that productivity is
low. For example, some FGD participants described the behaviour of health care workers
as "lazy", explaining that "they just sit there and ignore patients withCBHr. Although
a few respondents complained about the cleanliness of the hospital, most participants felt
that the facilities were clean but that lack of equipment is a problem in the district
hospitals. Thus, results from the FGDs contradict the quantitative findings, which
indicated that CBHI members have higher perceptions of quality than non-CBHI
members. It is therefore more likely that members who have positive experiences with
CBHI maintain enrolment in CBHI, and less likely that perceptions of good quality of
care at district hospitals are enticing households to enrol in the scheme.
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The probit findings showed that attendance at a CBHI promotional campaign had a
relatively large marginal effect on enrolment, with the probability of CBHI enrolment
increasing by more than 8 percentage points relative to those who did not attend.
However, at least to some extent it is expected that some CBHI members anticipated
joining the scheme prior to attending the campaign. Although FGD participants
confirmed that the campaigns were effective in encouraging people to enrol, participants
claimed that people also learn about the scheme from friends and relatives in the
village." When asked about the quality of information presented in the campaigns, most
participants agreed that the promoters of CBHI presented information clearly but about
half were discouraged that the scheme promoters had failed to mention the problems
with the scheme, such as poor quality, long waiting times, and cumbersome
administrative procedures when using services outside the designated hospital.
Therefore, attendance at a campaign, while useful to some extent, may not have the
impact on enrolment indicated by the quantitative results.
Households in urban areas had a significantly lower probability of enrolling in CBHI
than households in semi-urban areas. During FGDs, participants explained that people in
urban areas have many options for health care and prefer to use the central hospital or
private care. Enrolling in CBHI, which requires households to use services at the district
hospital, is therefore less attractive in urban areas for people who can afford to pay for
services. In contrast, there are fewer options for care in semi-urban or rural areas,
explaining the higher probability of enrolment in these areas. Urban areas in Vientiane
Capital are also close to the Thailand border, making care in Thailand an attractive
option, although focus group discussions indicated that only those who are relatively
well-off financially cross the border for their care.
Village level determinants of CBH! enrolment
At the village level, the factors that were found to be significantly associated with
enrolment are shown in the lower half of Table 5.4, presented earlier. The results suggest
76An attempt was made to measure the influence of other CBm members on enrolment but was left out of
the model as the measure was expected to be endogenous. For example, the interviewee was asked how
many close friends and family members were enrolled in CBm before the interviewee enrolled (i.e., few,
some, many). However, even though this is a retrospective measure, it is likely to suffer from recall bias in
that it is difficult for CBm members to remember which CBm members they knew before enrolling/after
enrolling. Moreover, "close friends and family" and "few/some/many" are subjective measures ..
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that CBHI enrolment is influenced by the availability of care in the village. Households
living in villages with a drug seller were less likely to enrol in CBHI, although this
finding was only borderline significant. Nevertheless, this association is likely because
self-treatment (from both registered pharmacies and private, unregistered drug sellers), is
relatively common in Laos (Paphassarang et al. 2002; Sihavong et al. 2006; Thome and
Pholsena 2009). The findings also showed that households living in villages with a
health centre were less likely to enrol in CBHI, most likely because CBHI - which
requires people to leave their villages to attend the district hospital for their first point of
care - is less attractive when a health centre is readily available in the village.
According to FGD findings, even when the district hospital is close, it is much more
convenient to use the village health centre. FGD participants also reported that they
receive faster services at the village health centres, unlike the district hospital where they
need to wait a long time. Distance (which was not included in the final model due to
little variation across villages7'), was not a significant factor affecting enrolment, but this
finding may have more to do with the way the programme has been implemented: most
villages where CBHI has been implemented, and where the study took place, are located
relatively close to the district hospital. However, in one FGD, which was held in a
village located 18 kilometres away from the district hospital, non-members mentioned
distance as a factor affecting both enrolment and utilisation. Enrolment levels in this
village have decreased since the district hospital was moved to another district. Thus, it
is likely that distance will pose a barrier once CBHI is scaled up to more remote villages.
"People don't want to go to the district hospital because it is very difficult to
find a vehicle (ambulance) to send them there. There is no vehicle (ambulance)
at the district hospital. In order tofind a car, we have to go to the market which
is veryfar!"
-Member from Ban Kaenghai, Keoudom district
The probability of a household joining CBHI was higher in villages with younger, more
educated chiefs. It is possible that younger chiefs are more active in their communities
and are more likely to promote CBHI among members. Similarly, higher education may
lead to a better understanding of the benefits of health insurance, making better educated
chiefs more likely to encourage enrolment. However, there was not much evidence from
FGDs that the chief has much of an influence in getting villagers to enrol in CBHI.
77 Little variation in this explanatory variable makes it difficult to estimate the coefficient with precision.
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Furthermore, support of the village chief (proxied by the chiefs enrolment in the
scheme) was not associated with the probability of enrolment.
Households in villages where a village collector collects monthly premiums at members'
homes were not significantly more likely to enrol in CBHI. Qualitative findings indicate
that the effectiveness of the money collection system is inconsistent across villages,
which may explain why a collection system alone does not influence enrolment: it also
has to function effectively. In two out of six villages, participants complained that the
village collection system is unreliable because the collector does not collect payments
regularly. Several participants have dropped out of the scheme as a result, explaining that
it is much more difficult to take money to the district hospital on a monthly basis. Others
report that they do not mind taking the money directly to the district hospital. Therefore,
although across villages there is no significant association between a collection system
and enrolment, these findings were expected to differ considerably at the village level
and this analysis is shown in Section 5.3.3 (Factors associated with village level
enrolment levels).
Households in villages that have had at least three CBHI promotion campaigns were
significantly more likely to enrol in CBHI than households in villages with less than
three campaigns. However, door-to-door promotion was not significantly associated with
enrolment. Although it is possible that repeating campaigns in villages with low
enrolment will help to boost enrolment, CBHI members and non-members feel very
strongly that the most effective promotion of the scheme occurs not through campaigns
but through word-of-mouth between villagers. FGD participants reported that if people
hear good things about the scheme and the quality of services, they will be more likely to
enrol.
"It is like going fishing; if many people go fishing and get a lot of fish, more
people will want to go to the same place. If people go fishing and tell their
friends that they don't get anyfish, then nobody wants to go there! II
-Member from Ban Kaenghi, Keoudom district
The probability of enrolling in CBHI was negatively associated with village population
size. It is possible that smaller villages have stronger solidarity with the community, and
therefore the influence of family and friends and other members of CBHI is likely to be
stronger than in larger villages. It is also likely that relative to households in large
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villages, households in smaller villages are more likely to know a close friend or family
member who is a CBHI member, making the concept ofCBHI more familiar.
Quality of care at the district hospital, as perceived by the village chief, is expected to be
less endogenous than household perceptions of quality. The results showed no significant
association between the village-level quality measure and enrolment, but it is possible
that there was not enough variation in perceptions to pick up differences in enrolment in
the analysis (most chiefs reported average perceptions of quality). However, the dummy
variables indicating the contracting hospital are to some extent expected to account for
differences in quality between hospitals. The results showed that relative to households
in Hatxaifong, households were 15 percent more likely in Champasak and 8 percent
more likely in Keoudom to enrol in CBHI. 78 As described earlier, discussions with CBHI
and WHO staff explained that the two schemes in Vientiane Capital (Hatxaifong and
Sissattanak) have had difficulty increasing enrolment due to competition with several
other health care options in the capital city. It is possible that the relatively higher
probability of enrolment in Champasak is a response to high prices charged to non-
members for drugs at the Champasak district and provincial hospitals, as one study
suggests (Ron et al. 2010). In Phonehong and Viengkham, a problem with coordination
between the provincial and district CBHI teams and the hospitals is believed to be the
main reason for low coverage (Personal communication with WHO staff members in
Lao PDR 2009).
Predicted probabilities of enrolment
The preceding analysis showed the relative impact of different independent variables on
CBHI enrolment. However, as described earlier, there are limits to understanding
enrolment by examining results from the probit alone. Therefore, to better understand the
relationship between variables, predicted probabilities are presented below for
"representative households". Figure 5.1 shows that the probability of enrolment for a
healthy household (i.e., a household with no chronic illness and no difficulty performing
activities) increases with income level (measured by consumption quintiles). Similarly,
the probability of enrolment for a household with a sick individual increases with
78 Although the CBm scheme usually contracts with the district hospital. the scheme in Viengkham
contracts with the Vientiane provincial hospital. The Vientiane provincial hospital also serves 4 villages in
Phonehong and these villages have been grouped under the Viengkham scheme in the analysis.
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income, shown by the predicted probabilities of a household with a chronic illness,
difficulty performing activities, or both." Thus, both income and illness have a positive
impact on enrolment. Although the absolute effect of illness on enrolment is higher in the
highest quintile than in the lowest quintile (i.e., 10.3% vs. 13.7%), the relative effect of
illness is actually smaller among the highest quintile than it is among the poorest quintile
(i.e., the relative differences are 200% for the highest quintile and 224% for the lowest
quintile). This is because the better off have a higher probability of enrolment in the first
place. These results indicate that the impacts of illness are heterogeneous across quintiles
- a finding that is not revealed by examining the results of the probit alone."
Figure 5.1 Predicted probability of CBHI enrolment by health status and wealth quintiles
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5.3.3 Factors associated with village-level enrolment levels
Overview of village-level enrolment levels
While the analysis above identifies determinants of household enrolment, the findings do
not explain the range in enrolment levels across villages. Across the sample, enrolment
79 Multiple signs of illness could exist within one family member or across multiple family members.
80 It is important to note that the heterogeneity in the impacts of health status on enrolment by quintile were
not explicitly modelled using an interaction term. Therefore, the higher marginal effects of illness on
enrolment in the highest quintile could be, at least in part, due to the parametric specification of the model.
Nevertheless, predicted probabilities provide a straightforward approach to examining relationships in the
data.
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ranges from 1 percent to 72 percent", with a median enrolment level of 12.2 percent
(See Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2 Village-level enrolment levels for the sample
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Factors associated with village enrolment levels
The results of the multivariate regression model in Table 5.5 identify factors associated
with enrolment levels at the village leve1.82 The village-level model includes some of the
independent variables used in the household enrolment model as well as additional
variables. Two different regression models were estimated: the first model excluded
from the analysis the village with a 72 percent enrolment level, which is considered to be
an outlier, while the second model included the outlier. The findings showed that using
both models, enrolment levels are significantly higher in villages with a young village
chief, a finding that is consistent with the determinants of enrolment at the household
level. In contrast to the household level analysis, which showed no significant
association between a CBHI collection system and household enrolment, having a
village collector was associated with higher enrolment in the village. A former member
of the scheme, who also once worked as the village collector, explained how the
collection system changed after he resigned.
81 The village with a 72% enrolment level is one of the smallest in the sample, with only 57 households.
82 Given the small number of villages in the sample, the level of significance is set at 10% for village level
effects. (According to ex post sample size calculations in Stata, using 'sampsi', to detect differences of 5%,
a sample size of93 is recommended; only 74 observations are required to detect differences of 10%).
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"When I stopped collecting money in 2005, it became a responsibility of the
village to promote the scheme. The vii/age promotes the scheme through
individual mobilising and community mobilising, for example, when I collected
money from members, I would encourage more people tojoin the scheme. After
I resigned, the district hospital was responsible for collecting money and the
number of CBHI members decreased until they handed over (responsibility) to
our current CBHI money collector. (Since then) the members have increased
gradually and remain stable (there are now about 30 CBHI members). II
-Drop-out andformer village collector, Ban Phonehang, Phonehang district
Another drop-out explained that the termination of the money collection system in his
village is the reason he dropped out.
"Actually it was not me who wanted to drop out! It was because of the money
collector who did not come to collect money from me. I waited for him to collect
money, but did not see anyone asking me to pay; I was just cut off from the
scheme. "
-Former member in Ban Phonehang, Phonehang district
It is clear that the quality and reliability of the village collection system may play an
important role in determining enrolment levels, especially in villages where the money
collector and other village authorities actively promote the scheme.
The relationship between high enrolment and monthly discussions about CBHI is likely
to be endogenous as villages with higher enrolment levels. are more likely to have
questions or raise issues about CBHI. Thus, these results should be interpreted with this
caveat in mind.
Village enrolment levels are higher in smaller villages and villages with fewer migrant
labourers. It makes sense that migrant labourers would be less likely to join CBHI
because they do not live in the village year round and can therefore not make the
monthly premiums or take advantage of services covered. However, it is also possible
that there are unobservable factors associated with migrant labour leading to omitted
variable bias (e.g., migrant labourers could be healthier given that they are well enough
to travel to work and therefore less in need of insurance or health care).
Pagel131
Table 5.5 Determinants of village enrolment levels: regression results
Modell (excludes 72% Model 2 (includes 72%
outlier} outlier}
Dependent variable: CBHl enrolment level in villaqe Coer. S.E. p>t Coer. S.E. p>t
Villagechief is young «-40 years) 0.061 0.028 0.035·· 0.094- 0.033 0.007··
Chief has at least secondary education 0,015 0.019 0.414 0.026 0.022 0.248
Chief is a member of CBHI 0.032 0.022 0.151 0.032 0.027 0.236
Pharmacy in village 0.000 0.022 0.991 -0.007 0.026 0.779
Drug seller in village -0.007 0.022 0.738 -0.002 0.026 0.927
Traditional healer in village -0.035 0.022 0.112 -0.037 0.026 0.159
Health centre in village -0.025 0.028 0.382 -0.025 0.034 0.468
Private clinic in village -0.033 0.030 0.279 -0.026 0.037 0.479
3 or more campaigns in village 0.006 0.020 0.779 0.009 0.024 0.723
Distance to hospital (km) -0.004 0.011 0.745 0.004 0.013 0.766
Door-to-door promotion of CBHI in village -0.013 0.026 0.614 -0.022 0.031 0.477
CBHI collection system in village 0.057 0.023 0.016·· 0.058 0.D28 0.040··
CBHI is discussed at least 1x per month in village -0.053 0.021 0.014·· -0.061 0.D25 0.018··
Mass organisations promote CBHI in village 0.036 0.021 0.093· 0.022 0.025 0.387
Number of visits from provincial CBHI team 0.020 0.023 0.372 0.017 0,028 0.539
Collector has stolen money -0.039 0.033 0.240 -0.067 0.039 0.092·
Total number of households inVillage <0.001 <0.001 0.030·· <0.001 <0.001 0.023··
% of households working for government <0.001 <0.001 0.603 <0.001 <0.001 0.992
% of households that are migrant labourers -0.002 0.001 0.022·· -0.003 0.001 0.020··
Perceived quality is medium (omitted: poor) -0.021 0.033 0.530 -0.021 0.039 0.591
Perceived quality is high (omitted: poor) -0.012 0.040 0.769 0.001 0.048 0.982
Hospital 1: Sissattanak(Hatxaifong omitted) -0.023 0.042 0.589 -0.033 0.050 0.510
Hospital 3: Phonehong -0.009 0.049 0.850 -0.044 0.059 0.453
Hospital4: Keoudom 0.066 0.042 0.123 0.036 0.051 0.475
Hospital 5:Vientiane provincial 0.039 0.050 0.434 0.026 0.060 0.673
Hospital 6: Champasak 0.102 0.046 0.032·· 0.088 0.056 0.120
Constant 0.133 0.062 0.036 0.168 0.075 0.Q28
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.408
N 86 87
.Significant at 10% level; •• sign!ftcant at 5% level. The above models use ordinary least squares resression.
Like the household enrolment analysis, the results indicate that the scheme has had the
most success in Champasak, in that enrolment levels were significantly higher for
villages using the Champasak district hospital. However, in Model 2 this relationship
was not significant. The results from the two models also diverged on two other
variables. In modell, enrolment was significantly higher in villages in which mass
organisations promote CBHI but in model 2 this relationship was not significant. In
model 2, enrolment levels were significantly lower in villages where the village collector
has stolen money but this relationship was not significant in model 1. Stealing or
misusing funds from the scheme by the collector was reported in 10 percent of villages
and could affect villagers' trust in the system.
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5.4 Discussion
The findings generated from this sub-study reveal useful information about the target
group's decision to enrol in CBHI. The empirical findings indicate that the decision to
enrol is influenced by a range of factors at the household and village levels, including
education, health status, risk attitudes, socioeconomic status, quality perceptions, and
availability of health care alternatives in the village. Four findings are of particular
interest because of their contribution to the literature on CBHI enrolment, as well as their
implications for health policy in Laos.
First, the results confirm that illness is driving enrolment in CBHI, and the use of
multiple health status measures helps to understand this relationship. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that households with poorer health status are more likely
to enrol in CBHI than households with better health status. Thus, there is evidence of
adverse selection in the scheme. This finding supports literature from Senegal,
Thailand83, India and China (Jakab et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2006;
Chankova et al. 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008) but is inconsistent with results from other
studies that did not find a link between health status and enrolment (JUtting 2003;
Schneider and Diop 2004; De Allegri et al. 2006a; Nguyen and Knowles 2010). From a
public health perspective the link between poor health and higher enrolment is
encouraging, as it indicates that households with the greatest need for health care
services are purchasing insurance. However, given that all members play a flat-rate
premiwn regardless of their risk profile, adverse selection can drive up the cost of health
care per insured member and can ultimately threaten the sustainability and financial
viability of the scheme. Although CBHI in Laos has attempted to counteract adverse
selection by requiring househol~ level enrolment and imposing a waiting time prior to
use of services, the results of this study indicate that these measures are insufficient to
prevent adverse selection. As long as CBHI is voluntary, it is likely that adverse
selection will remain a problem, judging from global experiences.
A second noteworthy finding is the negative relationship between risk aversion and
enrolment. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that households with greater
83 The evaluation of the Thailand scheme was conducted when Thailand had a community-based scheme,
which was largely subsidised by the government.
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aversion to risk are more likely to enrol in CBHI. However, it is important to note that
expected utility theory assumes that insurance is a risk-minimizing strategy and that the
scheme will offer protection. As noted in the literature, however, many schemes are
poorly managed (De Allegri et al. 2006b; Basaza et al. 2007; Basaza et al. 2008).
Moreover, in low-capacity environments, quality of care of covered services is often
poor and therefore the features of CBHI may not be risk-minimizing relative to other
options. For example, if households perceive the public health care system to be of low
quality, then they may view enrolling in CBHI (which requires users to first seek
services at the district hospital in the public system, where quality is reportedly poor) as
less attractive than remaining uninsured (which allows users a broad choice of health
care options, including seeking care in the private sector). Thus, purchasing insurance for
some could actually be more risky than not purchasing insurance, especially among the
poor, for whom a given loss can be ruinous (Dercon 2002; Dercon 2007; Bendig and
Arun 2011). The findings on the relationship between risk and enrolment in CBHI in this
study are consistent with a study that found that risk-averse households are less likely to
purchase rainfall insurance among farmers in India (Gine et al. 2008).
Other economic and social theories may explain better why risk-averse individuals are
less likely to enrol in the Lao scheme. Under the theory of expected payoffs (Manning
and Marquis 1996) households will insure only if they perceive the benefits of enrolment
to be higher than the costs, relative to being uninsured. Musgrove (2007) cautions that in
low-income countries, risk aversion does not readily translate into the demand for
insurance, and that other factors such as cultural or sociological reasons may carry more
weight than the purely rational approach to the connection between risk and insurance
(Musgrove 2007). For example, trust in the scheme management has also been reported
as an important determinant of enrolment (Schneider 2005; Ozawa and Walker 2009).
Furthermore, even if individuals can consciously calculate that the expected benefits of
insurance outweigh the costs, the benefits may not be realised in the presence of poor
quality health care and low capacity to effectively manage the scheme. Thus, in the
context of a poorly functioning health care system or poorly managed scheme, it may be
that the risk-averse will be less likely to enrol.
The findings regarding the relationship between consumption and enrolment and asset
index and enrolment both support the hypothesis that the poorest households are the least
likely to enrol in CBHI. These results are consistent with much of the enrolment
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literature (JUtting2003; Wang et al. 2005; De Allegri et al. 2006a; Chankova et al. 2008;
Gnawali et al. 2009; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011) as well as with economic theory, which
predicts that like other "normal goods" the demand for health insurance increases with a
rise in income (Folland et al. 2007). Although CBHI in Laos does not specifically target
the poorest households (this is the task of health equity funds (HEFs), which also suffer
from low coverage), lower enrolment by the poor raises concerns about equity. Given
that the poor are most vulnerable to catastrophic health payments (Pannarunothai and
Mills 1997; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003), it is important that strategies to expand
risk-protection schemes target the poorest. Although plans are underway in Laos to
eventually link health equity funds with CBHI, so that the fund will pay the premium on
behalf of the poor, these linkages have only been implemented on a small scale and the
effectiveness of this linkage on increasing coverage and other outcomes such as
utilisation is questionable. Apart from HEFs, there are no subsidies in place to cover the
cost of CBHI premiums for the poor. Nor is a systematic targeting scheme in place for
identifying eligible households." Given the current financing arrangements in Laos,
CBHI may continue to exacerbate inequities in areas where subsidies for the poor are not
available.
Finally, the study findings indicate that the perception of quality of care is an important
factor affecting enrolment in CBHI in that those who perceive quality to be poor are less
likely to enrol. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis generated from the
conceptual framework as well as previous studies on enrolment (Criel and Waelkens
2003; Basaza et al. 2008; Mathauer et al. 2008). The complaints about low quality of
public health care in Laos are consistent with what other studies from Laos have reported
(Paphassarang et al. 2002; Thome and Pholsena 2009). Poor quality of care remains a
source of dissatisfaction for both members and non-members and is one of the major
reasons for leaving the scheme. For example, health care workers lack the skills to
adequately diagnose health problems, productivity among health care workers is low,
and lack of equipment is a problem in most facilities. However, in addition to poor
overall quality, the study identifies specific details about the, differential treatment
between CBHI members and cash-paying patients. For example, CBHI members are
84 Although the government has drafted guidelines to assist local authorities in identifying and monitoring
poor households, there is presently significant variation in the criteria used by villages, as this study
showed, Moreover, the list of poor households is not consistently maintained across villages.
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reportedly made to wait longer to be treated, are treated with less respect, and receive
poorer quality drugs than non-CBHI members. A recently published study confirms that
cash-paying patients receive more expensive drugs than insured patients but does not
measure the extent to which the insured may be under-serviced (Syhakhang et al. 2011).
However, based on the qualitative findings the differences are unlikely to be simply
misperceptions by CBHI members: even non-members confirm that treatment is better
for paying patients. Differential treatment would not be surprising given that capitation
payments are low and do not cover costs, and that providers depend on the fees charged
by paying patients to operate the facilities. Thus, strategies that aim to improve quality
overall, and improve equality of treatment between the insured and uninsured will be
important factors affecting insurance uptake in the future. If people do not perceive the
health services as valuable, they will be less inclined to enrol. In their review of lessons
learned from CBHI schemes in sub-Saharan Africa, Wiesman and Jutting state that
quality improvement should not be expected as an outcome of resource mobilisation via
insurance, but must be considered a necessary precondition for successful
implementation of CBHI (Wiesman and JUtting2000).
5.5 Limitations of methodology
The main limitation of the enrolment sub-study is the cross-sectional nature of the data,
which makes it difficult to infer causation between an independent variable and the
outcome (enrolment). A number of variables in the enrolment probit model are likely to
be endogenous. Although consumption quintiles are expected to be less endogenous than
absolute measures of consumption, it is likely that the relationship between quintiles and
enrolment is still endogenous. Similarly, it is also possible that the relationship between
wealth status (as measured by the asset index) and enrolment is endogenous. Other
variables that are likely to be endogenous with enrolment include quality and exposure to
CBHI. Despite this endogeneity, the FGD findings support the direction of the results.
For example, the FGD results confirm that people who are poorer are less likely to enrol
in insurance. However, it is important to note that endogeneity is difficult to overcome
with the cross-sectional study and could bias the results identified by the probit model.
A second potential source of bias stems from omitted variables. Although the
questionnaires included details about a wide range of factors expected to influence
enrolment, it is likely that some important variables were excluded. For example,
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political affiliation was not measured due to the sensitivity of gathering this information.
Omitting variables may bias the effect of other determinants, either in a positive or
negative direction. However, as discussed, it is expected that the most important
variables influencing enrolment were accounted for in the analysis and therefore, omitted
variable bias is likely to be minimal.
Given that the findings on the relationship between risk attitudes and enrolment are used
to test a key hypothesis of this study, it is important to note the limitations of the risk-
aversion measure. First, the risk-aversion classes that were used in the question were not
,
validated in the context of Laos and were not based on partial risk aversion intervals, as
was done in the original experiment by Binswanger. However, given that the variable
was dichotomized, it was only necessary to differentiate the "risk-free" gamble with the
other gambles. The second limitation with respect to the risk-aversion measure is that it
may not be valid to extrapolate from hypothetical risk preferences to actual decisions
about health insurance enrolment, although in the experiment from which the risk
question was adapted, no significant difference was found between hypothetical and
actual responses (Binswanger 1980).
A fourth limitation is the external validity of the findings on the determinants of
enrolment. The household level findings on the determinants of enrolment in CBHI are
likely representative of the target population that existed at the time of the study, given
that the sample accounted for 30 percent of households enrolled at the time. This target
group included households in the most atlluent, urban and semi-urban areas of the
country, where quality of care is relatively good and where the majority of the population
belongs to the Tai-Kadai ethnic group. However, the target group has expanded since
data collection and will continue to expand in the future to groups that may be very
different and harder to reach (e.g., villages with lower socio-economic status, ethnic
minorities and remote access to health facilities, etc.). Thus, external validity is likely to
be strong for the target group that existed at the time of the study but results cannot
necessarily be generalised to new and future areas.
Although the village level analysis complements the household enrolment analysis, on its
own the small sample size (87 villages) leads to relatively low precision when estimating
the factors affecting village-level enrolment levels. Thus, the risk of a type 2 error (i.e.,
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failure to reject the null when a significant relationship exists) should be considered.
Results should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Although the main limitations of the focus group discussion methodology were discussed
in Chapter 4, there are limitations to the analysis that should be mentioned. The summary
reports that I received from the moderator may have excluded important pieces of
information that caused me to misinterpret the results, or give greater weight to certain
statements. Moreover, because I was not present for the discussions, I had to rely on the
moderator to translate, interpret and summarise the discussions, which may have led to
information bias. Although an effort was made to ensure all opinions were acknowledged
in the analysis, there is still a risk of "confirmability bias", which occurs because
researchers have a tendency to make a stronger case for accounts that fit well with other
independently derived analyses (Miles and Huberman 1994). Given that the quantitative
analysis had already been conducted, it is possible that I inadvertently gave greater
weight to statements that confirmed the quantitative findings.
5.6 Concluding remarks
This sub-study has uncovered factors that are most likely to influence enrolment in CBHI
and also sheds light on the potential challenges of expanding enrolment further: adverse
selection threatens the sustainability and financial viability of the scheme; (reported)
poor quality of care hinders expansion of the scheme (and is not likely to be improved in
the near future); and CBHI may be exacerbating inequities in areas where subsidies are
not available for the poorest. The findings point to a number of short- to medium-term
programmatic changes that could help to strengthen CBHI, including: reaching out to
households that are least likely to enrol in CBHI; improving quality of information
dissemination regarding CBHI during awareness campaigns; updating contribution rates
and improving collection of premiums (including strengthening incentives for village
collectors); and strengthening the CBHI and management information system. These
recommendations are discussed in more detail in a policy note that was written for the
Government of Laos and its partners, prior to drafting the health financing strategy
(Alkenbrack et al. 2010)(See Appendix Dl for the English summary-version of the
policy note)..
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However, although a number of short-term programmatic changes can help to strengthen
CBHI, the longer term challenges of expanding insurance to the informal sector through
this route will be more difficult to overcome especially given that the areas that have
been targeted to date are those with relatively high socioeconomic status, and access to
relatively good quality care. It is therefore worth considering broader strategies that can
be taken to expand enrolment within the informal sector. These recommendations and
policy implications are discussed in Chapter 8. This discussion will be partly informed
by the findings from the impact evaluation of the CBHI scheme, which are presented in
the next chapter. The impact evaluation builds upon the analysis from this chapter to
examine the impact of CBHI on utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures, source of care,
and other outcomes of interest.
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Chapter 6. The impact of community-based health insurance on
utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures
6.1 Introduction
As in other countries, community-based health insurance has been intr~duced in Lao
PDR in hopes of increasing access to health services and reducing medical-related out-
of-pocket payments among the informal sector. A voluminous body of the international
health financing literature is devoted to understanding whether, and to what extent,
CBHI and other voluntary insurance schemes facilitate utilisation of health care services
and increase financial protection among the insured. While most of the evidence suggests
that CBHI increases utilisation of health care among beneficiaries and reduces out-of-
pocket health care expenditures for its members, there are inconsistencies across
schemes. Moreover, with the exception of some recent studies, the literature on the
impacts of CBHI suffers from methodological weaknesses. One of the main concerns has
been the failure to adequately account for differences in risklhealth status between
members and non-members that leads to adverse selection and other sources of selection
bias.85 As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, and also shown in the
conceptual framework in Chapter 4, the demand for health insurance is influenced by the
expectations about the need for services in the future. This need for services is linked to
the use of and expenditures on health services and therefore, any attempt to measure the
impacts of insurance must take this need into account to prevent selection bias of impact
findings.
As discussed in the conceptual' framework, insurance lowers the price of care at the point
of service delivery, which leads to a higher demand for services among the insured.
Thus, it is hypothesised that CBHI members will have higher utilisation rates than the
uninsured. Among those using services, the insured are hypothesized to incur lower out-
of-pocket expenditures than the uninsured, given that most services are covered by
insurance and there are no copayments for covered services. However, despite coverage
of services there are some costs to using health care, such as transportation, supplies, and
8S The broader body of literature on voluntary health insurance and more recent CBHI studies make an
effort to overcome the selection problem but good quality impact evaluations of CBHI are still relatively
rare.
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additional fees charged at facilities (either informal or formal), which create barriers to
accessing health care. Because health care has a positive elasticity of demand,
households that are better-off financially are hypothesized to have higher use of health
services than poorer households.
This sub-study examines the impacts of CBHI by building on the methodology employed
in Chapter 5, which made a strong effort to measure factors that are most likely to affect
enrolment in CBHI. The sub-study addresses objective 2 of the study, which is to
measure the extent to which enrolment in CBHIfacilitates access to health care services
and offers financial protection to insured individuals by using a robust methodological
approach. Specifically, the sub-study aims to answer the following research questions:
1. Are CBHI members more likely to use health care services than an equivalent
comparison group of uninsured individuals?
2. Does CBHI membership influence the source of health care delivery among
those using services?
3. Do insured users of health care incur lower out-of-pocket payments for health
care than uninsured users?
4. Are CBHI members with an inpatient visit less likely than uninsured users of
inpatient services to employ coping strategies (e.g., borrowing, selling assets)
to pay for health care?
5. How do outcomes (e.g., utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures) differ across
socioeconomic groups?
Two hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework are tested directly:
Hypothesis 1: CBHI members are more likely to use health care services than the
uninsured.
Hypothesis 2: Insured users of health care incur lower out-of-pocket payments for
health care than uninsured users.
The next section presents the methodology of the study, and this is followed by .
descriptive findings and results. The discussion then summarises how the results relate to
the literature, and highlights policy implications in Laos, although these policy
implications will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. The chapter then summarises
the limitations of the analytical approach and concludes with some final remarks.
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6.2 Methodology
6.2.1 Overview o/methodology
This sub-study uses a cross-sectional, case-comparison study of insured and uninsured
individuals to measure the impact of CBHI on utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures,
source of care and coping mechanisms. Like the enrolment sub-study presented in
Chapter 5, this sub-study also uses qualitative methods to help explain quantitative
findings, but to a lesser extent. The main method is a survey of 3000 households
(covering 14,804 individuals) in 87 villages across 6 districts. The sample was selected
using a multi-stage cluster sample. Unlike the enrolment sub-study, which measured
outcomes at the household level, most of the outcomes in the impact evaluation are
measured at the individual level, given that individuals within a household have different
health care needs and health-seeking behaviours. Further details about the study design,
sampling, and data collection were discussed in Chapter 4. The method used in the
analysis is propensity score matching combined with single differences and the
justification for this choice and a description of the approach are given in the next
section.
6.2.2 Justification 0/analytical approach
As described in Chapter 4 (Methods), the decision to use PSM in the analysis was based
on the assumption that selection into CBHI was based on observable variables. This
assumption could be made only after a thorough understanding of the programme and of
the factors most likely to influence enrolment. This understanding was gained through
the review of economic theory and empirical literature presented in Chapter 2, as well as
the pre-survey work. With this extensive knowledge about the factors affecting selection
into CBHI, the questionnaire was designed to control for all known factors affecting
enrolment.
As described in Chapter 2, the counterfactual outcome of a programme can never be
observed because an individual observation cannot be in the treated and untreated group
at the same time. This is commonly referred to as the "evaluation problem". PSM is
therefore used to construct the counterfactual outcome to be used to measure the impact
of a programme. Given that matching controls for differences between groups, this
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comparison group is expected to be very similar to what the treated group" would look
like in the absence of the programme.
There are several advantages of using PSM over other methods when evaluating the
impact of a programme. First, by imposing the common support, PSM compares
observations that are comparable on observable characteristics. Other traditional methods
such as regression, rely on functional form to extrapolate outside the common support,
which may not always result in robust estimates (Bryson et al. 2002). Second, matching
uses a non-parametric approach'" that does not impose distributional assumptions about
the relationship between covariates and the outcome variable. Regression, on the other
hand does impose assumptions about the relationship that is not always justified by
economic theory or the data used (Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Smith and Todd 2005). The
third advantage of PSM is that it allows for heterogeneity in treatment effects - that is,
the impact of treatment differs across individuals or subgroups, whereas ordinary least
squares regression does not (Bryson et al. 2002). Finally, propensity score matching
offers a practical advantage over matching on covariates. When matching on covariates,
the chance of finding a match decreases as the number of covariates increases.
Propensity score matching instead matches on a single index reflecting the probability of
participating in the programme. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that matching on
this single index is sufficient to achieve unbiased estimates of treatment effects.
Therefore, observations can be matched as long as they have the same probability of
participating but they do not necessarily need to share the same characteristics.
6.2.3 Description 0/PSM approach
To estimate the impacts of a programme using PSM, a probit model is used to construct
the propensity score for each observation. The propensity score is a single-index variable
that represents the predicted probability of being enrolled in the programme, conditional
on 'the characteristics entered into the probit model. The scores are used to match
''treated'' observations (CBHI observations) to a comparison group of "untreated"
observations. This matching seeks to control for observable differences in characteristics
86 The term treatment is conventionally used in the evaluation literature to indicate participation in a
r.rogramme.
7 PSM uses a non-parametric approach to perform the matching. However, the propensity scores are
estimated using a probit or logit model, and therefore PSM is often referred to as a semi-parametric
approach.
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between the treated and untreated populations. The data used to construct the probit
model in this sub-study were gathered from the household and village surveys described
in Chapter 4.
A strong effort was made to account for factors that are most likely to affect selection
into CBHI, such as multiple measures of health status, risk preferences, preferences for
modern care, and quality perceptions. More details of the probit model are discussed in
Section 6.2.5.1 (Description of Model). The outcomes of interest were: utilisation of
inpatient and outpatient services, out-of-pocket expenditures, source of care, time
between symptoms and treatment, length of stay and whether or not coping mechanisms
were used to pay for health care. The analytical approach for using PSM is discussed
below in Section 6.2.5.
6.2.4 Description of focus group discussions
Like the enrolment sub-study, focus group discussions (FODs) were also used to
complement findings from the household survey. However, the focus of the FODs was
on enrolment, with more limited attention spent understanding impacts. Nevertheless,
some useful information was gathered about the impact of the scheme on utilisation,
source of care and financial protection and these results are presented where relevant.
The approach for the FOD methodology and analysis were discussed in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5, respectively.
6.2.5 Analysis of quantitative survey
In this sub-study PSM was used to estimate the impact of CBHI on the outcomes of
interest. I performed the matching using the psmatch2 programme (Leuven and Sianesi
2003) in Stata 10.1. After matching on the propensity score, the average treatment effect
(ATT) is calculated as the difference between the outcomes for the treated and the
untreated. This parameter takes into account that the treated individuals in the sample
have actually taken up insurance. Although it is often of policy interest to estimate the
intention to treat (ITT) or the average treatment effect (ATE), it was not possible to
estimate these parameters with this study design for a few reasons. First, the comparison
group was selected from "exposed" villages, rather than "unexposed" villages so data
needed to measure the ITT or ATE were not available. As outlined in Chapter 4 (see
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page 81), this design was considered optimal because of the non-random manner in
which the program was implemented. (In summary, the targeted and untargeted villages
were considered to be very different and selecting a comparison group from unexposed
villages was likely to result in strong village-level unobservables. Because the unexposed
villages were so remote and were expected to be very different in terms of health seeking
behaviour, a comparison group selected from unexposed villages was also expected to
lead to poor balancing on observables.) Furthermore, measuring the ATE or ITT would
require sampling the "treated" group from villages that had been offered treatment but
had not necessarily taken it up. Given the low CBHI uptake rates (Le. 13% in targeted
villages), very few treated observations would be included in the sample. Thus, it was
not considered relevant to policymakers to measure the population effects of a program
that had been introduced on such a small scale. For these reasons, the ATT was
considered the most relevant parameter.
The equation for the ATT parameter is sh~wn below:
'"
ATT=E(Y;(1)-Y;(O»1 ""1=1,
In this equation, treatment status is given by w, such that w=1 if the individual receives
treatment and w=O otherwise. yt< 1) and Y;(O) denote the potential outcomes for
individual i with and without treatment, respectively.
For comparison purposes, outcomes were also estimated without matching, using a
probit model for binary variables and ordinary least squares regression for continuous
variables. In both the matched analysis and the unmatched analysis, a significance level
of .0 1 is used (See "Sampling" in Chapter 4 for a description of sample size calculations)
but differences at the .05 level are also shown.
6.2.5.1 Description of model for estimating propensity scores for matching
A probit model was used to predict the propensity score for each individual in the
sample. The dichotomous outcome denotes whether the person is a member of CBHI or
not and the model includes variables at the individual, household and village levels. The
probit model is not a behavioural model but rather a statistical model to estimate the
propensity scores. However, only variables that simultaneously affect both treatment
(i.e., CBHI enrolment) and the outcome (e.g., use of services) are included. The decision
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of which variables to include was based on theory and knowledge of the programme, as
recommended by the literature (Sianesi 2004; Smith and Todd 2005; Caliendo and
Kopeinig May 2005). Variables that were expected to affect selection into insurance
were included to minimise the likelihood of selection bias (e.g., multiple measures of
health status, risk preferences, preferences for modern care, and quality perceptions.)
Other variables such as demographics, education, and type of employment were also
included. Like the analysis in Chapter 5, the impact evaluation used consumption
quintiles, as consumption is expected to be a more precise estimate of socioeconomic
status than an asset index. Endogeneity was expected to be less of a problem in the
impact evaluation than in the study of enrolment because consumption and other
variables are simply used to construct the propensity score on which matching takes
place. Nevertheless, to reduce the risk of endogeneity between consumption and health
care expenditures as much as possible, the consumption variable excluded all health care
expenditures. The use of consumption quintiles also helped to decrease the risk of
endogeneity, relative to a model using absolute consumption levels.
It is important to note that most of the impacts of CBHI were estimated at the individual
level. However, selection into insurance is at the household level, given that all
household members must enrol.88 Therefore, the propensity score was estimated for
individuals using mainly household level variables to capture selection into the
household level treatment. However, to ensure that individual level characteristics were
balanced, three important individual level variables were also included in the model (i.e.,
the individual's age, whether or not he/she has a chronic illness, and whether or not a
woman is pregnant). These variables are expected to influence both enrolment and
outcomes and are not affected by the programme or anticipation of the programme. The
probit model was constructed to take into account clustering within households.
81 The decision use household level variables at the individual level was carefully considered and discussed
with other experts in the field, including Barbara Sianesi at Institute for Fiscal Studies. Other studies have
also used this approach (Wagstaff et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2009). It also made sense to measure individual-
level outcomes rather than household level outcomes given that utilisation of services and episodic
expenditures are measured at the individual level. Another option would have been to measure household
level impacts but this would have prevented measurement of important outcomes such as cost per
individual visit, number of visits per person, length of stay per visit, etc.
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6.2.5.2 Choice of matching algorithm
In this analysis kernel matching is used to construct the comparison group." While other
matching approaches (e.g., nearest neighbour, caliper, radius) use one or a few
observations from the comparison group to construct the counterfactual outcome of a
treated individual, kernel matching uses a weighted average of all individuals in the
control group, whereby the weight given to the untreated observation is in proportion to
the closeness of a given treated individual. The kernel weights are inversely proportional
to the absolute difference in propensity score between the treated and untreated
observations (Smith and Todd 2005). Thus, kernel matching can be thought of as a
weighted regression of the outcome on the treatment indicator variable with weights
given by the kernel weights. If weights from a symmetric, nonnegative, unimodal kernel
are used, the average places higher weight on observations that are closer in terms of
their propensity scores, and lower weight on observations that are more distant (Caliendo
and Kopeinig May 2005). The advantage of kernel matching over other approaches is a
reduction in variance because more information is used to construct the counterfactual
outcome. However, the possible drawback is that observations that are too far away
could result in poor matches, which ultimately could lead to biased estimates. (This was
not a concern for this study given the high degree of overlap in propensity scores
between the treated and untreated, as will be shown in the results section). Moreover,
imposing the region of common support ensures that observations that are too far away
from each other are excluded from the analysis."
Because kernel matching is analogous to running a weighted regression of the outcome
on the treatment indicator, once the first outcome has been estimated using kernel
matching the results can be used to estimate subsequent outcomes using a weighted
regression, with probability weights constructed using the kernel weights generated from
the matching exercise. The regression only includes the treatment variable and does not
include the regressors, as the regressors have already been accounted for in the
89 I used a Gaussian (normal) kernel and bandwidth ofO.02. .
90 I experimented with other matching algorithms and found that the results were relatively robust across
different matching algorithms, including nearest neighbour (with I, S and 10 neighbours) and nearest
neighbour caliper matching (with various calipers and with and without replacement). Kernel matching
resulted in better balancing than other methods.
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propensity score." The coefficient on the regression represents the difference in the
outcome for CBHI members relative to the uninsured. The regression approach yields the
same results that one would get through kernel matching but has the advantage of being
computationally faster.92 Furthermore, the weighted regression results in robust standard
errors and therefore bootstrapping, also computationally burdensome, is not required,
whereas bootstrapping is required when using kernel matching through psmatch2.93 This
weighted regression approach is henceforth referred to as kernel matching, as it gives the
same results as that from kernel matching but just uses a different methodology than if
kernel matching were performed using psmatch2.
6.2.5.3 Checking the sensitivity of the results
As mentioned above, outcomes were estimated without matching, in order to assess the
value of matching. This used a probit model for binary outcome variables and ordinary
least squares regression for continuous variables. The equation estimated is the outcome
variable regressed on a dummy variable to indicate CBHI status and the covariates that
were entered into the probit model for the matching exercise. By comparing the matched
and unmatched results it is possible to determine whether findings from the matched
analysis differ from results obtained by using regression techniques on an unmatched
sample.
The options for using PSM, alone or in combination with other methods, are numerous
and are constantly evolving. Therefore, in this analysis a second method was used to
check the sensitivity of the results. The kernel weights generated from the matching were
applied to a weighted regression that regressed on the outcome of interest but unlike the
weighted regression used for kernel matching, which regressed on the treatment indicator
only, this second model regressed on both the treatment indicator and the covariates used
to estimate the propensity score. This combination of matching and regression has been
referred to as bias-corrected matching: even though matching reduces differences
between the groups, the AITs may still be biased due to discrepancies between the
91 A regression without the regressors and with kernel weights effectively gives the same results that one
would get by looking at differences in weighted means.
92 The consistency of the results between psmatch2 and the regression was confirmed by checking findings
using psmatch2.
93 Unmatched outcomes were estimated using psmatch2 but because no matching took place, standard
errors are robust and did not need to be bootstrapped.
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covariates, and the regression further adjusts for these differences. Thus, this method is
suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) and Abadie and Imbens (2007) because it
results indoubly robust estimates.
Using both kernel matching and the bias-corrected weighted regression, several
outcomes related to utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures, source of care and coping
mechanisms were measured. Although the full sample was used to estimate the impact of
insurance on use of inpatient or outpatient services, additional outcomes (e.g., number of
outpatient visits, out-of-pocket expenditures on outpatient visits) were calculated on the
relevant subsample (e.g., those who had an outpatient visit), rather than the full sample.
This approach of using the subsample was taken because it restricts matching to those
with any use of the visit of interest (e.g. inpatient, outpatient or both) and specifically
answers the research questions of interest. For example, the question about out-of-pocket
expenditures specifically asks whether insured users of health care incur lower out-of-
pocket payments for health care than uninsured users. Thus, the relevant subsample
analysis addresses double selection (e.g., selection into insurance and selection into
outpatient visits). Although an alternative approach that would make inferences on the
full sample was also considered for the analysis, this approach was not used because the
interest of the study was in determining how actual outcomes (of expenditures and
frequency of visits) differ between the insured and uninsured users of care. Furthermore,
with such low utilisation rates in the sample (Le. 18%), making inferences on the
subsample of users was considered a more appropriate approach for comparing actual
out-of-pocket expenditures (rather than expected out-of-pocket expenditures, which are
contingent on utilisation rates).
To accurately estimate the average treatment effects using this approach, the propensity
scores were estimated separately for the full sample and for each relevant subsample and
matching was then performed using the sample/subsample of interest. In this analysis
four different samples (l.e., the full sample; those with an inpatient visit; those with an
outpatient visit; and those with any visit) were used to estimate the outcomes of interest.
To better understand the magnitude of the impact of out-of-pocket expenditures, the
incidence of catastrophic expenditures was measured on the full sample. The
"catastrophic" threshold is expected to approximate the point at which a household is
forced to sacrifice other basic needs, deplete productive assets, incur debt, or become
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impoverished (Russe1l2004; O'Donnell et al. 2005). Although the value of the threshold
is somewhat arbitrary, the threshold of 10 percent of total expenditure is commonly used
in the literature (Pradhan and Prescott 2002; Ranson 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
2003; Russe1l2004; Limwattananon et al. 2007; van Doorslaer et al. 2007) and was used
in this analysis." Given that the estimates were at the individual level, catastrophic
expenditures were measured as the percent of individuals living in households in which
health care costs exceed 10%of total household expenditure.
Another area of interest of this sub-study was in understanding how households cope in
response to illness shocks, and whether or not CBHI households are less likely to employ
coping strategies, such as borrowing or selling assets, than the uninsured. As noted in
Chapter 4 questions about coping mechanisms were administered in the questionnaire.
The results of these responses were analysed through PSM using the same matching
technique described above. Kernel matching was performed on a subsample of
individuals with an inpatient visit as it was expected that an inpatient visit was most
likely to resemble a "health shock".
6.2.5.4 Examining heterogeneity 0/ impacts by quintile
One advantage of using PSM is that it allows for heterogeneity in impacts across
different groups. One particular interest of this study was measuring the impacts of
CBHI on the poor. The advantage of using the weighted regression approach is that
outcomes among subgroups can be readily measured without doing the matching
separately on quintile subgroups. The estimates for each quintile were obtained by
applying the weights from kernel matching to a weighted regression, and regressing on
treatment, dummy variables for quintiles, and interactions between treatment and
quintiles. To get the treatment effects for each quintile, I simply added the coefficients
on treatment and the interaction variables for the respective quintile. This methodology is
a straightforward method of estimating impacts on subgroups and was used in a study of
voluntary health insurance in China (Wagstaff et al. 2009).
94 The other commonly used threshold is 40% of non-food expenditure (Xu et al. 2003; van Doorslaer et
01.2007).
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6.3 Results
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics
A direct comparison of the CBHI and non-CBHI households and individuals was
presented in Chapter 5 (Tables 5.1 through 5.3). The key findings are presented below:
• CBHI households are larger, more likely to be married, more educated and
household heads are older relative to comparison households.
• CBHI households also have significantly higher household consumption levels
than comparison households but similar per capita consumption rates.
• With respect to health status, CBHI households are less healthy, have more
elderly household members, more women of reproductive age and more pregnant
women, relative to comparison households.
• The household head in CBHI households is relatively more risk averse than in
uninsured households (See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.5.1 for a description of the
risk-aversion measure).
• Attitudes towards different sources of care are similar among CBHI and non-
CBHI households.
• Individuals in CBHI households are significantly more likely to report a
somewhat serious or serious illness, relative to the uninsured.
• Individuals in CBHI households are significantly more likely to use health
services and incur lower out-of-pocket expenditures than the uninsured.
In addition to the findings reported in Chapter 5, descriptive analysis of the household
data showed that CBHI households are significantly less likely than the uninsured to
resort to coping mechanisms to pay for health care (e.g., borrowing money, receiving
help from family and friends, and purchasing less food).
6.3.2 Results from propensity score estimation
The results of the probit, presented in Table 6.1, give the propensity scores and also
bring to light the factors affecting enrolment, although as mentioned previously, the
probit used to predict propensity scores is modelled at the individual level. Although the
discussion of factors affecting enrolment will not be revisited here, the results from the
individual-level probit and the household-level probit used in Chapter 5 are consistent: in
Page l Hl
the full sample presented here, the probability of enrolment increases with increasing age
of the household head, education, and income level. The probability of enrolment is
higher among individuals living in households in which someone has a chronic illness or
had difficulty with activities, and also increases with the number of women of
reproductive age. There are differences between the full sample and the sub-samples due
to double selection (i.e., selection into insurance and selection into a visit). For example,
education was a significant predictor of enrolment among the full sample but not in the
subsample with an inpatient visit. In other words, among those who made an inpatient
visit, education levels between CBHI members and the uninsured were not significantly
different. Similarly, chronic illness in the household was only significant at the .05 level
for the subsample with an inpatient visit, but was significant at the .01 level for all other
samples. None of the individual-level variables were significant predictors of enrolment.
Figures 6.1 through 6.4 show the histograms for the propensity scores for the uninsured
and insured individuals in the full sample and subsamples. The histograms indicate that,
in the full sample and across all relevant subsamples, the propensity scores of both
groups follow very similar distributions and there is a large area of common support.
Thus, even before matching, the groups are very similar. After matching, the
distributions of the propensity scores were inspected and any observations off the
common support (where the propensity score in one group is smaller than the minimum
or larger than the maximum in the opposite group) were discarded. This ensures that the
matched sample includes closely matched households (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983;
Ravallion et al. 2007; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Wagstaff 201Oa), Using this approach, only
40 observations in the treated group were dropped from the analysis, leaving 5,296 and
9,468 CBHI and non-CBHI observations respectively (See Table 6.2 for the size of the
subsamples on the common support)." The small number of observations dropped from
the sample is unlikely to compromise the external validity of the results.
9$ Although various trimming methods are recommended for skewed data (Crump et al. 2006), the data in
both groups approximate a normal distribution and density of scores is relatively high across the
distribution so trimming was not necessary.
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Figure 6.1 Propensity score distribution
for the full sample
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Figure 6.3 Propensity score distribution
for those with an inpatient visit
('oj
•
(")-
o
CBH!
.2 .4 .6
Pr(CBHI)
.S
Graphs byCBHl1 Non CBHI
Figure 6.2 Propensity score distribution
for those with an outpatient visit
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Figure 6.4 Propensity score distribution
for those with any visit
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Table 6.2 Size of sample and region of common support
CBHI non-CBHI Total
Full sample On support 5,296 9,468 14,764
Off support 40 0 40
5,336 9,468 14,804
Those with an outpatient visit On support 797 1,279 2,076
Off support 8 0 8
805 1,279 2,084
Those with an inpatient visit On support 422 368 790
Off support 7 0 7
429 368 797
Those with any visit On support 1,128 1,573 2,701
Off support 14 0 14
1,142 1,573 2,715
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6.3.3Assessingmatching quality (balancing)
After matching, balancing tests were performed to check that the matching sufficiently
eliminated any significant association between treatment status and covariates. Two
methods for assessing matching quality were used. The first looked at the differences
between the treated and untreated on each covariate using t-tests (Rosenbaum and Rubin
1985). Differences in covariates are expected before matching, but after matching the
covariates should be balanced between groups and therefore no significant differences
should remain (Caliendo and Kopeinig May 2005). However, the value of the t-test is
based on the sample size and therefore on its own, this method of assessing balancing is
insufficient (Ho et al. 2007; Imbens and Wooldridge 2008), although for large samples it
should be sufficient. It is therefore useful to observe the normalised differences between
the treated and untreated groups." One rule of thumb offered is that the normalised
difference be no more than 25% of a standard deviation (Ho et al. 2007). The second
balancing test compared the pseudo R-squared values before and after matching. This
value indicates how well the covariates explain participation in the programme
(insurance), and therefore after matching, the pseudo R-squared value should be low
(Sianesi 2004).
Table 6:3 reports the results of the balancing tests for the full sample. The first and
second sets of columns show the differences before and after matching, respectively.
Before matching, the groups are significantly different on several covariates and
normalised differences on four variables exceed 25%. However, after matching, all
significant differences (at the .01 level) on 2S variables are eliminated." On all
covariates, the normalised difference, also known as the percent bias, is well below 25%
indicating that the sample is well balanced. Overall, matching reduced bias between the
two groups by approximately 89 percent. The pseudo R'squared values from both
matching approaches are very low, indicating that there is very little association between
the covariates and treatment status. Thus, the balancing tests together indicate that the
treated and untreated groups are well balanced and that the biases from observables have
been significantly reduced. The groups are not perfectly balanced but the bias-corrected
96 The normalised difference is calculated as the average covariates normalised by the square root of the
sum of the within-treatment group variances and is calculated automatically in psmatch2.
97 One difference remains at the .05 level, but this difference is not considered statistically significant given
that the sample size for this study is large enough to detect differences at the .Ollevel.
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regression adjusts for these remaining differences. These balancing results confirm that
in measuring the treatment effects of CBHI, the treated and untreated groups are
,
comparable. The results of the balancing for each subsample are not included here but
are very similar to results from the full sample (except that balancing is slightly better in
the subsamples).
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6.3.41mpacts of CBHl on utilisation and financial protection
6.3.4.1 Summary of Impacts
A summary of the impacts discussed in this section is presented in Figure 6.5. The results
can be interpreted as the impacts of CBHI on CBHI members relative to the uninsured.
More details of the estimates are presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
Figure 6.5 Percent differences in utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures, CBHI vs. non-
CBRl
OOPs on alliP visits in 12 mos
OOPs per IP visit in 12 mos
OOPs on all OP visits in last month IIIIIiI
OOPs on all OP visits in public facility in last month
OOPs on all self-care in last month
OOPs per OP visit in public facility in last month
00 Ps per self-care visit in last month
Total OOPs for all visits (incl. premiums) (12 rnos)
Average OOPs for entire sample, regardless of use
Incidence of catastrophic expenditures (> 10% of total ..
Inpatient visit in last 12 mas
# IP visits in 12 mos
JP visit at public facility in last 12 mos
JP visit at district hosp in last 12 mos
JP visit at prov hosp in last 12 mas
IP visit at central hasp in last 12 mos
OP visit in last month
# OP visits in last month
oP visit to any public facility in last month
OP visit to district hasp in last month
oP visit to prov hosp in last month
oP visit to central hasp in last month
o P visit to pharmacy in last month
o P visit to private clinic in Laos in last month
OP visit to healer in Laos in last month
Time between onset of symptoms and inpatient visit ..
Time between onset of symptoms and outpatient visit ..
Length of stay for inpatient visit (days)
Length of stay for outpatient visit (hours)
-200%
95%
4%
104%
324%
85%
-20%
20%
6%
177%
433'Vo
93%
-17%
-7%
-41%
-59%
-61%
-59%
-87%
-77%
-20%
-79%
-52%
-58%
-24%
96%
-46%
-9%
48%'----.--_ ...,--- .-.----..,---~
-100% 500%0% 100% 200% 300% 400%
_ Significant at .01 level _ No signifkant difference
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a bias-corrected regression constructed using the kernel weights
obtained from psmatch2 as well as additional covariates. With the exception 0/ "average OOPsfor the entire
sample" and "incidence of catastrophic expenditure" all oap estimates exclude the cost of the monthly
premiums/or CBH! members, and therefore represent the differences in cost at the point of service delivery.
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6.3.4.21mpacts of CBHl on utilisation, out-of-pocket expenditures and source of care
The impacts (with matching) of CBHI on utilisation and source of care are given in
Table 6.4, while the impacts on out-of-pocket expenditures are given in Table 6.5. The
first set of columns in both tables gives the raw differences in the mean of the outcomes
without matching and without controlling for differences between variables. These
differences are referred to as the "naive estimators" in the program evaluation literature.
The next two sets of columns give the results using kernel matching and kernel matching
with the bias-corrected regression. The ATTs are presented as the percent difference
between the groups (calculated as the difference between the CBHI and comparison
outcomes divided by the CBHI outcome). Also shown are the t-tests of the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in the ATTs between CBHI and non-CBHI groups.
The unmatched and matched impact estimates are similar across most outcomes, likely
because the groups were so similar even before matching. The results are also robust
across kernel matching and bias-corrected matching, as kernel matching on its own was
successful in balancing the insured and uninsured. The impacts from the bias-corrected
regression will be interpreted here.
For comparison purposes, Table 6.6 shows the impact estimates using multivariate
regression but without matching: binary outcomes were estimated from a probit model
and presented as marginal effects, while continuous outcomes were estimated using
OLS.
The results in Table 6.4 show that the CBHI scheme has significantly increased
utilisation of both inpatient and outpatient services. In fact, CBHI members were almost
twice as likely as non-members to make an inpatient visit in a one year period. However,
of those who had at least one inpatient visit, there was no significant difference between
the insured and uninsured in the number of visits. CBHI members were also 20 percent
more likely to have an outpatient visit, and used outpatient services more frequently than
the uninsured (although the difference in number of visits is only significant at the .05
level in the matched estimates). The results from the regressions, shown in Table 6.6,
yield very similar results to the matched estimates but the insurance effect is of slightly
higher magnitude. One exception is that in the regression results there is no significant
difference between the two groups in the number of outpatient visits.
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Regarding source of care (Table 6.4), the matched estimates show that relative to non-
members, CBHI members were four times more likely to have an inpatient visit in a
district hospital and five times more likely to have an outpatient visit at a district
hospital. (The estimates from the probit regression in Table 6.6 are very similar although
of slightly higher magnitude.) A significantly higher use of provincial hospitals among
CBHI members, for both inpatient and outpatient care, was also found. The results also
showed that CBHI members were significantly more likely to use public sector facilities,
and significantly less likely to use private clinics for outpatient visits. Although the naive
estimators that the insured were significantly less likely to use pharmacies, these
differences disappeared after matching. They also disappeared in the unmatched probit
results. Qualitative findings from FGDs revealed that for mild to moderate illnesses, both
the insured and uninsured use pharmacies, village health workers or clinics for their first
line care, rather than the district hospitals, where quality is poor - especially for CBHI
members. As discussed in Chapter 5, FGDs indicate that health care workers are more
respectful towards cash-paying patients than towards CBHI members; CBHI members
also report incurring longer waiting times. Moreover, the cost of transportation to the
district hospital was reported as a barrier to seeking hospital care for less than severe
illnesses. Both quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that seeking care in Thailand
is rare among the informal sector: in FGDs, many CBHI members and non-members
explained that they do not go to Thailand for their medical care because it is expensive to
travel out of the country. However, a few respondents note that those who can afford to
go to Thailand do so. Very few individuals across the sample make visits to traditional
healers and there is no significant difference between the groups in use of these services.
Most of the comparisons on out-of-pocket expenditures shown in Table 6.5 measure
differences in expenditure at the point of service delivery and exclude premiums."
Unless otherwise stated, the impacts are estimated on the subsample of individuals who
made the respective visit. The matched results indicate that the insured spent less than
the uninsured. In fact, out-of-pocket expenditures by the insured were one third the
amount of the uninsured for inpatient services and one eighth the amount for outpatient
services. When the cost of monthly premiums is included, CBHI members' total
payments,for those with any visit, were still only one third of the amount incurred by the
98 The first 7 outcomes in Table 6.S do not include the cost of premiums in CBHI members' expenditures.
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uninsured. However, lower expenditures for the insured are limited to the small share
(18%) of the sample making visits. When total expenditures (including premiums) were
calculated on the full sample rather than just the subsample making visits, there was no
significant difference in expenditures between the insured and uninsured. These findings
are consistent with the unmatched OLS results as well as with the findings from the
FGDs. Most CBHI members in FGDs agreed that being enrolled in CBHI has decreased
overall expenditures and prevented high expenditures at the time of care. However, a few
respondents mentioned that in the absence of illness, monthly expenditures are higher
than they were prior to enrolment, due to the monthly premiums.
Matched estimates showed that 6% of insured individuals and 9% of uninsured
individuals live in households with catastrophic expenditure. The lower incidence of
catastrophic expenditure for CBHI individuals was significant, indicating that the scheme
is providing some protection against impoverishment. 99 However, in the unmatched OLS
results, the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is only borderline significant (i.e. it is
significant at the .05 level but not at the .01 level). When the results on catastrophic
expenditures were examined/or those who had an inpatient visit, the impact ofCBHI on .
catastrophic expenditures was even more pronounced: 15.8% of insured inpatient service
users live in households with catastrophic expenditures compared with 27.8% of
uninsured inpatient users and these results were also significant at the .01 level. Although
the incidence of catastrophic expenditure was significantly lower among CBHI
households, these households still incur catastrophic expenditures, especially those in
which an inpatient visit is made. According to qualitative findings, catastrophic
expenditures in CBHI households could be the result of households paying for care
outside the CBHI scheme, either because of exclusion restrictions or because people
prefer to use care elsewhere (e.g., in central hospitals without a referral when the need
for care is serious, and in pharmacies or clinics for minor ailments).
99 When the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is measured using a threshold of >40010of non-food
expenditure, the incidence decreases to 2% of CBHI households and 4% of comparison households and
this difference is still significant at the .Ollevel.
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Table 6.6 Unmatched estimates of CBHI impacts on utilisation, source of care and out-of-
k d' i bi d OLSpoe et exnen Itures, us nl!pro tan
non- t-stat or
CBHI CBHI % difT. z-stat
Utilisation and source of inpatient visits (IP
visits)
IP visit in last 12 months 0.076 0.034- 122% 10.25"
# of IP visits in last 12 mos. (for those with visit) 1.168 1.122 4% 1.26
IP visit at any public facility in last 12 months 0.075 0.033 129% 10.53**
IP visit at district hospital in last 12 months 0.038 0.007 408% 9.63**
IP visit at provincial hospital in last 12 months 0.025 0.013 99% 5.36**
IP visit at central hospital in last 12 months 0.008 0.009 ·16% -0.96
Utilisation and source of outpatient visits (OP
visits)
OP visit in last month 0.147 0.123 20% 3.91**
# of OP visits in last month (for those with visit) 1.23 1.19 3% 1.37
OP visit to any public facility in last month 0.058 0.018 217% 11.81**
OP visit to a district hospital in last month 0.039 0.005 607% 13.34**
OP visit to a provincial hospital in last month 0.007 0.004- 86% 3.02**
OP visit to a central hospital in last month 0.002 0.002 ·13% -0.46
OP visit to a pharmacy in last month 0.080 0.088 ·10% -1.49
OP visit to a private clinic in Laos in last month 0.006 0.0096 -43% -2.63**
OP visit to a healer in Laos in last month 0.0002 0.0006 ·73% -1.45
out-of-pocket expenditures, $ US
OOPs on alllP visits in last year] $70.59 $188.24 ·63% -7.05**
OOPs per IP visit in last year t $60.00 $164.70 -64% -7.58"'·
OOPs on all OP visits in past month $1.66 $6.63 ·76% -3.84"'*
OOPs on all OP visits in public facility in last month $1.01 $3.61 ·72% -3.n··
OOPs on all self-care in last month (for all individuals) $0.02 $0.03 ·27% -0.64
OOPs per OP visit in public facility in last month $0.80 $3.01 ·73% -3.49·*
OOPs per self-care visit in last month $0.08 $0.17 ·64% -1.47
OOPs per individual with any visit (incl. premiums) $48.24 $109.41 -66% -4.74·*
Average OOPs per individual (estimated on all ·13%
individuals, includes premiums) $15.29 $17.65 -0.93
Incidence of catastrophic expo (>10% of total exp.) 0.056 0.079 ·29% -2.08*
Time between onset of symptoms and care
Time between onset of symptoms and JP visit (days) 16.65 10.54 68% 0.94
Time between onset of symptoms and OP visit (hrs) 28.9 56.7 -49% -1.69
Length of stay
Length of stay for JP visit (days) 3.94- 4.62 ·16% -1.62
Length of stay for OP visit (hours) 0.695 0.435 60% 3.80*·
Notes: Outcomes with binary variables were estimated using marginal dJects of a probit model; outcomes with continuous
variables were estimated using OLS. Percent d!fferences are presented as CBHI estimates relative to comparison estimates.
All estimates accountJor clustering at the household level. *.sign!flcant at the .01 level; *slgn!flcant at the .05 level
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The results from the matching showed no significant association between insurance
status and timeliness of care. This was also true in the unmatched regression results.
However, both the matched and unmatched results show that the reported length of stay
for an outpatient visit was longer for CBHI members. Although it is possible that CBHI
members present with more complicated symptoms that require more time to treat, it is
also likely that the longer time spent in the hospital is due to longer waiting times for
CBHI members relative to cash-paying patients, as qualitative results from this study
indicated.
6.3.4.3 Impacts o/eBBI on coping mechanisms/or those with an inpatient visit
The findings in Figure 6.6 show the coping mechanisms employed by individuals tOO who
reported an inpatient visit. The results were obtained using kernel matching alone
(without the bias-corrected regression). Overall, CBHI members were less likely than the
uninsured to resort to coping mechanisms to pay for health care. More specifically,
CBHI members were significantly less likely to receive help from friends, relatives or
the village; to borrow money; or to sell assets to pay for health care (these two latter
differences were only significant at the .05 level).
6.3.4.4 Impacts 0/ eBBI by consumption quintlle
Until now the estimates presented reflect only average treatment effects and mask any
heterogeneity in impacts across socioeconomic status. The results in Table 6.7 show how
the impacts differ across consumption quintiles. Across all quintiles, the insured were
significantly more likely than the uninsured to use inpatient services (in the highest
quintile this relationship is only significant at the .05 level). However, the only
significant difference (at the .01 level) in outpatient visits was in the highest quintile,
where the insured were more likely to use outpatient services. In fact, in the poorest
quintile the insured were less likely to use outpatient services, although the difference is
not statistically significant. For those individuals making at least one inpatient visit, the
number of visits did not significantly differ between the insured and uninsured.
However, the insured in the wealthiest quintile made a higher number of outpatient visits
relative to the uninsured.
100 Coping mechanisms are used at the household level but are measured here at the individual level.
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The impact of insurance on inpatient, outpatient, and total expenditures for those with a
visit was less pronounced among the poorest 20% of the population. When the cost of
premiums was included, individuals in the top four quintiles who had any visit enjoyed
financial protection from the scheme (i.e., out-of-pocket expenditures were lower for the
insured), and this difference was significant for the top two quintiles. However, in the
poorest quintile, CBHI members with any visit actually incurred higher total annual
expenditures than the uninsured. When the expenditures of all individuals in the sample
were averaged (regardless of whether they had a visit), the insured in the poorest quintile
incurred significantly higher out-of-pocket expenditures than the uninsured (no
significant difference between CBHI and comparison individuals was found in the other
quintiles). Similarly, among the poorest quintile the incidence of catastrophic
expenditures was significantly higher for the insured than for the uninsured. Among all
other quintiles, the results showed that CBHI offers some protection against catastrophic
expenditures (although in the middle quintile this protection was not significant).
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6.4 Discussion
As shown in the results section above, the matched results from the impact evaluation are
very similar to the unmatched results obtained using regression. The results are robust
across these two approaches, likely because the two groups were so similar even before
matching. However, there are some differences in the magnitude of the effects and the
results from the bias-corrected matching are likely to be the most reliable, given the large
reduction in bias that was achieved through matching (see Table 6.3). Another advantage
of matching over regression is that, unlike regression, PSM does not impose
distributional assumptions about the relationship between covariates and the outcome
variable.
Overall, the findings from this impact evaluation support the hypotheses generated from
the conceptual framework. First the results suggest that CBHI is having its intended
impact by increasing utilisation of outpatient and inpatient services. The magnitude of
the impacts on use of inpatient services is particularly large. These positive impacts on
utilisation are consistent with much of the previous literature on the impacts of CBHI
and other voluntary health insurance programmes (Bennett et al. 1998; Jakab and
Krishnan 2001; Schneider and Diop 2001; ILO 2002; Preker et al. 2002; Ranson 2002;
Ekman 2004; JUtting 2004b; Palmer et al. 2004; Gnawali et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al.
2009; Aggarwal 2010; Mensah et al. 2010). In Laos, where utilisation rates are low,
improved access to care is an important step forward.
In addition to increasing utilisation, the findings indicate that CBHI is encouraging use
of facilities at lower levels of care. This is expected given that the scheme contracts with
the district (and in some cases provincial) hospitals for first line care, but nonetheless
shows that CBHI is encouraging use of the referral system. Although the results do not
indicate whether greater use of services at lower levels of care represents a shift from the
central level or a flux of new users to the district level (because of the cross-sectional
nature of the study), it is possible that insurance can encourage users to move from the
central level to the district or provincial level for their care. Such a shift can bring about
cost savings to the government in the long term.
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The findings show that CBHI members are more likely to use public sector facilities and
less likely to use private clinics. However, there is no significant difference between the
two groups in the use of pharmacies: roughly 9 percent of households in both groups
reported visiting a pharmacy in the past month. The qualitative findings reveal that for
mild to moderate illnesses, both the insured and uninsured continue to use pharmacies
for their first-line care because of the convenience but also because quality of hospitals is
poor and transportation costs create barriers to seeking care for less than severe illnesses.
These findings are consistent with other studies that found that distance to facilities
(Bennett et al. 1998; Criel et al. 1999; Ranson et al. 2006; Sinha et al. 2006);
transportation costs (Ranson et al. 2006); and poor quality of care (Ekman 2004) create
additional cost barriers that limit access to services even in the presence of insurance.
While the results on utilisation are positive across the sample, there is heterogeneity in
impacts across consumption quintiles. The finding that the scheme has significantly
increased the use of inpatient visits is consistent across all quintiles and this increased
utilisation is most pronounced among the poorest quintile. However, the higher use of
outpatient visits among the insured shown for the sample as a whole is mainly due to the
relatively higher use of outpatient services among the insured in the highest quintile.
There was no significant difference between CBHI and comparison individuals in the
other four quintiles. In fact, among the poorest quintile, CBHI members were actually
less likely to make an outpatient visit, although this difference was not statistically
significant. These findings suggest that barriers to seeking care mentioned earlier (e.g.,
distance, transportation, poor quality) may be preventing use of less urgent services (Le.
outpatient services) among the first four quintiles.
The findings on out-of-pocket expenditures confirm that CBHI has a protective effect for
members using services. Despite the fact that CBHI members use more services than the
uninsured, expenditures for both inpatient and outpatient services are significantly lower
among CBHI members. These results are consistent with the hypothesis generated from
the conceptual framework and support other studies examining the impacts of CBHI
(Preker et al. 2002; Ranson 2002; Jowett et al. 2003; Ekman 2004; JUtting 2004b;
Devadasan et al. 2007; Aggarwal 2010) but stand in contrast to the situation in
neighbouring China, where out-of-pocket payments are actually higher among the
insured in urban areas (no difference was found between the insured and uninsured in
rural areas). The lack of financial protection identified in these studies from China is
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likely due to restrictive benefit packages, high co-payments, supplier-induced demand
(as a result of fee-far-service plans) and a demand for expensive care among the insured
(Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; Wagstaff et al. 2009). In the CBHI scheme in Laos,
members' care is paid for by capitation, which is set very low, resulting in loss of
revenues to the hospitals. This capitation payment discourages supplier-induced demand
among the insured - and may even contribute to under-provision of services. However,
among cash-paying patients, there is evidence that health care workers in Lao hospitals
are inducing demand for tests and more expensive drugs (Syhakhang et al. 2011). This is
because transactions from cash-paying patients allow providers to earn additional
allowances, especially from the sale of drugs, which are marked up by 25 percent or
more at facilities.l'" Thus, differences in incentives from provider payments undoubtedly
influence the type of services and drugs received by insured and uninsured patients, as
the literature on provider incentives indicates (Mills et al. 2000; Schneider and Hanson
2007; Yip et al. 2010).
Although the results on out-of-pocket expenditures suggest that the scheme has achieved
the objective of increasing financial protection, it is important to note that these positive
impacts are experienced by the small group of individuals using services. When total
expenditures (including the monthly premiums) are averaged across the entire sample
(i.e., including those without a visit), there is no significant difference in out-of-pocket
expenditures between the insured and uninsured, although the incidence of catastrophic
expenditures among the insured is significantly lower. Thus, on a population level, the
effect of CBHI on out-of-pocket expenditures is negligible, although the scheme does
provide protection against catastrophic expenditures.
As shown in other studies, the impacts of CBHI on financial protection are not
homogenous across socioeconomic groups (JUtting 2004a; Ranson 2004; Schneider and
Diop 2004; Wagstaff et al. 2009). This study shows that CBHI members in the poorest
quintile incur higher total out-of-pocket expenditures and a higher incidence of
catastrophic expenditures than the uninsured. This lack of financial protection is at least
partly due to the monthly premiums paid by CBHI members - which are flat rate and
101 Providers outside the insurance schemes are paid salaries from the Ministry of Health but these salaries
are low. Revenues from user fees and revolving drug funds in the hospitals are sometimes used to "top-up"
salaries.
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are therefore regressive - but is also likely due to the fact that the insured in the poorest
quintile are significantly (and highly) more likely than the uninsured to use inpatient
services. Thus, the insured may be more likely to incur expenditures for drugs and
supplies that are not covered by the scheme, as well as for transportation and food. These
findings indicate that insurance alone is not sufficient to counteract additional barriers to
financial protection among the very poor. The policy implications of these findings will
be explored in more detail in Chapter 8.
The finding that cash-paying members experience shorter length of stays for outpatient
visits is likely due to providers' incentives to offer preferential treatment to cash-paying
patients, as a result of their dependency on user fees and revolving drug funds to finance
operating costs of the hospital and possible extra payments for staff, as discussed above.
Given these incentives, providers are more likely to see cash-paying patients faster than
the insured. These results are consistent with the qualitative findings from this study and
are also supported by the provider payment literature.
The findings on coping mechanisms for those with an inpatient visit indicate that
insurance helps individuals (and households) smooth consumption, thereby reducing the
likelihood that the insured will have to borrow money (often with high interest rates), sell
assets or reduce expenditures in other areas (e.g., medical expenditures, food, children's
needs), relative to the uninsured. These results are consistent with another study in Laos,
which found that after dissaving, borrowing and receiving help from others are the two
most common ways in which households cope with shocks due to illness (Wagstaff and
Lindelow 2010). The lower likelihood of CBHI households resorting to coping
mechanisms is also consistent with a study of CBHI in India, which found that the extent
of borrowing and selling assets is significantly lower for the insured than for the
uninsured (Aggarwal 2010). These findings indicate the importance of looking at factors
other than out-of-pocket expenditures to understand the impact of insurance on financial
protection.
Overall, the impacts of CBHI have been positive: relative to the uninsured CBBI
members enjoy higher utilisation, lower out-of-pocket expenditures at the point of
service delivery, a lower incidence of catastrophic expenditures overall, and less need to
resort to coping mechanisms that may have long-term financial implications (i.e., selling
assets, borrowing). Despite these positive effects however, it is important to consider the
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results in a broader context. Only a small fraction of the population benefits from the
scheme. Given the low coverage rates in the targeted areas and low utilisation rates
among the insured, financial protection from CBHI is negligible on a population level
(although protection against catastrophic expenditures is significant). Furthermore, the
results indicate that the scheme has had very little positive impact on the poor and has
even increased expenditures and catastrophic payments among this group. Thus, CBHI
may be exacerbating inequalities in access to care and financial protection across income
groups. These results raise concerns about the implications for poverty reduction through
use ofCBHI.
6.5 Limitations and strengths of methodology
The main limitation of the study is the single-difference approach, which only allows for
control of observables, but not unobservables. (The argument against a panel design,
which would control for unobservables, was described in Chapter 4.) It is important to
consider how these unobservables may impact the findings. If any unobserved factors
affecting enrolment lead to an increase in service utilisation and OOPs, the impacts of
insurance will be overestimated. Similarly, if any unobserved factors affecting enrolment
lead to a decrease in service utilisation and OOPs, the impacts of insurance will be
underestimated. However, given the magnitude of the impacts in the current analysis, the
direction and significance of the true impacts are likely to be similar to results presented
here. Moreover, given the effort to account for selection into the scheme (through the ex-
ante qualitative work), and the closeness of the two groups on observables even before
matching, any bias is expected to be minor, but is nonetheless acknowledged.
A second limitation of the analysis is the difficulty of obtaining an accurate estimate of
consumption, utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures, due to non-sampling bias. Non-
sampling bias is due to the inherent limitations of individuals to accurately recall events
or expenditures in a given time period (Rannan-Ellya 2008). For example, the aggregate
consumption measure used in this sub-study is likely biased, as a result of both the
failure of individuals to accurately recall expenditures, and annualising smaller recall
periods (e.g., food consumed in one month) to one year. Similarly, reports on utilisation
of health care services and out-of-pocket expenditures are expected to be underestimated.
Research on health accounting indicates that using a recall period of 12 months or more
for inpatient visits can result in underreporting by as much as 30 to 50 percent, while
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using a recall period of more than three days for outpatient visits can lead to
underreporting of around 20 percent (Rannan-Eliya 2008). The use of proxy respondents
to obtain information about all family members magnifies this problem as proxy
respondents are likely to underreport events that they did not experience, or they may not
have knowledge of the event (although in most households, multiple respondents verified
information with other individuals in the household, which is expected to minimise this
problem). Finally, given the relatively lengthy household survey, it is possible that
respondents learned that not reporting certain events would result in the interview taking
less time (Rannan-Eliya 2008). Although non-sampling bias is likely to affect the results,
it is likely to be consistent across both CBHI and comparison households and is therefore
not expected to affect the relative differences between groups. It is also important to
acknowledge that the calculation of catastrophic expenditures is somewhat arbitrary and
should be used only to measure relative differences between the insured and uninsured.
A final limitation is that the measurement of financial protection due to insurance does
not reflect the indirect effects of illness. For example, households may choose to forgo
necessary treatment or seek sub-optimal care, rather than divert a large fraction of
household resources to cover health care costs (van Doorslaer et al. 2007). As shown in
Chapter 5 (Table 5.2), this study found that approximately 7 percent of individuals in the
CBHI and non-CBHI group went without care in a three month period: there was no
significant difference between the groups. Another indirect cost of illness is caused by
coping mechanisms such as selling assets and borrowing money. There are future costs
of these coping strategies: for example, households are required to repay money they
have borrowed in subsequent periods, possibly at high interest rates: when households
sell assets or dissave, they forgo returns on assets and savings in the future (Wagstaff and
Lindelow 2008). Finally, the cost of lost labour due to illness was not measured in the
survey but based on previous research is expected to be high. For example, in Burkina
Faso, indirect costs due mainly to lost labour comprised 69 percent of the total cost of
illness (Sauerbom et al. 1995). Omitting these costs makes it difficult to pinpoint the true
economic costs on households. However, as mentioned above, the methodology used to
measure financial protection was the same across CBHI and comparison households and
therefore the relative impacts of CBHI are expected to be reliable. In fact, the study
found that the CBHI households were less likely to sell assets or borrow money and
Page 1174
therefore, if indirect costs were included, it is likely that the financial impacts of
insurance would be even higher than those estimated on direct costs alone.
Despite the limitations, this sub-study has many strengths. First, a strong effort was made
to understand the most important factors affecting selection into insurance. As a result,
the survey designed for primary data collection included multiple variables of health
status, risk preferences, preferences for modem care, and other factors that are not
always adequately measured in other studies of voluntary insurance. The use of this rich
dataset, combined with PSM in the analysis, helped to control for selection bias. The
failure to control for selection bias has been a criticism of much of the earlier CBHI
literature, although more recently authors examining the impacts of CBHI on utilisation
and out-of-pocket expenditures have made an attempt to address selection bias, also
through use of PSM and a wider range of independent variables, including health status
(Gnawali et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Aggarwal201O). This study therefore makes
a contribution to the small but growing body of high quality evidence regarding the
impacts of CBHI on utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures. The second strength of
the study is the use of qualitative data from FGDs, which lends support to the direction
of the relationship between independent variables and impacts - a relationship that
cannot be captured through a cross-sectional study alone. Finally, the sample size of the
study is relatively large and is conducted across six districts where the scheme is
operating. This represents an improvement over other CBHI evaluations that have used
small sample sizes and are based on schemes with very few members (Palmer et al.
2004).
6.6 Concluding remarks
This study has revealed that enrolling in CBHI has increased access and increased
financial protection for those enrolled. However, when disseminating results to
policymakers it is important to be clear about what is being measured. To state that the
scheme has been a success in increasing financial protection for CBHI members would
be misleading - it is the CBHI members who use services that enjoy this financial
protection. Given low utilisation rates in Laos, these members account for only 21
percent of CBHI members. Moreover, the scheme has had a negative impact on financial
protection among the poor. Thus, there are both positive and negative impacts of the
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scheme that should be acknowledged as the government plans to move forward with
expansion of CBHI.
The findings from the CBHI enrolment sub-study in Chapter 5 revealed a number of
challenges in expanding enrolment of CBHI: the threat of adverse selection; poor quality
of care; and inequality in enrolment across income groups. Thus, it is likely that any
positive impacts from CBHI will be experienced by only a small proportion of the
population. As the government considers plans for scaling up CBHI and other insurance
schemes to achieve universal coverage, a number of complementary approaches will be
required to expand coverage and to ensure that once expanded, the scheme is having its
intended impacts. These policy implications will be discussed in Chapter 8. However,
prior to thinking about the policy implications of expanding coverage of CBHI and
progressing towards universal coverage, the next chapter will shed light on some of the
challenges of expanding enrolment in the SHI scheme, which targets the formal sector.
Given the problems of increasing SHI coverage to date, this study examines the
determinants of, and barriers to, enrolment. The SHI study complements the CBHI sub-
studies and helps to inform actions that can be taken to expand health insurance and risk-
protection in Lao PDR.
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Chapter 7. Determinants of enrolment in social health insurance .
7.1lntroductfon
In an effort to increase coverage in the health sector, many low- and middle- income
countries have adopted a model of financing which relies, at least to some extent, on
social health insurance (SHI). SHI is a model of risk-pooling that is usually contributory
and financed through payroll taxes that include a mix of employee and employer
contributions, with subsidies often provided by the government. In Lao PDR, SHI is part
of a broader social security scheme that includes other non-health benefits, and covers
employees of private companies (including previously state-owned enterprises) and their
dependents. Despite its mandatory nature, enrolment levels are low. While two reasons'
for low coverage in the population are the small size of the formal sector (i.e. private
sector employees and their dependents make up only 8% of the population) and the fact
that the scheme is only operating in four districts, the reasons for low enrolment levels in
the targeted areas is poorly understood. The conceptual framework in Chapter 4
described the factors that are expected to influence enrolment of firms in SHI. Given
firms' incentives to maximize profits, it is expected that smaller firms will be more likely
to enrol in health insurance. Economic theory also predicts that firms that are better-off
financially will be more likely to purchase insurance (because of the positive income
elasticity of demand for insurance).
The conceptual framework also demonstrated how adverse selection can result in a
voluntary scheme due to information asymmetries. While the mandatory enrolment of
social security should theoretically counteract any adverse selection in the scheme, the
scheme is effectively voluntary and it is therefore expected that firms will behave in a
way that is consistent with insurance theory. For example, firms with a higher
occupational risk profile are expected to be more likely to purchase health insurance, as a
way of reducing uncertainty of medical expenditures in the future.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Government of Lao PDR is progressing towards universal
coverage of health care and the expectation is that SHI will play a pivotal role in
increasing health insurance coverage. Thus, more information is needed about what is
both driving and hindering enrolment. This chapter reports the findings of a sub-study
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that examines the factors affecting enrolment in SHI102 and brings to light employers'
experiences with and perceptions of the scheme. The sub-study addresses objective 3 of
the study, which is to explore the firm-level determinants and barriers related to
enrolment in social health insurance, and specifically aims to answer the following
research questions, which were derived from the conceptual framework:
1. Which employer characteristics are associated with enrolment in social security
(e.g., size of firm, type of ownership, risk profile, etc.)?
2. What motivates employers to enrol/not enrol 'in social security?
3. What have been firms' experiences with social security (e.g., impact on business,
strengths and weaknesses of the scheme)?
4. Is the benefit package offered by non-enrolled firms comparable to social security
benefits?
S. Is there any evidence that firms are employing strategies to evade social security
contributions?
6. What are the prospects for expanding coverage of social security in Laos?
Within the first research question, three specific hypotheses derived from the conceptual
framework are tested:
Hypothesis 1: Smaller firms are more likely to enrol in social security than are
larger firms.
Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher revenues are more likely to enrol in social
security than are firms with lower revenues.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a higher occupational risk-profile are more likely to
enrol in social security than are lower-risk firms.
The next section presents background information about the social security target group,
which helps to set the context for the sub-study and justifies the use of the chosen
sampling frame. The methodology used in the analysis is then presented, followed by the
results and a discussion that summarises the contribution of the study to the literature and
highlights the policy implications of the findings. However, a more detailed discussion
102 Although the focus of the study is on SHI, SHI in Laos is part of a larger social security scheme and
therefore understanding enrolment in SHI requires understanding enrolment in social security. The two
terms are therefore used interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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of the policy implications of expanding coverage through SHI is included in Chapter 8.
This chapter then summarises the limitations of the analytical approach and offers
closing remarks.
7.2 Background information on the target group
Prior to selecting a sampling frame for this sub-study, more information was needed
about the social security target group. Therefore, background research was conducted to
understand both how the official target group is defined in the social security legislation,
and how the actual target group (l.e., the group of firms targeted by the Social Security
Organization (SSO» is identified. The background research revealed large discrepancies
between the official target group and the actual target group. This section of the chapter
describes these discrepancies and presents an overview of what the potential target group
could look like in the future. This description sets the context for the sub-study and
justifies the use of the sampling frame that was chosen for the study. The background
research was conducted using a combination of document reviews (including a review of
the social security legislation), key informant interviews with private sector employees
and staff members at the SSO, and secondary data analysis of the Lao Economic Census
(National Statistics Center 2007).
7.2.1 Overview of the "off/clal" social security target group as defined by Lao
regulations
According to the SSO Decree 207, the official target group for social security includes
all enterprises with 10 or more employees (Social Security Organization 1999).
However, the decree is difficult to enforce for two main reasons. First, Decree 207 is a
ministerial decree, and therefore by nature, it is weaker than a law promulgated by the
President. Second, no regulatory procedures are in place to enact penalties for non-
compliant firms. Although an inspection unit at SSO was introduced in 2008 with a
mandate of identifying non-compliant enterprises, at the present time only verbal
warnings can be issued. Furthermore, the SSO office is understaffed (with only five
employees in 2009) and has very little capacity to carry out inspections (Personal
communication with Social Security Office December 17,2008).
As a step to strengthening the regulatory framework around social security, the SSO was
planning to draft guidelines for inspections and sanctions for non-compliant companies
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at the time of this study, and was also planning to work with other line ministries to
promulgate a law specific to social security. The new law will mandate enrolment of all
enterprises with at least one employee (Personal communication with Social Security
Office December 17, 2008). Although the Labour Law (2006) mandates that Hal/labour
units must participate in...social security", the language is vague in that it does not
specifically define the term "labour unit" or the minimum number of employees that
constitute a "unit"(President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic 2006).
1.2.2 Overview of the "current" target group and the potential for expansion
While the official target group, according to the SSO decree, includes all enterprises with
at least ten (and eventually one) employees, the SSO currently targets only a small subset
of enterprises in the country. This is due to the way in which the SSO collects
information about its target group, which involves obtaining a list of businesses that are
registered with the central or provincial Tax Registration Office (Ministry of Finance)
and storing information about these businesses in a database. The database includes a
total of 1,320 businesses, all of which are located in the four provinces where the scheme
is running (Vientiane Capital, Vientiane Province, Savannakhet and Khammounej.l'"
The majority of this target group (99 percent) consists of firms with 10 or more
employees. However, because the database includes only companies that pay taxes to the
Tax Registration Office, enterprises without a tax identification number are excluded
from the target group.
In order to provide some perspective on the size of the current social security target
group relative to the universe of enterprises operating in the country, I performed
secondary data analysis using the Lao Economic Census (National Statistics Center
2007) - a survey that summarises information about all economic units104 operating in
the country. The findings, summarised in Figure 7.1, are helpful for understanding
various options for expanding the target group in the future. The first (outer) ring
represents all 209,484 economic units that operated in the country at the time of the
103 The scheme is currently only operating in four provinces due to financial, administrative and human
resource constraints of expanding offices to other provinces. Outside Vientiane Capital. the scheme targets
only a limited percentage offirms.
104 According to the Lao Economic Census. an economic unit is defined as any business entity, either
formal or informal, including shops that operate any economic activities. This group also includes non-
profit and non-government organisations but excludes international organisations.
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economic census (2006), including those units which had no permanent address or were
located in communities without road access. These latter units, which are usually
considered part of the informal sector'?', include mobile shops, street vendors, lottery
sellers, tuk tuk drivers, and other temporary shops. The outer ring also includes
international organisations and civil servants, neither of which are considered part of the
private sector, and are therefore not targeted by the SSO.
When informal econormc units, international organisations and civil servants are
excluded, 126,913 economic units remain (represented by the second ring). However,
even though economic units in this category have a permanent location, the degree of
formality with which they operate varies. For example, only 40 percent of businesses in
this category hold a trade registration certificate, while only 71 percent hold a tax
registration certificate.i'" In identifying opportunities to expand social security, it is clear
that targeting businesses that are not yet tax registered would present a challenge.
Figure 7.1 Economic units operating in Lao PDR
currently
reached
currently
targeted
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Lao Economic Census (2005/6) and SSO Database,
January 2009.
105 The distinction between the informal and formal sector is often blurred. The informal sector usually
refers to unregistered production units that are owned and operated by individuals, and sometimes unpaid
family members.
106 While the majority of economic units without a tax registration certificate are very small (with less than
five employees), 370 of these units are medium-sized (10 to 99 employees).
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The third ring represents the 90,457 units that are paying some form of tax. Clearly, the
fact that businesses are paying taxes indicates that they have a somewhat formal
structure. However, even among this group, there are varying degrees of formality.
Depending on the accounting system, businesses make their tax payments using one of
three methods: a lump sum tax; a daily tax; or through contributions to the Tax
Registration Office on a regular basis using a tax identification number. (The first two
types of taxes are paid by firms with less advanced accounting practices). According to
the Lao Economic Census, firms with a tax identification number account for only 8
percent of economic units in the country (represented by the fourth ring). Thus, by
targeting only firms with a tax identification number - which is the group currently
targeted by the SSO - the SSO automatically misses an opportunity to target the
majority of enterprises in the country.
The SSO's database of target firms comprises 1,320 enterprises (the fifth ring). This
target group is much smaller than the group of tax-registered firms shown in the fourth
ring, in part because the SSO targets only firms with 10 or more employees and in 4
provinces only. Due to low compliance among the firms currently targeted by ~e SSO,
only 388 enterprises were enrolled in social security in January 2009 (the sixth ring).
These 388 companies represent only 29 percent of companies in the SSO's database of
target firms (SSO January 2009). However, because most enrolled firms are large, this
group accounts for 61 percent of targeted employees. Collectively these 388 companies
provide insurance for 46,731 employees, and 86,690 beneficiaries10'_ approximately
1.5 percent of the Lao population.
While Figure 7.1 above does not give an indication of the proportion of the population
that could potentially be covered, the data indicate that there is considerable opportunity
to expand the number of firms that could be reached, at least in principle. The
implications of expanding enrolment outside the currently narrow target group will be
discussed later in the chapter.
107 The updated estimate for the number of beneficiaries covered by social security at the end of 2009 was
93,086 (MOH and WHO 2009).
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7.3 Methodology
7.3.1 Overview of methodology
As described in Chapter 4 a case-comparison design was used to select a sample of 130
employers (including 65 enrolled and 65 non-enrolled firms). The sample size of 130
was chosen based on the budget and a rule of thumb that the sample should be at least
100 observations (see Chapter 4, Section 4.6.2). The SSO's database served as the
sampling frame for this study and the sample was restricted to firms in Vientiane Capital
and to the four largest industries: manufacturing; construction; trade; and services.
Projections of different coverage scenarios for the future were also modelled in Excel
and this approach is presented following the description of the firm survey.
7.3.2 Analysis offirm survey
Analysis of closed-ended questions was performed in Stata 10.1, while open-ended
responses were analysed in Microsoft Excel 2007 using content (qualitative) analysis
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Morgan 1997). However, the majority of the data from the
survey was obtained from closed-ended questions and therefore, Stata was mainly used
in the analysis. Much of analysis was descriptive but a logit model was used to
understand the determinants of enrolment. The logit model is represented by the
following equation, where Pss represents the probability of enrolling in social security:
P = 1/(1+e)-(b + b x +b X +.... b X + 8)
ss 0 J J :1:1 ""
The dependent variable (social security enrolment) takes on a value of 1 for a firm with
social security and 0 for a non-enrolled firm. It is assumed that the logit transformation
of the outcome variable has a linear relationship with the predictor variables. In the
equation above, X, through X; represent characteristics of firms as well as the head of the
company; b, represents the coefficient for the respective X variable; and e represents the
error term, which includes unobserved variables. The logit model is used to estimate the
odds ratios, which represent the odds that a firm will enrol in social security given a
certain characteristic, when other covariates are held constant. The odds of enrolling in
social security are given by the notation below:
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Sampling weights were applied to the logit model to account for the stratified random
sampling approach described in Chapter 4. The post-survey weighting adjusts for the
probability that the observation was selected and also accounts for the refusal rates.!"
The weights act as inflation factors to restore the strata in the sample to their respective
proportions in the sampling frame (Groves et al. 2004). It is important to note that the
SSO sampling frame is likely to be very different from the population of firms in the
country due to the way in which the ssa target group was selected (i.e., the SSO sample
represents only firms that pay taxes and are registered with the tax office - a narrow
sample of overall firms in the country).
Some collinearity of variables in the logit model was suspected and therefore tests for
collinearity were performed in Stata. The results of these tests are presented with the
study findings.
7.3.3 Modelling scenarios for expanding coverage
As a complement to the finn survey, scenarios were constructed to illustrate the
prospects for increasing coverage of SHI, using data from the Lao Economic Census.
The scenarios are simplistic approximations that are intended for illustrative purposes
only. They were created in Excel and are based on assumptions about future compliance
and the feasibility of reaching differently defined target groups but neither account for
population growth nor growth of the target groups. Nor do they account for the impact of
increased enforcement on evasion or type of employment. However, although the
scenarios are simplistic approximations, they highlight the opportunities and challenges
associated with expansion of the target group.
7.4 Results
This section presents the following results: 1) background characteristics of the sample;
2) the results from multivariate analysis on the determinants of enrolment; 3) descriptive
101 Probability weights were calculated as the inverse of the sampling probability multiplied by the
response rate, i.e., (# in the population/# in the sample) X (# sampled/(# refused + # sampled». A check
was made to ensure that the sum of the weights equalled the number of firms in the sampling frame.
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findings on the perspectives of firms (regarding firms' motivations for enrolling or not
enrolling in social security; members' experiences with the scheme; the provision of
benefits for non-enrolled firms; and evidence of evasion of social security payments);
and 4) the findings from the scenario modelling exercise, which examine the prospects
for increasing coverage of SHI. Given the small sample size, a significance level of 10
percent is used to detect differences in the survey findings.l'"
7.4.1 Background characteristics 0/sample
Table 7.1 outlines background characteristics of the sample by insurance status. The
results show that significantly more firms with social security (SS-member firms) are
state-owned, and under foreign ownership or mixed ownership, while the majority of
uninsured firms are domestically owned. SS-member firms also have a significantly
larger workforce relative to their non-enrolled counterparts but there is no significant
difference in the percentage of staff who are permanent employees. SS-member and non-
enrolled firms are also similar in terms of their gender composition: in both groups a
little more than one third of the workforce is female. Although similar with respect to the
approximate size of their assets, a larger proportion of SS-member firms have higher
company revenues. Relative to non-enrolled firms, SS-member firms are also more likely
to be members of a business organisation, and to have company heads who are foreign-
born and have attended post-secondary education. Overall, few employers report higher
than average workplace risk110, and among those who do, there is no significant
difference between the insured and uninsured firms.
109 The ex post sample size calculation using the "sampsi " command in Stata shows that with a sample
size of 130 observations (65 in each group), a 20% difference in proportions can be detected (with
power=.80 and significance=0.10). The required sample size calculation does not take into account the
number of variables used in the multivariate analysis.
110 Employers were asked to report the risks their employees face in the workplace on a scale of 1 to S,
with 1 representing low risk, 3 representing average risk and S representing high risk. The two most
frequently reported risks were injuries and car accidents.
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7.4.2 Determinants of enrolment: results from multivariate analysis
The relationships between firm characteristics and enrolment in SHI, when all other
factors are held constant, are presented as odds ratios in Table 7.2. The odds of enrolling
are higher in the trade industry than in the services, manufacturing, or construction
industries. Ownership of the firm is also significantly associated with enrolment: the
odds of enrolling are approximately 16 times higher for state-owned enterprises than for
private firms, which is not surprising given that social security is a government-
mandated programme. III Although foreign-owned companies are not significantly more
likely to enrol than domestic companies, the odds of enrolment for a mixed company
(where ownership is shared between domestic and foreign owners) are 24 times greater
than that of a domestic company. It is possible that mixed companies, due to the nature
of their business, receive pressure to comply with industry regulations, or that these types
of firms have a stronger compliance culture.
As described in the conceptual framework, the relationship between firm size and
enrolment in SHI is complex. However, the expectation was that larger firms would be
less likely to enrol in social security. However, the study found that larger firms are
more likely to enrol: the odds of enrolment for a company with at least 60 employees are
three times that of a company with less than 20 employees.
Contrary to the conceptual framework, a firm's decision to enrol is not significantly
associated with either a firm's financial status (Le. revenues) or a firm's risk profile. Nor
is enrolment significant associated with the number of service outlets, the hiring of
temporary workers or employee turnover. Although key informants interviewed prior to
the survey expected pressure from leaders of business organisations to influence
members to enrol in social security, this claim was not supported by the study findings.
The findings also show that the odds of enrolling are more than three times higher in
companies whose heads have at least a university education but that nationality and
III In this sample, all but one state-owned enterprise (SOE) or partially state-owned enterprise are enrolled
in social security. Therefore, the effect of state-ownership on enrolment is very strong. It is not clear
whether there is an additional mechanism for SOEs to enrol in social security. For example, it is possible
that SOEs are pressured to enrol or are automatically enrolled.
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gender are not significantly associated with enrolment.l"
Table 7.2 Odds ratios (ORs) of enrolment, by firm characteristic
OR S.E. z p>lzl
Industry type (reference group: services)
Manufacturing 1.149 0.769 0.21 0.836
Construction 0.256 0.275 -1.27 0.205
Trade 4.469 3.371 1.99 0.047·
Ownership 1: State-owned (reference group: 100% private) 16.891 19.578 2.44- 0.015·
Ownership 2:
. 100% foreign (reference group: 100% domestic) 6.782 10.141 1.28 0.201
mixed (reference group: 100% domestic) 24.019 23.557 3.24 0.001·
Size of permanent workforce =20-59 employees (ref: 0-19 emp) 1.492 0.960 0.62 0.535
Size of permanent workforce = 60+ employees (ref: 0-19 emp) 3.296 2.308 1.70 0.088·
Revenues
1-10 billion Kip (reference group: < 1 billion kip) 1.437 0.788 0.66 0.508
> 10 billion Kip (reference group: <1 billion kip) 1.210 0.913 0.25 0.800
Firm has higher than avg perceived risk (3+ on a scale of 1-5) 0.621 0.635 -0.47 0.641
More than one service outlet/branch/factor / store 1.357 0.856 0.48 0.629
Member of business organisation (reference: no membership) 1.945 1.048 1.23 0.217
Employs any temporary workers 1.195 0.653 0.33 0.744-
At least 10010 employee turnover (annually) 0.476 0.280 -1.26 0.207
Taxes paid at central level (reference: taxes paid at lower levels) 0.743 0.522 -0.42 0.672
Head of company is Laotian (reference: foreign) 2.178 2.590 0.65 0.513
Head of company has a university education or higher 3.426 1.821 2.32 0.021·
Head of comeanl is male 0.626 0.404 -0.73 0.468
* sionificant at 10% ; *.sionificant at 5%;* •• Significant at 1%
7.4.3 Perspectives offirms: results from descriptive analysis
This section of the results presents information regarding firms' motivations for enrolling
or not enrolling in social security, members' experiences with SHI, the provision of
benefits for non-enrolled firms, and evidence of evasion of social security payments.
These findings are descriptive in nature and are intended to complement the results from
multivariate analysis.
112 Collinearity was suspected between nationality and education and between nationality and ownership.
Tests for collinearity of all variables were performed in Stata and all variance inflation factors were low
(below 4). Following guidance in the UCLA Stata help guide. a value lower than 10 is tolerated. Another
model was run without the Lao national dummy variable but the significance of other variables did not
change. Thus, nationality was left in the model.
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7.4.3.1Motivation/or enrolling! not enroillng in social security
To better understand employers' decisions to enrol, employers were asked to rate a
number of possible reasons for enrolment! non-enrolment on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
being not at all important and 5 being very important. 113 The results, summarised in
Table 7.3, confirm the trends identified through multivariate analysis but also shed
further light on employers' decision-making processes. Among the insured, the most
important reason for enrolment was to ensure employees are covered with health
insurance. Increasing employee satisfaction, and improving the health and well-being of
employees were also important factors. These findings indicate that employers are most
concerned with the health insurance benefits within the social security scheme. However,
retirement benefits are also relatively important. In another survey question, respondents
ranked health care as the most important benefit, followed by retirement benefits and
sick leave. The finding that pressure from the SSO was not an important factor was not
surprising given that the SSO is not currently enforcing enrolment.
Table 7.3 Most important reasons for enrolment! non-enrolment
Reasons for enrolment Rating (1-5)
To ensure employees have health care coverage
To increase employee satisfaction
To improve health and well-being of employees
To ensure employees have retirement benefits
Strong pressure from international bodies
Strong pressure from SSO
Strong pressure from employees
Strong pressure from business organisation
+.28
+.11
+.08
+.00
3.05
2.74
2.72
2.71
Reasons for non-enrolment Rating (1-5)
Company benefits are better than SS benefits
Do not know much about social security
Quality of government hospitals not good
Do not use health care benefits/ staff do not get sick
Employees do not want SS
Cost of SS is too high
Do not trust that money is used well
High turnover among employees
Many temporary employees
Employees prefer to purchase private insurance
4.11
3.+2
3.22
3.22
3.12
2.97
2.83
2.57
2.38
2.35
113 The possible factors affecting enrolment/non-enrolment were identified by first asking employers to list
their most important reasons for enrolling/not enrolling. Respondents were then asked to rank the full list
of responses.
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Among the non-enrolled cohort of the sample, the most important reason for non-
enrolment was that the company's benefit package is superior to social security benefits
- an interesting finding given that few companies offer health insurance or other
benefits to their employees, as shown in the next section of the report. Therefore, if the
respondents were being truthful in the interviews, the only possible explanation of this
finding is that although non-enrolled firms offer fewer benefits to their employees, the
benefits they do offer are of higher quality than those offered by the SSO. However, it is
more likely that in their explanations of why they were not enrolled, employers were
attempting to conceal the fact that they were offering few or no benefits to their
employees. Other important reasons. for not enrolling were: employers' lack of
knowledge of social security, the poor quality of government hospitals, and the fact that
employees do not use benefits or do not get sick.
To better understand the process by which a firm decides to enrol in social security
employers were asked to identify the people in charge of making the decision to enrol.
Most firms reported that enrolment in social security is the decision of the director of the
company, the general manager or the owner, and less often the executive board. In a few
companies, the personnel manager and all staff members are involved in the decision
process.
The study found that almost all SS-member firms (95 percent) intend to be enrolled in
the scheme in three years, compared with 38 percent of non-enrolled firms (51 percent
are unsure and 11 percent said they do not intend to be enrolled). The majority of firms
that are "unsure" about enrolment or do not intend to enrol are domestic, privately owned
businesses. Regarding exposure to social security awareness campaigns, only 13 percent
of non-enrolled firms in the sample have ever attended a meeting where social security
was promoted.
7.4.3.2 Members' experiences with social security
The impact of social security on business
As shown in Figure 7.2, the majority of respondents (72 percent) stated that social
security has had a positive effect on employee well-being and satisfaction. However, the
effect of the scheme on the ability to retain staff or recruit staff members has been less
impressive, with only 36 percent of employers reporting a positive effect. Employers
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explained that while some prospective employees inquire about benefits prior to
accepting a position, most job-seekers are mainly concerned with salary.
Although 57 percent of SS-enrolled employers claim that the impact on overall business
has been positive, roughly 38 percent claim that there has been no effect (while 5 percent
claim that there has been a negative effect). Among firms reporting a positive effect,
employers explained that social security: a) gives firms a competitive advantage over
non-enrolled firms by decreasing company expenditures; b) helps to build trust with staff
members; and c) increases productivity of employees. However, other employers noted
that being enrolled in social security decreases revenues unnecessarily because the cost
of contributions exceeds the benefits used by employees.
Figure 7.2 Impact of Social Security on Business
60%
40%
20%
0%
employee well-being and ability to retain or recruit
satisfaction staff
overall business
• Positive effect No effect r, Negative effect IINot sure
Source: Author's calculations. sampling weights applied
Members' perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of social security
SS-member firms were asked to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the
scheme. The three most common responses are described below.
Strengths:
• Social security reduces employers' expenditures on benefits for which the
company would otherwise pay.
Page 1191
• Social security provides convenience and cost-savings to employees, in that
employees can use cards for hospital care, rather than paying cash.
• Being enrolled in social security improves employee well-being. Employers
report that social security gives employees a sense of "security", "warm
feelings", "trust", and "confidence" and "increases employee satisfaction".
According to one employer, higher employee satisfaction due to social security
benefits translates into higher productivity.
Weaknesses:
• Employers do not perceive the scheme to be of good value, either because the
staff do not use benefits (most respondents made specific reference to not using
health care benefits) or because contributions exceed the benefits used.
Employers are particularly concerned that health insurance does not cover check-
ups and feel that including free check-ups would improve the value of the
scheme.
• Quality of care at public hospitals is poor, and according to SS-member
employers, is even worse for social security members. For example, SS-member
employers report that their staff members experience longer waiting times, are
treated poorly by health care professionals, and receive drugs of inferior quality,
relative to cash-paying patients. One respondent mentioned that because of the
long waiting times and poor quality, members resort to using private clinics for
their treatment.
• Communication by SSO regarding benefit structure and the procedures
associated with the scheme is poor. Members reportedly have very little contact
with SSO staff and therefore no opportunity to learn more about the scheme.
According to interviewees, some SSO representatives do not clearly explain the
details of the scheme. Moreover, there are reports that SSO staff members are
unfriendly when providing information to members or prospective members.
Other less frequently reported complaints of the scheme include slow and cumbersome
documentation processes required to submit health care claims and the difficulty of using
a hospital outside their jurisdiction (or switching the designated hospital at which they
must seek care).
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7.4.3.3 Comparisons of the benefit packages offered by insured and uninsured firms
As stated earlier, non-enrolled employers report that the most important reason for not
enrolling in social security is that their companies offer a better package of benefits than
the social security package. However, the study findings showed that the non-enrolled
firms offer far fewer benefits to their employees than do SS-member firms (See Figure
7.3). In fact, the majority of non-enrolled employers do not offer health care benefits:
onJy one quarter of non-enrolled firms make direct payments for employees' health care,
while none offer private insurance. In contrast, some SS-member firms offer extra
insurance for programmes that are already included in the social security package (e.g.,
private health insurance, maternity benefits, coverage for injuries, and sick leave). Thus,
SS-member employers are offering more generous benefit packages to their employees.
Figure 7.3 Benefits offered to SS-member and non-member employees
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Permanent Temporary
Source: Author's calculations, with sampling weights applied
Although private insurance is not commonly offered at the firm level, it is possible that
employees in non-enrolled firms are purchasing private insurance at the household level.
Key informant interviews conducted during the design phase of the study found that two
private health insurance companies are rapidly expanding in Laos. One insurance
company has launched new initiatives, including cooperative arrangements with
International NGOs and villager groups, whereby premiums are financed by income
generating activities. The premiums for health insurance are as low as US$ 2.50 per
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month and cover care both within and outside Lao PDR (Personal communication with
private health insurance companies in Lao PDR 2009).
With respect to temporary employees, very few in either group receive employee
benefits. However, approximately one fifth of SS-member firms extend social security
and paid annual leave to their temporary employees. According to employers, the length
of time an employee can work as a temporary employee varies across firms, and 30
percent of firms report that there is no limit. Because the majority of temporary
employees do not receive benefits, there may be a financial incentive for employers to
hire temporary employees to fulfil the duties of permanent employees. The potential for
such evasion is discussed in the next sub-section.
7.4.3.4 Evidence of evasion
As discussed in the literature review, one of the challenges of implementing and
enforcing mandatory insurance is evasion of contributions. In Lao PDR, it was expected
that any evasion tactics, such as underreporting the number of employees or reclassifying
job descriptions, would be minimal, given that penalties are not yet enacted for non-
compliance. Rather than employing deliberate techniques to conceal the fact that they are
not enrolling, firms can simply just not enrol without consequences.
One way to detect evasion is to examine the structure of the workforce. A
disproportionately high proportion of temporary workers in non-enrolled firms, relative
to SS-member firms could indicate that a firm is trying to evade social security
contributions by hiring temporary workers, who do not usually receive benefits. This
study examined the employment contracts of workers and found that overall, SS-member
firms were no more likely than non-enrolled firms to employ temporary workers: in both
groups temporary and daily employees accounted for slightly less than one quarter of the
workforce. After controlling for type of industry (See Figure 7.4), the difference in the
proportion of permanent workers between SS-enrolled and non-enrolled firms is small
and not significant in three employment categories. However, in the services industry,
SS-member firms employ significantly fewer permanent workers, relative to uninsured
firms. Even when differences in the size of workforce, revenues, and ownership (private
vs. state-owned; foreign vs. domestic) are taken into account, significant differences still
remain (p=.042). Therefore, it is possible that firms in the service industry are replacing
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permanent workers with temporary workers as a means of evading social security
payments. The difference in number of permanent workers employed in the trade
industry is also large, but not statistically significant. However, the risk of a type 2 error
(i.e., failing to reject the null hypothesis of no difference) is high, as a result of the small
proportion of the sample size within the trade industry (29 observations in total).
Figure 7.4 Composition of workforce by industry and insurance status
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Source: Author's calculations, with samplinq weiBhts applied
What cannot be ascertained from the data in Figure 7.4 is whether all firms (not just SS-
members) are evading payment of benefits. The language in the Labour Law (see Section
7.2.1) is such that even employers without social security are required to provide sick
leave, maternity benefits, health care, occupational disease benefits, and pensions for
their permanent workforce. These expenses must be borne by the employer for firms that
do not have social security. Therefore, it is possible that firms (both SS-members and
non-members) hire temporary workers, or under-report the number of permanent
employees as a way of shirking the responsibility and costs associated with purchasing
employee benefits. Key informant discussions with the SSO in the initial stages of this
study revealed that some companies' reports on the size of the permanent workforce
gradually decline over time when in fact, upon closer inspection by the SSO, the number
of employees remains constant. By underreporting the number of employees, firms may
feel that both employers and employees benefit: firms decrease their indirect labour costs
and employees may be given the option to receive the foregone contributions as cash
(Personal communication with Social Security Office December 17,2008).
Page 1195
Prior to the study, key informant interviews suggested that some employers allow
employees to opt-out of social security. Given that the scheme is mandatory for all
permanent employees, opt-outs can be considered an evasion strategy used to reduce
overall labour costs. In the international social security literature, some of the reasons
given for evasion at the household or individual level include: a desire to meet current
consumption needs, myopic behaviour, and lack of confidence in the scheme
(McGillivray 2001). To further investigate the extent to which opt-outs take place in the
Lao social security scheme, I cross-checked data on the number of permanent workers in
the company (identified in a module on "employment contracts" in the survey) with the
number of permanent employees enrolled in social security (reported in a separate
module on "employee benefits" later in the survey). If firms are complying with social
security, 100 percent of the permanent workforce should be enrolled. However, the
findings presented in Figure 7.5 show that 44 percent of member firms enrolled less than
100 percent of the permanent workforce in the scheme. In fact, 94 percent of SS-member
employers openly admitted to giving employees the option to enrol.
Figure 7.5 Percent of permanent workforce enrolled in social security
60
Q.i
0... 50
~
.5 40
en
E 30<2
0 20
Vl
Vl
'- 100
~e
0
Percent of permanent workforce enrolled
Note: Firms that enrol both permanent and temporary employees in SS
are :fJectively enrol/ina more than 100% if their permanent woriforce.
7.4.4 Prospects for expanding coverage of social security
Figure 7.6 illustrates scenarios that were conducted using secondary data analysis of the
Lao Economic Census. The expected coverage of each scenario is shown by the bars,
while the size of the target group is indicated by the dotted line. The baseline scenario
(scenario I) shows that current enrolment in the SSO target group stands at 29 percent of
firms but covers 61 percent of employees. The higher coverage among the latter is a
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result of covering mainly large enterprises. Given that the infrastructure required to
strengthen enforcement is almost non-existent in Laos, considerable effort will be
required to increase compliance within the current target group. Nevertheless, scenario 2
assumes compliance within the current target group of firms reaches 80 percent. Given
the small size of the SSO's target group relative to the universe of firms in the country,
as shown earlier in Figure 7.1, increasing compliance to 80 percent would not result in
substantial increases in coverage on a population level.
The remaining scenarios illustrate various options for gradually expanding the target
group. Scenarios 3 through 7 represent target groups that include all accessible areas
throughout the country. In scenario 3, the SSO would continue to target firms with] 0 or
more employees, and only firms with a tax identification number. Given that most of the
firms in areas that are not currently covered are small and medium-sized firms,
compliance in scenario 3 is expected to decrease, relative to the compliance level in
scenario 2. For illustrative purposes, compliance is assumed to decrease to 70 percent.
Scenario 4 targets firms with at least 10 employees who pay any kind of tax and assumes
a reduction in compliance to 65 percent. Relative to scenario 3, this scenario adds an
additional 83,000 beneficiaries. However, identifying these firms may be difficult if the
firms have not carried out formal licensing requirements.
Figure 7.6 Scenarios for expanding coverage of social security
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The next 3 scenarios represent expansion to groups that are increasingly more difficult to
reach. Scenario 5 includes firms with one or more employee with a tax identification
number, and compliance is expected to remain the same as in scenario 4 (65 percent). In
Scenario 6, firms of any size and paying any kind of tax would be targeted. The
assumption in this scenario is that compliance would fall to 60 percent, given the
difficulty of reaching these smaller, informal firms. Nevertheless, this scenario would
result in more than a doubling of coverage rates, relative to Scenario 5. Finally, Scenario
7 includes firms of all sizes, regardless of their tax payment (i.e. it includes firms that do
not currently pay tax). Compliance is assumed to decrease to 55 percent for this group.
As each new "hard to-reach" group is added, compliance is expected to decrease. While
based on hypothetical assumptions, the scenarios indicate the challenges of increasing
enrolment by simply expanding the definition of the target group. It is likely that the cost
of enforcing enrolment among harder-to-reach groups, such as smaller enterprises and
enterprises with less formal tax arrangements, will likely result in diminishing returns
because the return on investments in enforcement, legislation and infrastructure will
likely decrease as smaller and less formal firms are targeted. It may also be the case that
the cost of identifying firms and enforcing enrolment exceed the revenues collected,
although this claim requires further examination.
7.5 Discussion
The background research and the findings from this study bring to light a greater
understanding of the social security scheme in Laos and point to several opportunities
and barriers to expanding SHI. The multivariate analysis of the determinants of
enrolment showed that the relationship between firm characteristics is not as
straightforward as explained in the conceptual framework. The results do not support the
three hypotheses generated from the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework
expected smaller firms to enrol because they have a higher variance of medical
expenditure and therefore more to lose from an illness of an employee. However, the
results showed that larger firms are more likely to enrol in social security. It is possible
that larger firms are more likely to enrol in social security because they are more likely
to be targeted by the SSO or because they have a more formal structure that facilitates
enrolment, e.g., a human resources department, etc.
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Contrary to the second hypothesis (that firms with higher revenues are more likely to
enrol than firms with lower revenues), there was no significant association between
enrolment and the size of firm revenues. Similarly, the hypothesis that firms with a
higher occupational risk-profile would be more likely to enrol in social security was not
supported by the fmdings. However, the majority of firms rated their workplace risk as
low and therefore it is possible that there was not enough variation in the sample to
adequately assess the relationship between a firm's risk-profile and enrolment. It is
interesting to note however that the failure to identify a relationship between workplace
risk and enrolment is consistent with findings from Shanghai, which explored the
relationship between risk profile and compliance with social security (Nyland et al.
2006).
Other determinants of enrolment were also identified by the multivariate analysis. The
findings showed that privately owned firms in the services industry are the least likely to
enrol in social security. These findings are consistent with the literature on the
determinants of enrolment in private employer-based health insurance in the US (Gruber
and Lettau 2004). Firms in the trade industry are more likely to enrol in SHI than are
firms in the manufacturing, construction or services industry. These results contrast with
those from a study in the US, which found that employers in the manufacturing sector
are the most likely firms to purchase employer-based insurance (Buchmueller et al. April
200 1), but the results support findings from a study in Shanghai, which also found that
firms in the construction industry are less likely to comply with social security
obligations (Nyland et al. 2006). The finding that mixed companies, but not companies
that are 100 percent private, have a significantly and substantially higher odds of
enrolling than a domestic company, are difficult to interpret. Further investigation into
whether these mixed companies receive pressure to comply with industry regulations, or
have a stronger compliance culture, would help to explain these findings.
It is important to note that the relationships between firm characteristics and enrolment
may be dependent on the extent to which a given firm actually covers costs of health care
and other benefits. For example, the conceptual framework assumed that in the absence
of social security, firms paid for the costs of health care and other benefits directly.
However, discussions during the firm surveys showed that few firms provide benefits to
their employees, despite the language in the Labour Law that requires all firms to cover
the cost of health care treatment and other benefits for their employees. This is because
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the Labour Law is not enforced and no penalties are in place for failing to provide
benefits to employees. For these firms that do not directly cover the cost of services,
purchasing insurance can increase labour costs and can reduce profits. In this case, firms
may attempt to evade social security payments as a way of decreasing costs and
increasing profits. Thus, the decision of whether or not to enrol or evade social security
payments will depend on the extent to which firms cover health care costs in the absence
of social security. Nevertheless, the information generated from the multivariate analysis
is informative and useful: in the short-term it could be used by SSO to identify firms that
could be targeted with promotion campaigns, while in the long-term it could facilitate
policing efforts by the SSO, assuming a system for enforcement is established.
The perspectives of employers summarised in Section 7.4.3 help to pinpoint some of the
motivations for enrolling, or not enrolling, in social security. Firms that enrol in social
security are concerned about their employees: employers want to ensure their employees
have health insurance; they care about employee satisfaction; and they want to improve
the health and well-being of employees. Although health insurance is the largest and
most important benefit in the social security scheme and is the biggest draw to the social
security scheme, retirement benefits and sick leave are the second and third most
important benefits, respectively. It is important to keep in mind that, by design,
enrolment in SHI is linked to a broader package of social security benefits and therefore
decisions to enrol in social security are determined by the perception of the benefit
package as a whole. For example, in Laos, if retirement benefits (the second most
important benefit in the scheme) are not financially attractive to workers, employers may
be discouraged from enrolling in social security. These findings are similar to findings
from a study in Vietnam that looked at opportunities to expand SHI (which is part of a
larger social security scheme) among formal sector workers. The Vietnam study found
that reforming pensions, and possibly other benefits, will make social security more
attractive to private sector employers and may facilitate the scheme's expansion
(Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009). The same could be true in Laos, although further
research along the lines of the Vietnam analysis could be undertaken.
The study uncovered some of the reasons that firms do not enrol in social security and
these findings may be helpful in explaining low enrolment levels in other countries. The
main reason for not enrolling was that firms offered a better package of benefits to their
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employees, although further investigation of company benefits indicated that this is not
the case. Other important reasons for not enrolling are that employers do not know much
about social security. Although promotion activities targeted at employers could help to
encourage enrolment, there are other barriers besides lack of knowledge of the scheme
that prevent firms from enrolling. For example, the third most important reason for not
enrolling is that the quality of government hospitals is not good. Poor quality of health
care was mentioned elsewhere in the survey as one of the major weaknesses of the social
security scheme and appears to be a common theme affecting enrolment in health
insurance in Laos. Thus, it is likely that in the absence of substantial improvements to the
health care system, poor quality of care will be a limiting factor in expanding enrolment
in health insurance.
The fact that firms with relatively high workplace risks are not significantly more likely
to enrol in social security indicates that adverse selection at the firm level is not a
problem. However, the possibility of adverse selection at the individual level (which
could not be assessed in this study) should be further investigated for a few reasons.
First, the study found that having a healthy workforce was commonly reported as a
reason for not enrolling in social security, indicating that healthy firms may be less likely
to enrol in social security. Although adverse selection can be counteracted by enrolment
offirms in the scheme (because risks are pooled across the healthy and sick), this study
showed that enrolment in social security is optional for many employees. Voluntary
enrolment within firms poses a challenge to expansion of social security because it
decreases revenues to the SSO but also because it encourages healthy and lower-risk
individuals to leave the risk pool. As in other voluntary schemes, adverse selection can
threaten the sustainability and effectiveness of risk-pooling. Although adverse selection
cannot be confirmed from this study, the voluntary nature of the scheme and the relative
importance of health status in determining enrolment give reason to believe that adverse
selection could be a problem. This would not be surprising, given that many voluntary
schemes documented in the literature report evidence of adverse selection (Jakab et al.
2001; Wang et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2006; Chankova et al. 2008; Zhang and Wang
2008), including the sub-study presented in Chapter 5.
It is a concern from a social protection point of view that few non-enrolled firms offer
other types of insurance to their employees (despite the fact that employers reported that
they offered them). Some firms make direct payments for employees' health care but it is
Page 1201
unclear to what extent employees would be protected from high-cost expenditures in the
event of an illness. While private health insurance for households could increase
financial protection, it would likely do little to generate revenues for the health system in
Laos and may lead to a high percentage of households seeking care outside the country.
Given the problems of evasion documented in social security schemes (Bailey and
Turner 2001; McGillivray 2001; Wagstaff 2009) this study explored whether or not firms
are evading social security benefits. The findings indicate that there may be some
evasion taking place in the services industry, and it is possible that this evasion
behaviour is being practiced across all firms, regardless of social security status. As the
ssa plans to strengthen enforcement in the future, evasion of payments will likely
become a bigger concern that will require greater attention. Evasion can lead to a
significant loss of revenues for the government. For instance, in Colombia, evasion of
social security payments among formal sector workers was estimated to cost US$836
million in forgone revenues in a year (2.75% of GDP) (Escobar and Panopoulou 2003),
while in the Philippines and Kazakhstan, only 30 percent and 40 percent of expected
revenues, respectively, were actually collected (Gottret and Schieber 2006; Jowett and
Hsiao 2007).
The background information regarding the official and current target groups indicates
c
that there are several possible routes the ssa could consider as it looks to increase
coverage of social security in the future. These include: 1) expansion within the current
target group; 2) expansion to new geographic areas; 3) expansion to smaller enterprises;
and 4) expansion of the target group beyond the narrow group of tax-paying firms.
However, the information gathered in this sub-study, as well as the findings from the
scenarios point to challenges of expanding enrolment. Although the scenarios are based
on several hypothetical assumptions, the projections indicate that even if compliance
among the current target population increases to 80 percent (from 29 percent), increased
enrolment would result in a coverage level that, on a population level, would not
substantially increase the number of beneficiaries (because the current target group is so
small). If the target group were expanded to "hard-to-reach" groups (e.g., firms with less
than 10 employees, firms without a tax identification number, firms not paying any tax),
coverage rates would likely remain relatively low because compliance for less formal
and smaller firms would be more difficult to enforce, and because smaller firms do not
add substantially more employees. Furthermore, it is likely that expansion of the target
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group to these "hard-to-reach" groups will result in diminishing returns due to the costs
of strengthening enforcement and expanding SSO resources (e.g., offices, staff, capacity
building, etc.) throughout the country. It is also likely that any increase in coverage of
the current scheme is likely to reach the better off, and is unlikely to help the country
achieve broader goals of improved equity and poverty reduction.
The findings from this study point to some changes that could be taken in the short to
medium term to facilitate expansion of the schemes. These include: introducing
legislation for enforcing enrolment; making the social security benefit package more
attractive; building capacity within the SSO to stimulate and enforce enrolment; and
closing the gap between the "official" target group and the "current" target group for the
SHI scheme. (These recommendations are discussed in more detail in a policy note
written for the Government of Laos and its partners as part of this study (Alkenbrack and
Lindelow 2010) (See Appendix D2 for the English summary version of the policy note).
However, it is clear that efforts to strengthen and expand the reach of the social security
scheme will require broader changes to make progress towards universal coverage. More
details on these broader strategies are discussed in Chapter 8.
7.6 Limitations
The main limitations of the study design were mentioned in Chapter 4 and include the
narrow sampling frame, which leads to low external validity of results, as well as the
small sample size and cross-sectional design. In addition to the design limitations, two
potential problems can seriously bias results in enterprise surveys: non-response and
false responses (Jensen et al. 2007). A World Bank study by Jensen et al (2007), which
focuses on corruption, looks at investment climate surveys to understand non-response
and faIse response. Given that questions about corruption and non-compliance with
social security are both likely to be sensitive topics, the findings from the corruption
study are considered relevant. The study found that countries with less press freedom
were more likely to either not respond or provide false responses on questions related to
corruption. Given that Laos has a low freedom of press rating (184th out of 195 on the
Global Press Freedom ranking!" (Freedom House 2010), some bias in this study, due to
114 The Freedom of Press ranking measures the extent to which information flows freely and without fear
of repercussions, and attempts to measure the legal, political and economic barriers to information flows.
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non-response and false-response, is expected. However, it is difficult to estimate the
direction of the bias given that detailed information about the firms that refused to
participate is not available.
It is also important to emphasise that the projections outlining coverage scenarios are
simplistic approximations that are intended for illustrative purposes only. As mentioned
in Section 7.3.3, the scenarios are based on assumptions about future compliance and the
feasibility of reaching each target group but neither account for population growth nor
expansion of the target groups. Nor do they account for the impact of strengthened
enforcement on evasion or employment. Validation of scenarios would require more
precise data as well as consensus building with key decision-makers about the target
group and expected compliance.
Despite these limitations, the findings fill a gap in the health financing literature
regarding the determinants of enrolment in a mandatory SHI scheme - a topic that has
not been explored in the published literature. The results also provide new evidence
regarding the perspectives of private sector employers - a group that is not usually
engaged in health sector reform discussions. Finally, the results contribute to health
policy dialogue by highlighting the opportunities and challenges of expanding coverage
through SHI in a context of high poverty, low levels of government health spending, a
small formal sector, and weak regulation and enforcement.
7.7 Concluding remarks
This study has revealed important information about the determinants of enrolment in
social health insurance in Lao PDR, and has uncovered several barriers to the scheme's
expansion. A rich descriptive analysis of employers' perceptions and experiences of the
scheme has also been useful in identifying some of the underlying motivations for
enrolling or not enrolling. Although the Government of Laos expects SHI to play a
pivotal role in helping the country progress towards universal coverage, the results of
this study highlight a number of challenges that will hinder expansion. Thus, these
findings are particularly relevant and timely for informing the health financing strategy
that has recently been drafted but is yet to be finalised.
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The next chapter draws together the findings from the three sub-studies and summarises
the methodological limitations and strengths and the overall contribution of the findings
to the literature. The remainder of the chapter focuses on policy implications of
expanding coverage of health insurance and progressing towards universal coverage in
Laos. Areas for further research are also discussed.
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Polley Implications
This thesis has examined the determinants of, and barriers to, enrolment in CBHI and
SHI - two health insurance schemes in Lao PDR that target the informal and formal
sectors, respectively. The thesis has also explored the extent to which enrolling in
insurance has resulted in increased access and financial protection among the informal
sector. To guide the methodology, a conceptual framework was developed based on the
empirical literature and economic theory. Findings from the three sub-studies were
presented in the results chapters. This final chapter synthesises the key findings from the
results chapters, links them to the overall objectives of the thesis, summarises the
limitations and strengths of the methodology, and discusses the overall contribution to
the literature. The policy implications of expanding CBHI and SHI and progressing
towards universal coverage are then discussed. This latter discussion responds to the
fourth objective of the thesis, which is to identify the opportunities for, and challenges
of, expanding health insurance to the informal and formal sectors in Lao PDR and
internationally. Specifically, the policy implications aim to answer the following
research questions:
1. What are the prospects for increasing coverage of CBHI?
2. What are the prospects for increasing coverage of SHI?
3. How can Lao PDR progress towards universal coverage given the current health
financing arrangements?
In answering these research questions, this thesis also contributes to a broader debate
regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of various health financing schemes in
extending coverage, raising revenues, and pooling resources in other resource-poor
settings. Thus, following a discussion of the situation in Laos, broader health financing
implications are discussed. The chapter then closes with some recommendations for
further research and concluding remarks.
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8.1 Summary of key findings
8.1.1 The household and village-level determinants and barriers related to
enrolment in CBHl (objective 1)
The findings from Chapter 5 are consistent with the conceptual framework but also bring
to light new, descriptive information about households' enrolment decision-making
process. The findings show that the probability of enrolment in CBHI in Laos increases
with age and education level of the household head, illness in the household, a
willingness to take at least some risk, higher socioeconomic status, and higher perception
of quality at the district hospital. The probability of enrolment is lower in larger villages,
in areas where several health care options are available, and in urban areas. Exposure to
CBHI is also associated with a higher probability of enrolment. Four findings of
particular interest were discussed in Chapter 5 because of their contribution to the
literature on CBHI enrolment, as well as their implications for health policy in Laos.
These findings are summarised below:
First, a great deal of effort was made to unravel the relationship between health status
and enrolment. Using multiple measures of health status, the study confirms that illness ,
is driving enrolment in CBHI, which is consistent with roughly half the literature on
CBHI and voluntary enrolment. The policy implications of adverse selection will be
discussed in Section 8.4.
Second, in the CBHI scheme in Laos, it seems that the risk-averse will be less likely to
enrol. This is an important finding in that it is, on the face of it, incongruent with
expected utility theory, which predicts that risk-averse households will be more likely to
purchase insurance. However, this hypothesis rests on an inherent assumption that the
CBHI scheme has risk-protecting features. However, as indicated by the qualitative
work, CBHI may not actually be risk-reducing. For some, purchasing insurance could
actually be more risky than not purchasing insurance, especially in a poorly functioning
health system. Moreover, other social and economic theories have been put forth to
explain the decision to enrol in health insurance in low-income contexts and these
theories are useful in explaining study findings. For example, the theory of expected
payoffs (Manning and Marquis 1996) explains that households will insure only if they
perceive the benefits of enrolment to be higher than the costs, relative to being
uninsured. Dercon and others also argue that purchasing insurance for some could
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actually be more risky than not purchasing insurance, especially among the poor, for
whom a given loss can be ruinous (Dercon 2002; Dercon 2007; Bendig and Arun 2011).
Thus, in the Lao context, it seems that the relationship between risk preferences and
enrolment behaviour is complicated by the perceptions of the scheme and the extent to
which individuals view the scheme as risk-minimizing. Thus, expected utility theory has
limitations in explaining the relationship between risk-aversion and behaviour but other
theories can help to explain, at least in part, some of the reasons for enrolment.
As predicted by the conceptual framework, the study findings revealed inequalities in
enrolment across quintiles: better-off individuals are more likely to enrol in CBHI, while
the poor are the least likely to enrol. These results are consistent with much of the
enrolment literature (JUtting2003; Wang et al. 2005; De Allegri et al. 2006a; Chankova
et al. 2008; Gnawali et al. 2009; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011) as well as with economic
theory, which predicts that the demand for health insurance increases with a rise in
income (Folland et al. 2007). These findings suggest that complementary approaches
will be needed to increase coverage of the poor: these approaches are discussed below in
Section 8.4.2.
Finally, a perception of poor quality of care hinders enrolment in CBHI. This finding is
consistent with previous studies on enrolment (Criel and Waelkens 2003; Basaza et al.
2008; Mathauer et al. 2008). The qualitative findings shed further light on perceptions of
quality: both members and non-members are dissatisfied with the quality of care and
complain of differential treatment between the insured and uninsured (e.g., longer
waiting times, less respectful treatment, and receipt of poorer quality drugs for CBHI
members). This differential treatment may be due to differences in incentives created by
provider payment mechanisms.
8.1.2 The Impact of enrolment In CBHl on access to health care services and
financial protection (objective 2) .
The conceptual framework predicted that enrolment in CBHI would increase utilisation
and decrease out-of-pocket expenditures. Thus, the second objective of the thesis was to
identify the impact of enrolment on access to health care services and financial
protection for those using services. The findings suggest that CBHI is having its intended
impact by increasing utilisation of outpatient and inpatient services, and that the
magnitude of the effects on use of inpatient services are particularly large. These positive
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impacts on utilisation are consistent with much of the previous literature on the impacts
of CBHI and other voluntary health insurance programmes (Bennett et al. 1998; Jakab
and Krishnan 2001; Schneider and Diop 2001; ILO 2002; Preker et al. 2002; Ranson
2002; Ekman 2004; JUtting2004b; Palmer et al. 2004; Gnawali et al. 2009; Wagstaff et
al. 2009; Aggarwal 2010; Mensah et al. 2010). In addition to increasing utilisation, the
findings indicate that CBHI is encouraging use of public sector facilities and facilities at
lower levels of care. However, CBHI members are no less likely than non-members to
use pharmacies, which are the first choice for first-line care due to the convenience but
also because quality of hospitals is poor and transportation costs create barriers to
seeking care for less than severe illnesses. Thus, the study findings indicate that for mild
to moderate illnesses, insurance cannot overcome the additional barriers that limit access
to services. This finding is consistent with other studies in the literature (Bennett et al.
1998; Criel et al. 1999; Ekman 2004; Ranson et al. 2006; Sinha et al. 2006).
Despite the fact that CBHI members use more services than the uninsured, out-of-pocket
expenditures for both inpatient and outpatient services are significantly lower among
CBHI members who use services. These results support other studies examining the
impacts of CBHI (Preker et al. 2002; Ranson 2002; Jowett et al. 2003; Ekman 2004;
JUtting 2004b; Devadasan et al. 2007; Aggarwal 2010) but contrast with findings from
China, where out-of-pocket payments are actually higher among the insured in urban
areas (Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; Wagstaff et al. 2009). The differences across
countries may reflect differences in incentives from provider payments, which influence
the volume and type of services and drugs received by insured and uninsured patients
(Mills et al. 2000; Schneider and Hanson 2007; Yip et al. 2010; Syhakhang et al. 2011).
As discussed above, differences in provider incentives also help to explain differential
treatment between the insured and the uninsured in the CBHI scheme.
Although the findings indicate that CBHI reduces out-of-pocket expenditures for
members who use services, it is important to note that these positive impacts are
experienced by the small group of health care users. For the sample as a whole, there is
no significant difference in out-of-pocket expenditures between the insured and
uninsured, but the incidence of catastrophic expenditures among the insured is
,
significantly lower. Moreover, CBHI members in the poorest quintile incur higher total
out-of-pocket expenditures and a higher incidence of catastrophic expenditures than the
uninsured. This lack of financial protection is at least partly due to the monthly
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premiums paid by CBHI members but is also due to the fact that the insured in the
poorest quintile are significantly more likely than the uninsured to use inpatient services
and as a result, may incur higher costs on itmes or services that are not covered by
insurance, e.g. transportation, food, supplies at facilities. This finding that the impacts of
CBHI on financial protection are not homogenous across socioeconomic groups is
consistent with other studies (JUtting 2004a; Ranson 2004; Schneider and Diop 2004;
Wagstaff et al. 2009).
Focusing on out-of-pocket expenditures alone can have limitations when trying to
understand the impact of insurance on financial protection. The findings on coping
mechanisms complement the analysis on expenditures and indicate that the insured are
more likely than the uninsured to be able to smooth consumption in the face of an
inpatient visit. Thus, the insured are less likely to have to resort to tactics such as
borrowing money, selling assets or reducing expenditures in other areas.
8.1.3 Determinants and barriers related to enrolment in social health insurance
among private sector firms (objective 3)
The findings from Chapter 7 revealed that enrolment in SHI is associated with larger
firm size but is not associated with occupational risk-profile or firm revenues. All three
of these associations were inconsistent with the hypotheses derived from the conceptual
framework. However, it is important to note that these hypotheses assumed that in the
absence of social security, all firms were required to cover the cost of care for their
employees, when in fact this does not happen in practice.
The findings also revealed that privately owned firms in the services industry are the
least likely to enrol in social security. These findings are consistent with the US literature
on private employer-based health insurance (Gruber and Lettau 2004). Firms in the trade
industry are also more likely than firms in the manufacturing, construction or services
industry to enrol in SHI, which contrasts with results from a study in the US (which
found that manufacturing firms were most likely to enrol in employer-based insurance)
but supports findings from a study in Shanghai (which showed that compliance with
social security was lowest in the construction industry)(Nyland et al. 2006; Buchmueller
et al. ApriI2001).
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The descriptive findings on the perspectives of firms bring to light some of the
motivations for enrolling, or not enrolling, in social security. Firms enrol in social
security because they are attracted to the health insurance benefits, which improve
employee satisfaction, health and well-being. However, retirement benefits and sick
leave are also relatively important and therefore it is important to keep in mind that
decisions to enrol in social security are determined by the perception of the benefit
package as a whole. Reforms or revisions to non-health benefits, such as retirement
benefits, will therefore have an impact on the overall attraction of social security.
The SHI sub-study is helpful in explaining why some firms do not enrol in social
security. These factors include lack of knowledge of the scheme, poor quality of
government hospitals, and the fact that employees are healthy and do not need health
care. Quality appears to be a common theme affecting enrolment in social security. in
Laos.
The conceptual framework demonstrated how adverse selection can arise in a voluntary
scheme. Although the presence of adverse selection in the SHI scheme could not be
assessed from this study, employers without insurance reported that one of the main
reasons for non-enrolment in SHI was that the workforce was healthy and the employees
did not need insurance. The study also revealed that employees within firms can opt out
of social security. These two findings give reason to believe that adverse selection could
be a problem. Whether or not the employees who are opting out of insurance are the
healthy and young was not investigated but this would be expected given findings from
voluntary schemes in the literature (Jakab et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2005; Wang et al.
2006; Chankova et al. 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008).
The study revealed that few of the firms that are not enrolling in social security offer
other types of insurance to their employees. While some firms make direct payments for
employees' health care, it is unclear to what extent employees would be protected from
high-cost expenditures in the event of an illness.
The findings indicate that there may be some evasion taking place in the services
industry. However, it is also possible that all firms (not just those enrolled in social
security) are evading benefits as a way of reducing indirect labour costs. Evasion of
payments would likely become a bigger concern with strengthened enforcement: if that
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is the case than evasion could lead to a significant loss of revenues for the government,
as has occurred in other countries (Escobar and Panopoulou 2003; Gottret and Schieber
2006; Jowett and Hsiao 2007).
The background information regarding the official and current target groups identified
the following approaches to increasing coverage of social security in the future: I)
expansion within the current target group; 2) expansion to new geographic areas; 3)
expansion to smaller enterprises; and 4) expansion of the target group beyond the narrow
group of tax-paying firms. However, further expansion is likely to be met with
challenges. These challenges will be discussed in Section 8.4.
8.2 Summary of methodological limitations and strengths
8.2.1 Reflections on the approach for the CBHlstudies
The main limitation of the methodology for the CBHI study design is the single-
difference approach, which affects the two CBHI sub-studies differently. In the
enrolment study, the cross-sectional data makes it difficult to infer causation between an
independent variable and the outcome (enrolment). While endogeneity could be
addressed using instrumental variable methods, it was difficult to find an instrument to
test for endogeneity between enrolment and income, quality, and exposure to CBHI.
Thus, endogeneity in the model could bias the enrolment findings. For example,
households with insurance may have more disposable income as a result of having their
care covered by insurance. Thus, insurance may have raised their consumption level
relative to the time when they first enrolled. Thus, endogeneity between consumption
and enrolment could contribute to upward bias of the effect of consumption on
enrolment.
The main limitation of using single differences in the impact evaluation is that this
approach does not control for unobservable variables. Although the questionnaires
included details about a wide range of factors expected to influence enrolment, it is likely
that some important variables were omitted, which could bias the impact evaluation
findings. However, given the magnitude of the impacts identified in both sub-studies, the
direction and significance of the true impacts are likely to be similar to results presented
here. Moreover, a considerable effort was made to account for selection into the scheme
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through the ex-ante qualitative work and the collection of primary data using a
comprehensive questionnaire. The balancing tests showed the two groups to be very
similar on observables even before matching in the impact evaluation. Thus, any bias due
to omitted variables is expected to be minor, but is nonetheless acknowledged.
A second concern is the potential bias introduced during FGDs caused by group
dynamics, the effect of the moderator, or the effect of participating in an experiment. For
example, participants may have exaggerated negative opinions about CBHI in hopes of
improving the scheme in the future, or may have been reluctant to speak too negatively
about CBHI given that it is a government programme. However, the results of the study
suggest that participants felt quite comfortable speaking truthfully about the scheme as a
range of opinions were offered. The fact that the moderator had no incentive to influence
the results in one way or another and was skilled at creating a comfortable environment
for participants may have minimised these effects.
A third limitation is the external validity of the findings on the determinants and impacts
of enrolment. The results from both CBHI sub-studies are likely representative of the
target population that existed at the time of the study, given that the sample accounted
for 30 percent of the enrolled households. However, due to non-random programme
placement (i.e., the target group in the sample includes households in the most affiuent,
urban and semi-urban areas of the country where quality of health care is relatively good
and where the majority of the population belongs to the Tai-Kadai ethnic group) external
validity is likely to be strong for the target group that existed at the time of the study but
results cannot necessarily be generalised to new and future target groups. Since the study
was conducted, enrolment has expanded to more remote districts and will continue to
expand in the future to groups that are expected to be very different and harder to reach
in terms of the health facilities available, distance to facilities, ethnicity, preference for
modern health care services, and other factors.
Non-sampling bias through household surveys is difficult to avoid and is expected to
have affected estimates of consumption, utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures in this
study. Based on findings from health accounting studies, utilisation and out-of-pocket
expenditures are both expected to be significantly underreported. The desire to speed up
the interview process, and the use of a proxy respondent, are both expected to lead to
underreporting of health care or illness episodes (Rannan-Eliya 2008). However,
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measurement error is likely to be consistent across both CBHI and comparison
households and is therefore not expected to affect relative differences between groups. It
is also important to acknowledge that the calculation of catastrophic expenditures is
somewhat arbitrary and should be used only to measure relative differences between the
insured and uninsured.
Another limitation relating to the measurement of impacts of CBHI is the failure to
account for indirect and future costs of illness. Households often forgo health care or
obtain sub-optimal care, rather than diverting a large share of the household budget to
cover health care costs (van Doorslaer et al. 2007) but the impacts measured in this study
do not reflect such compromises. Nor do the results on financial protection adjust for the
future costs of employing coping strategies to pay for health care (e.g., borrowing money
or selling assets), making it difficult to pinpoint the true economic costs borne by
households. The indirect costs of lost labour due to illness are also excluded but based on
other study findings are expected to be large. Despite these limitations, the indirect costs
were omitted across both groups of households and therefore the relative impacts of
CBHI are expected to be reliable. In fact, the study found that the CBHI households were
less likely to sell assets or borrow money and therefore, if these differences are
considered, the financial impacts of insurance, when indirect costs are included, may
actually be larger than what was measured in this study.
Despite the limitations, the CBHI study design has several strengths. A strong effort was
made to understand and to control for the most important factors affecting selection into
insurance, including multiple variables of health status, risk preferences, preferences for
modem care, and other factors that are not always adequately measured in other studies
examining the impacts of voluntary insurance. The use of this rich dataset, combined
with PSM in the analysis, helped to control for selection bias. Another strength of the
CBHI design is the use of qualitative data from FGDs, which were useful in interpreting
the direction of the relationship between independent variables and impacts. Finally, the
sample size of the study was relatively large and was conducted across six districts
where the scheme is operating. This large samples size represents an improvement over
other CBHI evaluations that used small sample sizes and were based on schemes with
very few members (Palmer et al. 2004).
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8.2.2 Reflections on the approach for the SHIstudy
In the SHI study there are a few design issues that may contribute to bias. The main
limitation of the design is that the sampling frame represents only a small proportion of
firms in the country and examines enrolment preferences in only four industries. This
narrow sampling frame is likely to lead to low external validity of findings. Second, the
small sample size leads to large standard errors, which can increase the likelihood of
sampling errors. As in the CBHI sub-studies, the cross-sectional nature of the data also
makes it difficult to imply causal relationships and to rule out endogeneity.
Another important limitation of the SHI study is that the refusal rate was relatively high.
Although these firms were replaced using the same approach to select original firms, it is
possible that the refusal of some firms to participate contributed to sampling bias.
Moreover, non-compliance with social security is likely to be a sensitive topic for
employers. Therefore, some bias in this study, due to non-response and false-response, is
expected. However, it is difficult to estimate the direction of the bias given that detailed
information about the firms that refused to participate was not available.
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the projections outlining coverage scenarios are
simplistic approximations that are intended for illustrative purposes only. Validation of
scenarios would require more precise data as well as consensus building with key
decision-makers regarding various assumptions (e.g., definitions of the target group and
expected compliance).
Despite these limitations, the results from this study provide new evidence regarding the
perspectives of private sector employers. The findings also fill a gap in the health
financing literature regarding the determinants of enrolment in SHI and highlight the
opportunities and challenges of expanding coverage through SHI in a resource-poor,
low-capacity context with high poverty rates, a small private sector, and weak regulation
and enforcement.
8.3 Summary of contribution to the literature
This thesis makes several contributions to the health economics and financing literature
and these contributions were discussed in the respective results chapters. The overall
contributions to the literature are summarised below:
• The finding that adverse selection is driving enrolment in CBHI in Laos is consistent
with many other studies on voluntary insurance and points to the challenges of
overcoming adverse selection in a voluntary scheme. The use of multiple health
indicators provides a broad picture of the impact of health status on enrolment - a
relationship that is not always captured adequately using a single health indicator.
• Whereas expected utility theory predicts that more risk-averse households will enrol
in health insurance, the findings from this study showed that households enrolling in
CBHI are less risk-averse than uninsured households. The findings raise some
questions about the risk-minimizing features of CBHI in Laos but also indicate that
expected utility theory may be limited in its ability to explain the relationship
between risk aversion and enrolment in health insurance in resource-poor
environments, where quality is often poor and where the capacity to effectively
manage the scheme is often low. Other social and economic theories (e.g., expected
payoffs, income levels, cultural reasons, trust, management of schemes, and poor
quality of care) should also be used to understand the factors affecting enrolment.
• The findings provide country-specific evidence about the factors driving and
hindering enrolment in CBHI and SHI. Previously, very little was known about the
factors determining and hindering enrolment in the Lao schemes.
• Until now, reports about the differences in quality of treatment experienced by CBHI
and non-CBHI members in Laos have been largely anecdotal, with the exception of a
few small studies. While neither the CBHI nor the SHI study measured actual quality
of care, both studies explored quality perceptions of, and reported experiences with
the quality of care in Laos. The preferential treatment given to the uninsured is likely
a consequence of the differences in provider payment incentives and is consistent
with the provider payment literature.
• The CBHI impact evaluation confirms much of the literature, which shows that
CBHI increases utilisation of health care services and reduces out-of-pocket
expenditures for those using services. However, the study emphasises the importance
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of being clear about what is actually being measured: when impacts are averaged
'over the insured population, financial protection for the insured is not significantly
different from the uninsured.
• The use of propensity score matching combined with single differences, a qualitative
component, and a rich dataset that was designed specifically to control for adverse
selection and other factors that are often omitted from CBHI and voluntary insurance
evaluations, helped to address selection bias when measuring the impacts of the
voluntary CBHI scheme. The CBHI impact evaluation therefore makes a contribution
to the small but growing body of high quality evidence regarding the impacts of
CBHI on utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures.
• The combination of multivariate results and descriptive findings on the perspectives
of firms from the SHI sub-study revealed some of the major factors affecting
enrolment of firms in a mandatory social security scheme. This is the first known
study to investigate the determinants of firm-level SHI enrolment: findings from this
study can be used to help governments understand why enrolment levels in many'
mandatory schemes remain low and may facilitate policing efforts by regulatory
bodies.
• The findings outline some of the difficulties of expanding coverage using voluntary
health insurance (including schemes that are mandatory but are not enforced). The
discussion of the policy implications of expanding enrolment and progressing
towards universal coverage, which will be discussed in the next section, contributes
to the international debate on the roles ofCBHI and SHI in health financing systems.
8.4 Policy implications of study findings
8.4.1 What are the prospects/or increasing coverage 0/CBRI and SRI in Laos?
Although the CBHI and SHI schemes target very different population groups, there are
several common themes emerging from the sub-studies that relate to the motivation for
enrolment and members' experiences with the schemes. These themes have direct
implications for the opportunities and challenges of strengthening the schemes and
expanding coverage. With respect to strengthening the schemes in the short- to medium-
term, there are various programmatic changes that could be taken by the MOH and the
SSO. Several of these options were briefly mentioned in Chapters 5 and 7 and were also
outlined in two separate policy notes that were disseminated to the Government of Laos
Page 1217
and its partners prior to the development of the draft health financing strategy (See
summary versions of the policy notes in Appendix D).
While several strategies could be taken to strengthen CBHI and SHI, it is important to
recognise that programmatic improvements are unlikely to have much impact on
enrolment levels given the broader challenges identified in this thesis. Four key
challenges that relate to both CBHI and SHI are discussed below.
Further expansion of the schemes will become more difficult given the status quo
In both insurance schemes studied in this thesis, the geographic reach of the schemes has
been limited to areas where impact is likely to be the greatest. For example, CBHI has
been introduced in the most affluent urban and semi-urban areas, where quality of care
and access to hospitals are relatively good, and the social security scheme has been
introduced in areas with the highest concentration of private sector firms. However,
within the targeted areas, the schemes are still only reaching a small percentage of their
target groups, even though both schemes have been in place for more than a decade. For
example, CBHI is reaching only a fraction of the population (less than 10 percent in the
targeted districts), while SHI is reaching 29 percent of firms in its current target group.
Further expansion of CBHI to remote areas, with low population density and a
population that is not accustomed to the concept of insurance or use of modem health
care services, will likely pose even greater challenges. Although there is scope for
expanding the size of the SHI target group to smaller enterprises and groups that have
alternative tax arrangements (i.e., those that pay lump sum taxes, etc.), it is likely that
such expansion to these "hard-to-reach" groups will result in diminishing returns due to
the costs of strengthening enforcement and expanding SSO resources (e.g., offices, staff,
capacity building, etc.) throughout the country.
Voluntary enrolment hinders expansion and threatens financial vlabUity and
sustainability of schemes
Like most voluntary schemes documented in the literature, adverse selection is present in
the CBHI scheme. This is particularly worrisome because all members play a flat-rate
premium regardless of their risk profile. Thus, adverse selection can drive up the cost of
health care per insured member and can ultimately threaten the sustainability and
financial viability of the scheme.
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Although SHI is in theory a mandatory scheme, it functions much like a voluntary
scheme in that firms opt out of enrolment and, within firms, employees can opt out of
social security benefits. Voluntary enrolment within and across firms poses a challenge
to expansion of social security because it decreases revenues to the SSO but also because
of the threat to sustainability and effectiveness of risk-pooling.
Poor quality of care discourages enrolment in health insurance
As revealed in this study, perceptions of poor quality of care are major obstacles to
expansion of both CBHI and social security. Both insured and uninsured individuals in
the studies expressed concerns about the quality of care. For example, in the CBHI study,
FGD participants complain that health care staff members do not have the skills to
adequately diagnose health problems, productivity is low among health care workers,
and quality of equipment in the facilities is poor. However, the differential treatment
between the insured and cash-paying patients is particularly worrisome and is likely tied
to the incentives underlying the provider payment arrangements. For services rendered to
the insured, contracting hospitals are paid by capitation, the rates of which are very low,
and therefore health care workers have an incentive to under-service CBHI members
because the hospitals bear the risk of the insured patient. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
health care worker salaries are paid directly by the MOH but hospitals rely on the high
profit margins on drugs to finance the operating costs of the hospital and possible top-
ups for staff. Excessive reliance on these fees therefore provides strong incentives for
supplier-induced demand for the uninsured, including over-prescription of non-generic
medications, as shown by a recent study in Laos (Syhakhang et al. 2011). Thus, poor
quality of care poses a barrier to expansion of the schemes, but also to utilisation of
health services for the insured. Given the importance of quality, it is likely that little
progress will be made to increase enrolment or utilisation in the absence of quality
improvements.
Introduction of health insurance may be exacerbating inequities between the poor and
the rich and between uninsured and insured employees
The findings from the CBHI study indicate that the poor are the least likely to enrol in
CBHI. Moreover, while the scheme has significantly increased utilisation of inpatient
services for the poor, the insured in the poorest quintile spend more money out-of-pocket
than non-members and are more likely to incur catastrophic expenditures. These findings
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justify the need for further protection among the poor. With the exception of a few
villages where health equity funds are operating alongside CBHI schemes, there are no
subsidies in place to cover the cost of CBHI premiums for the poor. Nor is a systematic
targeting scheme in place for identifying poor households. I IS
Although the impact on equity in the SHI scheme was not evaluated, the study does
indicate that firms without social security do not provide other types of health insurance
to their employees and it is therefore unclear to what extent employees would be
protected from high-cost expenditures in the event of an illness. The fact that a large
percentage of the target population (including the poor) in both the CBHI and SHI
schemes is left without insurance raises concerns about the country's ability to increase
access to services and improve financial protection. Thus, there is a need to increase
coverage to this uninsured group and introduce complementary approaches (i.e.,
subsidies) to ensure the poor enrol (or have adequate coverage through another
mechanism). Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that for the poor who are enrolled in
CBHI, the impacts of the scheme on financial protection are positive.
From the synthesis of the issues highlighted by the sub-studies, it is clear that there are
challenges to increasing coverage of both CBHI and SHI in Laos. Given these
challenges, what options are there for building on the experiences to date to make broad-
based ~rogress towards universal coverage? Answers to this question will be explored in
the following sub-section.
8,4,2 Looking forward: How can Lao PDRprogress towards universal coverage
given the current health financing arrangements?
There is no blueprint on how best to achieve universal coverage. However, there are
various lessons learned from countries that have made progress towards this goal. Based
on these lessons, some of the most important policy recommendations for advancing
towards universal coverage in Laos are outlined below. Most of the recommended
strategies will undoubtedly already have been considered by policymakers: the extent to
which such strategies are already being implemented is discussed and further
us Although the government has drafted guidelines to assist local authorities in identifying and monitoring
poor households, there is presently significant variation in the criteria used by villages, as this study
showed. Moreover, the list of poor households is not consistently maintained across villages.
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recommendations are made. Although the health financing strategy for 2011 to 2015 has
already been drafted and the government seems committed to continuing with the current
health financing arrangements, it is still not too late to consider modifications to the
strategy - or even substantial overhauls. Health financing reform discussions in Laos
will be ongoing for some time to come and strategic planning should be an iterative
process that evaluates progress at various stages and remains open to different
approaches along the way. Although the recommendations below are specific to Laos,
they can also inform development of strategies in other countries, given that CBHI and
SHI are common elements of many countries' health financing systems.
Increase government investment in the health system
As indicated in Chapter 3, government health financing in Laos is extremely low by
international standards, with only 19 percent of spending on health coming from the
government budget!" (World Bank 201Ob).Government expenditure on health amounts
to less than 1 percent ofGDP, which is very low by international standards. Most of this
public expenditure covers salaries for health care workers, and therefore facilities are
dependent on revenues from the revolving drug funds and user fees to cover recurrent
costs (WHO 2010a). This situation may explain the increased attention on health
insurance and risk-protection schemes to mobilise resources for the health sector.
However, to make progress towards universal coverage, substantial increases in general
tax revenues to subsidise health services will be needed, but given the poor economic
situation of the country and the limited ability to generate revenues through taxes (due to
a small informal sector, low wages, etc.), government resources are limited. Fortunately,
fiscal space is set to increase in coming years due to growing natural resource revenues
and improved tax administration. As shown in Chapter 3, economic growth is climbing
faster than other countries in the region (with a growth rate of 6.4 percent in 2009).117
However, the extent to which the health sector will benefit from increased government
revenues will depend on the ability of the Ministry of Health. the Ministry of Labour and
Social Welfare, and other government and non-government bodies to make a strong case
for increasing government spending on health.
116 This amount also includes funding from donors.
117 As mentioned in Chapter 3, much of the economic growth is due to the construction of Nam Theun 2
(NT2) - the new hydropower facility that is expected to contribute to 4()oA,ofGDP growth in the next few
years. Other industries, such as manufacturing, and services are also experiencing growth.
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In addition to the expected sources of increased revenues, there may also be
opportunities to raise additional revenues from levies, such as products that are harmful
to health (e.g., tobacco, alcohol) (WHO 201Ob). These taxes have been used in other
countries (e.g., the Philippines) to help subsidise the poor (Jowett and Hsiao 2007).
Diversification of financing will be required to increase investments in the health sector.
Assuming revenues to the health sector can be increased, investments could be used in a
variety of ways. First, subsidies could be directed at the poor and near-poor to make
premiums more affordable and address the current inequalities in access to health
services. However, based on global experiences, as well as the evidence from Laos that
indicates that reaching the poor and informal sector through CBHI and SHI will be
challenging, it may be more worthwhile to focus on investing resources not in the
schemes themselves but directly in the public health care system. For example, these
subsidies could be targeted to specific high priority health services (e.g., maternal and
child health'"), or geographical areas (e.g., the poorest regions) (Powell-Jackson and
Lindelow 2010). Subsidies could also be used to increase the capitation paid to providers
for services rendered to insured patients, making it partly based on volume or other
measures of performance (recommendations for improving quality and introducing
incentives are also discussed in a separate recommendation below).
In addition to increased investment that will (hopefully) come from increased fiscal
space, increased investments from donors will also be required to increase access to
health services, especially given the large size of the population living below the poverty
line (37 percent in 2008) (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). Improvements in the
predictability of donor investments, which are highly volatile, will also be needed.
In summary, there are various approaches to subsidising coverage of health services and
these options are not mutually exclusive. However, the issues need to be studied and
discussed in more detail among policymakers in Laos.
118 Laos has recently begun piloting a scheme in which deliveries in hospitals are offered free of charge to
all women.
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Foster political will and government stewardship
It is clear from global experiences (reviewed in Chapter 2) that political will and
government stewardship are prerequisites for achieving high coverage of health
insurance. For example, in Rwanda, national policies were developed for expanding
coverage of health insurance and this expansion has been a key element in poverty
reduction strategies. This focused policy framework has allowed donor funding to be
channelled to the health sector, which has strengthened the entire health system (Logie et
al. 2008; De Allegri et al. 2009). In Thailand, the process of extending coverage within
the schemes and eventually harmonising them was well articulated through laws and
strategies and strong political support at the central government level.
In Laos, the political will to achieve universal coverage is strong, and this support is
reflected in the National Socio-Economic Development Plan, the National Health Sector
Development Plan, and the Health Financing Strategy that has recently been drafted. A
decree is also being developed to govern the process of merging the schemes in 2015 and
several specific coverage targets have been set for each target population (e.g., 50% of
the informal sector reached with CBHI by 2015; 55% of the civilian population!"
covered by health insurance by 2015)(MOH Lao PDR 2010). However, the specifics of
how coverage in each of the target groups will be increased have not been articulated.
Given the challenges of increasing coverage of health insurance that were revealed in
this thesis, many of the coverage targets seem unrealistic and it would be worth
reconsidering whether or not these coverage targets could be more realistically achieved
through other risk-pooling approaches, such as general taxation.
While the political commitment for expanding health insurance is strong, this
commitment lacks specific guidance from the government that will be necessary to
develop a clear pathway to universal coverage. Although the health financing strategy
represents a good start, details within the strategy need to be further developed.
Furthermore, coordination and alignment of donor activities with government priorities
will be required to channel resources appropriately. To date, donor programmes have
119 The civilian population excludes the military and police. When these groups are included the proposed
coverage is roughly 60% of the population.
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largely been driven by donor agendas and are used to fund vertical programmes, which
are largely fragmented (MOH Lao PDR 2010).
Subsidise enrolment for households outside the formal sector using general tax
revenues
International experience suggests that it is impossible to achieve high coverage rates
under a voluntary scheme (WHO 201Ob).This is because the young and healthy will opt
out, and because it will be difficult to encourage enrolment of the informal sector. Yet
the health financing strategy in Laos continues to view CBHI as a mechanism for
covering the informal sector on the path to universal coverage.
One of the key recommendations made in the 20I0 World Health Report is mandatory
.
coverage of risk pools. However, as shown by the SHI sub-study, a mandatory scheme
can function much like a voluntary scheme in the absence of legislation and enforcement
and in the context of poor quality. A study from China also points to the difficulties of
mandating enrolment in CBHI: the household enrolment policy is not enforced and as a
result one third of enrolled households are only partially enrolled, and within these
partially enrolled households only the sick individuals are enrolling (Wang et al. 2006).
A more effective approach to "mandatory" enrolment, also recommended in the World
Health Report, may be to cover various sub-populations under one scheme using
taxation. Although the government of Laos appears committed to a strategy that is
centred around expanding voluntary schemes in a vertical manner, and eventually .
bringing them together, it is not too late to consider lessons from other countries in the
region that have been relatively successful at expanding coverage. For example, lessons
from neighbouring Thailand showed that even after CBHI (which existed prior to
reforms in 2001) was heavily subsidised and the benefit package made more attractive,
enrolment was still low, adverse selection persisted, and the scheme was not financially
viable due to insufficient risk-pooling (Prakongsai et al. 2009). The informal sector,
which is largely engaged in agricultural production, did not have regular cash income for
the premium collection and therefore enforcing compliance among the informal sector
would have been difficult and expensive (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). At the same
time, the Low-Income Scheme, which was intended to exempt the poor and other
vulnerable groups from user charges, was facing difficulty with leakages to the non-poor
and a large proportion of the poor not identified. Thus, the "Universal Coverage" (UC)
scheme was established to bring beneficiaries of the Voluntary Health Card, the Low-
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Income Scheme and the 30 percent of the population that was uninsured under one
mandatory scheme that is financed through taxation (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2004).
A similar approach to the VC scheme in Thailand could be considered in Laos, whereby
a single scheme would target the poor, the informal sector and those not covered by the
formal sector schemes. The scheme could be managed by a single autonomous agency -
the same agency that would manage the formal sector schemes. However, the benefit
package of the subsidised programme may have to be somewhat less generous to deter
formal sector workers from operating informally. The programme could be financed
entirely out of general revenues (and donor funding) and would be administratively more
efficient than trying to expand or mandate enrolment among the informal sector, the
poor, and those not covered by the formal sector. Moreover, as shown in Thailand,
coverage could increase relatively quickly. Furthermore, Thailand's tax-financed
universal coverage scheme has proven to be much more equitable than a voluntary
contributory scheme or a targeted scheme (Prakongsai et al. 2009). Thus, a universal
coverage scheme may be a more feasible and efficient means of extending coverage than
targeting mechanisms, especially given that the administrative and technical capacity in
Laos is so weak.
Invest in quality improvements and introduce incentives for providers
As described in the conceptual framework in Chapter 4, improvements to the supply of
health care ultimately affect the demand for health care and insurance and therefore help
to expand the health financing system. The results from this thesis also revealed that
(perceived) quality of care is an important factor affecting enrolment in insurance, and
among those insured, quality of care (and inferior treatment towards insured patients)
discourages utilisation for mild to moderate illnesses. Thus, it is clear that improvements
to quality will be needed to progress towards universal coverage, regardless of the
approach taken to get there. There are several areas in which quality improvements could
be made.
As revealed by focus group discussions in'Chapter 5, health care workers often lack the
skills to diagnose problems and productivity is low. Investments in pre-service training
and in-service trainings could help to increase the capacity of health care workers.
However, there is also a maldistribution of qualified health workers throughout the
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country (i.e., health workers have a strong preference for urban areas because of the
opportunities to earn supplementary income in private clinics (Dodd et al. 2009».
Introducing incentives for practicing in rural and remote areas could help to attract more
qualified individuals into the public system and would help to improve the geographical
distribution of human resources (Kanchanachitra et al. 2011).
While the findings from this thesis point to a need to directly invest in facilities and
human resources to improve quality of care, there are also opportunities to influence the
quality of service delivery. The goal of moving towards strategic purchasing and away
from the status quo of passive purchasing will be important and is articulated in the draft
health financing strategy, although details have yet to be defined (MOH Lao PDR 2010).
One approach to strategic purchasing would be for the MoH to contract only with
facilities that meet certain criteria in terms of service delivery. Another approach is to
revise the payment schemes in order to motivate health care providers to serve the
interests of the patient and to provide good quality care, and eliminate differential
treatment between the insured and uninsured, which is one of the main concerns about
quality raised in the thesis. This can be done by including performance-based incentives
(as part of a capitation, salary or fee- for-service payment), in which part of the payment
is tied to specific targets that will encourage quality and provision of preventive care
(e.g., vaccinations, health education, maternal and child care, patient satisfaction).
Payments could also be tied to cost control and service volume, in order to fulfil other
goals of cost reduction and increased efficiencies (Yip et al. 2010).
Increase efficiencies In health careprovision andflnanclng
Although this thesis did not directly explore the efficiency of the health insurance
schemes or the health care system, the background analysis conducted as part of the
thesis revealed that there are several opportunities for increasing efficiencies in the
health sector. If the Government is set on progressing towards universal coverage
through multiple schemes that serve distinct population groups then it will be important
to harmonise schemes as much as possible to prepare for an eventual merge (McIntyre,
2008). One of the key features of the universal coverage (UC) scheme in Thailand is that
it is managed, along with other schemes, by a single autonomous agency - the National
Health Security Office (NHSO) - which is separate from the Ministry of Public Health.
Funding is also channelled through contracting units which consist largely of primary
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care providers. This system represents a clear purchaser-provider split (Hughes and
Leethongdee 2007).
In contrast to the harmonised structure of the Thai schemes, the Lao schemes are
managed by two separate ministries and separate departments within those ministries.
For example, the Civil Servant Scheme is managed by a newly established State
Authority of Social Security (SASS), under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,
while the Social Security scheme is managed by the SSO. The CBHI and HEF schemes
are housed by the Ministry of Health, which is also tasked with paying providers and
providing services directly. Management by a single agency would result in higher
efficiencies but will be a challenge given the current fragmentation of the schemes. To
prepare for the merging of the CSS and the Social Security scheme in 2015, SASS and
the SSO are to be merged under a single governing board by 2013 (MOH Lao PDR
2010). This would be an important step towards improved coordination and reduced
administrative costs and would also increase purchasing power and facilitate better
supervision of quality. However, given the current low coverage rates and the challenges
highlighted in this thesis, it is unlikely that simply merging the schemes will facilitate
expansion of enrolment.
Other approaches to increasing efficiencies include shifting the balance of the health care
system from urban to rural areas and from hospitals to primary care at health care
centres. Contracting with health centres could increase access in rural areas and could
decrease overall expenditures, assuming investments in quality improvements are made
at health centres.
The margins on drugs are currently one of the biggest drivers of costs in the public health
care system in Laos and the draft health financing strategy proposes regulation of drug
prices and reduced margins on the price of drugs and services (MOH Lao PDR 2010).
This approach would decrease incentives for providers at hospitals to over-prescribe
drugs and services. However, given that hospitals are reliant on this revenue, the profit
margins on drugs and services would have to be replaced by increased government (and
donor) financing.
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Introduce legislation and strengthen regulatory structure
If the Government of Laos intends to continue its efforts to expand coverage and
compliance of SHI, much attention needs to be given to introducing legislation and
strengthening the regulatory structure. SHI effectively functions as a voluntary scheme at
present (for firms, and also for employees within firms) and the lack of legislation or
regulatory structure makes it impossible to enforce. To increase compliance, the
organisation managing a mandatory social security scheme must be granted the right to
inspect employer records, the right to assess and collect contributions, and the right to
exercise enforcement penalties (McGillavry, 2001). Although the SSO has begun
inspections of non-compliant firms, it will be in no position to penalise firms until a law
is enacted. Completion of the guidelines for inspections, which are due to be drafted, will
also be important for strengthening enforcement. but without a law, inspections and
sanctions will carry little weight.
Before expanding the legislation it will be important to differentiate the "official" target
group from the potential target group and identify various options for expansion.
.Currently there is ambiguity over which firms should be enrolled and the lines between
the formal and informal sector are blurred, as shown from the secondary analysis of the
Lao Economic Census in Chapter 7. The costs and benefits of expanding the scheme
geographically - as well as expanding to smaller enterprises, or to firms with alternative
tax arrangements - should therefore be considered.
Although introduction of legislation and greater enforcement would facilitate expansion
to a certain extent, there are high costs to stronger enforcement, as offices would need to
be established throughout the country (currently in Laos only one national office and two
provincial offices exist) and infrastructure and legislation required for enforcement
would need to be developed. The costs would likely increase considerably once smaller
and less formal firms are targeted. Furthermore, stricter enforcement can exacerbate
incentives for informality and evasion, the costs of which can be significant (Wagstaff
2010b). For instance, in Colombia, evasion of social security payments among formal
sector workers was estimated to cost US$836 million in forgone revenues in a year
(2.75% of GDP) (Escobar and Panopoulou 2003), while in the Philippines and
Kazakhstan, only 30 and 40 percent of expected revenues, respectively, were actually
collected (Gottret and Schieber 2006; Jowett and Hsiao 2007). Moreover, the
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background information reviewed in the SHI sub-study showed that the capacity within
the SSO to increase expansion of the scheme is weak.
Strengthening enforcement will also require improvements to tax registration. The SHI
study revealed that only 8 percent of firms in Laos currently have a tax identification
number. Thus, monitoring tax payments will remain a challenge, even if enforcement is
enhanced. Bringing firms into the formal tax system may help to simplify tax collection
and monitoring of social security payments. One way in which the government could
increase the number of firms with formal tax registration would be to issue a tax
identification number at the same time that a business registers for a license. Currently in
Lao PDR, two separate procedures, with separate agencies, are required to obtain a
business registration certificate and a tax identification number. Furthermore, as noted in
the World Bank's survey of "Doing Business in Laos", there are various bottlenecks in
the business registration process that could be simplified, thereby making it easier to
monitor payments (The World Bank 2009).
Invest In system capacity
Some of the recommendations made above will require investments to increase capacity.
For example, management of health insurance schemes, improved budgeting of the
health sector, and strengthened enforcement by the SSO, all require training and capacity
building. Donor funding could be channelled to fund specific activities.
In Laos, there is also a need to build capacity among research institutes and government
bodies that produce data (e.g., the National Statistics office) and coordinate and use
research (e.g., the National Institute of Public Health) to ensure that evidence is used to
guide decision-making and policy formulation. An important feature of the transition to
universal coverage in Thailand was the national institutional capacity to generate
evidence to guide health policy decisions and the strong links between the research
community, civil society and policy makers (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2004). In China,
experiments by local and international researchers on different models of health
insurance and different payment schemes are also driving the policy agenda.
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Identify priorities regarding the breadth, depth and height of coverage
A final recommendation for the Government of Laos is to recognise the trade-offs
between various aspects of coverage. The 2010 World Health Report explains that
achieving universal coverage requires progress to be made in three general areas: the
breadth of coverage (the extent to which the population is covered by health insurance
schemes or other prepayment arrangements); the depth of coverage (the package of
services covered by the scheme, for example, inpatient, outpatient and other high-cost
services); and the height of coverage (the level of financial protection) (WHO 2010b)
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). To progress towards universal coverage, governments
will need to prioritise between these three areas. Currently in Laos, the breadth of
coverage is low, while the depth and height of coverage are relatively high (i.e., health
insurance schemes are quite generous, covering outpatient and inpatient services; in the
CBHI scheme, financial protection is positive for the insured who use services). Given
that the contribution rates are relatively low, it may be worth redefining the benefit
package to be more in line with the contributions. Alternatively, contribution rates could
be set at a higher level to offer more generous benefits, but doing so would risk
excluding 'a significant share of households in the target population. It may be more
important to cover a large population with a basic package of services, than to provide a
high level of service and financial protection to a small group of people
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). Such trade-offs between various aspects of coverage
should be discussed and debated among policy makers in Laos.
In summary, there are various approaches that cSfi:be taken to make progress towards
universal coverage in Laos and other countries. The lessons drawn from international
experiences can help policy-makers decide on a strategy that is best suited to the country
context. However, as emphasised in the 2010 World Health Report, "a health financing
strategy needs to be home-grown - pushing in the direction of universal coverage out of
the existing terrain". To progress towards universal coverage it will be important for
policymakers to remain flexible throughout the process, and develop their own capacities
to adapt, implement, and monitor health financing policies (WHO 2010b).
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8.4.3 Broader policy implications beyond Lao PDR
Several policy implications emerge from this thesis that are applicable not only to Laos
but to other low- and middle-income countries striving to extend coverage of health
insurance and risk-protection schemes. First, the findings from this thesis and the
international literature indicate that, with few exceptions, achieving high coverage rates
among the informal sector through a voluntary CBHI scheme is neither feasible nor
efficient. Furthermore, voluntary schemes often lead to inadequate risk-pooling across
the healthy, sick, rich and poor, and adverse selection can threaten countries' ability to
raise revenues and achieve financial sustainability.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the thesis findings relates to equity of health
insurance coverage. Even if the poor are exempted from the cost of CBHI or are targeted
through some other mechanism, such as health equity funds, targeting mechanisms may
not be feasible in environments where capacity is weak. Recognizing the limitations of
contributory or targeted schemes in increasing coverage among the poor and the informal
sector, it will be important for countries to also consider alternative or complementary
financing mechanisms, such as a universal tax-financed scheme. Decades of experience
with different schemes in Thailand showed that a tax-financed universal coverage
scheme is a more effective and efficient approach to extending coverage than a voluntary
contributory scheme or a targeted scheme (Prakongsai et al. 2009).
The study findings indicate that while removing financial barriers (e.g., through a
universal coverage scheme or a targeted approach) could positively impact coverage and
equity, improvements in financial access alone will not be sufficient to address inequities
in access. In most low-income settings, inadequate access is largely a result of
geographical barriers, and therefore improving service coverage through strengthening of
primary health care will be crucial in ensuring equitable access for the poor, rural
population (Prakongsai et al. 2009).
The thesis has also shown that the extent to which a mandatory scheme can effectively
cover the formal sector depends on increased formalisation of the labor market and
effective enforcement mechanisms. Thus, in environments where enforcement and
regulatory capacity are weak, considerable financial investments will be needed to
strengthen enforcement and build capacity to effectively manage and regulate schemes.
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While donor funding could be channelled to fund specific activities, in countries with a
small formal sector, covering this group through a combination of taxation and donor
funding could be administratively more efficient than trying to expand or mandate
enrolment among the formal sector. Universal coverage of this group would also address
the high rates of evasion that are prevalent in many countries.
Finally, moving to universal coverage requires political will and increased funding. As in
Laos, increasing funding in resource-poor areas will likely require an expansion of fiscal
space and increased investments from donors. There may also be opportunities to
increase efficiencies. For example, combining the management of schemes in a single
agency, focusing on a limited benefit package and gradually expanding as fiscal capacity
increases, and shifting the balance of the health care system from urban to rural areas and
from tertiary to primary care would bring about efficiencies.
8.5 Areas for future research
This thesis has generated new information about health financing in Lao PDR and other
low- and middle-income countries and has also made a contribution to the empirical and
theoretical literature. The findings from the study also point to new areas of research that
could be undertaken and these are discussed below.
Consider the indirect costs when measuring the impact 01 health insurance on
financial protection
As mentioned in the limitations section for the CBHI survey, the approach used to
measure the financial impact of CBHI did not take into account the indirect costs of
illness, such as the future costs of borrowing or selling assets, or income foregone due to
illness. To capture fully the economic impacts of health insurance on financial
protection, future studies should consider these indirect and future costs. These costs are
expected to be high: in a rural setting in Burkina Faso, indirect costs accounted for 69
percent of total illness costs (Sauerbom et al. 1995). While, measuring the indirect costs
of illness has methodological challenges, Russell has used longitudinal qualitative
methods to understand the impacts of illness on household livelihood over time and
suggests that qualitative research has a comparative advantage over quantitative methods
when examining the complex and dynamic nature of the impact of illness on household
vulnerability (Russell 2005). Similar work combining quantitative and qualitative work
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could be undertaken to better understand the extent to which health insurance provides
financial protection when the indirect costs of illness are taken into account. In addition,
innovative strategies for protecting households from the indirect costs of illness
implemented alongside insurance schemes need to be introduced and evaluated.
Explore the secondary effects of insurance on use of preventive care and MeH
services
The impact evaluation presented in this thesis examined the effects of CBHI on
utilisation and out-of-pocket expenditures in general but did not differentiate between
preventive and curative care. In fact, few studies from low- and middle-income countries
explore the association between insurance and preventive care: among those that do,
most focus on reproductive and maternal and child health (MCH) services, many of
which are preventive. For instance, a study from West Africa found a significant
association between CBHI membership and use of prenatal services in Mali but no
association in Senegal (Smith and Sulzbach 2008). A descriptive study in Rwanda found
higher use of prenatal services among members of a CBHI scheme but no difference in
immunisation rates between CBHI and non-CBHI members (Schneider and Diop 2001).
A more recent study evaluated the impact of the National Health Insurance Scheme in
Ghana on u~e of MCH services and the findings show that the insured were more likely
to use prenatal care, deliver in a hospital, and have better birth outcomes (Mensah et al.
2010) than the uninsured. However, the literature on the impacts of insurance on use of
preventive care is still scant. Part of the reason for the shortage of data on this subject is
that many preventive services are provided for free for the insured and uninsured and
therefore it is not possible to measure the direct effect of insurance in increasing access
to these services. However, it is possible that insurance can have a secondary effect by
serving as an entry point to promote healthy behaviour and use of preventive services. A
few authors have alluded to this indirect effect (JUtting 2004b) but the idea requires
further exploration. Further research in this area would therefore shed light on the extent
to which the secondary (as well as primary) effects of health insurance can be a vehicle
for increasing access to preventive and MCH services - a topic that is particularly
pertinent as countries strive to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.
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Examine further the relationship between risk attitudes and enrolment in health
insurance
The finding that risk-averse households are actually less likely to enrol in CBHI warrants
greater attention. Although a body of literature examines how the poor cope with risks,
and how insurance can be delivered more effectively to reduce risks among the poor
(Dercon 2002; Dercon and Clarke 2009), the relationship between risk-aversion and
enrolment in insurance has not been well documented. Further research in other settings
could be used alongside the findings from this thesis to more clearly identify this
relationship. At the very least, attempts to measure and account for risk-aversion should
be made in future impact evaluations as it is likely to be an important determinant of
enrolment that should be observed in order to reduce bias in treatment effects.
Investigate different ways to improve service quality
The findings from this thesis indicate the importance of improving the quality of health
care supply. Revising provider incentives in Laos to influence quality of care may be one
way to influence quality improvements. To inform how incentives should be
restructured, research examining the factors that motivate health workers could be
undertaken in Laos and used to guide health policy decisions. It would also be useful to
experiment with different designs of provider payment mechanisms and evaluate their
impact on quality and efficiency of service delivery. For example, a variety of pay-for-
performance schemes could be introduced and results could be evaluated to drive the
policy agenda, as is currently being done in China.
Assess the costs and benefits of various scenarios for covering the formal sector
The SHI sub-study used projections to estimate the extent to which SHI could be
expanded but these projections are based on many assumptions and are crude estimates
only. A useful exercise for the Government of Laos, and other countries looking to
expand reach of the formal sector, would be to assess the costs and benefits of various
approaches to expanding coverage. For those groups that are considered too costly to
reach (e.g., firms with less formal tax arrangements, firms with less than 10 employees,
areas with a low concentration of private sector workers), arrangements could be made to
extend coverage under some other mechanism (e.g., taxation).
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Model scenarios to establish clear linkages between health investments and the
achievement of national and international goals to be usedfor advocacypurposes
There are good prospects for increasing fiscal space in Laos but as in other countries,
there is no guarantee that increased fiscal space will translate into increased revenues for
the health sector. In many countries, even when health is a priority, the Ministry of
Health often lacks the analytical capacity to make the economic case for increased
funding to the health sector (Goldsbrough 2007). Moreover, there is not always an
understanding among the Ministry of Finance as to how investments in health can
translate into benefits for the economy overall. Projections on how increases in fiscal
space could be used for health services and the effects of this spending on the economy,
poverty reduction, achievement of MDGs and other national and international goals, will
be key and (assuming health investments are shown to be beneficial, which is highly
likely) can be used to advocate increased government financing for health (with the
assistance of civil society organisations). This resource allocation exercise would be
useful in Laos and in other countries where the health sector is underfunded.
8.6 Concluding remarks
Like many low- and middle-income countries, out-of-pocket payments by households in
Lao PDR continue to account for a large share of health care spending, which can deter
use of services and increase the risk of financial catastrophe and impoverishment.
Recognition of this problem has led the Government of Laos to focus greater attention on
the expansion of contributory health insurance schemes to both the formal and informal
sectors, with the ultimate goal of achieving universal coverage. This thesis has examined
two of those schemes: community-based health insurance (CBHI) and social health
insurance (SHI) using a conceptual framework that was based on empirical literature and
economic theory. The findings bring to light the factors that are driving and hindering
enrolment in CBHI and SHI in Laos, while filling several gaps in the health financing
literature. The CBHI impact evaluation showed that insurance has had a positive effect
on utilisation and financial protection but that the low coverage rates and low utilisation
among those insured brings into question the scheme's ability to increase financial
protection at a population level. Moreover, the findings indicate that CBHI is not
facilitating the achievement of national and international goals such as poverty reduction,
reduced inequities, and improved access to health care among the poor. Although the
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SHI scheme is a central element of the government's draft health financing strategy,
several challenges that hinder future SHI expansion were identified in this thesis.
The main policy implication of the study findings is that expansion of health insurance in
a resource-poor setting with low capacity to administer and regulate schemes will pose
considerable challenges and that alternative or complementary approaches should be
considered. Based on the study findings and the knowledge of health financing in Laos,
the thesis has recommended several reforms that should be used to stimulate dialogue
among Lao policy makers as the draft health financing strategy is finalised. Although the
findings and policy recommendations made here are specific to Laos, lessons can be
applied to other low- and middle-income countries striving towards universal coverage.
The thesis has also contributed to a broader health financing debate regarding the
limitations of contributory schemes in extending coverage, promoting equity, and
pooling and generating revenues for the health sector.
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Appendix A4.Consent forms and information sheets for interviewees
Understanding enrolment and impact of community-based health
insurance (CBHI)
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & Indochina Research Laos
Information Sheet for Village Heads
Purpose of study
Hello. My name is and I am from an organization in Laos called
Indochina Research. We are doing a study in your community to understand how people feel
about community-based health insurance (CBHI) and we would like permission to interview
households in your village. The study wiIJ help program planners understand why some
people decide to join CBHI, why others do not join and why some people drop out of the
scheme. This information is important for making the scheme better in the future. The
information from the study will also help program planners and policymakers understand
whether or not CBHI is benefitting people.
Procedures
Before we ask households to participate in the study, we would like to collect information
about the village. With your permission we would like to ask you to help us obtain this
information by participating in an interview. The questions we would ask you are about
types of employment in your village, use of health care services by people in your village
and the distance to different sources of health care. The interview will take about 20
minutes.
Potential Risks and Benefits to Households
The questions in this study are not expected to cause discomfort to households. However, I
want you to know that anything the household interviewees tell me will be kept a secret. No
one will be able to identify data from your specific village. Ifhouseholds decide to
participate but later change their minds, they can stop at any time. They will not be
penalized for not participating in this survey.
The village will not receive any money or other benefits in exchange for answering the
survey questions. Your answers will be put together with the answers from many other
families in this community to help us understand how CBHI and the health care system can
be improved.
Confidentiality
Everything that you or the household interviewees tell me is a secret. The paper that Iuse to
write down all your answers will be kept in a safe place where nobody except the research
team can see it. We are then going to take all the answers that people give us and put them
all together to write a report, so nobody will know your individual answers.
Questions
If you have questions about the research, feel free to ask me anything. You can also contact
me after the interview at . Do you have any questions for me right
now?
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Understanding enrolment and impact of community-based health
insurance (CBRI)
Consent Form for Village Heads
I confum that I have been informed of this study and I understand what will be required
of me and my village if we choose to participate.
My questions concerning this study have been answered by the interviewer.
I understand that at any time I, or the households in my village, may withdraw from this
study without giving a reason and without being penalized.
I agree to take part in this study.
Location of Village: _
Name of Village Head: _
Location of District: ------------------
Signature of Village Head: _
Signature of interviewer Date
Name of Interviewer: -------------------------------------
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Understanding enrolment and impact of community-based health
insurance (CBHI)
Information Sheet for Households
Purpose of study
Hello. My name is and I am from an organization in Laos called
Indochina Research. We are doing a study in your community to understand how people feel
about community-based health insurance (CBHI). The study will help program planners
understand why some people decide to join CBHI, why others do not join and why some people
drop out of the scheme. This information is important for making the scheme better in the future.
The information from the study will also help program planners and policymakers understand
whether or not CBHI is benefitting people.
Procedures
I would like to ask you some questions. if that is okay with you. The questions in the survey are
about your home. your health, your expenditures, and your preferences for health insurance and
health care. It will take about 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. I would also like to interview one mother
in the household to ask her about use of health services for women and children. The questions
are about women in this household who are expecting a baby or who have had a baby in the past
two years. Iwill ask you questions about women's use of maternity care and health care for
babies. This part of the interview will take about 20 minutes.
You can decide if you would like to participate in the surveyor not. Jfyou decide to participate
but later change your mind, you can stop at any time. You will not be penalized for not
participating in this survey.
Potential Risks and Benefits
The questions I will ask you are not expected to cause discomfort. However, I want you to know
that anything you tell me will be kept a secret. No one will see your answers to these questions. If
for any reason you want to discontinue the interview at any time, please let me know. If after the
interview, you would like to withdraw from the study you can contact my research organization
and we will remove your questionnaire from the study.
You will not receive any money or other benefits in exchange for answering the survey questions.
Your answers will be put together with the answers from many other families in this community
to help us understand how CBHI and the health care system can be improved.
Confidentiality
Everything that you tell me is a secret, The paper that I use to write down all your answers will be
kept in a safe place where nobody except the research team can see it. We are then going to take
all the answers that people give us and put them all together to write a report, so nobody will
know your individual answers.
Questions
If you have questions about the research, feel free to ask me anything. You can also contact me
after the interview at . Do you have any questions for me right now'?
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Understanding enrolment and impact of community-based health
insurance (CBHI)
London S(hool of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & Indochina Research Laos
Consent Forms for Households
1. Do you confirm that you have been informed of this study and what will be
required of you if you choose to participate?
Yes »»»» move to next question
No»»»»> go through consent process again and clarify
procedures/questions
2. Have your questions concerning this study been answered by the interviewer?
Yes»»»»>move to next question
No»»»»>answer any questions that the prospective interviewee may
have
3. I understand that at any time I may withdraw from this study without giving a
reason and without being penalized.
Yes»»»»>move to next question.
No»»»»>explain procedures again.
4. I agree to take part in this study.
Yes»»»»> begin interview.
No»»»»> do not proceed with interview. Thank participant for their
time and leave household.
Interviewer: Please confirm that you have followed the consent procedures by
signing below.
I Name of'Participam: --------------
Signature of Interviewer Date _
Name of Interviewer:--------------------
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Understanding enrolment and impact of community-based health
insurance (CBHI)
Information sheet for focus group participants
Purpose of study
Hello. My name is and I am from an organization in Laos called
Indochina Research. We are doing a study in your community to understand how people feel
about community-based health insurance (CBHI). The study will help program planners
understand why some people decide to join CBHI, why others do not join and why some people
drop out of the scheme. This information is important for making the scheme better in the future.
The information from the study will also help program planners and policymakers understand
whether or not CBHI is benefitting people.
Procedures
Our team will be conducting household interviews and many of you have already/ will be asked
to participate in these interviews. We would also like to hold a focus group discussion with you
so that we can learn more about your views on CBHI.
You can decide if you would like to participate in the focus group discussions or not. If you
decide to participate but later cbange your mind, you can stop at any time. You will not be
penalized for not participating in the discussions.
If you do participate, the information from these discussions will be used collectively to write a
report. However, sometimes it is helpful to quote parts of the conversation to help convey
messages in the report. We will therefore ask you for your permission to include information
from the discussions (either summaries or quotes of parts of the conversation) in the final report.
Your name would not be included in the report and nobody would know who made the comments
tbat are used in the report.
Potential Risks and Benefits
The discussion is not expected to cause discomfort. I also want you to know that your names will
not be attached to the final report. Therefore, the results of the group will be compiled and but
nobody will have any way of knowing individual answers after they leave this group.
Questions
If you have questions about the research. feci free to ask me anything. You can also contact me
after the interview at . Do you have any questions for me right now?
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Undentanding enrolment and Impact of community-based bealth
insurance (CBR)
Consent form for focus group participants
I. Do you confirm that you have been informed of this study and what will be
required of you if you choose to participate?
Yes »»»» move to next question
No>>>>>>>>> go through consent process again and clarify
procedures/questions
2. Have your questions concerning this study been answered by the interviewer?
Yes>>>>>>>>>move to next question
No»»>>>>>answer any questions that the prospective interviewee may
have
3. I understand that at any time during tbe discussion I may withdraw from this
study without giving a reason and without being penalized.
Yes»»»»>move to next question.
No»»»»>explain procedures again.
4. I understand that either summaries or specific quotes from individual
conversations may he used in the final report but that my name will not be
attached to these findings. I give permission to use this information in the final
report.
Yes»»»»>move to next question.
No>>>>>>>>>thank the participant for hislher time but do not recruit
subject to focus group discussion.
S. I agree to take part in this study.
Yes»»»»> begin interview.
No>>>>>>>>> do not proceed with interview. Thank participant for their
time and leave household.
Interviewer: Please connrm that you have followed the consent procedures by
lignlne below.
IName of Participant: --------------
Signature ofinterviewer Date _
Name of Interviewer:-------------------
Page 1267
Appendix A4. Consent forms and information sheets
Understanding employee benefits in Lao PDR
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & Indochina Research Laos
Information Sbeet for Enterprises
Purpose of study
Hello. My name is and I am from an organization in Laos called
Indochina Research. We are doing a study with the World Bank to learn more about
employee benefits in Lao PDR. In this study we will collect information about your
business such as number of employees, ownership, types of employment contracts and
the type of benefits you offer to your employees.
Procedures
I would like to ask some questions about your business. The survey will take between 45
minutes to one hour.
Potential Risks
The questions I will ask you are not expected to cause discomfort. However, if at any
time you want to skip a question or withdraw from the study, you can contact me.
Everything you tell me will be kept confidential and no information about your particular
firm will be revealed. Our team has procedures in place so that nobody will ever know
the answers to your questions. If after the interview. you would like to withdraw from
the study you can contact me and I will remove your firms' questionnaire from the study.
Potential Benefits
You will not receive any money or other benefits in exchange for answering the survey
questions. Your answers will be put together with the answers from other businesses to
help us understand preferences for benefits. No names of firms will be included in any
reporting of the results.
Voluntary Participation
You can decide if you would like to participate in the surveyor not. If you decide to
participate but later change your mind, you can stop at any time. You will not be
penalized for not participating in this survey.
Confidentiality
Everything that you tell me is a secret. The questionnaire that I use to record your
answers will be kept in a safe place where only the research team can see it and all results
will remain confidential. We are then going to take all the answers that people give lIS
and put them all together to write a report, so nobody will know your individual answers.
Questions
If you have questions about the research, feel free to ask me anything. Vou can also
contact me after the interview at Do you have any questions for
me right now?
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Understandlne employee benetlts In Lao PDR
Consent Form for Enterprises
By signing on the line. Iconfirm that Ihave been informed of this study and Iunderstand
what will be required of me if Ichoose to participate.
My questions concerning this study have been answered by the interviewer.
Iunderstand that at any time Imay withdraw from this study without giving a reason and
without being penalized.
I agree to take part in this study.
Name of participant: _
Signature of participant: _
Name of interviewer: _
Signature ofinterviewer Date _
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AppendixB:
Details of methods
!
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1. Purposive selection of districts. The sample was drawn from 6 districts: Sissatanak;
Hatxaifong; Champasak; Keoudom; Viengkham; and Phonehong. Given the low enrolment
rates, six districts were needed to achieve the desired sample size. The selection criterion was
that CBHI should have been launched in the district at least two years prior to the survey.
Seven out of the 10 districts where the scheme was operating met this criterion; the seventh
district was excluded due to the likelihood of contamination of the comparison group, due to
multiple donor projects taking place in that area, and the cost constraints of conducting field
work in a district that was relatively far away.
2. Selection of clusters (villages) using probability proportional to size: A two-stage cluster
sample was selected using probability proportional to the number of CBHI households in each
village. To assist with this step, the CBHI office in the MOH first sent personnel to update
village enrolment rates in all 6 study districts and to compile a list of all CBHI villages and
their respective numbers of CBHI members enrolled. All villages with at least 10 enrolled
households were considered eligible, amounting to 98 eligible villages. (Two percent of
households lived in villages with less than 10 households and were excluded from the
sample). Villages were then sorted alphabetically and two columns were created: the number
of CBHI households and the cumulative number of CBHI households. In order to reach a
sample size of 1000 households 125 clusters was required (1000 CBHI households I 8
households in each cluster=125 clusters). A sampling interval was then used to systematically
select the clusters. I Some large villages were selected multiple times.
3. Random selection of households: A CBHI household was eligible for the study if it had been
enrolled for at least one year. Comparison households were eligible as long as they were not
members of another scheme or had not been enrolled in another scheme for at least one year.
After selection of villages, the research team visited the village and met with the village chief
and CBHI village collector. The village collector keeps a roster of CBHI households that is
updated monthly and this was used as the sampling frame and was checked against the
numbers collected by the MOH team prior to the survey. A list of all eligible CBHI
households was compiled and non-eligible households were excluded from this list. Where
villages were selected multiple times, multiples of 8 CBHI and 16 comparison households
were randomly selected (e.g, 3 clusters in one village x 8 households in each cluster=24 CBHI
households to be selected in the village). To carry out this random selection, a sampling
interval was used to select households (i.e. sampling interval=# eligible CBHI HHs in village/
# HHs to be selected in village). The starting point was selected by asking the village chief to
select a number between 1 and the sampling interval.
The comparison households in each cluster were selected in the same way as CBHI
households but using the village registry, which is updated annually. Before selection, all
non-eligible households (e.g. CBHI households; recent drop-outs) were excluded from the
sampling list where possible. However, sometimes the eligibility of a household was
unknown and for this reason additional screening was required at the household level.
Forms created to assist the research team in the sampling process are included in Appendix B2.
1 The sampling intervalwas calculatedbased on the total numberof householdsin eligible villages and
numberof clustersrequiredto reacha samplesizeof 1000. (i.e. 2483householdsl12Sclusters= 19.8)
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Appendix B2. Village sampling forms for CBHI survey
Village Sampling Fonn for CBHI HOUMholds
Name of DlttJict _Name of Village _
Step 1. Record total number of CBHI households in village (including new enrollees): D
(A)
Step 2. Make a numbered list of all households that have been enrolled In CBHI for one year or more and record
the number of households in box B. D
(B)
Step 3. Record number of CBHI households to be IntefVlewed in this village (see quota):
Step 4. Calculate sampling Interval: D
(0)
- __ ' 8
(B) (C)
Round to the nearest whole number (e.g. 5.32 will be rounded to 5)
Step 5. Choose a random number between 1 and the sampling Interval (0). Record here:
Step 6. Select aUhouseholds: Household number (E) in the list Is the starting point for the sampling
1SI selected HH number = (E) + (0)
D
(C)
D
(E)
2nd selected HH number = (E) + (0) + (0)
Continue until quota (C) is fulfilled. If you reach the end of the list continue to add households from the
beginning of the list.
Step 7. Record the location of the households and go to the household and ask for Informed consent.
Step 8. Please report below any problems you had with the CBHI sampling:
Appendix B2. Village sampling forms for CBHI survey
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Nam. of VIR. _
Village Sampling Form for Comparilon Houttholdl
Name ofDlatrtct _
Step 1. Get a list of all households in the viUage. Make sure ~ has been updated within the last year. If no updated list
Is available, make the list from aft un~ In the village.
Step 2. Record the date when household list was last updated _
Step 3. Record the total number of households In the v81age. 0
(F)
Step 4. Record the number of comparison households to be interviewed in this village (see quota): 0
(G)
Step 5. Calculate sampling interval: --- I =0
(G) (H)(F)
Round to the nearest whole number (e.g. 5.32 will be rounded to 5)
Step •• Choose a random number between 1 and the number of households In the village. Ask the village chief to
pick the number. Then use that number as the starting point Record random number in box J:
'0
(J)
Step 7. Select households: Household number (J) in the list Is the starting point for the sampling.
1"seleoted HH number = (J) + (H)
2nd selected HH number = «J) + (H) + (H)
Continue until quota (C) is fulfilled. If you reach the end of the list continue to add households from the
beglmlng of the list.
Step 8. Record the location of the households and go to the household and ask for informed consent.
Step'. Please report below any problems you had with the CBHI sampling:
Page 1273
Appendix B2. Village sampling forms for CBHI survey
Appendix B3. Construction of wealth index using principal components
analysis
In constructing a wealth index using principal components analysis (peA), instructions
from an article by Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006), which explains the methodology
developed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001), was used. A chapter on "Measurement of
Living Standards" in a book by O'Donnell et al (2008) was also helpful in informing the
methodology.
1. Examine descriptive statistics of variables
The eBHI questionnaire asked households to report on ownership of 20 household
possessions (e.g. houses, motorcycle, bicycle, sewing machine, television, rice cooker,
etc.) and asked 9 questions about housing conditions and materials (e.g. materials of
walls, roof and floor, source of water during dry and rainy seasons, type of latrine, etc.),
I first carried out descriptive analysis for all variables to examine means, frequencies and
standard deviations. Variables with a standard deviation of less than 0.15 were not
included in the asset index. Three variables were dropped and I performed peA using 24
variables.
2. Identify variables for asset index based on comparisons of assets in urban
and semi-urban/rural areas
In the next step, peA was performed separately in urban and semi-urban areas. Following
guidance by Filmer and Pritchett (200 I) variables were dropped if they only identified
location (i.e. if they are highly weighted in one area but not the other). The variables that
differed substantially between urban and rural regions were discarded.
The final asset index was then constructed using 11 variables, including 9 household
assets and 2 variables to indicate housing materials and conditions. Spearman's rank tests
were conducted to test for correlations between consumption and each variable used in
the asset index and all correlations were significant. The index was generated using the
first principal component, which is generally considered to be an adequate measure of
welfare (O'Donnell et al, 2008). This component accounts for 35 percent of the
variability in wealth in the sample. The results from Stata are shown after Step 5, below.
3. Check correlation between final asset index and consumption variable
The final index was checked for its correlation to the household consumption index and
the correlation was significant (Spearman's rho=.60; prob> Itl<.OOI).This correlation is
reassuring and indicates that the asset index is a valid predictor of consumption. Most
asset indices based on principal components analysis have a weak relationship with
consumption, with correlation coefficients between 0.2 and 0.4 (O'Donnell et al, 2008).
4. Create wealth quintiles
The asset index was then parcelled into quintiles and sampling weights were applied.
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5. Sensitivity analysis
The asset index was run several times by removing and adding different variables and
results were relatively consistent across all permutations. The final asset index was
considered optimal because it accounted for the most variation in wealth, it included
variables that were important in both urban and rural areas, and it had the highest
correlation with the consumption variable .
. pca Sassets
principal components/correlation Numbe r of obs 3000
Number of compo ~ 11
Trace 11
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho 1.0000
Componen't Eigenvalue Di fference Proportion cumul ative
Comp1 3.81181 2.50663 0.3465 0.3465
comp2 1.30518 .272145 0.1187 0.4652Comp3 1.03303 .259397 0.0939 0.5591
Comp4 .773637 .020394 0.0703 0.6294CompS .753243 .0850819 0.0685 0.6979comp6 .668161 .0176009 0.0607 0.7586Comp7 .650561 .110867 0.0591 0.8178
comp8 .539693 .00414459 0.0491 0.8668Comp9 .535548 .0331447 0.0487 0.9155Comp10 .502404 .0756722 0.0457 0.9612Compll .426732 0.0388 1.0000
principal components (eigenvectors)
variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 CompS Comp6 Comp7 Comp8 comp9 ComplO
dhha_vehicle 0.1994 0.6368 0.1587 -0.0303 0.1457 -0.1718 -0.0446 -0.5680 -0.3815 0.0244dhha_moto 0.3495 -0.1214 -0.1086 -0.3515 0.0682 0.2500 -0.4198 0.3005 -0.4392 0.3569dhha_fri dge 0.3793 -0.0993 -0.1655 -0.1546 -0.1662 -0.0968 -0.3561 -0.0868 -0.0490 -0.3956dhha_washing 0.2071 0.6393 0.0655 -0.1160 0.0078 -0.1307 0.0576 0.6464 0.2911 -0.0784dhha_elerice 0.3578 -0.1139 -0.2573 0.0018 -0.1034 -0.3855 -0.2544 -0.2335 0.5103 -0.0331dhha_tv 0.3284 -0.2391 0.3825 0.0401 -0.1464 -0.0771 0.3132 0.1522 -0.3187 -0.5707dhha_radio 0.3264 -0.1263 0.3180 -0.2035 -0.4239 -0.1511 0.3826 -0.1017 0.1070 0.5598dhha_mobile 0.3035 -0.1092 -0.0784 -0.3550 0.6527 0.2940 0.3840 -0.1587 0.2599 -0.0811dhha_cable 0.2391 -0.0809 0.5970 0.4967 0.2672 0.1985 -0.3816 0.0078 0.2313 0.1198dhhl atri ne 0.2860 -0.0951 -0.3966 0.5548 0.2825 -0.3541 0.2534 0.1861 -0.2742 0.2151dgoodhousing 0.2791 0.2180 -0.3129 0.3385 -0.3969 0.6730 0.1587 -0.1178 0.0691 -0.0439
Variable Compll unexplained
dhha_vehicle 0.0843 0dhha_moto 0.2716 0dhha_fridge -0.6817 0dhha_washing -0.0386 0dhha_el erice 0.5028 0dhha_tv 0.3334 0dhha_radio -0.2258 0dhha_mobil e -0.0685 0dhha._cable -0.0939 0dhhlatrine -0.1363 0dgoodhousing 0.0765 0
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Confidential
CBHI in Lao POR,Household Questionnaire,2009
,_
Section i. Identification (Please fill out BEFORE INTERVIEW)
Province
COde~
Household ID
CBHI=1/ non-CBHI=2
-"
District Code
Village Code I I I I I D
Unit Number House Number Telephone Number:
Area: Urban ....... ,1 Semi-Urban ........... 2 Rural .......... 3
Section 2. Resulte (Please fill out AFTER INTERVIEW)
Household Visit#1 Household Visit#2 Household Visit#3
Day 1 Month 1 Year I I Day I Month I Year
II
Day
IMrthl
Year
II I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I
ResultD ResultD Result D
1= inteNewer com plete 3= not eligible after screening 5= House not found
2= inteNew partially complete 4=HH members not present 6=HH refused inteNew (specify reason)
Name of main respondent
f ,
Circle the main respondent for the inteNew: 1) head of household; 2) spouse of head of household; 3) other member
Please sign when interview is complete:
InteN ewer's name ID Date
Field supervsor's name ID Date
Office supervsor's name ID Date
Visit 1 Visit2 Visit 3 Use ofTranslator?:
start Inteview Time: :
I
:
I
:
I
Yes, all/almost parts ..... 1
End Intel.1ewTime:1 : : : Yes some parts ..... 2
: : : : I No ..... 3Total Time:
Name of data entry Date entered 1 12009
Month Day
Name of supervisor (central level) Date entered 1 12009
Month Day
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3. Household possession of durables
I would now like to ask about items your household mayown.
Which of the following goods does this household own?
Record "1" even if household has more than 1 of each iten
ID Item
1-
Yes=1INo=2
1 Plots of land
2 Houses
Transport equipment
3 Vehicle (Car, Van ..-.)
4 Motor cycle
5 Bicycle
House equipment
6 Refrigerator/freezer
7 Sewing machine
8 Washing machine
9 Vacuum cleaner
10 Electric rice cooker
11 Steam rice cooker I
TV, radio, phones ,
12 Television
13 Radio/ VCD, etc
14 Telephone
15 Mobile phone
Other goods
16 Satellite disc or cable connection
17 Computer
18 ,Ajrconditioner
19 Fan
20 Water pump
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3: Housing conditions
I would now like to ask about the twes of materials used in ~ur house.
3.03 What are the two main construction materials of external walls?
Interviewer: Make observations.
FIRST SECOND
Brick 1
Concrete 2 2
Unbaked brick 3 3
Wood 4 4
Bamboo 5 5
Tin 6 6
Mud 7 7
Other 8 8
>>>, specify _
3.04 What is the primary material of the roof?
Interviewer: Make observations.
Concrete .
Wood 2
Metal sheets/links 3
Tile 4
Grass 5
Lea'ves 6
Other 7 »>, specify _
3.05 What is the primary material of the floor?
Interviewer: Hthere are 2 primary materla/s, select the hIghest cost
Marble/ceramic .
Floortile/cement 2
Concrete/brick 3
Wood 4
Bamboo 5
Earth/clay........... 6
Other 7 >>>, specify _
What is the main source of drinking water in the rainy season? (PROMPT
3.06 a RESPONSES FROM LIST)
What is the main source of drinking water in the dryseason?
b (PROMPT RESPONSES FROM LIST)
a) Rainy b) Dry
Piped water in/outside 1 1
Well/borehole protected 2 2
Well/borehole unprotected 3
Riwr, dam, lake etc 4
Rain water from tank1ar 5
Bottled/bought drinking water........... 6
Other 7
................ 3
4
5
................ 6
................ 7
>>>, specify _
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Part 5: Community BasedHealth Insurance
I would now like to ask ~u questions about community based health insurance. (INT ERVIEWER: TRY T 0
GET THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD TO RESPOND TO THESE QUESTIONS. IF NOT POSSIBLE, ASK
SOMEONE WHO PARTICIPATES IN DECISION-MAKING, EX. SPOUSE OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD.)
Part 1: Questions for CBHIMembersOnly (for non·CBHIhouseholds skip to Part 2)
5.00 Please tell me the three most important reasons natjou enrolled in CBHI.
(INT ERVIEWER: DO NOT READ ANSWERS. RANK FROM 1 TO 3)
Illness among household members .
Pregnancy among household member .
Financial protection against unexpected illness ..
CBHI is better value for money than user fees .
Friend or relatiw encouraged ~ur household to join .
Village leader encouraged ~ur household to join .
Other (specify ) ..
Other (specify ) .
Other (specify ) ..
5.01
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1st
2nd
3rd
Now I'm going to read out a list of possible factors that may haw influenced ~ur household's
decision to enrol in CBHI. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how important these factors were in
helping ~ur household decide to enrol. Num ber 1 represents"
Reasons ~u joined CBHI:
a Illness among household members
b Pregnancy among household member
c Financial protection against unexpected illness
d CBHI is better value for money than user fees
e Friend or relatiw encouraged ~ur household to join
f Village leader encouraged ~ur household to join
not im pt. wry impt.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
When ~u enrolled in CBHI, how rnanyotyour close relatiws and friends had already joined?
5.02 (INTERVIEWER: READ FROM LIST)
None
Some friends and/or reiatiws 2
Manyfriends and/or reiatiws 3
5.03 Haw ~u ewr quit the scheme or been forced to quit because of a late pa}111ent?
Yes 1
No 2»»»>SKIPTO Q5.05
5.04 How many times haw)<)u rejoined the scheme (including the last time)?
_____ times
5.05 On a scale of 1 to 5, how would ~u rate ~ur lewl of satisfaction with the CBHI scheme if 1 Is not at
all satisfied and 5 is wry satisfied? (SHOW CARD)
1 2 3 4 5
SKIP TO PART 3---~ -
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Questions for non- CBHI Members
Haw ~u ewr heard of community-based health insurance?
Yes 1
No 2 if no go to module 6
5.07 How rnanyotjour close relatiws and friends are enrolled in CBHI? (INTERVIEWER:READFROM
LIST)
None 1
Some friends and!or relatil.es 2
Manyfriends and!or relatives 3
5.08 Haw ~u el.er been a member of a CBHI scheme?
Yes 1
No 2»» skip to 5.11
5.09 How many times haw ~u been enrolled in the scheme?
_____ times
5.10 In total, how long were ~u a memberofCBHI?
Months Years. _
5.11 Please tell me the three most important reasons that ~u are not enrolled in CBHlor haw dropped out.
(INTERVIEWER:DO NOT READOR PROBE. RANKFROM 1ST TO 3RD)
not enough money , , , , , , ..
not good value for money ,., , " , ..
nobodywas sick! no need for health care ..
'villagecollector does not come .
health facility with CBHI too far away , ..
prefer to use other facilities , , , .
not happywith quality at district hospital (or provncial hospital if in
Viengkham district)
do not trust that CBHI contributions are put to good use .
1st
2
3
4
5
6
2nd
7
8
3rd
don't know how itworks , ,.,. , ,.," ,' ,,...... 9
friend!relatiw or neighbour told me about a bad experience...... 10
do not trust that Iwill get the benefits I'm entitled to receiw........... 11
does not cover all expenses! manyexclusions with CBHI 12
must paymoneyon top ofCBHI contribution to get faster servce 13
Other (specify )..................... 14
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5.12
I'm going to read out a listof possible reasons that>uur household is not enrolled in GBHI. Please tell
me how much this factor influenced >uur decision NOT to enrol. Number 1 represents "not at all a
factor" and number 5 represents '\eryimportant fact
not enough money .
not good value for money .
nobody was sick/ no need for health care ..
village collector does not come ..
health facility with GBHI too far away ..
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
prefer to use other facilities.................................................. 1....... 2 ...... 3 ...... 4 ......5
not happy with quality at district hospital (or provincial hospital if in
Viengkham district)............................................................... 1 2 3 .4 5
do not trust that GBHI contributions are putto good use 1 2 3 4 5
don't understand how scheme works........................................ 1 2 3 .4 5
friend/relati\e or neighbour told me about a bad experience.......... 1 2 3 .4 5
do not trust that! will getthe benefits I'm entitled to recei\e............ 1 2 3 .4 5
does not cover all expenses/ manyexclusions with GBHI.... 1 2 3 4 5
must pay money on top of GBHI contribution to get faster service.... 1 2 3 .4 5
other (specify )................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Part 3: EXJ?osure,~erce tlons and trust of CBHI (for everyone)
5.13 Has anyone in >uur household e\er attended a GBHI promotion campaign?
Yes 1
No 2
Do >UU trust that the money contributed to GBHI will be used in the right
5.14 waf?
Yes, I feel that money will be used in the rightway 1
No, I don't think money will be used in the rightway 2
Uncertain about how money will be used 3
Do >UU trust that ifsomeone pays money to the GBHI scheme theywill getthe
5.15 benefits they pay for when they need them?
Yes 1
No 2
Uncertain 3
5.16 Do >UU think the GBHI scheme is good value for money?
Yes, it is good value for money 1
Somewhat good value 2
No, notatall 3
Don't know/no idea 99
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(5~1'i---'Do)O~'think'staff'at'thed~tricthospitSl'ac-idiit8rendytOward 'CBHlmembe;?: - ......•r"
1- .. _-, Yes, CBHI members are treated worse than non-members ~ 1 i .. I
•. ..~~]~·)e~, GB~I.mem.~ersare treated better tharillon-melT1berS ., 2 i . 1.' '.. .
I :
! i No, they are treated the same as non-members 3
["'''-'-T'' -Don' knowl no idea .. ~ ~.: : : : :.99
f ..-'-~~·--·~:'~·~~·'--·'" _-_-".~ ~" •.~,.~ •.~.-,'.-~ - ,~-"'-- .•. --,~-, .. '•• " -_._ .._-, .~ .• ,-- ..~•.• ---- •..••.• '' _ ..••._" _- .' '" "". ,-. ' .• -' .,-" _-" .•
t _._..__,_.__ _.~.J .-,-~ ---..- _.,_.-_ _-_,.,-,'--~.'-_ --..--..~.--..--.-- -.-". ,-_ ."'-'.--'_',_".-~-- _'.
5.18 Please tell me how you rate the following aspects of quality at the district hospital. Use a
I-",--····-····,,·--·~·'-t -.-_ ..- .... - -. ;
:. . .scaleef 1 to 5 togiw~ur answer, where 1.is poor and 5 is excellent (SHOWCARD) '.' .. ..:!_.. -_.-., (For' \"e'~gkham district aSk iibout pro\AnClaihospital) ," -. . '" ...., ....._...,.-,._ ..
I,.,·-,~·-",,~<.,'_ ,-",' "-,' -.'. .- ,. •.. ',. .-.••,-~.~•.•._...._" ••. -.•....•.~.,., ....-.. -_--.-_ _...
Ii. How do you rate the way staff act toward patients? 1 2 3 4 5
r·--··--r-·-·--HOwdo~u-rate the qualityofthe facilities and equipment? 1 2 3 4 5 i
!,'-""--·i,'---"·-"·"·.Howdo you''rate the'skills/competence of staff? .. '; l' 2 3-"4 .-..s'.: ....... ...... ...... ...... :
'-'''--''~-''''''--'T'''-- ..".. ..... ... -...._ ....__..-.. -"1' i i·· ..:
1 i ! L._ .._..~..~.~-.,,-.-.-.--t.....-.,..-,..-.... -~--{
Future plans for enrolment (for both members and non-members) : i I
• . ... ··1 ._ .. " ••....... ,- '" .' ...•... ~
!5.19 Do you plan to be enrolled in the scheme in 1 year from now? -1" '''-. :
f--=I--)~:::·:~'Y=?:s~:~O_~l_:-_~-_~:=--_-==_-~_-:••~!--_= i~._I~_~-::;
t iUnsure 3 ! , , f~,·-----·-~--~f--·..~- --'1·-·-'-.-., ,_..- -•..:.~-~.~,.~_;__._~.__·_.._.~_,_~_, .._.._~.,~w_. ,,----,,-.-,- .-.--- -~--~.-.-.-.- •.•. -.--,--~ ..• -- •..-- .• - --- - -··-i -._. -_- .~--..j- -,,_,-,-, _ --.- ~"-""'" - "--···f
, I I , iii
~..~ ._-_ ....!_ -. -~,,_j ..~.-_. ...-.-,..._.-...~.--._~ .. '..---'--,-~. -.-' .• -.~~'_""'-""-_' -.- ..., "--.-_._._-_. __,..__ ~.. ,,..•-.......--~'''''~'',_ -_. .-.._ ••.. ..,.~- ,,_,_ "-;r~"~ "._--.•. _I ••• ~ .'~'" ., .._, .•. J ..... _" .. - -_"_",_--_,,, .~
5.20 What are the 3 most important reasons that you do not plan to be enrolled 1 . I
I ior are unsure about enrolling in CBHI in the future? (DO NOT PROBE OR i
~ !READ. RANK FROM 1stTO 3rd) :.
f-"--- ,-... .,.- ..-- -..- _ _._ _-..- -.-. --.-- -"'- ".---" _.-, -" -,,'.-- "-",. , .j
! I .notenouqh money.............................................................. i 1. ;1ST I
~--~··....-~-·~'-·-i..~··-~--~·---l -..---. "-~'---'" .,,_. _.-...-..~..-. -.~---._"--" ,.. ,...-.. '''-.' ."-' '-'---'1'''''' -- ••.. :· ..··..·_··t "---'1
L.._. __ .L. __ ~~otgooo.value !Ormoney:_.~'.::.' ~: ~:.."~:."_~::':.":"'~:"'" :::_:ou J .__2 '" !---:--. 1
! iii! ; 'nobodywas sick/no need forhealth care................................ ! 3 !r·--T·-· ..-·1\AllageColiectordoesnotcome ~:.: '''i ·4 "'2nd!r.....- .."·-·'''''-·-..·..~ ..·-· . " ".. ·-i· ·..- ...... ..--!
i i .health facilitywith CBHI too far away................. i 5., ' - / " ". . ".- _ ..-. .. -" -'" ..
! I prefer to use other facilities................................................ ! 6
r'''-'''-r'-''--'-~ not happy with quality at district hospital(orpro~nciai·hospitalliin .. r"
I j : '
I ! lViengkham district) i 7. 3rdr·-..··-".·-·'-·~-:.--.~--..-"; ,..- __ _ .., - _ _" _ -.-- , - ~.' -, - - .. _'.- -.-_ ----.-.-.. -. -_ ~---~. . <" ~.- .. - _ • .'
I . .! . ..do not trust that CBHI contributions are put to good use......... . . .. i . 8.. .. iC::_·_~~~_1.-~_~~.~.·:don' know how it~orks - : : .. ·.:.-.,u·.--i ·..··9: ·"1_"_''''' __
l- _ J .__}riend/relatiw orneighbour.tol~ .meabouta bad experience ..~... 10, _.
L ,,_.L-----; do not trust that Iwill get the benefits I'm entitled to recelw........... ...._ 11: .._....... [ .. .
! : .does not cowr all expenses/ many exclusions with CBHI 12,..... I
r·----·--I-··--·'mustpaymoneyon top ofCBHI contribution to getfasterser\1ce 13
}-~<-~,··-·-·-__-~·~..-~-·~·-,·t ., .....,.-,. . -- ... '" -- .L .! ..Other(specify ) ..i' - ..--.-"1- ."._.T ". .. .. .. .
j , !
1-"'- _, ..•_----! ._. , ~' ._. __. - --..•. - _ - ,. "-'_-"-" - - .. ' _."'-->-'" - , _ - ~.,.- - -. - -.-- •• - .• - - --
521 .Do you think itwould be a good idea to haw ewryhousehold to be
i' '. irequired to join CBHI and paya monthly prem lum to cowrcare Inr' .." !! Yes, good idea to make CBHI a requirement byall .... :.:~....r-·...__ ....../- .....- "'r ------" .."...... .. . .' . .
Iii Undecided. I don' know iflfs a good idea or not.. .i......- .-- ...- ..!....-"-,..,.,. .._.;"-...- ~...."-...."'-.. .....
I .. ! . J . .. No, people should be able to enroll on a \()Iuntary basis .r,,~~~·... ·[·.-.'-"]:::' ..::-:...... ....'.'"''''' "'_ ......"__' ..__.__... ...._.'
j
__...... '.--".. ,~..-.._..... j
!
~-- ....-.. ·i
"'-'j
i
'j,
!
!-- ..," ... ~-- '.-
i.,.,_,~... - ..,_.t· .-......_",..
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1. Medical Care Checklist
Ask questions 7.00 to 7.04. Then in the right hand column identify which modules you need to complete forthls
household. Proceed to the required modules.
7.00 In the past 3 months has there ever been a time where someone in ~ur yes ..... ".1 »» if yes, complete
household has had an illness or injury? (including minor illnesses and No ......... 2 FOREGONE CARE module
ailments) (MODULE8)
7.01 Has anyone in ~ur household had an inpatient visit in the last 12 yes ...... ,,1 »» if yes, complete
months? (that is they stayed overnight in a health facility). No ......... 2 INPATIENT module
(MODULE9)
7.02 Has anyone in ~ur household visited any of the following places to seek yes ........ 1 »» if yes, complete
health services or purchase drugs or herbs in the last four weeks? No ......... 2 OUTPATIENT module
(INTERVIEWER: PLEASE READ LIST OF SOURCES OF CARE - THIS (MODULE 10)
WILL HELP PEOPLE TO REMEMBER.)
7.03 Please tell me if there are any women in your household who have either yes ........ 1 »» if yes, complete
given birth in the past two years or are currently pregnant. (GO BACK T 0 No .......... 2 MATERNAL HEALTH
ROSTER TO CHECK FOR CHILDREN 2 YEARS AND BELOW) module (MODULE 11)
7.04 Are there any children in ~ur household who are less than 2 years old? yes ..... ".1 >>>> if yes, complete
(GO BACK TO ROSTER TO CHECK FOR CHILDREN 2 YEARS AND No .......... 2 IMMUNIZATION module
BELOW) (MODULE 12)
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8. Foregone Care
Now I would like to ask jou about anyone in }Our household who was sick or had an injury in the last 3 months. Please tell me
the names of all these people and then Iwill ask a few questions about each separately.
8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03A 8.03B 8.03e
HH ID Names of people Was (NAME)'s illness Did (NAME) seek Please tell me If no health clinic or hospital
in household who or injury serious, advice or all the places has been mentioned ask:
have had an somewhat serious or treatm ent for NAME visited for What are the main reasons that
illness or injury? not serious? his/her illness or this illness. (SEE (NAME) did not seek treatmentata
injury or purchase CODE LIST) health facility? (Please rank the top
drugs? 3 reasons by order of importance).
(Note that there too busy .................................... 1
maybe more notsenous enougn ..................... L
Record all names Yes .......... 1
than one place
too ClIfficult to geltnere ................ ,;j_
Not serious ........ " .. 1 No ........... 2 knew how to treat problem" .... " ....4
Somewhat serious ...2
peril/ness
problem already diagnosed and just
Serious .................. 3 Ifno,skip to 8.03
episode. Please
need medicine ........................... 5
enter all notgood quality ........ " ................. 6
mentioned) would not be helpfui. .................... 7
do not trust hospital staff ............... 8
too expensive ............................. 9
other (specify) ............................ 10
1streason 2nd reason 3rd reason
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13. Coping mechanisms to pay for health care
Now Iwould like to ask ~u questions about how ~u ha-.e paid for health care during the past 12 months.
13.00 In the past 12 months did ~ur household borrow money to pay for health care?
Yes 1
No 2
If no, skip to 13.04
13.01 VVhodid ~u borrow most from?
Private Bank ..
State Bank 2
Employer 3
Moneylender ..
Familymember ..
Friend .
Other .
13.02 How much did ~u borrow in total over the last 12 months?
VVhatwas the interest rate on these loans? (Give approximation.
13.03 Ifthere ~re multiple loans give highest interest rate)
4
5
6
7 Specify.. _
In the past 12 months did ~u recelve any help to pay for health care from friends,
13.04 relanves or the village?
Yes ..
No .
13.05 VVhohelped ~u payfor health care?
Relative in Laos ..
Relati-.e abroad ..
Friend/neighbour ..
Fund from village ..
Other (specify ), ..
How much did ~u receive in assistance from
13.06 friends, relatives or village?
1
2 >>>ski pto 13.08
2
3
4
5
13.07 Under what conditions was this assistance given to ~u?
Donation or gift (do not need to pay back) 1
Must pay back money but without interest 2
Must pay back with interest 3
(specify interest rate )
13.08 In the past 12 months, did ~u sell any household assets or goods to cover the cost of the illness or
injury'?
Yes .
No .
Appendix Cl. CBHl household questionnaire
1
2 >>>ski P to 13.10
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r·-··---··-·'"-· -·····--··-~--~"'~·~-··~ -_.' .-<'~----.-,,--- ,..-.-~ -.- - ..--- - -, .__ ,.._._.- '--'.,-- ..~.'-' ""_"'--_' -r ~ - - , _ _".__ ,T"_··' ._ ' --- '1 •• _ -_ , , •.-..•. , ._-., ".• ". '
I 13.09 What did )OU sell? Iii
t.~~~:~.. ~~:.~.'~~~~:~.~~~~.~..~~: -, ~.'~'~'._._,~=~=.~.,~~~~.::.. == ~.~~~=~~.,:~~==: o< ~ :'.~,~ :~~~·~.==~~~,=~~~::~,t=:',·-.,~-:~:,' - ~.. ,, ,~..: t=·.·:',:·..~ ~.·,··-,,~·=:·.·-_~'J,···.~..~:-.::,.,-:~~ _-.~.. -" - _.- .
! •Household goods such as jewelry, appliances, machines, blc~les : 11·---.-··.·- '-. . "-" ..•..... . .. ' . . , .
f .. -- r tt.an.est..::::.:::.'::.::'::'.'.::::: :.::.':.'.::.:.'.'.:.::: :: : ,' ::.:::.:.':.:•.:.' :..:::......... ' 2
I 'Animals........................... 3c··~--....··--·-7"' .-. . .• ,-.- .., _.,_ ....- .. -- ~.,_ .-- - --_ - , '.~,.-. -,,'_.'.- .. ..
i ,Housing, land ..
l=~-~~~'!othe~(SpeCi_fy) ~~.~'.;.:.~:~.;.~.. :.~.~".:'-:::.:.:·:·~···:··~:····~··.'::I·'.:: : ::..:i:··.' . :. :.~"-
~._ ._.__ .,. ~- ......- '_"." ".<_' •••••••. _•• __.~ •••.__ .... _ ...... _." .•__.~.__ ...._.__ •• _." .....,....._.... _ •.~. .... __ ...,, ~_...... __ .. , ••••••• __ ......_. _". _.,, __•• ,.~~ .._,__,_,i,
113.10 ,In thepast 12months, ha\E)<>u e\Er had to do the following in ordertopayfor
[·~__.~._1_=_.~~•. =~~.~~.~=~. .•:-.=.•..~- -.-.~.-~.~~~.~-.~~~.-..~•. . .:~-.J..~.~.~~~.-.~..- f ~•.' . ..'~
i :1. Purchase less food· I I
,._._ l...... . - - _ _ _ _ - ··--·1· _, , -- ..
; 2. Switch to cheaper foodl eat less meat ! ..
1'- [3. Spend less on children's needs (eg. education~-tO~d:clothing)
l--~-·--·-..- ..~i·,-·-·-· ._ ,,_.-._'._ -.'_--.'-'''-'_..'--- .-- _..... .. - ' " _-- ~ '. '-'
L. .._._;~:~II ~~wstock.~~othe~~ssetsto pu~h.ase food _.. J ._.__..._..
j . . .5. Reduce medical expenditures for otherfamily members
(.' .. _'"'S:Delayfutlireplans" .'- '"-
,.._----_._--_.",
Appendix Cl. CBHI household questionnaire
4
5: ......
.._ ......
health care?.... ...._ ......
:Yes No
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
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'Risk Questions: For head of household
f-" ._."-' .•. __
,Pleas. try to get the head of household to answer theae questlonl.lf on the second visit the head
i
,of household II stili not available you may alk the Ipouse of the head of household to respond.
r1~i1 r·r-~-··'For the next question I am going to ask)Qu about risk attitudes. Please tick a box on
! :the scale, where the value 0 means: "risk averse" (do not like to take risks) and the 10
,means "fu"y prepared to take risks" (like to take risks). You can use the valu
r~.~~·.-~~·.~·~.~,~~~l. ,.-,~-,---~-.~-.._',.'_"._ ,.,_,_-~.__,~-.__.._.~L_...- -.-~..--- ~ .. ---. .
, ,
I 'In general, are)Qu fu"yprepared to take risks ordo they try to awld taking risks?,..-.- -.- ~ ' .. .. .. . .. .. ..._ ..__ _ .. "'"
'risk-awrse risk-lo\Ang
r 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
.... _ <. 1 _ __ _ _ _.. _..__ _ .._ _ _ _ _.._ _.._. . _..
Iii i
r1·4.2·~"-:lnstruCtlonl: Place the paper Withth,'picturel of the' gamble In front ofthe'
C'" ......_ ... .lI .respondent. Read the question and then get them to choose one ofthe bets.
i .Record the letter ofthe game that corresponds with the respondent's choice.r~.·.·:~~·~:~!. ..::.- --:..- '_'''-_''''_''.._'.~~:L : _..................1 ~ ..
1 ; Imagine)Qu haw to guess which of my hands the coin is in.lf.the coin Is In myleft i
; •hand )Qu win the amount shown in the left hand box. If It is In my right hand )Qu win the
I !amount shown in the right hand box, as shown on the paper. T he amountjou win d
I, ,
I _.~ ~- -- ~-- _ -_ ~..- _ __ __._.,_ _._ ' _ _ r.
!········!A.25125"i..~K· .. ··· "j j
1,.~,_.~,... __,•._.,._,..... , ..t .. ..0_' __ .,,_.~ ",,_,_,' .••. __ •••.. ,_,._. __ ~ __ • __ ._,._". __ .• _ •••• _••• _·_._._._._. __ .~ ... l_ •.,. .__ .••.__~. , ._. _ ..•. ~. •... __ ., ' __ . '" _ •. _".. _ .,'_.
i .·8.20/50 LAK iii
1·_··.. ·_· --: _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ t _ ""'.'_" ..- _ - _ , ·.." ..· ·T .
I.C.15/65 LAK : i.'~ - ;- - ,_ _ _ _.·• ·.._· ..··_-.._ ..···_·..·····i····.. ··_··..__ ..·•· ·..····- - ~ -- -1 _. '" .- .
I. 0.10/80 LAK I ! ir '..-.- -.-..~ ~'.'-- - - _ -_ -.., -- ,-,._..,_..,,_- -"-_,,.._{,-..".,_--._.-..~- "'''''-'''''-'''''~'..- '., ,-._,', _-,..._,.-_ ,.._., ,,.,_..-.,
i E. 5/95 LAK !r·---
F
. 0/100LAK-- ..-· .. ···· ....- ..·--- · ..·..· ..-- ..·y._._ ......_.. 1····· ....
r.·----' -~.--.. r·_···· __ ,._ _~ ..~.~ R_·,_ ~ -.-. R_' __ .~ , _ .. ,_ __ .- •• -~~ .. ,.-~-
i 14.3 INTERVIEWER: Please state the position of the respondantwho answered the
r.. ·..·- ..... 'following modules (list all that apply):r--""'- T . .. .. . . . . . Name
! I
I I MemberlD! "..- ..~ ~···..f·· -~. _..- .. - ~ -.~-~ ..--•.- _ ·_· ·····h .. •·• ,- - .. - .•... ~ .. - ", '-'~
! I
! a' Module 1: Roster
1 ·•·• .. ••·· " =======- '._"._"
! b'Module4:Expenditure ! -r ..··_··..· ..r .. , :.----
1 __ c Module 6: Health.~eeklng beha\4our '=====-"
1 d, Modul.es 9 and 10: Inpatient and Outpatient!.,... _
i..... e, Module 11 and 12. MH and Immunization : _
! I I:
i.__...._....f}~1o~ule .~.~~.~I~k...._.....__..._._......._ .._ ....._ ..._ .........I __ ---.,.. .... __ .,,_ •• _ .•. i ..Brother/sisler In law .. " 7 ;
I I .., ,
I~=~:E-~~--:=~===~--=--=--=-=----=-~~-='~= ~~~=~~~-•••-
L J __.. .._._ _ _...
Brother/sister 6
GrandchBd/niecelnephew..8.
Adopildlbnr/stepchild ... 9
Other relatives 10
Non relat/ve 11
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Left Hand Right Hand
Bet#l
Bet#2
Bet#3
Bet#4
5,000 Kip 5,000 Kip
4,000 Kip 10,000 Kip
3,000 Kip 13,000 Kip
2,000 Kip 16,000 Kip
Bet#5
Bet#6
1,000 Kip 19,000 Kip
o Kip
20,000 Kip
Appendix Cl. CBHI household questionnaire
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I would first like to ask some questions aboutjou and }{lur position in the \Allage.
1 Full name
Background Information about informant
2 Howald are }{lu? ~ years
Never attended school ,... 0
Some primary .
Primary completed 2
Some /ooor secondary 3
Looor secondary completed 4
Some upper secondary 5
Upper secondary completed 6
Some/completed vocational school 7
Some/completed university 8
3 What is the highest le~1 of education }{lu ha~ completed?
4 What percentage of people in this \Allageare working for the go~rnment? (approximate numbs __
5 Does this include teachers, police, military, etc? yes ....... 1 No ...... 2
What percentage of 'Jillages lea~ temporarily during certain
6 times of the year to look for work elsewhere? ----_%
7 What percentage of households are in the 'Jillage now? ----_%
8 What is the definition of a poor household in this \Allage?
1. ___
2. ___
3. ___
Currently, how many poor households are there in the \Allage
9 according to this definition?
Health ISlue,
Generally speaking, if someone in this \Allage has a minor
illness where do they go to seek advce first? (record code from
card) Example: A minor illness could be a mild throat infection or
10 headache.
Generally speaking, if someone in this \Allage had a major illness
and/or emergency where do they go to seek advce first? (record
11 code from card)
Where do most women in this \Allage prefer to gi~ birth? (see list
12 of facilities)
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13 Has a CBHI promotion campaign been done in your village? Yes ..... 1 No ......... 2
14 How many campaigns have there been?
15 When was the last campaign? (give approximate answer if don't know)
16 How many times has the village been visited by the provincial GBHI team? _
17 Has there been any door-to-door promotion of CBHI in this village? Yes ....... 1 No .......... 2
18 Where do households in this village make their monthly paynents? Village collector goes to house ... .... 1
Household pays at village collectors' house....... 2
Pays at hospital....... 3
Pays village chief.. 4
Other (specify ) 5
Don't know....... 99
19 Who is the village collector in this village? Village chief (respondent) 1
Deputy village chief 2
Appointed village collector.. 3
Other (specify ) ,. 4
20 Are you a memberofGBHI?
21 Are you supportive of GBHI?
Yes 1
Yes 1
No 2
No 2
22 How often is CBHI discussed in the village during official forums (for example, official village meetings, the wat, other)
More than once per month....... 1
About once per month 2
Once in a while (less than once per month) 3
Rarely....... 4
Never ....... 5
Please tell me who helps to promote CBHI in your village. (Read list and
23 check all that apply) Village chief.. 1
Members of mass organizations 2
Village collector....... 3
Monks 4
Other (specify ) 5
Nobody....... 99
24 Has there ever been an incident in this village where the village collector yes 1
has not given the money to the hospital? No 2
Social Ca ital Proxle.
25 Please list any mass organizations that exist in this village, for exam pie women's unions, etc.
Lao Front .... 1
Lao Women's union .... 2
Youth league 3
Trade union 4
Village community .... 5
Pupils parent committee .... 6
Other? (Specify) .... 7
26 How often are meetings held in this village?
More than once per month 1
About once per month 2
Once in a while (less than once per month) 3
Rarely....... 4
Never ....... 5
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Appendix C3.Firm questionnaire (for Social Security study)
Determinants of Enrolment in Health Insurance in Lao PDR
Enterprise Survey, February 2009, FINAL
RESEARCH
I N I)OC HI N A ...Z~!r=======-- Interview Number 1 1 1 SSO-1/unlnlured·2 0
j Pro,' DlsllSubcj Block I ,
Inilrview No, 1 1 1 I I
Inilrviewer Name
Inilrviewer code
Dail oflnilrview Inilrview Lenglh
1 12005 Fr:_,_ To_:_
1 12005 Fr:_'_ To_:_
I 12005 Fr:_:_ To_:_
Total in minutes:
Indochina Research (Laos) Ltd
23616 San Thongthoum, PO SOX 1887
Vientiane Lao PDR.
Tel: (856) 21 262 073
Fax: (856) 21 243 571
Interviewers: Ask for the business card of the respondent if available. All Information needed Is wrHten on It and
will enable you to get accurate contact details. Please staple the business card to the questionnaire.
Nameof Business(asregistered):_--------------------~-----------------------Registration(tax)number:
StreetAddress-----------------------------------------------
Village:
Distrlct:-------------------
Respondent'sName: ___
Title:
OfficePh:-----------------~O~ffi~c-e~F~a-x-:-------------------
Email: MobilePh:----------------_-------------
Dlstrlctcode:...I_~_,
Result of interview: _-.,.,..--,,...-__ 1= complete; 2= Incomplete blc respondent not available for entire interview
3= incomlete blc information not available; 4= not started because cannot find firm
5= not started because respondent not available
Fieldwork supervisor (Name) _
Fieldwork supervisor signature Date _
Date entered 12009
Month Day
Date entered __ ---', 12009
Month Day
Pag 1313
Appendix C3. Firm Questionnaire for Social Security Study
SectIon i. INTRODUCTION &0 NERAL INFORMATION
Please read information sheet and obtain informed consent. Leave the information sheet with the employer and
keep a copy of the signed consent form.
1 Company's main secor of operation:
(circle only one)
Garments .......
Textiles / handicrafts ....... 2
Food and Beverage production ....... 3
Wood processing ....... 4
Mining ....... 5
Printing paper and chemicals ....... 6
Product from iron/steel- factory ....... 7
Product frm iron/steel - handmade ....... 8
General furniture ....... 9
Electricity and water supply 10
Construction 11
Repairing 12
Trading 13
Transportation 14
Communication 15
Property development and rental 16
Hotel/ restaurant............. 17
Educationlhealth 18
Other (specify) 19
2 a More specifically, what type of business do you do? (main product, service, etc.)
3 a) Current Position (of main respondent)
Head of companylDirector/GM/CEO 1
Head kcountant 2
HR / Mmin Manager........... 3
Dept Head (Mktg, Sales etc ..) 4
Other (specify ) 5
4 a) Current Position (of secondary respondent)
Head ofcompanylDirector/GM/CEO d 1
Head kcountant , 2
HR IMmin Manager 3
Dept Head (Mktg, Sales etc ..) 4
Other (specify ) 5
5 If respondent is not head of company ask the followng:
a) Nationality of head ofcompany
(optional)
b) Nationality (of main respondent)
(optional)
c) Gender (of main respondent) Ma/e= 1 Female =2
d) Age (of main respondent) years
b) Nationality (of secondary respondent)
(optional)
c) Gender (of 2nd respondent) Male= 1 Female =2
d) Age (of secondary respondent) __ years
b) Gender of head of company Male= 1 Female =2
c) ~e of head of company __ years
d) Current country of residence of head of company
6 What is the highest level of education of the head ofthe company?
No formal education .
Lowerprimaryschool............................... 2
3Upper primary school
Lower secondary school 4
Upper secondary school 5
Vocational training 6
Some university training 7
University or coliege degree (BA, BSc etc.) 8
Post-grad or graduate degree (Ph D, Masters) 9
Appendix C3. Firm Questionnaire for Social Security Study
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Section 2. FIRM PROFILE
1 Inwhat year did your company begin business in Laos?
Please tell me how your business is defined in the Enterprise law: (Interviewers: employers should be ftJm/ller 'lrith these
8 a terms because they need to define their business when they register es an enterprise.)
Private enterprise
State enterprise
Mixed enterprise
1 »»» skip to b
2 »»»sklp to c
3 »»>>>sklp to c
Cooperative enterprise........ ........ 4 »»»>skip to c
b Please tell me about the ownership of your business (Interviewer: These definitions are elso In the Enterprise Law):
(An indhAdualor family owned business Inwhloh owners are completely
Individual enterprise 1 responsible for the companydebt)
Ordinary partnership 2 (Similar to Indilltdual owned company but consists of more than one partner.)
(A partnership with at least one 11mlted partner arid one generiif partner.TI1e
limited partner Is not responsible for a company's debts, whereas a general
Limited partnership 3 partner Is liable for all oompany debts)
(A company owned partially or completely by shareholders Inwhich
shareholder responslbilityfor company debt is limited to the amount the
Limited company 4 shareholder has invested In the oompany)
A company that otrers shares to the public on an open market (the company Is
Public company 5 listed on a stook exchange)
Other (specify
) 6
c \Nhat percentage of your business Is owned by?
11
111
Iv
Domestic Privateg%
Foreign Private %
Government %
Other %
Totsl 1 0 0 %
(Interviewer: If a company Is an Indlvlduel owner In Laos
the answer vJlI be 100% domestic private)
9 a Was your business previously owned (fully or partially) by the government? b \Nhen was your business privatized?
Yes »»ask b
No 2 »>sklptoQ 10
Yearl_1__J,_I...-..J._....I
Does your business have separate factories, stores or
10 a service outlets In Laos?
How many separate factories, stores or service
b outlets does your business have In Laos?
Yes No Total
Factories ............. 1 2 »> /fyes record Number EEGStores ......... , ... 1 2 >>> If yes record NumberService ouUets ........ " ... 2 >>> /fyes record Number
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r"-~'1"- 'o'_"'''''~~''''' __ -'''_''_'" .••.• _ .... ,,_ .. ,_.,-_.,.,. l····~ .
: I .Does )Our business haw separate factories, stores or i How many separate factori .. , stores or seNio.
111 i. .seNce oudets in olher countries? outl.ts do.. )OUrbuslne.. haw In olher oountries?
r""" J.. "-L.··---.L·'''~''1·._·-",··~..-,, ..·t·~- ,,~·~~~···:··:T~'·=·~~r·='_,·'·~·r~,,·-"-~= ":" . .J '.:.; "-)
, , . ! . i ,! .V.. i No i I Totel
CTiIT=f;;'=:"",,:::'+ :::::::'::::::::z::: .•~
[".1_.::J"~r~.:se~~e·ou6.ets:··:···i"···~_'?-'+"·: 2 '»>;"y .. recordNum~.r I
i 12. What wera )Ourtotel company assets In 2008? (es steted to authorities) (Record below) I
r- ,Inte':'lewer; Total .... ta Includ. the total v.lu. of .v.rythlng the comp.ny own., including money In the bank,
I .property or buHdlnp, .qulpm.nt, supplies, .nd .11 thlnp of valu. th.t the bus/n.. s own•.
r:: i' !
J ._L .._..L.. ...... 1,....__L_ ...._.L __ .J.._..".L_ l
~._ .:b..: What was )Our totel company rewnue in 2oo8? . .._I __ i
, 1 Interviewer; Total revenu." the tota/ •• le. of. companybefore co.ta .re .ubtracted.
l-'r'! '(amount in Lao Kip) ! i : il i ! i ia)Asaets 'b) Rewnue
_""_'.,.,'T"" -- ..~ , r-: _.. . _"'r -v-v-r- ...•-·l ..~·······I·..·,~· ..~._._.,',__'0' ""',_' - ~_ •• '•. _'0.1 ".'_" '0-' _. o.
J i ! .Ieaslhan 25 million kip: I , : Ii: i 1 1
~'" ",or- ...·''i"'·.-.-"~:: . . . . -,~. ",-~~"o .. _'_~".-.""_ r·~··'·t,,-·- 1-" ··..Y- - -1i-i~l-,::::~E:=~~:.mf:::~f~-:r ··· ..· · !..:~! '
rL_!._;moralhan250miliionupto500milliOnkiPj .. t. ,,' 5 ,""""""""'"
l J ;morelhan500millionupto1billionkip !::__ 6 ; .
C:j'~',-L::::mora lhan 1 billion up to 2 billion kip ...I-f ·~.r·i 7 " "''''''''''''''''';' ;
! i i,moralhan2billionupto4billionkip.~ ! i : 8 ! , ! 8 iL.~:.r.~~.i._ .. morelhan4billionupto6biliionkiP .,.,-l· -1..,+--. 9: : 9 :.
I .morelhan6billionupto10billionkip: 4 __ i-'i" 10 ! : 10;
;.'.w~·.. l \ :morethan 10 billion up tD20 billion kip r' ~'; I i l 11 ~ r11l-·
r'·.L--l-:;morathan20billionuPID30billionkiPl'·( .. j ' 12 : : 12 ~
:, .. I_ .. 1 ,mora than 30 billion up to 40 billion kip; -1-: ; .
, , I morathan40 billion up to 50 billion i ! 11' 14, ; 14
'v •• _ ~ ••_._~ • ...__., ...... - ~-. --...,._.-~.-. -(- .•.__.., , >.
i i ! morathan50blllion. i __i,LL.t.j~"""''''''L15, 15f'--",,!" _"---j i r" -'r' "'---r _., , I I . 1
".'" .,."., .. "_".,,,,, _.• ,__:. .. .1"" ,_.,... ,1., ,1 L, ,. .. :... ..1 "
! 13 i lNhat t',tle of communication equipment do )OUhaw? (Interviewer.Circle ell thet epply) i
: r-"'! i 1FixedUnetelephone iii i ; ! i ; .. ,
- ...... --~ ..... - .. -t.",,_--- --·1...... · --"'. "j -- ,·· .. ·t --..... ,,~. ...-, "r" .... , . , ' .. I
j ; i ! 2 Moblletelephone! i ; ; j'
:.:---;··:-.C·,.1-- 3 Fax: 'L:-T-,.r-.j-.~'r..: ,.~.t: -.1' _.j - .!.
L. __J __+~ ~ •••• ! ~.~4 Intemet/email, ..L.__~" ~._~._L.",,_ !.._ _1. L,." ..- ~" "r.A'''!' .._~. L
: ! i I 5 Olher, specify : : I· _.1-- ''' ·•··. . .' ·•· ·f , .
! i i ! 6 None ; I ! i i ! i i .._"..__l_ ..
l~''':L=C=:~L.'j....L:~~[~:C:~J·.·~'I'~~"=i~:~.::.~'T~]..._.L.....i.
: 14. Is )Ourcompany a member of a business memberahip organl.llon In Laos?
l._ l__...~·J"....*,~,L,..._.j ._. ...L.~,.,....L .._.._..L ....__.L.._.~._L.... - .... ~.. ,.~ .,,_;,.. _..... J. - ".... ,j'......".~. .
: b)lfyes,pleasespecifynamesoforgani.tions:' i " !: _
i ; ; ; i: i ...-r~'~~·--L~'1,..- ·l:---------------i__LJ~J_J_j_~L~_[_j___j__j __j_._L_i ..
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Section 3. HEALTH & RISK PROFILE
I'd like to know if there are any health risks or risks of injuries that ~ur employees face in the workplace (eg. Injuries, Illness,
15 a etc.) On a scale of 1 to 5 where "1" represents low risk and "5" represents high risk please tell me what level of risks
low risk high risk
1 2 3 4 5
b Please describe in a few words or sentences the types of risks ~ur employees face in the workplace:
I would like to know the approximate ages of staff members in this company. Can ~u tell me approximately how many of
16 ~ur permanent staff fall into the following categories? You can give the estimate using numbers or percentage of staff.
Interviewer: Let the respondent choose the method that is easiest for them.
N"",",,',", "T'l'"14-25 yearsold §"" """"''''''26-35 yearsold .. ..
36-45 yearsold . ..
46-55..................... .. ..
55+ .. ..
1000A.
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Section 6. AWARENESS OF/EXPERIENCE WITH SSO
Interviewer: Please interview the person who is most knowledgeable about SSObenefits, I.e.HR
manager, head of company, manager, etc.
6A) Questions for companies enrolled Yith SSO
If the companyis enrolled in SSO ask the following questions:
44 When did ~u become enrolled in social security? Month Year _
I'd now like to ask about different places where y:>umay haw heard about SSO. Before ~u
45 enrolled did ~u ewr ....?
a read about SSO in the newspaper?
b had a visit from SSO at ~ur company?
c attended a meeting where SSOwas promoted?
d recebed a notice from SSO encouraging enrolment?
e recelvsd a warning from SSO telling ~u to enrol?
f heard about it through a business organization
g hear about SSO in other ways?
(specify -::--__
Yes No
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
What were the three main reasons that ~ur com pany decided to enroll in social security?
46 (DO NOT READANSWERS. Rank in order of importance)
strong pressure from international regulations and audits.. 1st
strong pressure from industry leader 2 2nd
strong pressure from SSO " 3 3rd
strong pressure from employees , 4
to increase emplojee satisfaction ," 5
to improve health and well-being otemployees ,.. " 6
in order to provide retirement benefits for ernplojeesi .. , " 7
3110wemplojses to access free health care with mem bership card , 8
other (specify ) .. " \ 9
Now I'm going to read out a listof possible factors that may haw influenced ~urcompany's
decision to enrol in SSO. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how important these factors were
47 in helping y:>urcompanydecide to enrol. Number 1 represents "not a
not a factor wry important factor
strong pressure from international regulations and audits 1 2 3 4 5
strong pressure from industry leader " 1.. 2 3 4.., 5
strong pressure from SSO 1 2 3 4 5
strong pressure from employees .. " 1.. 2 3 4 5
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to increase employee satisfaction ,1 2.. , 3 4 5
to irnprova health and well-being of employees 1 2 3 4 5
in order to provide retirement benefits for emplo~esO '" 1 2 3 4 5
3110wemployees to access free health care with membership card 1.. 2 3 4 5
other (read from question abovs) 1.. 2 3 4, 5
48 Who made the decision to enrol in social security?
49 Iwould like to know how SSO has affected various aspects of ~ur business. Please tell me if SSO
has had a positiw effect, no effect or a negatiw effect on these aspects of ~ur business.
(Please choose only one answer for each question)
a How has SSO affected employee well-being and satisfaction?
SSO has had a positiw effect 1
SSO has had no effect 2
SSO has had a negatiw effect 3
Difficult to say/ don't know 4
b Please giw me one or two reasons or examples to support ~ur answer.
c How has SSO affected ~ur ability to retain and recruit staff?
SSO has had a posltbe effect .
SSO has had no effect 2
SSO has had a negatiw effect 3
Difficult to say/ don't know....... 4
d Please giw me one or two reasons or examples to support ~ur answer.
e I understand that some companies enrol in SSO and others do not. How rnanyofjour
competitors also enrol in SSO? Try to giw an approximate range.
None 1
Veryfewfirms ".... 2
Some firms 3
Manyotherfirms 4
Mostotherfirms 5
All other firms " 6
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Does the fact that)\Ju are enrolled in social security affect )\Jur ability to compete with other
companies (in either a positi-.e or negati-.e way)? Please describe whytwhy not. You can gl-.e
f examples to illustrate )\Jur point.
I know the costs of SSO can be quite high. Please explain how these costs ha-.e affected )\Jur
company. For example, perhaps these costs ha-.e caused big problems for )\Jur business, or
g pernaps jou feel that the costs are worthwhile. You can gl-.e examples to
h O-.erall, how would )\Ju say SSO has affected )\Jur business?
SSO has had a posltl-.e effect " ..
SSO has had no effect 2
SSO has had a negatl-.e effect 3
Difficult to say/don't know " " 4
50 Please describe the nature of contact with the SSO (reason for contacts, frequency, etc.)
51 Please tell me how you rate the management and capacity of the SSO scheme on a scale of 1 to 5
where 1 is "low capacity/poor management" and 5 Is "high capacity/strong management".
Low capacity/poor management High capacity/strong management
1 2 3 .4 5
52 Do )\Ju trust that the contributions to SSO will be used In the right way?
Yes, I feel thatmoneywlll be used In the rlghtway .. " .. ".1
No, I don'tthlnk moneywlll be used In the right way .. """ ..2
Uncertain about how moneywlll be used" .... "" ..3
53 a In three years from now do )\Ju think )\Jur firm will stlll be enrolled In SSO?
Yes 1
No 2
Notsure .. "... 3
b Why?Whynot? _
In general, how satisfied are ~ur employees with the benefits they recel-.e from SSO? (Use a
54 a scale of one to fi-.e to gi-.e ~ur answer where 1 Is -.ery unsatisfied and 51s -.erysatisfied).
Very unsatisfied Very satlsfi ed
1" " ..2 " " " 3 " ..". ".4."." ". " 5
b What are the main complaints that the employees ha-.e?
Go to section SC
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6B) Questions for companies NOT enrolled with SSO
55 a I'd like to know more about how ~ur company decided on which benefits to offer and not offer.
First of all, who makes the decisions about which benefits to offer?
b What factors did ~u consider when deciding on which benefit to offer/not offer? _
Now I \YOuld like to ask about your exposure to the social security scheme ......
56 I'd now like to ask about different places where ~u m ay have heard about SSO. Ha-.e ~u
a read about SSO in the newspaper?
b had a "';sit from SSO at ~ur com pany?
c attended a meeting where SSO was promoted?
d recebed a notice from SSO encouraging enrolment?
e receh.ed a warning from SSO telling ~u to enrol?
f heard about SSO through a business organization
g hear about SSO in other ways???
(specify _
h If they ha\.€ never heard of SSO circle "99"
Yes No
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
99
What are the three m ain reasons that ~ur cam pany is NOT enrolled in social security?
57 .(rank in order of im portance)
Emplo~es prefer to purchase private insurance .
Com pany benefits that we provds are better .
Em plojees do not want SSO .
High turno\.€r among emptoyees .
Manylemporaryernployaes .
Quality of go\.€rnm ent hospitals not good .
Health care benefits are not used/ staff do not get sick .
Do not trust that money is used well
Cost of SSO is too high .........
Do not know m uch about SSO ......... 10
Other (specify 11
1st
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2nd
3rd
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Now I'm going to read out a list of possible factors that may haw influenced ~ur companys
decision NOT to enrol in SSO. Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 5 how important these factors
58 are in making ~ur decision about not to enrol. Number 1 represents
not a factor wry Important factor
Employees prefer to offer private insurance 1.. 2 3 4 5
Company benefits that we provide are better 1 2 3 4 5
Employees do notwantSSO 1.. 2 3 4 5
High furnover among employees 1 2 3 4 5
Many temporary employees 1.. 2 3 4 5
Qualityof gowrnment hospitals not good 1 2 3 4 5
Health care benefits are not usedl staff do not get sick 1.. 2 3 4 5
Do not trust that moneyis used well 1.. 2 3 4 5
Cost of SSO is too high 1 2 3 4 5
Do not know much aboutSSO 1 2 3 4 5
Other (specify ) 1.. 2 3 4 5
59 a Do ~u think ~ur company will join social security in the next three years?
Yes 1
No 2
Not sure 3
b Why? Why not? _
6e) Questions for ALL companies in sample
Has a leader from a mem bership organization in ~ur industry ewr encouraged ~u to enroll in
60 social security?
Yes
No 2
Please describe up to 3 advantages to employers that enrol in social securtty? (does not have to
61 be in order)
1
2
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Please describe up to three disadvantages to employers that enrol in social security? (does not
62 hal.e to be in order)
1
2
3 __
63 Which of the following benefits in the social security scheme are/ would be most attractiw
to }Qu as an em ployer? (Read the list and rank the top 3 in order of im portance) 1st
Medical care benefits 1
Sickness benefit 2
Maternity benefit .
Death benefit ..
Employnent injury or occupational disease benefit .
Retirem ent pension .
3
4
5
6
2nd
3rd
Survi\oOr'sbenefit 7
Invalidity/ disability insurance 8
None 9
64 ke }Qu aware of any laws or decrees that talk about social security? If so, please
tell me which laws or decrees mention social security and what is said about it.
Circle 1 if the respondent mentions SSO Decree or Decree 207 .
Circle 2 if the respondent mentions the Labour Law 2
Circle 3 if the respondent mentions mandatory enrolment 3
Circle 4 if the respondent mentions none of the abow or does not know 4
The social security organization is trying to increase enrol ment rates in the scheme. Can
you suggest any ways of improving the scheme to attract more companies? Please
65 describe up to 3 ways of improving social security.
Please feel free to tell me any additional Information that we may not have already covered.
The survey Is now complete. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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Appendix C4.Focus group discussion guide for CBHI members
Objectives
1. To better understand the factors affecting the decision to enroll in CBHI.
2. To discuss CBHI members' experiences. perceptions and satisfaction with the CBHI scheme
and with the health care system in general.
3. To discuss whether or not CBHI has affected health-seeking behavior. use of health services
and health-related expenditures among members.
Instructions for Moderator
Step 1: Introductions and Informed Consent
• Introduce yourself and thank participants for attending
• Give an overview of the study and explain why the participants were chosen (you can
read from the information sheet) .
• Answer any questions the participants may have
• Ask for informed verbal consent. (It is not necessary to get written consent from the
participants. Verbal consent with the moderator's signature will be sufficient.)
Step 2: Explanation of Process and Ground Rules
• Discuss the process and timing of the focus group discussion (2 to 2.5 hours)
• Explain the presence and purpose of recording equipment and introduce note-takers.
• Outline general ground rules and discussion guidelines (speak one at a time; remember
that there are no right or wrong answers; feel free to disagree with others and express
your opinion; do not repeat information to others outside the group; treat others with
respect).
Step 3: Get participants to introduce themselves and begin discussion
• Get participants to introduce themselves
Step 4: Review tops of discussion guide and tell team what you are going to discuss ahead
of time.
Discussion Guide
Introduction:
To start off the discussion it is important that all participants get a chance to say something early
in the discussion and thai they feel comfortable speaking infront of other group members. The
following questions are intended as "ice-breakers":
• How do most families earn a living in this village?
• How long have you been enrolled in community-based health insurance?
• Are there very few households or many households enrolled in eBBI in this village? (We
do not need to get exact numbers. Wejust want a general sense of how many people are
enrolled)
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Part I. Factors affecting enrolment
1. Knowledge of CBRI
• How did you learn about CBm?
• When was the last CBm campaign conducted in your village?
• How many of you attended the CBm campaign?
• By the end of the meeting did you clearly understand how CBHI worked?
2. Implementation ofCBR1
Now I'd like to ask you about some of the rules of the CBHI scheme and how it is implemented in
this district:
• If one person in a household of five wants to enrol is this possible? Are there ever exceptions
made?
• If you enrol in CBm how long do you have to wait before you can use services?
• How many months can you go without paying the monthly premium before you have to
leave the scheme?
• Are all services and drugs covered by the CBm scheme? What services and drugs are
excluded?
• Are there any diseases which are excluded from coverage?
• If a CBHI member is outside their province when they faU sick will their services be covered
at another hospital? What is the procedure for getting covered?
• Do you think the information presented was accurate? (Were the promoters realistic and
honest about what was included in the scheme and what type of care you would get?)
• In your opinion, were the rules of the scheme that we just talked about presented clearly in
the CBm meeting? (For example. household enrolment, waiting period, monthly premiums.
exclusions. etc.)
3. Motivationfor enrolment (Important Section)
I would now like to know more about the specific reasons that your households decided to enroll
inCBm.
• What are the main reasons your household decided to join CBHI? There are likely many
reasons but try to think about the most important reasons.
Allow the participants to discuss the most important issues and then ask about thefollowing if
they have not already been mentioned:
lIlness in thefamily? (e.g. Chronic diseases)
Needfor frequent health care due to medical condition? (E.g. Chronic illness, pregnancy,
operation) ?
Needfor frequent health care due to small children? Elderly family members?
CBRI is a better deal financially than paying out of pocket at the time ofcare?
Financial protection against unexpected illness
Experience with high hospital costs?
Pregnancy? Small children? Elderly?
Other reasons?
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rModerator: Among the reasons mentioned, try to understand which reasons are the most
~ml!ortant.Make sure you ask each member.)
• Did anyone influence your decision to enroll in CBm? Please tell me who
influenced you.
Probe for thefollowing if not mentioned: staff running the scheme? Friends or relative?
Village chief? Village collector? Mass organizations? (which organizationsi)
The following are some examples of questions you can use to probe:
• Why were these people persuasive? Are they influential people? Are they old?
Young? What do they do to influence the household to enrol?
• How persuasive was this person/these people in getting you to enroll? Would you
have enrolled anyway? What did they do to persuade you to join?
4. Trends in Enrolment
a) Questions about non-members and drop-outs:
• Why do you think some people have dropped out of the scheme? How are the e people
different from people who join CBm?
• Why do some people never join? How are these people different from people who join BH1?
(are they poorer? Are they rich? Are they not sick? Are they uneducated? are they ethnic
minorities?)
• What do the people without CBm do when they are sick? (Where do they go? central
hospital? Thailand? Private hospital? Pharmacy? Treat themselves? )
b) Changes in Levels of Enrolment:
• Have there been any increases or decreases in enrolment levels? For exampl ,have there been
any times when the number of people who joined CBm increased over a short am unt of time
or decreased suddenly? (examples: village collector topped coming, drought, f1 d, hange
in the way CBm is implemented?)
c) Differences in Enrolment across Vii/ages:
• In some villages enrolment rates are high and in other villages they are I w. Why do you
think this is the case?
o Probe: do you think promotion by mas organization ha an imp I on enrolm nt?
Distance to the hospital? Authority of village chief? Villa oil ctor? ixtent of
community participation?
o Do many people in this village enroll in other types of in uranc ? (private?
Security? Civil Servant?)
d) Risk Preferences
• Many people believe that health insurance is a way of minimizing th ri k havin t mak
high payments on health care. In this way, insurance can be u ed a ri k pr te ti n.1-I wever,
because insurance in Laos is new it is po sible that some pe pIe may think ftheir enr 1m nt
Pag 1334
in health insurance as a risky venture. When you joined CBm did you think about how it
may help you avoid financial risk in the future? Do you see CBm as something that
increases or decreases your risk? Please describe why you think CBm increases or decreases
your risk?
Part II. Experiences and Perceptions of CDHI and the Health Care System
I would now like to ask you questions about the way CBm is managed in your community.
1. Management/ contribution collection process
• Can you tell me how the money is collected each month in this village?
(If no village collector: Did you ever have a village collector? Do you ever have a problem
getting the money to the hospital on time? Would you prefer to have a village collector?)
• Have there ever been any problems with village collection? For example, does the vilJage
collector come regularly? Has there ever been a time where the village collector has not taken
the money to the hospital?
• Do you trust that the money you contribute to the scheme will be taken to the hospital? Please
describe why/why not.
• Do you trust that if someone pays money to the CBm scheme they will get the benefits they
pay for when they need them?
2. Quality of care of health care system
• What is your impression of the quality of care at the district hospital? Is quality good? Poor?
Mediocre? Please describe why. (If there have been changes in quality please ask why)
• Probe on thefollowing aspects of quality ifnecessary (but try to let them say what is most
important):
o What about drugs?(availability and quality)
o What about the way hospital workers treat patients?
o What about skills of staff members? (e.g. do they give the correct diagnosis
and prescribe the correct drugs?)
o Arefacilities clean?
o Are waiting times appropriate?
o What do you think about the equipment?
• Do you get the impression that eBBI patients are treated differently than uninsured
patients? Please give examples to support your answer.
•
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• Are these payments used to cover care or drugs that are not included in the cherne?
• Are any of these payments informal payments? What I mean by this is payments that are n
part of the fee schedule but are made to receive better or faster treatment? How are the e
payments organized? Who asks for the payments? Does this happen a lot? Are these extra
payments the same for the insured and the uninsured?
Part III. Impact of CBHI on Health-Seeking Behavior, Utilization and Expenditures
(Important)
1. Source of Care:
• Before you had health insurance, if you had had a mild to moderate illness what would you
have done for treatment? (Fry to describe the order ofp/aces visited, i.e. I": home; 1"":
pharmacy; etc.)
• Before you had health insurance, if you had had a more serious illness what would you have
done as a first step for treatment?
• Example: would you have tried to treat yourself?
• Where would you go now? (for mild to moderate? For more serious?)
'he ollowing three uestions are uite important to the study so lease make sure you
~nderstand how health insurance has affected use of services:
2. Use of Services
a) Changes to use of services
• Has health insurance affected the place you go for services?
• Has health insurance affected the amount oftime you wait before going for treatment?
(example, do you use services right away? Do you wait and try to treat yourself?)
• Compared to before you had insurance do you use health services more frequently? If 0,
why?
(Moderator: Keep in mind that transportation costs and lime spent in ho spital may prevent people
from going to get treatment. Discuss ijmentioned).
b) Use of services by non-members
• When someone without insurance is sick, do they go to the same place you go to? (eg. d they
go to the hospital first? Which hospital? Central? Di trict? Thailand? 0 they go t the
pharmacy first? Do they treat themselves?)
• How do you think your use of services is different from the unin ured?
• Do you use services more frequently than someone without insurance?
• Do non-members wait a long time before going for treatment? L nger than m mb r w uld
wait? (example, do they use services right away? Do they try to treat them elve ?)
3. Financial effects of insurance
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• Do you think health insurance has increased or decreased the total amount of money your
household spends on healthcare? (including the amount you pay every month for premiums)
• Please tell me other ways in which you think health insurance has affected your family's
financial situation, if at all. Can you give some examples?
Part IV. Wrap-Up of Discussion (Don't spend too much time - IS minutes)
Moderator: Explain that there are a few questions left.
1. Satisfaction with CBHI Scheme
• Overall, do you feel satisfied as a member of the CBHI scheme? Please describe why/why
not?
• Do you feel like the scheme has met the expectations you had when you joined?
• . Do you expect to be enrolled in CBHI in one year from now? Why? Why not?
2. Changes to CBHI Scheme
We've talked a little bit about your satisfaction with the scheme. Now I'd like you to think about
how the scheme could be improved in the future so that more people would enrol.
• Please tell me about any changes you would make to the scheme and why. Think about
changes that would increase the satisfaction of members and also encourage other
members to enroll.
Concluding Remarks
This concludes our discussion. Iwant to thank you very much for your time. Please feel free to
comment on anything else that you wanted to say during the discussion but didn't get the chance.
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AppendixCS.Focus group discussion guide for non-members
Objectives
1. To better understand the factors that affected the decision to not enroll in CBHI
2. To discuss non-members' experiences with and perceptions of the CBHI scheme and
with the health care system in general.
3. To identify how out-of-pocket payments influence health-seeking behavior and use of
services among non-members.
Instructions for Moderator
Step 1: Introductions and Informed Consent
• Introduce yourself and thank participants for attending
• Give an overview of the study and explain why the participants were chosen (you can
read from the information sheet)
• Answer any questions the participants may have
• Ask for informed verbal consent. (It is not necessary to get written consent from the
participants. Verbal consent with the moderator's signature will be sufficient.)
Step 2: Explanation of Process and Ground Rules
• Discuss the process and timing of the focus group discussion (2 to 2.5 hours)
• Explain the presence and purpose of recording equipment and introduce note-takers.
• Outline general ground rules and discussion guidelines (speak one at a time; remember
that there are no right or wrong answers; feel free to disagree with others and express
your opinion; do not repeat information to others outside the group; treat others with
respect).
Step 3: Get participants to introduce themselves and begin discussion
• Get participants to introduce themselves
Step 4: Review tops of discussion guide and tell team what you are going to discuss ahead
of time. '
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Discussion Guide
Introduction
To start off the discussion it is important that all participants get a chance to say something early
in the discussion and that they feel comfortable speaking infront of other group members. The
following questions are intended as "ice-breakers":
• How long have you lived in this village?
• How do most families earn a living in this village?
• Do you know of many families that are enrolled in CBHI in this village?
• For drop-outs: how long were you members ofCBHI?
o How long ago did you quit the scheme?
Part I. Factors affecting non-enrolment
1. Knowledge ofCBBI
• Row did you learn about CBRI?
• Has a CBm campaign ever been conducted in your village?
• How many of you attended the CBm campaign?
• In your opinion. how well were the concepts in this meeting presented?
• By the end of the meeting did you clearly understand how CBRI worked?
• Can somebody please briefly explain how CBm works? (Moderator: confirm that they
understand the concept of insurance and they know that it is not a savings account or fund.)
2. Implementation ofCBB!
Now I'd like to ask you about some of the rules of the CBRI scheme and how it is implemented in
this district:
• If one person in the household of five wants to enroll is this possible? Are there ever
exceptions made?
• If you enroll in CBRI how long do you have to wait before you can use services?
• How many months can you go without paying the monthly premium before you have to
leave the scheme?
• Can members of a scheme use any hospital when they are sick?
• In your opinion. were the rules of the scheme that we just talked about presented clearly in
the CBHI meeting? (For example. household enrolment. waiting period, monthly premiums,
exclusions, etc.) .
• Do you think the information presented was accurate? (Were the promoters realistic and
honest about what was included in the scheme and what type of care you would get?)
• How do you feel about prepaying for care offered in the future? Is it something you would
feel comfortable doing? Why? Why not?
3. Motivauonfor not enrolling or dropping out (Important Section)
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I would now like to know more about the specific reasons that your household decided not to
enroll in CBIll, or that you decided to drop out.
• First I'd like to know from the non-members, what are the main reasons your household
decided not to join CBIll? There are likely many reasons but try to think about the most
important reasons.
Allow the participants to discuss the most important issues and then ask about the following if
they have not already been mentioned:
Knowledge/understanding of the scheme
No illness in the family
Do not use modern health care (inquire about what kind of care they use)
F 'acility too far away from household
Not much encouragement from friends or relatives; village chief
Heard about bad experiences
Village collection system not working
rModerator: Among the reasons mentioned, try to understand which reasons are the mos
imR.ortant
• Now for the drop-outs, what are the main reasons your household decided not to join CBHJ?
There are likely many reasons but try to think about the most important reasons
4. Trends in Enrolment
a) Questions about members
• Why do you think some people have enrolled in the scheme?
• How are these people different from people who do not join CBHl? (Are they poorer? Are
they rich? Are they sick? Are they more or less educated? Are they ethnic minorities?)
b) Changes in Levels of Enrolment
• Have there been any increases or decreases in enrolment levels? For example, have there been
any times when the number of people who joined CBHJ increased over a short amount of
time or decreased suddenly? (Examples: village collector stopped coming drought, flood
changes in the way CBm is implemented?)
c) Differences in Enrolment across Villages
• In some villages enrolment rates are high and in other villages they are low. Why d you
think this is the case? (promotion by mass organizations? Distance to hospital? Village chief?
Village collector? Community participation?)
• Do many people in this village enroll in other types of insurance? (Private? cial ecurity?
Civil Servant?)
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d) Risk Preferences
• Many people believe that health insurance is a way of minimizing the risk of having to make
high payments on health care. In this way, insurance can be used as risk protection.
However, because insurance in Laos is new it is possible that some people may think of their
enrolment in health insurance as a risky venture. When you joined CBHl did you think
about how it may help you avoid financial risk in the future? Do you see CBRT as something
that increases or decreases your risk? Please describe why you think CBHI increases or
decreases your risk?
• (If participants view CBm as risk-minimizing ask the following) If financial risk is reduced
by purchasing CBm why has your household not enrolled?
Part II. Perceptions of CBHI and the Health Care System
I would now like to ask you questions about the way CBm is managed in your community.
1. Management/ contribution collection process
• Do you think the CBm fees are affordable?
• Can you tell me how the money is collected each month in this village?
• Have there ever been any problems with the village collection system? For example, does the
village collector come regularly? Has there ever been an incident where the village collector
has not taken the money to the hospital?
• Do you trust that the money people contribute to the scheme will be given to the hospital?
Please describe why/why not.
• Do you trust that if someone pays money to the CBm scheme they will get the benefits they
pay for when they need them?
Moderator: In the household interviews 75% of non- members reported that they trust thai the
oney, will be used the way it is intended 23% reported that they were uncertain. The
percenta es were approximately the same when asked ifpeople trust that they will get the benefit
hey p'aJ.,/or when they need them) We want to confirm that these levels of trust are as high a
theY'!l!P.ear).
2. Quality 0/ care of health care system
• What is your impression of the quality of care at the district hospital? Is quality go d? P r?
Mediocre? Please describe why. (Tfthere have been changes in quality please ask why)
• Probe on the following aspects of quality if necessary (but try to let them say what i most
important):
o What about drugs?(availability and quality)
o What about the way hospital workers treat patient ?
o What about skills of staff members? (E.g. do they give the correct diagno i
and prescribe the correct drugs?)
o Arefacilities clean?
o Are waiting times appropriate?
o What do you think about the equipment?
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• Do you get the impression that CBHI patients are treated differently than uninsured
patients? Please give examples to support your answer.
• Do you ever have to pay extra money to be seen faster or get better services? How are these
payments organized? Who asks for the payments? Does this happen a lot? Are these extra
payments the same for the insured and the uninsured?
Part III. Health-Seeking Behavior, Utilization and Expenditures (Important Section)
J. Source of Care
• If you had a mild to moderate illness what would you do for treatment? (Try to describe the
order of places visited, i.e. i": home; 2nd: pharmacy; etc.)
• If you had had a more serious illness what would you have done as a first step for
treatment?
• Example: would you try to treat yourself?
2. Use of Services
a) Changes to use of services (ask to drop-outs only)
• Is your use of services different now compared to when you had insurance?
• Ex. Do you go to the same place? Do you go at the same time or do you wait before
seeking treatment? Do you try to treat yourself? Do you use services more or less
frequently now? If so, why?
'Moderator: Kee in mind that trans ortation costs and time spent in hospital may prevent people
rom going to get treatment. Discuss lfmentioned).
b) Use of services by members (ask to non-members and drop-outs)
• When someone with insurance is sick, do they go to the same place you go to? ( .g. do
they go to the hospital first? Which hospital? Central? District? Thailand? Do they go to
the pharmacy first? Do they treat themselves?)
• Do they use services more or less frequently than someone without insurance?
3. Financial effects of insurance
• If you had a major illness that cost a lot of money, how would your household pay for the
treatment?
'(Let them describe hat they would do: example: do they have savings? Would rh OJ ell
iftotJseholditems? What would they.sell? Would they borrow? From whomi)
• Do you think that if you had health insurance and you had a major illne you w uld be better
protected? Why?Why not?
• How do you think insurance would affect the amount you spend on h alth care in t tal
(including premiums)? Would your expenditure increase? Decrea e? tay th arne?
Part IV. Wrap-Up of Discussion (Wrap-Up of Discu sion: Don't pend more than 15
minutes)
Moderator: Explain that there are a few questions left.
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1. Future Enrollment
•
coverage rates.
2. Improvements to CBHI
• Now I'd like you to think about how the scheme could be improved in the future so that more
people would enroll.
• Please tell me about any changes you think should be made to the scheme and why. Think
about changes that would encourage other members, such as you to enroll.
Concluding Remarks
This concludes our discussion. I want to thank you very much for your time. Please feel free to
comment on anything else that you wanted to say during the discussion but didn't get the chance.
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Appendix D1. CBHI summary policy note
The following note was prepared for policy-makers in Lao PDR and was
translated into Lao and disseminated at the national and provincial
levels.
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Community-Based Health Insurance in Lao P.D.R.:
Understanding Enrollment and Impacts
• World BtllIk. September 1010
Th;s /!{lIe IJ" summal), if" lonqer m$lon in EoSlish. It lI"asp".".,,,d <IS f"Jrt if u 1I0rld funk rrosr"m if "natl~k 1I"0rkon h~"/lhfinandn9 In LIl"
PDR. and In col/abor"lion n'Ub WHO, the London hool if rlj"9I"n~ and Tropical M~d/rlne (L NT.lI) unJ th« .lIinimy if If,allh ("ION). ("DU
members if the $Iud), ',<lm in luded uI<lh .~lken"ru k (L HT.fl) . .Ifagnus Lindelow (11'8). <lnd Bar! Jaooht (Lux-Derdorment. rrcrious!)' WHO).
Phetdan: Ch,Jnlhulu and ophu"unh Thist)' wsiSltd ",ilh the Sllldy desi8n lInJ implementullon "rrun8,·menls. FidJ 1I'0rk ,,·us Imrlemenled by
Inch>rhm..r&seurch. Hdeful c"mm~nls on Ihe Jr.ifr !'rNloDS iflhe nOl. 1I·(r.m Ired from Ba),,,r B"YUN,,/l:hun •. ih-.tis BI8,·"rJ. Gcn"'j"'e Bo)Tf"U,
Kat" Hanson, Chrislorh l\uro'V$kl. Anne ,1Iil/s, Jean-Marc Thom. and Adum Wugsl$. The authors 1I'0uld lik. II' Ihunl: Dr. Bouuphal PhonrlSIJ},
(Depuf)' Chlif tfCBN1 I.Ilm In .lIlnI111'}'tf H.IlI,h) und her Icumfor Ihd, .oJ/"boroJllon on thi« ,1ud·. Flnullj', tbe "'um is '.IIr"mdy 8r<llifu/l0 Ihc
inlero'ie ..... ·• ",ho ,ook the lime 10 puniclp"le in Ihis swdy. The nole summllrlzes finJlngs from Ihc slud)'; .further Ilnalj~ls Ilnd dClulls 11'11/be
dlsS<!minulcJ in" serar"t' re_reh "porr.
Bu('kllTOUlld
Health carC' in Lao P.D.R. is primarily tlnann,d through
direct out -or-pockC't pa)lllCnts by households. ThC's('
payments indude expenditures on services and drugs from
public health facililies. pham13cies, private providers.
traditional providers, and facilities outside the country. As
in other counlries, high relianc(' on out-or-pocket
financing contribules 10 101\' Ulilizalion of health servict's
and ri,k ofimpovt'rishmenl.
In an efrort to iJlCreast' health service utilization, de<Tt'ase
health-related out-or-pocket expenditun's, improve health
outcomes and generate resourcf'S for the health sector. the
(Jon'mment of Lao PDR is trying to (·xpand coverage' of
health iJlSurance and risk prolection schemes.
Community-based health insuranCt' (CBHI) is one of the
main risk-prot"elion schemes in tIll' country and targets
tht' informal workforce. Other health prokction schemes
include Ihe Ch'il Servants' Scheml' (CSS). Social I it'alth
Insurance (SHI) for prh'alt' and slak-owned enterprist's
and health <'<juit)' fund (Hl:fs) for poor hous,'holds.
However, outsid,· the CiI'i! $rrvants' scheme. COv('rage
rales are low ( 'ee Figure I).
Fil1UTe I. Insuf<ln," corer<lB~ in L,,,, PDR
1/0/1,1(~)<);s~oJu,.h","" ~ () J"n !(~)9: U~ I.l.H~
Juluh",.·s.'(~)9: HEF !OM"nnuu/ N/""' .. 1I0H !O/()
This note summarizes findings from a study of tIll" cm II
sdwme, dl'signf'd to bf'tt<'r understand th .. status or tht'
CBI-II program and idenlify challl"ngl's Jnd opportunities
to I'xpand t'nrollment. The study also t'xamitwd thl'
impact of the scheme on health care utilization. somc" of
can', and out-of-pocket t'xp,'nditun's.
Overview «1CBH1
CBHI has b"come one of the key risk-prot('C'tion ,d'l'mes
and is l'xp('cted to play an important ro'" in h"lping the'
country mon' toward universal (1)\,eragl' in the heaft h
serlor. Under the sclll'lllt'. which \\'as introducl'd as a pilot
proj{'<1 in 200t, thl' MOH contracts publiC' hospitals to
proviclf' ser\'in's fill' CBHI membt'rs. Bt'nt'lits inc1udt'
outpatient and inpatiC'm s,'n·ia'. including primary health
care. spedali,t seryin", diagnostic tests, and pn's(Tibed
drugs that are 3vailabl<' at the hospitals. Mt'mbc.'n. an'
rt'quirf'cI to iniliat .. trl'atmenl at Ihe primary mntraCh'd
hospital - typicall), thl' district h05pit.11.
The main target group for the· CBIII schenw is dl'llned as
houst'holds \\'ho an' sl'lf-t'mplo)'t·d or working in thl'
informal t'conom), and 3re not cO\'l'red b~'olhl'r social
protl'ction schemes. This group comprises approxim.,h·ly
S2 lK'rcellt of thl' population.' Enrollm('nt in th,' ,dlt'nll'
takes place at the household lewl and t hl' cosIoI'
prt'miullls vari,'s according to ud'3n or rural rt'sidt'nct'.
and numher of hous('hold nwmhers. Th., conlribution
ratl'S \\','1'" originally sel at h"t\\'e,'n 1. S to J% of 3\'eragl'
household incollle'.
To dalt', CBlII opt'ratt" mainly in urban and st'mi·urhan
arNs. but the MOH intl'llds to expand to 1110rl' relllotl'
areas in the future. Howt'\'f'r, aft"r 9 y<,ars of piloting.
CBHl in Lao PDR fares a number of challeng,>s. OIl(' of
tht' main challeng", is Ih,' low ('()\'t'ragl' ratl's. Figul'l' 2
shows thaI rolling out thl' sdwml' to IH'W district;. halo not
resulted in substantial increase, in enrollnll'nt. By July
2009. tht' schenlt's I\'en' operating in t9 distTicts but
reJched only 7% of till' population in thl' largeted districts
(and 13°0 of thl' population In tIll' targ"Il'c1 "11I<l8~S within
thost' dislrict,). This is Ih,' ('9uivalt'nl to 1.700 of th,' total
I 'l1li~ Ilgurf' i~ all approximation I'Had,· hy l.lking II", t(llal
population and sublractillg Ih" formal S('C1or and tlwir
d'·pt'lId,'nl>. Ih,' military. and till' puor.
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population. Scaling up of the scheme to more remote
areas is likely to pose further challeng.es due to low
population density, poor geographical access to
contracting facilities, and limited acquaintance with
modem health can' among ethnic minorities.
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Another challeng.e facing the CBI-II scheme is financial
sllstainability. For in ·tance, in Vientiane Capital, the
>('heme made capitation payments to ho'pita). amounling
to betm'en LAK 4-0,000 to 45,000 (li 4.iO - 5.30) p('r
insured person in 2009. Howeyer, in the absence of
additional sub iclies, the capitation payments are
insuflkil'nt to cover the cost of seryices. As a result,
sl'wral central hospitals in Vit'ntialw Capital have refused
to contract "'ith the CBHI scheme.
In addition to thl' prohll'll1s of low cOH'rage and
insullkit'nt funding, high drop-out ratt's and latt' payments
han· been reported as challenges alr{'cting Ihe scht'me.
Ane dotal t'\'idt'nce also claims that lilt' dlt'nw sulli-rs
from ,IJI"CrSC sel"dion, the phenomenon by which high. risk
indh'iduals (e.g. til(' chronicall\" ill) .11"(' man· likd\" to
enroll in healtll in,urJnC't' bec;use they kno\\" they' \\'ill
IWt'd to uSt' Iwahh ,<'n'ices in tilt' lutm". And J reCt'nt
. rudy also describes "arious managC'lll('nt challenges of til!'
,cheme, including imuffidt'nt staffing. insullkit'nt
teclulical capacities and scarce financial re,ourn's at all
le\·els.
Stud)' APl'rIlllc/1
TIll' st udy took place in Si \'illag"s acros, G districts li'OIn
Vil'ntiane Capital. Vif'ntiant' Prodn 1', and Champa,ak
Provinc.-. The p';mary Illethod of till' ,lUd\' \\'as a
household 'Ul"\"l')". which was adminis1l'red fran; Januar\"
through Ap';l 1009, using a cross-sectional ("as;-
comparison d("ign of 1000 CBHI-t'nrolled housdlOlds and
2000 comparison houst'holds. amounting to a lotal of
14,804 individuals. Data "WI' collt'cted through in-depth
household qUl'st ionnairos and a \'illa!!,l' Hlrn'y
administered to village chiefs. 'Ye al-,o conducted vix
focus group discussions with members, non-members and
drop-ours to better understand factors .lilt-Cling
enrollment. '
Stu~v FindinJ/!i! enrollment
Hull' do CBHlund non-CBlII h"useh"/Js compare]
In comparing CBHI and non-CBHI members, a number of
ditl"P...-nces stand out.
• CBHI households an' larger, mort' likely to he
married, and mort' educated than 110n-{ 'BlII
households.
• CBHI households han' signiJlcantly higher household
consumption levels than 'compari;on Ilou",'hold, but
imilar per capita consumption rates.
• CBHI households are in worse health, have mort'
elderly household members. marl' women of
reproductive age and marl' pregnant wonwn, rdali\"('
to comparbon hOllseholds.
• Altitudes toward dilrt'rt"nt .0UlTe, of ("art' are similar
among CBI-I( and non-CBHI hOllseholds. Ilow<'\·(-'r.
CBHI hou,ehold~ report a higher perception of
qualilY ofheahh carp at Ilw di,trict hospital.
• CBHI members are more likelv 10 h,1\"t' all ended a
CBHI campaign.
Iinut ur~th,' m,m irnp"rt<lntJu<"t(}rs'!fJcltins ,'nTl.l/n1('nt?
Although the comparison of till' tWO groups diSClI'Sl'd
above is useful for undt'rstanding Ihe ,amplt', a simple
compari,on of mean, a(,'oS$ twO groups can confound Ih"
,·(1t-cts of dilTl'rt'nt factors. To ,hed light on which facton
intlut'nct' !'nrolln",nt \\'hl'n othl'r la;·tnrs art' controlled
for, muhh'ariate analysis Wa, undel"laken. For ea,,' nf
inlt'rpn>tation, rl'sult, are pn'sentt'd as "pn'dil"tt'd
probabiliti<'s", which rt'pn>,ent the prohabilily that a
hOllst·hold will (,Ilroll ill CBlII wh"11 all oth,'r fJetors a...•
held constant at thl'ir mean ";llll(,. \Vhen \H' compare
pr"dicted probahilities I' r "rl'pre,,'ntatin' indh'iduals", we
can ,('e how the probabilit~· of enrollmt'nt changes as the
"ariabl(> of inh'!"l'sl (t'.g. "dllcation lewl) c11angl's.
TIll' r ..sults from this analpb is pn'st'nll'd in I:igllrt" J and
4. A fl'\\, determinants stand Ollt as particularly important.
• .IS~ unJ ,'du"ltilm III h<lus,'h,,'J hr'IJ. 1I0u,,'holds in
which thl' Iwad i. oldl'r an' .igniHc,lIltly mOrt' Iik,·ly to
..nroll. TIll' prohability of .'nrollnwnt i, al,o hi!!l,..r if
the head has vocational training or post-,econdary
"du("atiot1 (rt'lati\'t' to 100\"I'r "ducat ion Il,\'('I,).
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• Household stu, Households wirh six or more family
members are "ignilkanlly more likely to enroll in
CBHI.
• Healtt: SluCU,~ and risk I'a(cprians/ auuudes. II;wing
worse than a\'t'rage (self-assessed) health does not
significantly increase enrollment, However,
households in which a family member h.1S either a
chronic illness or had difl1culty performing regular
activities in the past three months were signilkantly
more likely to nroll in (,BHI than households wHit
no signs of illness, These findings confirm that
adverse selection is present in the scheme,
• Economic siCU<ltitm <1the household. When other factors
are held constant, households that are better-off
fillJnciaIIy (measured hy per capita consumption) are
Significantly mort' likely to enroll in CBIII. Till' low
probability of enrollment among low-income
households is a concern from an l'quity per'pl't'th'e,
and implies that most of tilt' bcncfhs from the scheme
(and go\'ernnwnt subsidies to health f.1C'ilitil") arrruo
to till' better off.
• Factors '!ffi"rin8 I'r.ji"m,e.< fi'l' modern ,tlr,', Almost all
household, in the sample have a prelereno- lor
modern health care OH'r traditional can" and (he!.e
factors do not explain differences in enrollment.
• Exposure It! CBHI, People who haw attended a
campaign art' mort' likelv to ("111'011 in em II than
people who did not au ..nd. I lowov er , it is possible
that CBlII members were inter ..sted in joining CBI II
and therefore attended tilt' campaign in anticipation or
joining (he scheme,
Fillur,' 3. Predi<1,'Jrmhtl"ililY 'ienrollment ".,1' h<luleh"IJ ("h,ml<rerisril's
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In addition to household le\'d 1~1C10rs, then' an' abo a
number of important \'ilIage le\'el drtermin.lnts of
enroll men' (Figure Si.
• L"cluion, Households in urban \'ilIages haw a
signifi anti\' 10\\,1"1' probabilit\' of enrollinG in CBHI. . ~
than hOll~t'holds in st"mi-lu·ban "iI!ages, Thi, is mo,t
likely b('causl' there arC' I(,'\\'er op~ions for can' in
emi-urh.1Il areas,
• .1I'tliluhi!ilY ~r,un' in I'Jlh'8", Households Iil'ing in
\'illag"s with a drug ,eller or health ('('nll'f an' I,'ss
lik('ly to enroll in (,RHI. Hrnn', if local options an'
3\'ailable, hOllsl'holds are less likely to ,'nroll in CBlII,
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whil'h rt'quir .., tlwlll to , ek care in the di"triet
hospital,
• .IHc tlnJ eJunllitm '.II ,hi'f TIll' proh.lbility of a
household joining CUI-II i hight'f among \'j)Jagrs wi( h
younger. mon' t'duC'Jll'c1 chief",
• I'IlltlHe siu, The prohability of ,'nrolling in CRHI is
hight'" for .malk·r \'iIIag"',
br",wre I" CBlll, Iloll,{'holds in "illagt's that han·
had at least thrl'" campaigns are ,ignilkantly mtlJ"{'
likdy to ('nroll in ('BHI than houst'ltolds in \'iIla!:!e,
with le,s than (hn'., campaigns,
•
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hen controlling for household and village level factors,
there are large distrtcr effects, which art' likely to reflect
availability of services in the respe('ti\'(' districts, as well as
quality, price and other factors,
Fiuurc 4. Predicted prohuniliry ,!/enml/menr ~r 1'il/uO('chatuucrisucs
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Stll(iy FillJinns: TIll! Impact of Hl!alth IIISUr(IlI(,(,
:Ire CRHI m,'mhen more Iike!r co use heulrh cure (hun rh"
unlnsureJ?
To assess the impact of insuranct', we used a method
known as propensity scort' matching (PSM). This
approach uses a range of \'ariables 10 match households
that enroll in CBI-IIwith households that are "similar" in
key reSpe(1s.1 In this \\,ay, diiTerences hetween CRHI
members and non,members are controllt'd for, and
comparisons art' mort' n·liablt' (tht"y should rt'prt'sent the
impact of the scheme).
Figure 6 repOt1S the estimates of the impact of being
enrolled in ('BHI on utilization. The r('suits show that th('
schemt' has Significantly increast'd utilization of both
inpatient and outpatient seryict's, In fact, CBHI mt'mber,
are almost twin as likely as non-members to lhl"e an
inpatient dsit in a one year period, In Lao PDR, ",h~re
utili7..ation rates are H'ry low, impro\'ed a('('t'~s to rare is
an important step for",ard. The scheme dot'S not seem to
haw an impact on tht' numhcI" of visits for those \\'ho lise
senict's,
,
- Surn·y instruments were then dt'sign~d to capture s..lf-
selection into the schellW, For example, the '-olumar\' nature
of the scheme makes it prom' to adn'rse s('lection, "High-risk"
charactelistics such as rhronic- ilInC'ssl's,disabilities. ~r ,'H'n
diITl'rt'nlattitucl,·sand pnof,·...·Il<'t·sfor health ('an', hal'" J din"'t
..tl'c-cton an inclh'iduaI'sus(' of health s"rI'ices.
The study fuund that CBI II Illt'mbers an' mort' likt'ly than
non-memb('rs to I'isit both district and pnwincial
hospitals. 1'01' both inpatient and outpanl'n! can'. This is as
expected gin'n the r(''1uirl'llwnt that pati('nts initiate
tr OItment at this l('wl in order for costs to bl' col'('rl'd,
Results also indicate that insurance is encouraging use of
public sector facilities, and decl't'Jsing tilt' likelihood that
members will uSt' prh'att' dinics.
Do CRHI hOll5rholJ5 sl'cnJ lC5s mon,;" on hl'ulrh ."f<! rh'/n rhe
uninsureJ.'
The study found that even though CBHI t'nrolll'es lISl'
more S('T\'iCl'S, they face lo\\'('r out -of-pockt-t
t'xpt'nditul'l's ror hath inpatient and outp.ltil'llt ><'I'\'il'l'S
than do tht' uninsurt'd. In ract, out-or-pocket
('xpenditul'es on inpatient \'isits for the insured \\'t'I't' less
than half or those of the uninsurt'd, ",hill' inpatient
t'xpt'nditurt's lor th .. insured wert' one t'ight'h or tht'
amuunt spent by the uninsured. Wlwn thl' eO,l of
monthly prt'll1illll1S is included, CRill nwmlwrs' total
payments, for thost' using s('nices, are still only one third
of th(' amount incurn'd by the uninsuTl'd. 110\\,('\'('1',
wl1l'n total ('xp.'nditun's (including thl' monthly
prt'nliutns) are ;11'eraged aCt·o.s the entin' samp'" (i.l'.
including thos(' withollt a \'isit), ther(' is no significant
diITl'r('n~l' in out-of'pocket l'xp('nditurt,s lwt\\~""n tlw
insured and uninsured.
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FiIJUT<' 6. D!fFrenccs in uttltzution <jh"ulth sen'I,,'s ,md "ur-cf-".~k~1 ,·xr,·ndllUrcs. CBH/ relative I" non-Cbril
Inp.rtient visit in 1.'\~111 1Il0~
#IP"isits ill Ilmos
JP visit at public J:,dlit~· ill last 11 mos
JP visit ,\1 district hasp in ).ISI 12 mos
IP ";,it .,t 1'1'0\' hosp ill I.,SI 11mos
IP visit at centra] hosp in I.lst 11 1ll0S
OP visit in last month
# OP visits in 1.\.0;;1month
OP "hit to ,my public f.lcitity in last month
OP visit to district hosp ill last month
OP vtsit to 1'1'0\' hosp ill 1.1Stmonth
OP visit 10 centra] bo-p ill 1.\Stmonth
OP visit to pharmacy in last month
OP visit to pri\·.Ht.' clinic ill Laos in !.ISImonth
OP visit to healer In UOS in 1.1<tmonth
·10(Y'o
- Si~lIiflc.lIlt.1I .01 It"',d
li3°0
~16°0
·4--1°0
·;4°()
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·88°.
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()O.
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·66°0
.14°'0
0"0 100'0 l(X)Oo lOO"o
- Nt, P,ig_llilk.lllt diITf"'t'I1f't"
""h rhl.! 1.'.!,;c"'1',ion,{rhl.! JLJSlIWd estimates, u/J OOP ~'Sfimurl's l.!.u/uJ ..• Ih~ ulSi '!.f ,h\· m()nthtr rr..-miumJor (BHI m~'1TJ"\·rJ. I..mJ th~"'!l0u
Il.r'''''_h:m Ih~' J!II~.,.~·nH~in u))l ul the r(linr (?f S~'(I'Ic~'Jdi1\'':I".
LookinlJ Forward: Challenpe« and Opportunities
The st udv has shown that the decision 10 enroll in CBHI in
lao POR is influenced by a rang!:' of factors at the household
and l'iIIage k\'t'ls, including hNlth status, sociot'C'Onomic
status, family sizl', Jnd exposure to CBHI. \Vith resp,'ct to
its impact, findings suggest that CBHl can increase utilization
of health sen'ices and pro"ide flnancial prort'('tion for
members. TIll' ,dwllle also t'ncourages use of tl1<' refi.-nal
system by directing members to lo\\'er lel'e1s of care.
Despite tl1t' posilive r ...sults g"lwrated from this study, tilt'
tlndings must be \,i ...wec! in a broader mnt,'xt. Ali ...r 9 ),..ars
of piloting, CBHI is reaching only a fraction of the
population (Ie'ss than 10% in till' targC'le'd districts). TIll'lo\\'
covt'rag" is consistenl with eXlwrienre \\'ith mluntary h"alth
insurance (II' th .. infonnal St'ctor Ii-om mal1\' otiwr munlri ...s.
Moreon-r. the sdwlll(, may he I(·ading to'gn'Jter incljuity.
Cx('('pt for J fl"" villages whert:' hl'alth ('quit)' hInds and
(,RHI operate togethet·, th",rt' art' no Hthsidies in pl.we to
con'r the cost of CBHI premiums for till' poor. Nor is a
systt:'matic targeting scheme in place for identifi'ing poor
housdlolds. Therdon·. ",hill' impacls of thl' scill'nll' hayl'
been mainly positiYe for members, they are Yery small at a
population level.
Previous sl1ldi('s in Lao POR make useful rt'c'omnlt'ndations
for strengthening managt'ml'nt functions. Thi, study also
points to' sonl<' lmnlC'di;,,' program chang'" thal CO~tld he
taken I,,· th~ MOH to incr,'as(' t'nrollment rates and improve
tilt' sch;me, Th ..se induclt': j
• Rr'/Ih ,'ul '" h.JlI.<ch,,/d, Ihul I""'/rtlJl lik"~I'/" ""r,,11 in CB/-II,
• ImrJ'llt't· 'illtl/lly "~Ii~/<'Tmuri'>n Jisst'nunarJon "'HurJinB CBH/
dl/rins ,ltrtl'rtlt'S.i ,tlnlI'IItHIlS.
• U".I./Il· .."mrII>JJtI,>n ra/('s un.! ImI'TC't'{·lo/h'ltJ,'n,
• SlrcIl8'h~n Ih,' eMil lIIt1nl'8clllclIl ,1/11/ i,!j;'rm,"ic'n .~1'SI~III,
But \l'hilt.- programmatic changes to CBI II may stl'l'llgthl'1l the
schenw, the SiZl' of tht' impact of the,,' (·hang .., is likely to be
small. Indeed. the majorily nf "oluntary CBllI sclwnll's thai
han' bl'en documented in til<' lJlt'ratun' hal'" falk·d to reach a
large shan' of t Ilf' larg"t puplliat ion. So, what opt ions an'
I See English language notes fot' additiollal det.,Us.
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there for building on the experiences to date to make broad-
based progrt'SRtowards universal ('overage?
The limits r1CBHI <lnJ the n«J.fi" in<'te<lsed8",'elnmenr ~nJin8
(,BHI rt>presents an effort to generate resources for the
health system and provide finandal protection for
households in the Informal sector through contributory
financing. This reprt>sents a signilk.mt ('halll'ngC', For
house~olds in the Informal sector, it is Virtually Imposslble
to v("rif),income and relate contributions to ability to pay.
Households art' therefore asked to make nat-rate
contrlbutlons, This creates a real dilemma. For the scheme
to be affordable and inclusive, fees need to be kept low, But
this also means that the bendlt pll'kage has to remain either
narrow or shallow. Alternatively, contribution rates ('an be
set at a higher level to otTer more gent'rous benefits, hut
higher rates may exclude a slgnifi(,ant shan~ of the target
population.
('urrt'ntly, go"ernme.>ntspending on he.>althin lao PDR Is
\'ery low by Intt'mational standards, making elTorts to
mohilize rC'sources through CBHI and dirt'l'I out-of-poekl't
pa)ments understandable. However, roverage of the Il'heme
is likely to remain lo\\' in the absenre of imTeased
governmt'nt subsidies. Fortunatt>ly, there are good
opportunities to increase government spending on ht'alth in
the ('oming years: hydropowl'r and otht'r natural reSOUf('t'
r("venues have gainC'd Importan(,e, and Impro"ed tax
administration lti rontrlbuting to Increase.>d ro.>wnue.>
('ollection.
B~t wh~re should inC1'~'asC'dgovt'rnnwnt spending be
d,rt'ctt'dt Tilt're art' a numhe.>rof options. Govemme.>nt('QuId
Increase spt'nding to improve facilitlt'l and equlpmt'nti It
~ould im't'st in human It-sour('es for lon~t'r-term
Improvemt'nt of servke quality: It ('ould IneTc.-aseIlnan('ing
of non-wage rerurrent rolts at fadli!\' le\'d, and in that way
rt-du('e rdian('(" on out-or-pollet pay;'ul"ntl (at Il'ast for som~
priority servkes): and It l'ould pro\ide dirt'l't ~lIbsldies to
cBln and Jlt'alth Equity Funds to increase t'Drollml'nt and
expand benefits of thest' s('hemt's,
Th,'S("options are not mutually eX('luslvei In somt' ('aSt'Ithf')'
may t-n"n be romplt'ml'ntarv, It is bevond thl' sropl' of this
note to disC'USIthe ad,·antag~. and dls~dvantage. of dllTerl'nt
options, but It iJ important to ronsidt'r the experlt'nl't'l of
other rountrles that ha\·e.>fa('C'd similar (·hallt'nge.. For
examplf', Rwanda I. one of the fe\\' rountrl .... that havt-
aehit"'C'drelatively high roverage through a "olwltary CBlU
scheme, which has ret'entl), m"('()memandatory. This 'U('l'l'SS
is due to good administration, strong polItic..1 leadt'l'lIhip,
financial Nl'king by thl' gowrntnt'nt and donor., and
linkagt'l with mkrollnanre institutions and formal ht'llth
Insuranl't' SC'hemes.China has also rt'<'ently aC'hie,'l'd high
lewl. of ('O\·l'rage.>of a new mluntarv lIl·hemefor the formal
5(',:or (tht' Rural Cooperative M;dkal Scheme). Again,
pohllC'l1 leadership and lublotanlial gO\'"mment 5ulnldl..1i
were [Titit'al to the rapid expansion and high uptake.
However, in both ('asel there hilAbeen some degrf"f' of
prt'S.~uft'from offidals to enroll,
Other countries ha,'!' extended social health insuran(l' to the
Informal sector, In Vietnam and tht' Phllipplnl'8, the ptHlr are
enrolled using taxation, whtle the non-poor have the option
to enroll in a voluntarj' IIndollheahh insuraru'e ...·h..m.. at
thl"lr own e'xpenSl'. ('olombiol has a Nlmilar program l'xn'pt
that enrollment for the' non-poor II mandatory. Me'xiro haa
also made considerable t'1li1l1 In I"xpanding Insurance hy
o!T,'rlng housl·holds not ('o"l'rt'd by th,' formal 1It'C.·torth.·
option of enrolling in a 5('parate publi(' ht'.llth Insurolnl't'
program known as Se8ot<> '''pu/<ll (SP). Tht- S, prngnm Is
fully subsldizC'dfor the poor, and the non-poor rontrlbut.,
arC'ordingto thl'lr ability to pay.
Although (,BHI W,lI a feature of the ThaI health 'YIIl'm for
se"erOlId..nd!'8, tht' sml'mt" WiIA ewntually rolll'd Into a tax-
I1nan('t>clSl'ht"lTlt',whkh ('onan tht" poor and nun-poor
informal sector and all those not ro"ered bv tht' formal
St'ctor 5(·hl'mt'l. l'hailand'Ji new (mandatof\')' tax-nnanced
5C'ht'll1l',known as the.>lInh"'rsal ('o\'t'rag~ Sl·ht'11le.>,hiIK
proven to be a mudl more ,·Ilt·l·th·e,l'<!ultahle and ellkl('nt
ml'OIIlSof ro\'t'ring thl' informal 5I'(1nr ilnd admini.,rati\,t>!y is
mum It'Ssl'Ompll'x.
In lummary, experi ..nll'l from a wide rangt' of ('ountrlt'l
~uggl?stthat (,Btll l'an haw bt·nt'fill In tl?rml of InlTl'a»i.ng
utili7.atlon of h..ahh ('are and redUcing out-of'p''''kl't
t'xpendiluft'R for nlt","!wrl, hut that It II wry diffi",1t to
t'xpand co\'("rag("to a point ",h,'re b,·nd}t. r",)('h • largt'
share of th.. population. Rt"l'ognlzlng th.. IimltoltlunKof
CBlil, It Is Important to also ronsid,'I' aItt'rnathe or
complt'mentilry Ilnandng m"l'hanisms, sum as taxation or
..xtension of sodal health in.urance. Tbt'l .. art' bv no m..anl
l'asy options: uniwrliill tax-llnanC't>rl .(nt'm~1 require.>
adl'<!uat(" and 'URtaln,'<I go\'t'mmt"nt Ilnancing: targ..trd
5C'hemesr..quire elre('!!vl" tolrgl'tIngmt"('hanls,"li: expansion
of sodal St'C'Uritydt'pends un imTt'ollit'dformaliloltiun IIf th..
laOOr markt't and etlt-rth'e enforn'mt'nt mel'hanl.nui and
rnntrihutory 5{·ht'me.>Krt'<Julrt" t'1lt-l1h'l" and t'mdent
(uUI'l1Ion Sy.tt'Jn8. The nt·w ht'alth finandng .trah·g)' that iM
rurrently !x-Ing prepared pro,·ld.., a good OpptlrtWllty to
d..fint"a dt'ar and ft'alislk pollhto a(nit"'1"hroad ro,·t'ragt" of
kt')' health aer,'il'l:l and Impro\'e Ilnandal prot.'C'llon In lao
Pl>R, and to addrt1il lOme of thl' l'hallt·ng(·, that will
undoubtt>dly arist' during thl' Impl"m"ntoltlun pha"....
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Appendix D2. SUI Summary PoUcy Note
The following note was prepared for policy-makers in Lao PDR and was
translated into Lao and disseminated at the national and provincial
levels.
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Enrollment of Firms in Social Security in Lao PDR:
Perspectives from the Private Sector
• World B<II,k. Sl!pl"m/lCr mio
Tbls nou II "summJr.r '!f II 1,'118'"Iw.fo.n In EnOhlh, II WlIS rtfl"'h.J at fVrt '!r~1I~,rlJ&mk rn'ti""1l1 ,.m"~'11. u·...rk "n h.uhhjlnun.ms In L""
PDR. und In ,~ll"b.n.ttjon ",r), the {..,nJ.>n Scb",,1 if H)'8kn~ uOO TrOf'klll .If,oJltlno (/. ITfI!) lind Ih. ~I .111 , .. url~1 (},s,mltllliun ( ~()) (.w
m~mffl' r>j'tbe Slud)' ICum in luJ(J SOI\lh ,'lIken~ru<,k(LSfnil1) "nd .l/"snus Lmdelo« (IJIlII, Th,'jldJ Ilwk u "" impl.mvnt...J b, InJ,,,hln,,, /k·,v,J/.h,
He/I!ful rommenls <'n ,h, linyl "rn;"ns if the nm. """,' r«.,i •• dI",m FNnl F«lc)" I;"r" Hanson, fj',"11 11,,,,,,/1. 8.m j",~I". Chrffft:JI Kurow ."
rud~umrh"lIe SOlllhall),' jc.Jn-.1fOJT< Thj)(IJJ unJ ,jJum lI'atpl'!iJ. The team IrmdJ Ilk" It) ,hunk rh. pri. <It<1 iO<"'I)f crnr"~lmfOf 1"'" IclpJlill"q 111tht
nnw)"; rv= SC<fQ( utld 9'I"~rnnl~nt"'!ff (in.luJing h<><p"ulJf~lPfIJI' rarrl.il'littn9 In ••)' J'!fol'm"nr JnlMW I, unJ "~ffm,',n/Xlfl oJl Ibt 0.,,,,1
Securi~rOrO<lIl;l,,'IOII Jar thtir IJSdsL"nc~ In prOl'IJ1n8 bucksround 'rif0rm<Jtfon, Th. nOt< .ummoJrlzl.'S .fInJlns, .fr"m rhe "u~ ..; Jurthtr """tru ,mJ
litl"l/s .. til b.t Jil><mJn.lltJ tbr"ush "Sil{,<»,"h' f"$e"r<h rel"""
B",kurQund
Increasing participation in health insurance and risk-
protection scheml's is a key priorit)' for tbe Go\'ernrnent of
Lao PDR, 111t' four main risk-protection SC'hemes operating
nationally in lude: 1) mandatory h('alth insurance for rh'i!
~en'ants; 2) mandator), social h,'ahh insuranc'(' ( III) aimf'd
at pri\,ate and state-owlll'd enterpri,es; 3) \'oluntary
community-based health insurancl" (CBHI) for the informal
workfore'\"; and 4) health C<juity funds (HEFs) for hOllsehc)ld
Ihing in extreme PO\'t'I'ty,
As the Go\'cmmcnr of Lao PDR sc-d:s to impro\'e finandal
prott'ction and acccs to health (';11'(,', greater attention is
being gi\'en 10 the social set-uril), s('heme and the 1'011' it
cOllld pby in expanding co\'(>rage, Howt'\'er. enrollment in
social security - whkh is mand.lIoTY for all enterpl'ise. with
at INst 10 employee (according to a minish'rial d,'cre(') -
h~5 remained lo\\' sinn' the sche'ffi"'s in eption, lo\\'
enrollmt'nt is at Il'ast partly rlUI' to Ihe slll~1I scale of thto'
fonnal s('(1or, Iimitt'd geographic' reach of the seh('mt' (4
pro\'inCt's only), lack of enfol'cem('nt and \l'eak r gulatory
structure, and limitt'd capac.it)' of Ih,· odal S('curit)'
Organization (SSO - the impl('menling agency for the
&('hcme~ to attract n w members.
This nOLl' .ummarizt'~ finrlings from a tlldy ddgl1l'd 10 sht><!
light on the factors afli.'l'ting enrollment in social security,
employers' experience. with and perceptions of the schcnll',
and benl:'fits prm'idt><! to emplo)'l't's in l1nm thai do not
participate In S, 0:
• Th~ sl\ld\' was dr£il1.llt:'d~nd rnrri"d nUl b\' a 1<'J1ll of l'e~eal'('ht'I's
Ii'om thl" \\torld &nk and London Se'hool o'r H~gil:'ne and Tl'opi al
Medicine (LSIITM), A local research t<'am was hll'~d 10 ~JI1'\' out
data ("oll.('tion under th" Supel'l'i'ion l,r the World &nk/L,i ITM
It-am, "111e study was fund"d by th" Wurld n""k, hnplcnwntatlon
of the .urI'ey \\',IS approved by the 0 ~nd t;thical ~ppro\'al
was granted by lhe Nallollal In~tilu\" (.1' J>llhli IIl"lIlth in
Laos and LSHTM in the {[nited Kingdom,
OVctrv;('lv (~rSofie" Sl!nrrit,v i/l Lcw PDR
111l' so('j~1 ;'N'uri!), s hC'llw ,"Onsi5t. of i\ (ornpreh 'n,iVC'
package or ht"lhh care and (.ther h"lwllt olTer ..d 10
i:'mployt·f'S in prlvi\t(' Jnd &tal -ownl'd t'Omp~nil's,
Introduced in 1999, tht' s('h~m(; is m"nag"d h)' thl' SSO. ,1
~e1l1i-alltOnomou!o ol'~anI7.atlon within th,> ~IiJli.tr)' of lahor
and Social Welfare, Funding. ror til,· sl'lll'llll' is it n(,I'atl'd
from a rombill.ltion of' employ,· and 1'l1lplo)'l.'r
('{)ntriblltions, Thl' heillth care fund. \\'hkh al~Cl re('\·iws
go\'ernnlt'111 sllb~idi(·~, is lh .. largesl of all Iwndlts Jnd
flnann's outp.1tient and Inp.1til·nt care, and pI' I>C'riptlon
drugs a\'ailabl(' at hospitals, Th~n' al" no o-(>ayml'nt& or
limit, on lht· Illllnlwr nf ('ontacts or lit'n'iC't's prllvid"d, Publi
providers 3r p,IJd by ('''pit,ltion, \\'hkh b flxt><! at l:\K
80,000 (tI~ !>,+O) per in'l1l'<,<1persolllwl' Y"Jl',
OI'i:l'l'i~II'I!l 0 J"eisJ<I,i"n Jifin;ny ,he! '<lft/'" fll<lUr
Ac 'Ordillg to till' SSO De'rt'1.' 207, the official targ(;l !!rOllp
lor sodal M't'urity Indudes all t'ntt'l'priw> with 10 or morl'
employl'i's, IIm\'e\t>r, in prac'tke. Ihl' dl'CTt'(' is dlmcult tn
(,IU!)r~, Th,' 'SO is cUlTently dl'aJ\lng glllclt·lhws for
inspeclions and sanC'tions fur non-complbnt ('olYl('lanl('s, and
i•• llso working \\'ith oth('r line millis"'r, to proilluigate a la\\'
sI''' ilk to sorial oN'mity, The II \\' la\\' will mandat ..
..nrolhm·nt of all "nll''l'ri'l' ''''Ih <II I~,t<r,,"~ "ml'l"n',', lllu.
expanding th' target population for th ... SSo >l"lwl1lC',
01'",,'11:11' <1tlw ,ut r~nI "rry," 8ft>Ur
Whill' the ol1lcial tal'grl gl'uup induell" .lllt·lllt·l'pri-.e, wllh
,It IN"t It'n (anel ,'\('ntll.lIy om') l·mplo),l'e,. tlw SSO
('uJT,'ntly targets only .1 small, uhwt of l'lIh'rprisl's in th(
rountry bas,'d on inform,llion It (1)1I(,(,t, fro III "lItt',,1 .lntl
pl-O\'in~~lal tax I' gl~trati(ln olll<'~ in tht" pro\'ln('(', \\'111'1','
SSO " npt't-atlng., 'T1w .In' of IIll' S'i lal'ge'l g:r(lUp, n>latl\'"
to all f'imls opt'rolting in thl' ('ountry i~ sho\\11 In ligur,' I.
\\'hl h I~ h.l.e·d on dat.! from th!' lM' l:mnllll1k l \·n~u .. - ol
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sur\'ey that summarizes information about all economic
units; operating in the country.
The _first (outer) rinn in Figure I repre rents all 209,484
economic units that operated in the country at tl1<' tim .. of
the economic census (2006), many of which had no
permanent address or were located in communities without
road access (P.g. mobile shops, street vendors, lottery
sellers, tuk ruk drivers, and other temporary shops). When
we exclude informal economic units and international
organiZJtions, we are left with 116,913 economic units
(r presented by tht' 5e«lnJ rinn). However, even though
economic units in this cat£>gory have a permanent location,
many of these firms operate informally. For example, only
4-0% of businesses in thi- ('ategorr hold a trade rt>gistration
certificate, while only 71010 hold a tax re~istration
certificate. The third rine r{'pr{'sents the 90,4n unit~~ rhar are
paying some form of tax. Clearly, the fact rhat businesses are
paying taxes indicates that the), ha\' .. a somt'",hat formal
structure, Howe\,er, eyen in this group, only a small share of
unil has a lax rl'gistration number (other unit pay lump
sum or daily taxes) -these are represented by tht'JwTth rine,
Tht' SSO c1atabasl' of targ('t IInns ('ompri~ ..s I,no
entt'rprist's (the J!fih rmn)' Ho\\'e\'er, duE' to lo\\'
complian(,e. only HI8 t'ntt'rp!'ises w.-re t'nroll.-d in sodal
,ecurity in January 2009 (thl' sixlh rill.'/), Tllt'se 388
('ompanie reprt'st'nt only 29% of companies in tht' SSO's
database of targl't firms, but becausl' mo~t l'nrolled lIrms are
large, tlus group accounts for 610'0 of targetl'd employe,'s,
Collecti\'l'Iy thl'se ~88 ('ompanit's pro\,id(, insurance for
46,i31 l'mployees, and 86,690 benl'flciaril' __ approximJldy
I, S~O oftht' I 31) population,
Fil/ure I, £wnllmh' unlrs "reMine in Lu" PDR
lurrcnll,
lil'1:t•h'1.l
S"uru.'; (l)mr,/~J hI lh ...Jwhllf'j WinS JIJtIJ jftlm Lw hl.mom,,- (,'nsus
i!(l()/6, JnJ.lSO D~t~~J"',
; An economic unit is ddlned as any bu<itws ('ntitY, dlh.,!' form,,1
or informal. indudillg ~hops Ihal operate al1\' f'co~omic Jcth'ilies,
Thi!' group .llso indudt~!'oo non.prof1t ~nrl non·gon·r0111('nt
organizations but f'Xc!Ud,'Sinternational ol'~allizations, '
Overvil'w l!.l SI II~I'
K~JI'0/it}' ,/u<,sritllls
The study was dl'signl'd to address a number of policy
questions rplating to enrollment (\I'hy are some tlrtm
enrolled and not othcrsl), flrm p,'rC'l'ptionl> and ,'xlll'ri,'n{'('
with ,0, and till' pro\'ibion of health and other l"'lwllts in
non-SSO firms.
To answer these questions, a structured questionnaire was
administered to 130 ernplovcrs (including 65 member linn>
and 6S non-member Iirnu-), intt'I'\'it'\\'ing heads or
companies where possible 11\1' sample was randomly
selected from the four bing!'st mdustries in the SSO tJrgt'l
group: manufacturing; ('~nstru('tion; trade: and s"n'il~'"
using strata that corresponded to industry and number of
employees, with firms ht'ing selected from till' SSO
databas(', Thl' sun'l'\' rl'stricll'd attl'ntion to Vkntianl'
Capital.<
Findings
Enl'<lJ/mc/lI in Snl'iu/ <'curir)'
In order to l"",rn mOl'e ,lhollt tilt' I~l('tor, thai art' related to
('nrollm('nt, "'l' pl'rfortnl'd muith'ari,ltl' logistic rl'gr('ssion,
This allows 1I to {'xaminl' how one fa tor relatC's to
l'l1rollmt'nt whill' holding all uthl'r factor, constant, Thesl'
findings arr pr('s('ntl-d as odds ratios in App,'ndix I, Odds
ratios rt.'prt'st'nt the stro'ngth of tilt' relationship het\\'I'l'n till'
variahle of interest and l'nrulln1l'nt in social sPeltrit y wlwn all
olh"r \'ariablt:s are ht'ld constant. An odds r.ltio great"r than
OIl<' r<'preSt'nts a gre,ltt'r lik"lihood of ('nrolling: relati"" to
the rt'fert'ncl' group, whill' an odd~ rollin of less th,ln one
rt'presl'nts a lower likelihood of enrolling, rt'lali\'e to tl1<'
nofl'rl'nc(' group,
The IInding. sho\\' that companies \\'hos,' kadl'!'~ ha\,' a
unin'r.ily ('du('atiun art' mort' than tI1l'<,'t'time. mort' Iikl'ly
to ,'nroll in social s<'curit y, ()\,..r ('ompanie" \\'ho,o' Io'acit'rs
han" I"," than ,l uniwrsity education, Firms in thl' Ir,ldl'
industr), art' also igllifl('antl)' more likdy to enroll th"ln llrms
in thl' sl'tTicl's indust ry, O\\,lll'rship was also found to Iw
associ,lted with enrollml'nt. TIl<' odd, of enrolling are
approximat('ly 1 ~ tilllC" higlll'r for ,tah'-o\\'lll'd ,'nlt'tl)ris,',
• A, j, often tht' ca'" \\'ith firm <lIf\'"y', tIll' rf'[\I<.,1 rat,' wa'
Illod,'rah·ly high (hl'lw,·,'n (,7"0 and SOOo), Th,' fom",r rah'
indud.·, ('ontactt'd linn. in ",Ilkh nuhody WJS .""ilabl" 10 1..-
int"r\'i,·\\'(·d: Ilw lalll'r indud,>, finly (·xplicit l''''ll<,'1-. fnl<'I'\'i"\\"'rs
atll.'mplcd to sci...dllll· an inl<'I'\'k'" three lim,'< 1",1("',, I',ndnmfl'
sdrcting anolht."f t'lltt ....,'ri~t". The l'>..llnplt" WJ,$ \\'eig,hlt.~d to .lCljll~t
1,,1' Ill<' I'dll,~1 r,II'S and th" IInns Ihat \\','1'<' no longt·r in ,,!,,'ralion
or could 1I0t be fuund,
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than for private Ilrms, which is not ;;urpnsmg gi\,C'n that
social securitv is a gOH'rnment-mandated program.
Although foreign-owned companies are not signifkantly
more likely to enroll, mixed companies (in which ownership
is shared between domestic and fordgn owners) are 20
times more likely to enroll in social security than domestic
companies. It is possible that mixed companies, due to the
nature of their business, receive pressure to comply with
industry regulations, or that these types of firms have a
stronger compliance culture. Contrary to an ..rdotal
evidence, largt>r firms were not more ltkelv to be enrolled
when other factors are controlled for.
1I'llllr morir<lrcs emplovets ro enroll / nor enroll in social scruriry?
To better understand ernplovers ' decisions to enroll,
employers were asked to ratt> a number of possible reasons
for enrollmenl/ non-enrollment on a scale of 1 to S, with I
bt'ing not at all importailt and ; being \'ery important. Tht'
results, summarized in Table I, tell liS mort' about
employers' decision-making process. Among the insured,
the most important reasons for enrollment were: to ensure
employees an> C'O\'ered \lith health insurance; to increase
employee sa tisfaction; and to impro\'t' the health and well-
being of employees. The Bndings indicate that peopl., are
most concl,rtwd with the health insurancl' b"tH'fits within tIll'
sodal security ,('heme. Ilowe\,el', rt'tirenwnt henellts art'
also relatively important.
Among th(· non-enrolled cohort or tilt' sampl." tIlt' most
imp0l1ant reason for non-rnrollm!'nt was that the
company's bt'twt1t package is superior to social security
(thest' statenwnts are cOtltradictcd by Ilndings on bcndlts
actually pro\'idt'd hy non-t'tlrolled firms-sl't' h"lo\\,).
Other important reasons for not enrolling were: emplo)','rs'
lack of knowlt'dgt' of sodal s..nltity, til .. poor quality of
government hospitals, and the fact that employees do not
ust" hent'll Is or do not gt"t sick.
Experiences with .sori(JI wcurity
Tht' majority of r!'spond,'nts (69%) statl,d that social security
has had a positi\'e effeC't on employe!' well-being and
satisfaction (Figure 1). Iiowewr, most feel that tIll' selwml'
has had no cIT,'ct on the ahility to retain stalT or recruit stalT
mfmbers. Employers explained that most job-seekers
mainly considt'r salary when ('onsid!'ring a nt'w job, and an'
It'ss mnct'rn ..d \\'ith henel1ts. Although ;4% of SSO-t'nrolled
('mplo)'C'rs said that the impact on overall husin('ss has b"Ptl
posit i\'t', almnst half said t l1<'re has heen no t'ITt'ct.
Table I .. lIost iRlptJrrll/lf r~"s,msJ"'r cntollmcm / non-enrollment
Reasons for enrollment Rating (1-5)
To ton ure emptoyee NVt- health ('lIff'
C'Ovt-rllg"
To inrr~.lS~ '''mploy(''f' !Wltisf.u1ion
To improve health and w.. II-b ..ing of
l'D1I'loyN'S
To ensure employees have r("tirpllu'nt benr-Ilts
Stl'Ong J>l'f'1S1Il'f' from Int ..mlltlonal bodies
Strong prt> •• ure from SSO
trong 1'l't"tlSlI re (rom ..ntploy,,1'11
Strong pressllr(' from membership
urg."112~tiun
4.28
4.11
..08
4.00
3.05
2.74
2.72
2.71
RC-allons for non-c-nl'Olimc-nt Rating ( I oS)
Company b ..u"fit. aN' better th .. l SSO benefits
Do not know much about 50dal • .-curity
Quality of govermuent hospitals not good
Do not u... ht'alth ca .... brn ..fit8/ltafT do not
g.-t sick
EmIJloy"('s do not \V.lnt SSO
Cost ofSSO is too high
no 110t trllst that 111011"),is us"tI \\'l·1I
High tumO"fOr among employfO"S
Many tt'mporary t'mplo),t'<'s
EmI))oyC't'1lut-frr to pUN'ballt' pri"atr
iD8UranCT
4.11
U2
l.22
3.22
3.12
2.97
2.Rl
2.57
2.38
2.3S
Figure Z. Imr"" '!FS"fJ<l1 S~(UrJr,r ,In BuslMSS
1000•
60"0
.j.()O·o
2000
0"0
oll1ploy"(' ",dl·
bC'in2,1Iul
!Mtbl~lion
.Ihilit\" to rt't.lin or
r~ruh st.dT
• Posit;", ell'oct
11'11", "re th,' >lrcnHths .mJ II'cllkm'sses 4th,' sc~Jlll sf((lrJty s,h,·m,·?
Employt'rs who art' currently ('nrolkd in sodal s"curily
w<,rl' asked to C'omnll'nt on thl' strl'ngth, and \\'l'aknl',"'" of
Ihl' sehen,... TIll' thn'" most common rt'spun,," an'
descrilll'd h<'lol\'.
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Srrenerhs
• Socia! sa urity reduces (mrl,~rcrs' expenditures on b..n..llts
for which the company would otherwise pay,
• Sociul se<"uri~r provide: cc'nreniena and ,'ost-surinss to
employees, because employees can use cards for hospital
care, rather than paying cash,
• Beine "nroJ/eu in social security improres employee well-
heins, Employers report that SSO gin's employees a
sense of "security", "warm feelings". "trust", and
"confidence",
lI'euknesses
• Emr"~rcrs tlo nor I'ercdrr the scheme to be '?f S""J r"/ue,
either b ..caus<' stall' do not use benefits (in particular
health services) or because contributions <'xcef"d the
benefits used,
• Q}1iJli~r '?f ,'iJre iJt h,'spitiJls is roor, according to SSO
mf'mbers - and perc{'i\'ed to be worst' for sodal
security mf"mber (e,g, longer waiting timf's), One
respondent mentioned that because or the long waiting
times and poor quality"" ,members somdimes h.tl'e 10 So
to rhe {'rirute ..IinicJIf Cfe"tmenr."
• Communiwtion ~1' 550 r<'SurJins ben~flr srrudure un.! the
rr'''"''Jurt's ,tsS"cj..,r,·J lI,ith the s,h,'nw is roor, Mrmbers
reportedly have very little contact with SSO stall' and
therC'foTl' no opportunit), to learn marC' about SHI.
Is rhe b~n.jlr ruck'tH" <1jcreJ hy non-member firms wmp'tn.rble I<J
",d..,1 security ben:filS?
Many non-member firms Tl>ported that the reason for not
enrolling in social s,'curity is that thry pref"r to oner their
own benefits, Howe\'er, the study findings show that the
non-enrolled firms alTer far frw~r b.-nrnts to thrir
emplo~·t,(,s th,m do SSO nwmbel' IIrms (SC'I' Figure' ~). For
rxampie. \'ery few non-~nrolled employers olkr hC'alth arC'
benefits: only one quarter of non-SSO IIrnl> make direct
payments for C'mpioyC'es' health can" whik naill' han'
pri,'ate insurance. In contrast. some SSO nwmb("r firms
ufTer <'xtra insurance' for programs that art' aln'ady indudt'd
in thl' sodal securit)' package (e,g, private health insurance,
matl'rnity be'lwllts, ('O,'erag<' for injuries, and sick leaH'),
\Vith rt'sp<'l1 to tt'mporary employe<,s, wry It-w in <,ill",r
group rC'cch'C' any brm'fit" HQ\\'C'\'C'r, i 5% of SSO tlnn do
t"xtend social security and pay annual l<,a\'1' to t1wir
«'mporary C'mployccs.
Figurc ), Ben~flts 1Jer.·J le' 5 0 iJnJ n,IO-550 l'mrl,~r,"'s
;:.
.@ ~ ~ ~' ; ~ .., ::: ~.~ l l ] '0 .s l 1:2
~
;:
-=~ - ~. '" 1 " - '" "31 E 1 -;; ~ ,~'e I ~~ " ~ "3 -= "F ~ , ~ ~ e ;;;< J % ~'l [ s :~ .. :J. ["7. a, a, :l:e ~ c _""- r- ~ .5 "-" ~ ~~C
Pt:·nn.lIWIII eillplo~'l't'~ Tempor,wyemployces
Arc memf,er .firms emrlt~l'jn8 Slrl.llcHiI.·s It. en.lJ4? s()<:hI! S4;'( uritr
,'on! rihul ions?
Ont' of the C'hallt'nges of implementing and enforcing
mandaton' insurance is ("'asian of contributions. For
example, publi ht'd articll's on international experit'n ('s
with social securit)' describ<' ways in which many enterpriSl"
evade sodal security pa~"ll'nts (e.g. by underreporting till'
numbC'r of permanent (>mploye<'s, redassif~'ing joh
descriptions, underrt'porting t'arnings, and failing 10 remit
employe .. contributions).
III Lao POR, (','asian is IikC'!y to be minimal, gh'C'n that
p('nahiC's are not yet I'nact<'d for non-C'omplianCl" This is
largC'ly ('ontlm1C'd by rhl' study, Controlling for othl'r
factors, SSO fiflns are no marC' likely to I'mploy t<'mporary
workC'rs than non-SSO memb,'r tlrms. Th,·I'l' is hO\\,<'\'('r
some indication that SOIllI' firm, gin' "mplo~'l't,s tilt' option
to <'111'011 in sodal s('curit ~'. p"rhaps to amid ,oeial Sl'l'urit)'
payment~. TIll' study compared data on the numlwr of
p('rmanent workers in till' mmpan\' with till' numb('r nr
C'mploy<'es C'nrolled in sod.ll Sl'C1.lrit~' for tht' salll" tinw
period, The findings, pr""'nted in Figure 4, shnw that ++0"
of member tlrms ..nrolkd less than 100% of til<' p<'rnun<'nt
workforcC' in thl' sdll'nll', In fact, 94% or emplo)'<'rs with
sodal Sl'C'Urity bC'nefits openly admillt'd to gidng ('mployl"'s
the option to enroll. AllOWing opt outs c.ltl It'ad to "adn'nl'
sd~Clion". the ph~nomenon whert'by younger and heahhkr
indiViduals leavC' the sdwllll' and higlwr ri>k indh'idual.
rl'main in til<' schl'ml', Adn'rM' sl'kction can dri\'(' III' till'
awragl' rost of Ill'alth carc, ultimatC'ly I'hrcalt'ning
sustainabilit~· and l'ITt'ctin·tll'ss of risk-pooling.
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Lookintljorward: Ch(JIIenues and Opportunities
Tltis stud), brings to light a greater understanding of
employers' al1it"udes toward social security, Althouoh ~hl"rt,
are Ii~itations to the study, the result~ are hd~ful for
understanding perspectives of the pri\'ate sector - a group
that is not usually engagl"d in health sector reform
discussions,
A number of points t'merge from the study and backgrow1d
analysis that will be impol'tant to consider in ongOing elTorts
to strt'ngtht'n t hp selwm,' 311dt'xpand ceJ,'erage,
• Impr<>re ull"uren<?ss-r<lisins <lnJ pnlllwrion uClil'ilie,".
Awareness-raising actil'itil"S and face-to-face mt'etings
\\'ith (,tnployers could help expand enrollmt'nt,
Howen'r, n('1\' approaches will b(' required to reach
smaller nnns with less formal slnKturt's, The stud,' also
highlights Ihe nt'E:'d for improved and more r;oular
communication between SSO and employers, I:-
Pruma,<? imp,."r~m<'n[ in '1ulI}iry '!f h,'"Jrh sari«'s, Poor
quality of care in gOl'ernlllt'nt hospitals is a major rea~on
that t'mployer, do not enroll in .'odal s('cllrity, Although
quality improvement is a mmplex issue re<Juiring
multifaceted interventions, then' is nonetheles~
potential for the SSO to influence St'n'iCt' dt'lil'l'ry by
u.ing its purchaSing po\\'l'r to encourage better quality
care,
,I/"k~ Ih~ sud,Ii S~CUri~I' pu,k.,oe, <ISu Irh"k mM" uClrudire,
Although SHI is the largest and most important benenl
within the social security packa"e enrollment in SHI is
also ~ink..~ to the bro~d('r pa~k~ge or sodal security
hl'neltts, III particular rt'tirt'mt'nt ppnsions, Hast'd on
l'xperien e from othl'r countries (l',g. il'tnam), it is
important to ensun' that these bt'nefits are suflkientll'
attractil'l" to hdp stimul.lIe enrollment, I
•
•
SrrenSlhm -i-»: unt! inlrot!Ule }es'si.lli(ln "' mf<.r,e
entullment. The scheme is t'ffl'l1i1' .. lv voluntar~' at
present, as the SSO does not han' till' p~1I' r to penalize
non-compliant Ilrrns. Both capacity and a l"gis!Jtin'
framework art' needed to address this challenge. Beyond
enforcement, capacity also needs to be strel;gth"n~d in
other areas, such as public relations, health care
purchasing, and so forth,
• Expand lurg"r 8',.up, As rhe 'SO looks to increase
con'rage of social security in the future, there an'
several possible l'OUIt'~ it could consider. Th,'~e include:
1) expansion within the current target group; 2)
expansion to new geographic areas: 3) expansion to
smaller enterprist's; and +) expansion of the target
group beyond th« narrow group or tax-p,'ying flnr».
Llnfortunately, each of these routes is associated with
signifkalll l'hallt'ngs;., EI't'Il if compliance among the
current target population incrt'"st'S to SOO'o of
benelkiaries, cOl'eragl' would r(,Ill"in wry lo\\' at a
pOpul31ion le,'pl ht'CJUSl' lilt' siZt' of Ihe larg,·t
population b already "t'ry small, ht'n .'xpanding ;he
target group to "hard-to-reach" groups (e,g, firms with
less than 10 employees, firms without J tax
idl'l1tilkation numb"r, firms not paying any tax), is
Iik('ly to h,1\'(' a lirnitt'd impact on ('O\'('rag(' ,1S the
smaller i1nns do nOI add .ubstantially mon' ,'mplo)'t't's,
Mor<,owr, nllnpliann' for less formal flrms will I,..
difllcult to enforce,
•
• Iml'T<"'" (UX reOi>lr,1I i,m, One way to facilitate
enforceml'nt would bt' to bring more finn, into the
formal tax systl'm--l',g, hy linking lax and husim'ss
r<'gist r3tion pro ("sS<,S,
• Crmso}idu(,' "t!minislr<lli<>n rl) mhul1'~ <1dminislr,lIil'e
.jJidemy, In the long run it Ill,'), be more .. Ilkit'nt to
colll'c\ and ,'nforn' SHI premiums and otlwr
contributions through a sing.!" agt'llcy (t',g, tht' tax
orfice, Ministry of Finam't'), rath ..r than through tilt'
SSO, This approach has been used ill t\rgt'ntina and is
expected to facilitall' complimlCe because t'mploYt'rs
and workers need to make pa)1"ents only 10 a single
agen('~' rather l-han to multiple agenci ..slll HO\\'j?"er, till'
advantages and disad,'anlag"s of c mbining ('ollt'ct ion in
Lao PDR would haw to Iw analyzed furtlwr,
But whilt' tht's(' llpt'ralional dlanges can 'Irt'ngtlwn Sill and
expand enrollment among the target population, other
chall,>ngt'~ may 11(' more diOku!t to OI'('rCOnlt', Firsl, thU't'
are high costs to stronger ,'nlor ('ml'llt, a~ ollkt's will IWt,d
to bt' t'stablisht:'d throughout thl' ('ountrY (ClIITl'nth' onlv ont'
national ofl1n' and <t11'0 provincial' olll,'t's :xi>t)' and
infrastructure and I,'gisl"tion ft~<Juirl'd for l'nfol'cemt'nt 11'111
need 10 bl' c1evelop,'d, The rosts would Iik"ly il1<Tl'as,·
considerahly on('(' ,mallpr and It'ss 1'01"11131 BrillS ar;' largl't('d.
Furthermore, strickI' enforcenwnt c.1I1 in !'t'aSl' in<',:ntil'''s
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for Ilrms to remain in, 01' join, the informal sector or for
firm HI evade social security payments - both of which
would signifkantly reduce revenues to the SSO,
Although the soctal security system can play an important
social insurance role for the small but growing formal
sector, it is unlikely to he a vehlde for imprO\ing ace..ss io
health services and reducing health-related financial risk on a
broad basis, or for gener.,. ing subsrcntia! revenues lor the
health sector. To 'a('hi<."'(> 'thebe goals, complementary
approaches will be needed. It may be possible to build upon
other health protection scheme: including community-
based health insurance and health rquit)" funds, Currently,
the dillerem health protection schemes are highly
rragmented. Howe"t'r, the n('w health financing ~tratl'gy
ell\'isages that the schemes will be Ilwrgt'd o"",r lhe next few
years, This would bl' "n important step towards impron'd
coordini'ltiol1 and ft'duced administrativt' costs, Intt'gralion
under ont' organiz.11ion ('Quid also increase purchasing 'power
~nd facilitate better supen'ision of quallt)', NOI1l'thdess.
gin'n tht' current lo\\' coverage ratt's it is unlikely that imply
merging tlU' S<'hemt's \\;11 help to inc'reast' enrollment raws,
To address til<' challl'l1g .. of low n)"l'!'agl, substanual
gowl'Ilm('tlt (or donor) Ilnan Ing will hl' n'qull' 'd.
Currently, gowl'Ilmml bpending nil IWQhh in I JO I'OR b
wry low by inrernatlonal randards, hut it i~ ('''p'' ted th.lt
opportunit-ies to g('n~rat(' gm'ernnwnt revenue will il1nN~1'
in coming rl'3rS due to growing natural resource revenue
and improved lax admlnistratlon. And If th., !(OWrnml nt
commits to using these 1'1',,!nUI', to in rease ~pending on
health, these funds could be used tu dtlwr subsirllze lu..rlth
lnsurance ('OH'ragt' din'l'Il), or incrcasv fllnclin!/. to health
care providers (potentially based on mea ures of
performance) and reduce th h.lrgl's for patients. Both
options ...10 rontrlbutc 10 improved al'ce., and llnandal
protcctlon, and both ha".' ad\'alltag~~ allrl disad"nnt3gt'~' In
de\t'loping Ol nt'\\' Ilt'alth fin:mdng ~tr.lh'ro', i! willi,.. (Tilkal
to bast' plans lor tht, lutul'l' on a rNli,tic 3"t'S,m~'J1t uf" hal
('an be ol'hh'wd !hrough ('Urn'IlI health protl'l'1ion 'I'h"m,'"
and to bt' dear on tht' gm ..nmwnt t'Kp('ll(liturt'
('Ommin11t'nh that are net'd ...d t('l ac:hi \'e lI.alth .eMur
ohjel'tl\l' ,
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